From “Thin” to “Thick” (and Back Again?): The Politics and Policies of the Contemporary US–Canada Border

Abstract

Despite making modest progress on challenging management and security issues common to their shared border, the United States and Canada have, in recent years, slipped behind on advancing a progressive border agenda. The momentum unleashed under the 30-point Smart Border Action Plan, signed in late 2001, has slowed in the face of new regulations at the border, many of which were initiated by the United States. These include significant changes in US admission procedures under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), new border policing resources and protocols, as well as new customs and inspection fees. The much-heralded Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), designed to facilitate both trade and security between the two countries, has also lost momentum, with the last trilateral meeting of leaders resulting in little more than a press release. As a result of these and other developments, it appears that rather than “thinning,” the US–Canada border is “thickening” at precisely the time when greater economic and security cooperation is necessary to bolster North American competitiveness in an increasingly globalized economy and complex security environment. This article will investigate some of the key reasons behind these policy developments, exploring some of the early positions that frame approaches to border management in the Obama administration. It will also offer some thoughts on opportunities for improved border management policies by providing some specific recommendations, which may help advance solutions to pressing – and festering – bilateral security and trade issues.

Keywords:

• border security
• US–Canada border
• trade

Notes

1. Gabriel, Jimenez, and Macdonald (2003).

2. Hunnicut (1997).

3. Martinez (1994, 1–15).

4. Pellerin (2005, 55).

5. Gabriel, Jimenez, and Macdonald (2003, 1).

6. Jannol, Meyers, and Jachimowicz (2003, 1).

7. See, for instance, Adelman (2002); Andreas (2003).

8.Heyman and Ackleson ( 2009).

9. Ibid.; we mark this period with the passage of US House Resolution 4437, the “Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,” a strong anti-immigration measure. In the subsequent period, additional legislation authorized the construction of border fencing, “virtual” fencing, and other control efforts.

10. Ackleson (2007): 189–203.

11. Lyon (2002).

12. MacPherson (2008).

13. McConnell (2003).

14. Olmedo and Soden (2005); MacPherson et al. (2006); Taylor and Robideaux (2004).

15. Marx (2005, 25).

16. Bigo (2002).

17. On new methods and practices of interior immigration enforcement in the US, see Coleman (2007).

18. Lewis (2005, 108).

19. See Ackleson and Kastner (2006).

20. Coleman (2007).

21. Goldman and Barutciski (2008, 56).

22. Goldfarb (2007, 5).

23. Ibid., 18.

24. Dawson and Fife (2005).

25. Bell (2004); Flynn (2004); Ervin (2006).

26. Kutz and Cooney (2007).

27. Ibid., 12.

28. Belelieu (2003, 5).

29. See Koslowski (2005).

30. Hale (2006, 14).

31. United States Government Accountability Office (2008).

32. Zremski (2008).

33. Manley (2009).

34. Eric Farnsworth, quoted in Dickerson (2008, A1).

35. See Burney (2009, 22–6) and Kinsman (2009).

36. Barrett (2008). See also Bergen (2008).

37. Stairs (2003, 6).

38. Howe Verhovek (2001, 1).

39. Hataley (2007).

40. See, for example, Chellino et al. (2008). See also Carafano and Heyman (2004).

41. Lipowicz (2008).

42. Napolitano (2009).

43. Drogin (2009).

44. See, for example, Kitchen (2003). See also Pastor (2001).

45. The term was developed by Karen Litfin with regards to environmental issues and has been expanded and adapted by other scholars. See Litfin (1997). See also Mattli (2000 ).