Appraisals are direct, immediate, intuitive, and unwitting…and some are reflective…

Abstract

In 1960, Magda Arnold defined the appraisal construct as being causal to emotion. Appraisal, according to her, refers to a direct, immediate, and intuitive process that does not initially require recognition of the object that is being appraised. It is based on phylogenetically ancient subcortical brain structures. In addition, Arnold proposed the existence of a related conscious process, also referred to as appraisal, that interacts with the direct appraisal and is responsible for a differentiation of emotional states. This theory was revolutionary and is still to be considered modern because it already comprised much of what is currently hypothesised to be causal for emotion. However, Lazarus, who initially believed that conscious aspects of appraisal are more important than implicit and unaware appraisals, coined the term cognitive appraisals and popularised this notion widely. In opposition to what he perceived as a prevailing emphasis on higher cognitive processes in emotion theory, Zajonc (1980) argued that emotion elicitation does not depend on conscious cognition. I argue that Arnold's theory is in fact completely consistent with Zajonc's view and data. The concept of appraisal should be discussed in relation to Arnold's original intention, because it provides not only the basis of an integrated view of multiple levels of emotional processing, encompassing views espoused by Zajonc and by Lazarus, but may guide current and future research on multiple levels of processing in the elicitation of emotions.

Acknowledgments

Particular thanks are due to Rainer Reisenzein for focusing my arguments in this paper, as well as all others, anonymous or not, who have reviewed or commented on previous drafts.

Notes

¹I am referring to the fact that the five arguments Cannon outlined are now either considered irrelevant or as not consistent with current data (see summary in Cornelius, 1996). Thus, the intended discrediting of James–Lange was thwarted. For example, Cannon claimed that arousal was not emotion-specific, but instead unspecific. Hence, he argued that arousal could not serve as the source for a differentiated subjective state. Since then, the notion of unspecific arousal, still popular in social psychology as a central construct of classical theories, has been shown not to be tenable (e.g., Cacioppo, Berntson, & Crites, 1996). Interestingly, Arnold's early research (e.g., 1945) was targeted at demonstrating that Cannon was wrong in postulating that different emotional states were accompanied only by unspecific arousal.

²As of June 2005 there were over 1700 citations for Zajonc (1980) in the ISI Web of Science database!

³Unfortunately, this might sound rather like discussing a group of conspirators, but it is important, at times, to differentiate between research programs that are aimed at elucidating basic emotional processes and those that are more applied and use a particular theoretical framework to answer questions in areas such as clinical psychology or development (see also Kappas, 2002).

⁴There is no systematic/empirical study of the effect of Zajonc's (1980) publication or the Zajonc–Lazarus debate on beliefs regarding modern appraisal theory. Schorr (2001) argued that the debate, “had a strong consciousness-raising effect as to the role of cognition in emotion and thus indirectly prepared a more favorable climate toward appraisal theories” (p. 27). However, it appears to me that the effect has rather been polarising in that it stimulated appraisal theorists to be more specific and perhaps more procedural in their definitions—which is good, but led to scepticism towards appraisal theory outside of that community—which is undeserved.

⁵Lazarus discusses possibly the first use of the term “appraisal” in the context of emotion elicitation in a publication by Grinker and Spiegel (1945; in Lazarus, 2001, pp. 38–39).

⁶Thanks to Rainer Reisenzein for pointing out this quote—“In nature, of course, cognitive or situational factors trigger physiological processes, and the triggering stimulus usually imposes the label we attach to our feelings” (Nisbett & Schachter, 1966, p. 228).

⁷Interestingly, Arnold clearly anticipated the currently popular distinction between a “high road” vs. “low road” to emotions made popular by LeDoux (1996; see Arnold 1960b, Chapter 2). Thanks to Rainer Reisenzein for pointing out that Cannon and Bard entertained such notions already and most likely inspired Arnold who dealt extensively with Cannon in her dissertation.

⁸Ellsworth and Scherer (2003) wonder whether the emphasis on appraisal theories as “cognitive” goes back to the 1980s as a response to the Zajonc article on the one hand, and on the other, as a way to differentiate appraisal theories from Jamesian bodily/facial feedback theories. However, the move towards the “c-word” clearly can be traced back to Lazarus himself, as he also acknowledges in this quote.

⁹At least Scherer (2004) mentions Arnold, together with Lazarus, as having pioneered appraisal theory.

¹⁰Her version of a “fear module” (Arnold, 1960b; see p. 188) requires the involvement of subcortical structures, such as the hippocampus.

¹¹The demand for systematic manipulation of appraisals and multiple types of responses cannot realistically imply that each and every study has to include these features, but that any research program considers these demands.

¹²Note however, that Panksepp's (1998) use of appraisal is not identical to Arnold's intention.