Theories in cognition & emotion – social functions of emotion

ABSTRACT

It is widely recognised that emotions have important social functions, particularly with respect to the interaction between individual needs and preferences and socio-cultural norms and values. So far, however, a general theoretical framework has been missing for the social functions of emotion. In this issue of the special theory section of Cognition & Emotion, an invited article by Keltner et al. proposes an expanded version of social functionalist theory entitled “How emotions, relationships, and culture constitute each other”, which attempts to remedy this situation. Two invited commentaries, by Manstead and Von Scheve, welcome this attempt but enumerate issues in need of further elaboration, such as the interaction between relational needs and cultural norms, the necessity to consider situational context and cultural differences, and a more stringent specification of “functionality”. The remainder of the current introductory article briefly outlines some areas in need of attention from social emotion theories, such as the effect of social and technological change on the elicitation and regulation of emotions. Here, earlier work is cited that evokes the danger of a potential waning of shame and guilt feelings due to changing values, norms, and self-ideals (for example, the growing importance of self-related values such as freedom and the weakening of prosocial values such as the responsibility for the common good). Another problem is group polarisation leading to negative emotions such as hate and potential violence taken together, the contributions to this theory section highlight the importance of creating a comprehensive theoretical framework for studying the social functions of emotions.

KEYWORDS:

• Social functional theories
• cultural values and norms
• relational needs
• group polarisation

This is the second instalment of the new Theory Section in Cognition & Emotion (see Rothermund & Koole, 2020), which is to be a regular feature of the journal from now on. The overall goal is to encourage innovative and generative theoretical efforts that raise and address broad questions about the nature of emotion and its interface with cognition. Approaches that combine and coordinate diverse theoretical ideas, and thus facilitate cumulative growth in knowledge about the emotion process are particularly encouraged.

Following up on the two introductory articles in the last issue (Reisenzein, 2022, Scherer, 2022), we will now devote each issue of this special section to a topic of particular theoretical significance for emotion science. Besides dealing with some of the central theoretical debates in the field, we will focus on important but neglected theoretical approaches as well as on domains of emotion research that are of particular relevance to current affairs and that are in need of a theoretical framework to guide further research and application. Each of these instalments will consist of a brief introduction, one or two invited position papers, followed by one or more invited commentaries by experts in the area. We will also attempt to further the crosstalk between scientific disciplines that is a hallmark of emotion science.

In the current Theory Section, we focus on the social, relational aspects of emotion. Arguably, this is a somewhat neglected area from the point of theoretical preoccupation. Interpersonal and social phenomena are obviously part and parcel of many areas of emotion research such as emotion communication through verbal and nonverbal expression, social sharing of emotion, empathy and compassion, interpersonal attraction and relationships, group conflict, effects of power and status, social rituals and cultural activities, to name but a few examples. What has been missing however is a comprehensive theoretical framework that systematically embraces the various factors that interact in eliciting and regulating emotions in a socio-cultural context.

A quick search for “social theories of emotion” in Google Scholar yields less than a hundred entries as compared to several hundred for discrete or basic emotion theories, appraisal theories, constructionist theories or cognitive theories of emotion. Though admittedly circumstantial, this search result is consistent with the idea that this may be a somewhat neglected area of theorising on emotion.

An important exception is a chapter on “The social roles and functions of emotions” by Frijda & Mesquita in 1994 which can be considered as the start of a social functionalist approach to emotion theorising, insisting on the mutual influences between emotion, society, and culture. This approach has now come of age as demonstrated by this issue's invited article by Dacher Keltner, Disa Sauter, Jessica L Tracy, Everett Wetchler, and Alan S Cowen, entitled “How Emotions, Relationships, and Culture Constitute Each Other: Advances in Social Functionalist Theory”. The authors posit that several classes of emotion can be understood as being generated by six “relational needs” that respond to major challenges in social life, requiring different ways of relating to others. The corresponding emotions guide relational action, structure social interaction, and generate cultural representation. Besides theoretically systematising and structuring these social functions of emotions, the authors provide a very extensive review of empirical studies that support the theoretical framework.

The article is followed by two invited commentaries. The social psychologist Antony Manstead, one of the early proponents of social functionalism (Manstead, 1991), appreciates the extension of the theoretical framework but emphasises the need to further elaborate the reciprocity of the interaction between relational needs and cultural norms on individual emotions. The sociologist Christian von Scheve, who argues for an interdisciplinary approach to study emotion and social structures (Von Scheve & Von Luede, 2005), also welcomes the approach but underlines the need to consider situational context and cultural differences as well as to relativise the notion of functionality.

There are many reasons to believe that further theoretical development and consequent research on the socio-cultural anchoring of emotions is urgently needed. One frequently neglected aspect is that social and technological change may profoundly affect the experience of emotions (Scherer, 2001, pp. 134–136). For example, changing values, norms, and self-ideals should have a strong impact on the experience of shame and guilt. It may well be that normative constraints, at least in many Western societies with a high standard of living, are weakening and values are losing their control functions. The symptoms that are often evoked include the apparent increases in undesirable or immoral behaviours as well as rule violations that are not directly sanctioned. Whereas in the past one would not have done certain things because of being afraid of feeling shame and guilt, one now engages in such behaviours if there is no fear of punishment. The tell-tale signs invoked in much of current social criticism, to name but a few, are increases in vandalism, sexual permissiveness, petty crime, economic crime, bad manners, and violence. If this analysis is correct, one could assume that the increasing de-emphasis of prosocial values and self-ideals will diminish the incidence of shame and guilt in modern society. One consequence is the weakening of internalised control mechanisms, developed in the socialisation process, such as shaming. The latter may lose their effectiveness and often only provoke derision or even aggression in their target.

Another example is the increase in social polarisation. One particularly salient recent manifestation are the violent protests by vaccination opponents in the current COVID crisis, often fired by conspiracy theories. A recent survey in 8 countries showed that greater exposure to traditional media (television, radio, newspapers) is associated with lower conspiracy and misinformation beliefs, while exposure to politicians and digital media and personal contacts are associated with greater conspiracy and misinformation beliefs (De Coninck et al., 2021; see also some interesting ideas on social media and polarisation by Haidt, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/05/social-media-democracy-trust-babel/629369/). Continuing social and technological change, particularly in communication patterns, is likely to have a strong impact on emotional experience. One consequence is the increase in social media hate messages directed at individuals and groups, threatening victims’ psychological and physical well-being (Walther, 2022). Thus, the frequency and significance of hate, until recently a somewhat neglected emotion, is likely to increase.

Addressing this issue, Fischer et al. (2018) have proposed a social functional perspective on hate, arguing that it is based on perceptions of a stable, negative disposition of persons or groups, which is especially significant at the intergroup level, where it turns already devalued groups into victims of hate. They argue that hate can be reassuring and self-protective. It seems interesting to revisit the classic theories on in-group/out-group phenomena (Scheepers et al., 2006) in terms of their effect on the elicitation and regulation of emotion. This aspect of emotional polarisation may also provide cues to understand the growth of political extremism.

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