Valuing Reputation and Prestige: Canadian Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court

Abstract

How do we explain the behavior of states when they appear to be engaged in normative international actions that carry some cost in terms of their material interests? This essay examines the relevance of reputation and prestige for Canadian foreign policy and, in particular, the role of these concepts in relation to Canada's leadership over the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It argues that Canadians and Canadian policymakers care about their country's international reputation and are motivated by the desire to gain prestige. Ottawa's decision to support enthusiastically the creation of an international criminal court demonstrates how the interaction of the Canadian self-identity as a good international citizen and the desire to be recognized as such translates into foreign policy.

Keywords:

• Canadian foreign policy
• International Criminal Court
• reputation
• prestige
• identity

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, John Purdy, and Kathy Reigstad for their comments. Thanks are also due to Lynn Rider for her review of a draft of this article.

Notes

1. Shenkar and Yuchtman-Yaar (1997, 1361–82).

2. Brewer, Gates, and Goldman (2002, 30).

3. Morgenthau (1985, 94).

4. Morgenthau (1985, 94).

5. For a discussion of the relationship between international prestige and sports competitions see: Allison and Monnington (2002, 106–34).

6. Matas (2008).

7. Axworthy (2003, 358).

8. O'Neill (1999, 196).

9. O'Neill (1999, 196).

10. The author is indebted to an external reviewer for this insight as well as for other points that helped the author clarify the two concepts central to the paper.

11. For critical scholarship on the Canadian identity see the chapters in Beier and Wylie (forthcoming) and Lackenbauer and Cooper (2007, 99).

12. It is highly debatable whether Canada has lived up to this self-image. For example, Canada's image of a country that cares for the less fortunate does not live up to the reality. In 2002, Canada's Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) was 0.28 percent of gross national income (GNI). The average among OECD countries was 0.40 percent.

13. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs (2004).

14. Tandt (2005).

15. Canada, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Gerald Schmitz, et al “Report of the E-Consultation on the Government's April 2005 International Policy Statement Conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade - October–November 2005,” (April 13, 2006), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=2614385&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1.

16. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Overview Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview2-en.asp (January, 2005).

17. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs (2003).

18. Gotlieb (2004).

19. Address by the Honourable Stéphane Dion, President of the Privy Council and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs at the biennial conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Minneapolis, November 21, 1997, cited in Cox and Sjolander (1998, 217–42).

20. POLLARA 2004.

21. Axworthy (2003, 1).

22. UNICEF (2006).

23. This issue is addressed by many of the contributors to Hillmer and Molot (2002).

24. Copeland (2001, 152–72).

25. Hillmer and Molot (2002).

26. Wells (2001).

27. Wolfe (2004, 97–118).

28. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs (2003).

29. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs (2003).

30. MacFarlane (2001).

31. Black (2006, 57), Black's emphasis.

32. Hillmer and Chapnick (2001, 79).

33. Maclean (2006, 64).

34. Jockel (1994, 15).

35. Human Rights First (1998).

36. Because states are first required to update domestic law to conform to the Rome Statute, this process can take a long time in some states. By the time the necessary 60 states had ratified the Statute in 2002, the Preparatory Commission had prepared the critical texts and procedures of the Court's operation, thus allowing the court to come into effect July 1, 2002.

37. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 887–917). For information on Canadians as norm entrepreneurs see Howard and Neufeldt (2000, 11–38) and Franceshet and Knight (2001).

38. United Nations (1998).

39. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs (2005).

40. Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2008).

41. Riddell-Dixon (2005, 1087).

42. Busby (2005).

43. Canada, Department of National Defence (2006a).

44. Canada, Department of National Defence (2006b).

45. Canada, Minister of Public Works and Government Services (2008).

46. See the Rome Statute at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm

47. This scandal made international headlines. One of the reasons given for disbanding the Canadian airborne regiment was its negative impact on Canada's reputation. In making this decision, Defense Minister David Collenette stated “We have to be concerned with the reputation of Canada and Canadians and the Canadian armed forces,” In fact when Louise Frechette was being reviewed for her UN appointment in 1998 the Somalia affair again made international headlines. For example, see Turner (1998). See also Farnsworth (1995). The impact of this case on Canada's international prestige would be an interesting avenue for inquiry but is not the focus of this paper. Although it is not the main focus of her article, Sandra Whitworth (2005) addresses the impact of this event on Canada's reputation.

48. Byers (2006).

49. Article 8 of the Rome statue concerns torture and other related crimes and article 25 addresses individual criminal responsibility. See http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm for the Rome Statute. Whether or not Canada could be charged under the Rome Statute remains contested but Byers and Schabas make a convincing argument. For details on the accusations made by Byers and Schabas see their letter to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (2007).

50. Washington has used the threat and actual withdrawal of aid to coerce compliance. In 2002, the US Congress passed the American Service-members’ Protection Act (ASPA) that prohibits the US from granting military aid to the states that are members of the Court. In December 2004, President Bush signed the Nethercutt Amendment which imposes additional penalties on countries that refuse to tow the US line over the Court.

51. Preston (2002).

52. United States, Department of State (2006).

53. Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson (2008, 224).

54. Dymond and Hart (2003).

55. Dymond and Hart (2003).

56. In particular, the well publicized frustration experienced by the Canadian, General Romeo Dallaire, when he served as the United Nation's commander during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, helped to demonstrate to Canadians the urgency of improving global institutions for law and order.

57. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs “Human Security Program,” http://www.humansecurity. gc.ca/psh-en.asp (February 23, 2006).

58. Franceschet and Knight (2001, 64).

59. Horowitz (1966, 143–71. See also Hartz (1964).

60. Lloyd Axworthy quoted in Hillmer and Chapnick (2001, 69).

61. Francschet and Knight (2001, 66).

62. Axworthy (2003, 209).

63. Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson (2008, 224).

64. Canada, Prime Minister's Office (2002).

65. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs “Canada's Human Security Website,” http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/govaccount-en.asp (October 17, 2005).

66. Canada, Department of Justice (1999).

67. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs “Canada and the ICC,” http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/icc/canada_icc-en.asp 22Oct2005.

68. Canada, Citizenship and Immigration (2000).

69. Ambassador Philippe Kirsch was chosen as the chair of the Committee of the Whole and then selected to be the chair of the Preparatory Commission. He was then elected by the Assembly of States parties as a judge and subsequently was chosen by the other judges to become president of the ICC.

70. Canada, Foreign Affairs (2006).

71. Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Osler Hampson (2008, 224) wrote that during the Rome Conference “[m]edia coverage at home projected a positive image of Canadian leadership.”

72. Joyce (2001).

73. Toronto Star (2005).

74. Toronto Star (2005).

75. Lee (2005, 147).

76. Ukraine, Embassy of Ukraine in Canada (1999).

77. Knight (2001, 132).

78. Howard and Neufeldt (2000, 15).

79. Riddell-Dixon (2005, 1078).

80. Howard and Neufeldt (2000, 31).

81. Canada, Foreign Affairs (1998).

82. Axworthy (1997, 183–96).

83. Melakopides (1998).

84. Hillmer, Carment, and Hampson (2003).

85. Gotlieb (2004).

86. Canada, Parliamentary Information and Research Service Gerald Schmitz, et al “Report of the E-Consultation on the Government's April 2005 International Policy Statement Conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade - October–November 2005,” (April 13, 2006).

87. Canada, Parliamentary Information and Research Service Gerald Schmitz, et al “Report of the E-Consultation on the Government's April 2005 International Policy Statement Conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade - October–November 2005,” (April 13, 2006).

88. Beier (2005, 442).

89. See for example, Cox (1989, 823–62); Smith (2006, 73–84); and Neufeld (1999, 97–119).