Affective distinctiveness: Illusory or real?

Abstract

The contributions to this special issue illustrate the value of cognitive methods and theory in the study of affect. Together, this work makes a compelling case that it is time to move beyond the question of whether human affect and cognition represent completely independent constructs, and that there is much yet to be gleaned about affect from the perspective of cognitive science. Evidence that aspects of affect can be conceived as cognition leaves open the question of whether all aspects of affect are a special case of cognition. We pose a series of questions about whether all aspects of affect can be subsumed within cognition; and if not what the fundamental distinctions might be between affect and cognition, where and on what basis the line might be drawn between affect and cognition, what is the nature of the interactions between affect and cognition, and how are these processes implemented in the human nervous system.

Acknowledgements

Preparation of this paper was supported by NIMH Grant No. P50 MH72850.