Emotion and persuasion: Cognitive and meta-cognitive processes impact attitudes

Abstract

This article addresses the multiple ways in which emotions can influence attitudes and persuasion via primary and secondary (meta-) cognition. Using the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion as a guide, we review evidence for five fundamental processes that occur at different points along the elaboration continuum. When the extent of thinking is constrained to be low, emotions influence attitudes by relatively simple processes that lead them to change in a manner consistent with the valence of the emotion. When thinking is constrained to be high, emotions can serve as arguments in favour of a proposal if they are relevant to the merits of the advocacy or they can bias thinking if the emotion precedes the message. If thinking is high and emotions become salient after thinking, they can lead people to rely or not rely on the thoughts generated either because the emotion leads people to like or dislike their thoughts (affective validation) or feel more confident or doubtful in their thoughts (cognitive validation). When thinking is unconstrained, emotions influence the extent of thinking about the persuasive communication. Although prior theories have addressed one or more of these fundamental processes, no other approach has integrated them into one framework.

Keywords:

• Attitudes
• Persuasion
• Elaboration likelihood model

Based on the 2012 Cognition and Emotion Keynote Lecture presented by the first author at the annual emotions pre-conference to the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Meeting, San Diego, CA, USA.

Based on the 2012 Cognition and Emotion Keynote Lecture presented by the first author at the annual emotions pre-conference to the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Meeting, San Diego, CA, USA.

Notes

¹ Thought usage refers to people relying on their thoughts in forming judgements. When thoughts are used, the extent of positive and negative thoughts generated should be more predictive of the attitudes formed than when thoughts are not used (Petty et al., 2002).

² It is also possible that fear could bias perception of the severity of the consequences proposed in the message such as making the threats seem more likely or undesirable (Petty & Wegener, 1991). This biasing impact of emotions is discussed in the next section.

³ Emotions can also influence other aspects of thinking such as when positive emotions make thoughts more creative and flexible (Isen, 1999) or induce a global rather than a local focus (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2004). We have emphasised the dimensions most relevant for understanding persuasion.

⁴ Consistent with the idea that sadness is associated with more effortful processing than happiness when receiving persuasive messages, Bohner and Schwarz (1993) showed that sadness (versus happiness) is also associated with more effort in the generation of persuasive arguments to convince others.

⁵ In accord with prior use in the literature on attitudes and persuasion (Petty et al., 2007; Rucker, Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2014), we consider the terms certainty and confidence as similar in meaning and will therefore use them interchangeably in this review.

⁶ If the unpleasant feeling from disgust is analysed as an argument, however, it would likely support more negative moral judgements but not more positive ones, or disgust could make moral infractions seem worse or more likely (see earlier section on emotions as arguments and as biasing cognition).

⁷ Some researchers treat the “feelings as information” view as focused solely on the “direct” impact of emotions on judgements (i.e., as a simple misattributional inference) and exclude the enhanced processing role (see Greifeneder et al., 2011).