Emotion regulation via reappraisal – mechanisms and strategies

ABSTRACT

Emotion regulation, and in particular cognitive reappraisal. Gross has been booming in theory development and empirical research for the last two decades. A large number of publications have demonstrated the importance of these mechanisms for understanding and promoting well-being and mental health. It is thus timely for Cognition and Emotion to examine the current state of theory in this domain. The resultant invited article, authored by Uusberg, A., Ford, Uusberg, H., and Gross, aims to expand the scope of reappraisal theory by extending their recent reAppraisal model by suggesting different forms of goal commitment and situation construals. Their suggestions are commented on by Kashdan and Goodman from a purpose in life perspective, Ehring, and Woud from a clinical psychopathology perspective. In this editorial, I briefly discuss the lack of specification of the goal construct, which is central to the reappraisal model. Moreover, I point to recent evidence showing that problems may arise because of appraisal biases, in the case of individuals prone to inappropriate evaluations of situations. I suggest that future work in this domain could benefit from increased interaction between theorists and researchers working on appraisal and reappraisal processes.

KEYWORDS:

• Appraisal processes
• cognitive reappraisal
• goal pursuit
• mental representations

Emotion regulation has been one of the most active fields in emotion science over the past two decades, not least because of its important clinical implications (Gross, 2002, 2015; Lincoln et al., 2022). One of the most promising mechanisms identified in recent years is cognitive reappraisal of the respective situation (McRae et al., 2012). This is not surprising as it is now generally accepted that, in many cases, emotions come about through a process of appraising events and situations in terms of a number of dimensions such as their conduciveness to reach a goal, their likely causes, one’s power and ability to cope with potential consequences, and the urgency of action (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Being able to manipulate the initial outcome of this appraisal process by changing the evaluation of one or more appraisal criteria will change the resulting emotion, which can serve to avoid suffering from negative emotions. This theory section takes a closer look at the current theoretical framework for the reappraisal process.

In their invited paper, Uusberg et al. (this section) expand their theoretical framework, labelled reAppraisal (Uusberg et al, 2019), which suggests that appraisal shifts can be produced by either changing the mental construal of a situation (reconstrual) or by changing the goal(s) that determine the situation construal (repurposing). The authors propose to add two further types or strategies to the reappraisal activity, (1) to reduce commitment to the original goal (decommitment) vs. facilitating commitment to alternative goal(s) as well as (2) the distinguishing between targeting object-level construals of states in the environment vs. meta-level construals of different representations in the mind. These distinctions, combined in a 2 × 2 × 2 matrix, are illustrated by the authors with specific daily-life examples. This richer, more detailed theoretical framework is offered to guide future research on particular reappraisal strategies and their utility.

Kashdan & Goodman (this issue) comment on the expanded reappraisal framework from the established theoretical perspective of purpose in life as a major determinant of human well-being (King & Hicks, 2021; McKnight & Kashdan, 2009). After reviewing the empirical evidence on the positive effects of purpose in life for well-being and mental health, they argue for the benefits of an integration of the emotion regulation and sense of purpose frameworks. Using realistic examples, they discuss ways in which a sense of purpose approach can suggest different forms of successfully applying cognitive reappraisal strategies. Conversely, they discuss how different forms of cognitive reappraisal can serve to progress towards one’s purpose in life. The authors end by arguing for a greater appreciation of how self-regulation and a sense of purpose operate together in the human pursuit of a better life.

In their commentary, Ehring and Woud (this issue) examine how the expanded reAppraisal framework can be applied to the field of clinical psychology and psychological treatment. They critically examine reappraisal processes across the following dimensions: (1) type of processing (controlled, intentional vs. automatic, outside of awareness. (2) elicitation of the process and selection of strategies, (3) trait versus state aspects, (4) cognitive representation of goals and situation construals, (5) prerequisites – control capacities; motivational and situational factors, (6) dynamic interplay between the different appraisal strategies, (7) likelihood of success, both in the short-term and the long-term. The authors conclude that the reAppraisal framework can stimulate novel and fruitful perspectives for research on the role of reappraisal in psychopathology. Yet, Ehring and Woud conclude that the utility of the new framework will depend on the reliability of assessing individual differences and their degree of distinctness in individuals’ lives, their relevance for psychopathology, and the explanatory value for a mechanistic understanding of reappraisal. They underline that, ultimately, the utility of the framework depends on the nature and amount of empirical support found.

Clearly, the three-pronged theoretical proposal on reappraisal strategies suggested by Uusberg et al. (this issue) provides valuable perspectives for an integration of emotion regulation theories (as suggested by Kashdan & Goodman, this issue) and interesting vistas for novel directions in the treatment of psychopathology (as detailed by Ehring and Would, this issue). Given that an invited article can only offer a general overview of the suggested approach, future publications will need to clarify the details. I agree with Ehring and Would that this is particularly indicated for the distinction between “object- and meta-level representations” which raises a number of fundamental questions about the presumed mechanism underlying appraisal and reappraisal.

To these commentaries, I add some remarks of my own. One key concern I have is with the presumed nature of goals, which occupies a central place in the reAppraisal framework. Uusberg et al. (this issue) write: “The term goal is used here to cover different kinds of representations such as motives, norms, values, and identity that are involved in representing the states that the person seeks to approach or avoid”. This use of the term may be a bit too encompassing and could eventually lead to confusion. It is of course true that the word “goal” is used very frequently in the literature and is only rarely clearly defined. A Google search for “human goals” (to exclude football) yields approximately 1,340,000,000 results; a Google Scholar search finds 7,420,000 publications. Obviously, there are many shades of meaning here. In psychology, the definition of a goal as an internal representation of a desired state, where states are broadly construed as outcomes, events, or processes (Austin & Vancouver, 1996) is still likely to be shared by many scientists. Arguably, this does not include “norms, values, and identity” (which are, moreover, unlikely to be easily manipulable via reappraisal interventions).

Given the importance of the goal construct in current emotion science, it might be useful to update the current state of the theoretical and empirical status of human goals (e.g. goal setting, orientation, pursuit, etc.). Earlier attempts at updating can be found in a contributed volume on the psychology of goals by Moskowitz and Grant, (2009). Another interesting approach is the search for common definitions in the area of motivation–cognition interaction (Braver et al., 2014). Recently, Hommel (2022) argued that while the goal concept enjoys widespread popularity, its actual mechanics are still poorly understood. He proposes a radical break with conventional theorising about the control of goal-directed behaviour, proposing a new model “GOALs guide Intentional Actions THrough criteria (GOALIATH)”. This mechanistic theory posits that people have internal states that are actually guiding behaviour, allowing people to predict the outcomes of their actions beforehand, to immediately correct their actions if something went wrong, and to act differently under identical stimulus conditions (Hommel, 2022, p. 1073). The author briefly discusses the difference of his approach to perceptual control theory (Powers, 1973) and predictive coding theory (Parr & Friston, 2017), which also propose a comparator feedback approach. In contrast to these theories, which postulate a relative straightforward comparison between expected and actual outcomes of in terms of goal pursuit, Hommel argues that rather than assuming a single coherent “goal structure or process”, one needs to take into account that there are often multiple goals and that there often exists a patchwork of goal components that may be contradictory or in conflict with each other. Clearly, a “reappraisal” of the implicitly assumed goal construct in current theory and research is highly desirable.

Another issue that seems worthy of further consideration is the relative ease with which people may decommit or recommit to major goals in life (see Brandstätter & Bernecker, 2022). While it seems relatively easy to decommit from the goal of going to a party, it might be much more difficult to decommit from a career choice one has made early in life (“I always wanted to be a brilliant pianist”) or to (re)commit to goals that go against one’s moral conviction. This is particularly the case for goals that have developed jointly with purpose in life as part of personal identity (see Kashdan & Goodman, this issue; Lewis, 2020). Goals (as well as construals) are also likely to be strongly linked to value and belief systems (Converse, 1964; Schank & Abelson, 1977), which may vary across cultures (Scherer & Brosch, 2009, pp. 268–269). Further, goal pursuit seems to be related to personality. For instance, Grant and Dweck (1999) have suggested that goals can be used to predict and explain personality coherence, individual differences, and within-individual variation in a wide variety of domains. To cite but one source of evidence in the literature, McRae et al. (2017) have identified genetic and environmental influences on emotion reappraisal in a twin study. In sum, the choice of goal commitment strategies may need to take into account pertinent individual differences in goal function, structure and hierarchy.

Finally, while Uusbek et al. (this issue) acknowledge the role of the different components of the appraisal process (Moors et al., 2013; Scherer, 2009) for reappraisal theory, their three-pronged approach is mainly concerned with the nature of the respective goals. However, it is possible that, in many cases, problems arise because a person fails to appropriately appraise (or reappraise) an event. For example, the person may have unrealistic expectations, misjudge the relevance and/or conduciveness of the event for the goal(s) concerned, or underestimate his/her potential to control or cope with consequences. I have suggested the concept of appraisal bias for cases in which a person is regularly prone to inappropriate evaluations and predicted that this may lead to stable emotion dispositions (see Scherer, 2021, for details and empirical evidence). In the case of sadness or worry dispositions, this may even constitute a serious risk factor for depression or anxiety disorders (Scherer et al., 2022). The evidence points in particular to a central role of control beliefs, a persistent tendency to underestimate one’s control and coping potential.

The belief in one’s ability to exert control over the environment and to produce desired results is essential for an individual’s well-being. Leotti et al. (2010) review the literature supporting the claim that need for control is psychological and biological necessity and present evidence for a biological basis for the need for control and for choice. An appraisal bias of habitual underestimation of one's control and coping potential is thus in urgent need of treatment. It would be of great interest to develop reappraisal control strategies to be used in appropriate intervention programmes. This matter, as well as many others, might greatly benefit from more interaction between theorists and researchers in the domains of appraisal processes and those in the emotion regulation via reappraisal tradition – therefore, a major desideratum for the future is increasing the incentives and the means for such interdisciplinary activities.

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