Learned helplessness revisited: biased evaluation of goals and action potential are major risk factors for emotional disturbance

ABSTRACT

The present theory section deals with learned helplessness produced by pervasive experiences of failure or negative events, leading to decreased motivation and risk for depression. In their target article, Boddez, van Dessel, and de Houwer apply this concept to different forms of psychological suffering and propose a goal-directed mechanism –generalisation over similar goals. Duda and Joormann define goal similarity by action-outcome contingencies and highlight individual differences in attribution styles. Brandstätter proposes incentive classes as the organising principle for goal similarity and explores outcomes such as deterioration of cognitive ability. Mikulincer and Lifshin focus on differences between goals and introduce the notion of motivated helplessness, serving as an anxiety buffer in uncontrollable life settings. Finally, potential contributions from emotion science are outlined, in particular individual differences and biases in appraising goals and coping potential likely to produce negative emotion dispositions. In conclusion, the need to elaborate a more comprehensive theoretical framework for helplessness that can guide empirical studies using multifactorial and longitudinal designs is emphasised. Given the strong increase in the prevalence of anxiety and depression worldwide, better understanding of predispositions and eliciting factors is needed for early diagnosis and the development of intervention programmes to reduce psychological suffering.

KEYWORDS:

• Learned helplessness
• goal directedness
• depression
• causal attribution
• action potential

When people encounter pervasive or recurring experiences of failure or other negative events, they often experience a stressful feeling of helplessness and loss of control that may engender a lack of motivation and effort in goal pursuit and even lead to emotion disorders such as depression or generalised anxiety. A major theoretical orientation in this domain has been labelled “learned helplessness” by Seligman and Maier (1967), based on an operant learning experiment with dogs experiencing inescapable electric shocks. After more than half a century, and many critical assessments and reformulations, learned helplessness is still alive and kicking – in motivation science as well as in many applied areas, in clinical psychology and psychiatry but also in educational and organisational psychology. Despite this long history of theoretical effort and empirical research, a comprehensive theoretical framework for the causal factors and the mechanisms involved is still missing. For example, the important role of the emotions generated by the feeling of helplessness has not yet been elucidated. Similarly, the nature of the goals a person fails to achieve remains to be further examined. The current theory section is devoted to these concerns, with an emphasis on recent theorising on goal-directedness in motivation science.

In their invited target article, Yannik Boddez, Pieter van Dessel, and Jan de Houwer (this issue), while acknowledging the profound influence of the learned helplessness concept in the domain of depression-related disorders, propose to extend this perspective to serve as an explanatory framework for other forms of psychological suffering such as attachment problems, burn-out, and complaints of fatigue. To facilitate this generalisation of the underlying principle of prior exposure to uncontrollable negative events, the authors propose to conceptualise learned helplessness as persistent lack of reinforcement, both negative (avoidance) or positive (approach). More importantly, Boddez et al. suggest combining the operant, stimulus-based level of explanation, based on the initial proposal by Seligman and Maier (1967; Seligman, 1975), with a goal-directed perspective on behaviour (Kuhl, 1981; Moors et al., 2017), focusing on the evaluation of events based on mental representations of goal structures. Specifically, they conceptualise learned helplessness as a dysregulation of goal-directed responding due to a failure to reach a goal: People stop trying, because (1) (former) goals lose value and / or (2) they no longer believe that further effort will result in attaining their goals.

To illustrate their learned helplessness approach, Boddez et al. (this issue) elaborate three types of psychological suffering – attachment problems in adulthood due to unresponsive parents, burn-out due to lack of recognition of work achievements, and fatigue symptoms due to an inability to find help for the treatment of a chronic pain condition. The authors posit that learned helplessness resulting from experienced lack of reinforcement (or goal attainment) will generalise to other life domains due to the similarity of discriminative stimuli but, even more importantly, due to the similarity among goal stimuli belonging to the same category, sharing similar features. Because goals tend to be hierarchically organised, the effect may spread widely over different types of goals. Boddez et al. then relate their learned helplessness framework to alternative approaches, such as attachment and depletion theories. Based on the theoretical framework proposed, they indicate potential interventions to treat different forms of psychological suffering: (1) reducing the similarity between the failed goal and other goals, and (2) relying on (generalisation from) a success experience to counter the generalisation from failure.

In their invited commentary, Jessica Duda and Jutta Joormann (this issue) express their general appreciation of the learned helplessness framework proposed by Boddez et al. but suggest that it may be the similarity in the action-outcome contingencies or the perceived controllability that accounts for generalisation (rather than the similarity of goals in terms of goal categories, e.g. work vs. leisure related goals). They also propose additional cognitive factors that have been shown to have reliable effects on learned helplessness. In particular, Duda and Joormann mention causal attribution styles (e.g. external vs. internal, stable vs. variable, general vs. specific causes), expectancies (e.g. pervasive anticipation of low self-efficacy and/or general pessimism), and memory biases (e.g. mood-congruent negative memory biases). Regarding the treatment options proposed by Boddez et al., Duda and Joormann suggest that these can be combined with existing techniques for cognitive restructuring to reduce fear generalisation. Overall, they highlight the urgent need for further research in this area to validate these approaches and to examine to what extent a goal-directed approach, focusing on appetitive contexts, can be generalised to aversive contexts (in which more automatic, stimulus-driven processes might dominate).

Next, Veronika Brandstätter (this issue) addresses three major issues in her invited commentary: (1) the distinction between motivational and functional helplessness, (2) the role of goal-related failure and its consequences, and (3) the issue of generalising failure experience due to the similarity of goals. She proposes that the explanatory concepts for learned helplessness can be expanded beyond the basic notion of expectancy-value theories, suggesting that uncontrollable failure to reach goals leads to lowered control beliefs and a devaluation of goal values. Specifically, Brandstätter adds the notion of a decrease in “functional efficiency” (as suggested by Kuhl, 1981), predicting a deterioration of cognitive functioning after persistent failure experiences (for example, due to rumination), which may lead to a decrement in goal performance. This approach has also been proposed by other researchers interested in the volitional aspects of goal pursuit and how these account for individual differences in reactions to repeated failure experiences.

In addition, Brandstätter briefly reviews a number of research traditions that have shown important individual differences in the reactions to goal failure, especially in relation to long-term goals. Thus, there is empirical evidence that in many cases failure experiences can actually increase goal pursuit efforts, at least for a certain time (Brunstein, 1993; Klinger, 1977). Brandstätter refers to some of the research by herself and her collaborators on what she calls an “action crisis”, the struggle between persistence and disengagement in the case of major difficulties in goal attainment (Brandstätter & Bernecker, 2022). Finally, Brandstätter takes up the notion of goal similarity as advanced by Boddez et al. She suggests that the central basis for learned helplessness effects spreading over different types of goal pursuits may be the similarity of the underlying motive or incentive classes, like achievement, affiliation, or power. Another potential mechanism is suggested by Linville’s (1987) affective spillover model, which predicts that low self-complexity (defined as having a low number of relevant self-definitions with high overlap in content) facilitates a spreading of (negative) affect from one domain to others (see also Rothermund & Meiniger, 2004).

In their commentary, Mario Mikulincer and Uri Lifshin (this issue) suggest that the notion of “similarity of goals” is a complex issue, given the difference between the nature of goals in different life domains, and that Boddez et al.’s attempt to elaborate a general model of learned helplessness might not result in a workable framework for future research. By contrast, Mikulincer and Lifshin propose that there are qualitatively different kinds of helplessness that require a more in-depth analysis. They feel that the complexities of human suffering and the motivational sources of feelings of helplessness require taking into account a larger scale of human concerns, including existential concerns, attachment, or management of death anxiety, and the respective affective and protective responses.

Mikulincer and Lifshin (this issue) formulate, and empirically examine, the concept of motivated helplessness. From this perspective, a sense of helplessness in coping with threats in a specific domain can – somewhat paradoxically – serve an anxiety-buffering function and protect people from experiencing fear, anxiety, guilt, or self-esteem injuries related to the specific threat or to their actions or inactions. In a series of studies, Mikulincer and Lifshin examined this hypothesis in the context of the current COVID crisis. They interpret the results of their own and similar studies as showing that an increase in motivated helplessness, feeling unable to have any impact on the development of the pandemic (for example, fatalism), will indeed reduce feelings of anxiety. The downside is, however, that this may also reduce the willingness to engage in protective behaviours. Mikulincer and Lifshin conclude that

Motivated helplessness may differ from learned helplessness in many ways. While motivated helplessness may protect us from experiencing negative emotions in a specific context and is associated with improved psychological wellbeing (e.g. Lifshin et al., 2020), learned helplessness is associated with depressive feelings and causes psychological suffering. (e.g. Mikulincer, 1994)

The emphasis on the difference between feelings of anxiety and depression in the contribution by Mikulincer and Lifshin brought to my attention that the central role of emotion is rarely touched upon as an independent factor in the discussion of the origin and effects of helplessness, both in the contributions in this theory section and in the helplessness literature in general. After all, depression and generalised anxiety are emotion disorders and it might be useful to consider what emotion science can contribute to this field. So, before closing, allow me to examine to what extent appraisal theories of emotion may provide useful contributions to the complex phenomenon of helplessness. Even though much of emotion research focuses on the immediate affective reaction to specific events happening to the individual at a certain point in time, the appraisal perspective can be applied to more enduring phenomena such as changes in world view, perception of preferences or goals as well as a series of failure experiences.

Appraisal theorists generally agree on the major categories of appraisal dimensions that contribute to the nature of the emotion elicited (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003, Table 29.1): Novelty, Valence, Goals/needs, Agency/Coping, and Norms/Values). These serve as the basis for detailed predictions for the profiles of appraisal outcomes that are expected to produce specific emotions (see chapters by Lazarus, Roseman, Scherer, Smith & Kirby, and Frijda & Zeelenberg, in Scherer et al., 2021). This approach can account for a large number of different emotional disorders (Roseman & Kaiser, 2001, Table 14.1). In particular, one can assume that there are individual and socio-cultural differences in the nature of the appraisal process, producing appraisal biases (e.g. persistent underestimation of one’s own control and power in dealing with adversity), which can lead to emotion dispositions (like frequent feelings of worry or despair). These, in turn, are predicted to contribute to the development of emotion disorders such as helplessness, hopelessness, depression and general anxiety disorders (Scherer & Brosch, 2009, Table 2). Recent large-scale international survey studies have confirmed predictions on (1) the existence of appraisal biases and emotion dispositions (Scherer, 2021) and (2) their effects on the risk for disorders such as depression and general anxiety symptomatology (Scherer et al., 2022).

The appraisal perspective is very much in line with the importance of individual difference factors mentioned in passing in the articles in this issue. For example, attributional (or explanatory) style has been advanced as a major cause of learned helplessness (Alloy et al., 1984; Joiner & Wagner, 1995; Peterson & Park, 1998), in some cases generalising to optimism vs. pessimism. The father of attribution theory, Bernard Weiner, has been quite critical of some of the assumptions (and simplifications) made in this area (Weiner, 1991; see also Miller & Norman, 1979). Partly based on earlier proposals, his own theory (Weiner, 1985) highlights the perception of causality (causal attribution) and posits three dimensions: stability (stable and unstable), locus of control (internal and external), and controllability (controllable or uncontrollable). The coping ability category in the appraisal dimensions mentioned above includes these factors, adding power and adjustment potential as additional criteria.

To my knowledge, there has been no attempt so far to systematically consider the causes of helplessness from an appraisal theory perspective. But, evidently, theories of learned helplessness, including the version proposed by Boddez et al. in this issue, implicitly assume an appraisal of repeated negative events (failure or other types of negative reinforcement with low controllability). However, emotions are likely to be different depending on a combination of the appraisal of locus of causation (internal – my fault – or external – someone else or fate are to blame) and locus of controllability (control is generally impossible vs. consequences could be controlled if one had enough power). In addition, a major factor is how easily a person can adjust to the negative consequences if they cannot be changed. In all of these cases, appraisal theorists would predict rather different emotions and it seems reasonable to assume that there may also be different types of helplessness. For example, in the case of Mikulincer and Lifshin’s (this issue) motivated helplessness, there are external causes (e.g. a contagious virus circulating) that the person cannot control but where an adjustment to the situation can still be envisaged. It might be promising to consider the possible combinations of appraisal outcomes on these different dimensions and their effects on different varieties of feeling helplessness. The consideration of different appraisal configurations may also help in the avowed aim of Boddez et al. to extend the explanatory principle behind the helplessness framework to other forms of psychological suffering such as attachment problems, burn-out and complaints of fatigue.

Boddez et al. (this issue) acknowledge the importance of individual differences in attribution or perceived control, suggesting that their approach may allow tracing the underlying developmental factors when people learn to treat certain goal stimuli as more or less similar. However, here we face the common chicken-or-egg problem: It seems also possible that a bias toward unrealistic appraisal makes people react in similar fashion to problems with similar goal pursuits. Experiencing a negative reinforcer would seem to always depend on an appraisal of the respective events in terms of expectancy, goal conduciveness, and coping potential. Appraisal is not limited to humans. The dogs that had been treated with escapable shock in the first phase of the original experiment by Seligman and Maier (1967), showed more energetic behaviour and many more successes in the trial-and-error phase than the group that had been exposed to inescapable shocks. One could argue that the dogs in the former group had learned to appraise (1) that expectancy was unstable and (2) that they disposed of means for coping. As to individual differences in appraisal tendencies, even in the group treated initially with inescapable shock, one-third did learn to escape, albeit after a larger number of trials. The reason for the success of those dogs might well have been the ability of adopting a more realistic appraisal over time.

The evidence reported in many of the studies cited in the contributions to this theory section strongly suggest that bias in the appraisal of low controllability of events and low coping ability is a major factor for the development of risk for depression and anxiety disorders. As outline above, I also suggest that there is a mediating factor – emotion dispositions for sadness and worry – which seem to be a direct consequence of a control/coping bias. Recurring bouts of experiencing these emotions may reinforce the risk for emotion disorder. Therefore, adding the assessment of individual differences in appraisal biases (or attribution styles) and emotion dispositions may be a useful addition to current theoretical frameworks for helplessness.

What could be the origin of individual differences in appraisal processing? Unfortunately, there is little focused research on this topic in the literature. A review article by Hankin et al. (2009) provides an overview of potential developmental origins of the main cognitive vulnerabilities, including dysfunctional attitudes, negative cognitive style, and rumination (all quite similar to the notion of appraisal biases), and explores the evidence for genetic factors, temperament, parents and peers as salient interpersonal influences, and stressful life events. The authors emphasise the need for additional conceptual and empirical work integrating these disparate processes together into a coherent, developmental psychopathological model of cognitive vulnerabilities to depression.

Overall, the contributions in this issue of the theory section raise the question of whether the concept of “learned” helplessness is still timely. After all, it is based on an operant learning experiment with dogs (Seligman & Maier, 1967). Early on, Martin Seligman, together with two co-authors, suggested a major reformulation of the underlying mechanism: “once people perceive noncontingency, they attribute their helplessness to a cause. This cause can be stable or unstable, global or specific, and internal or external”. (Abramson et al., 1978, p. 49). The contributions in this section show that recent theorising and evidence suggest complex interactions between the attributions, or more general the appraisals, of goal structure and action potential determined by the nature and causality of the event as well as personal control or coping potential. Of course, learning from experience is involved but so are many other factors including stable individual differences such as attribution styles and other appraisal biases. Thus, the feeling of helplessness is but one, albeit important, component in a process affecting emotional stability and increasing the risk for major emotion disorders.

In general, there is a pressing need for the domain of helplessness as a precursor of emotion disorders, requiring major research efforts using multifactorial approaches and longitudinal studies. Scientific evidence for the predisposition and elicitation factors involved is central to allow early diagnosis and the development of appropriate intervention programmes to prevent or at least reduce the psychological suffering from emotion disorders that can cause serious disability. Obtaining such evidence is becoming extremely urgent. In March 2022, the World Health Organization (WHO) published a wake-up call to all countries to step up mental health services and support, given that the COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a 25% increase in the prevalence of anxiety and depression worldwide (WHO, 2022). It would seem that an essential complement to this effort should be to also step up incentives and funding of theory-driven interdisciplinary and longitudinal research on the complex interactions of the etiological factors involved.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).