Charting Quebec’s Engagement with the International Community

An exceptionally warm spring in 2012 brought forth an unanticipated blossom to Quebec. The streets of Montreal, Quebec City, and elsewhere were filled with people—sometimes in the hundreds of thousands—marching in protest of the Quebec government’s plans to raise university tuition. A student strike had begun in February, arising in a global context of contestation; Montreal had been caught up in the Occupy phenomenon, with protestors in Victoria Square—unofficially re-christened the Place du Peuple—adding their voices to a transnational outcry against economic inequality that the 2008 financial crisis and its consequences had highlighted. The year preceding the student strike had also witnessed the Arab world gripped by social and political convulsion, so that it was not long before the expression printemps arabe—Arab Spring—found its echo in the printemps érable—Maple Spring—at once a whimsical play on words and a deliberate effort to associate events in Quebec with a global wave of grassroots-organized and social media–driven protest. What began as a conflict over a tuition hike took on dramatic proportions, so that by May there were growing links with student movements from Chile to the United Kingdom. Even more significant, the protest movement had spread beyond Quebec’s student population. By the time that the Liberal government of Jean Charest moved to pass legislation—Bill 78—to curtail the multiple daily protests and help bring an end to the strike, Quebec society was increasingly polarized. This was reflected in the estimated 500,000 who on May 22 marched through Montreal protesting Bill 78 in what was dubbed the “largest act of civil disobedience in Canadian history” (Schonbek 2012). Little surprise, then, that the eyes of the international media were on Quebec; the student strike made the front page of French dailies, newspapers from Britain and the United States sent correspondents to report on events, and viewers of Al Jazeera and CNN were treated to images of confrontations between police and protestors. They also saw entire neighborhoods, taking inspiration from the Latin American tradition of cacerolazo, descend into the street to bang pots to protest the apparent affront to civil liberties.

These were not the images that Quebec’s government wished to project onto the world stage. By coincidence, the wave of contestation that gripped Quebec occurred amid the 50th anniversary of the opening of Quebec’s delegation-generale—a quasi-embassy—in Paris, recalled in the historical memory as the moment when Quebec strode onto the world stage, ushering in what much of the scholarly literature characterizes as the modern period of Québec’s international engagement. The dramatic events of 2012 underscore the value and necessity of placing Quebec in its global context, not least because exploring Quebec’s encounters with the world facilitates a greater understanding and appreciation of Quebec. This of course entails understanding the diversity of relationships that Quebec’s government has established, nurtures, and maintains. But it also means investigating the links between elements of Quebec society and the global community all the more necessary if we are to understand the impact—past and present—of global forces on Quebec, as well as the scope of the Quebec contribution to international affairs.

It was with these objectives in mind that a group of scholars convened a workshop, organized by the Institute on Québec Studies at the State University of New York at Plattsburgh and McGill University’s Québec Studies Program, at the École nationale de l’administration publique (ENAP) in Montreal. This workshop brought historians and political scientists together to discuss the foundations, key actors, and a range of historical and contemporary policy issues associated with Quebec’s international relations. Colloquium participants and the editors of this special issue of the American Review of Canadian Studies were then, and still remain, struck by the need for a comprehensive English-language text that expressly explores Quebec’s encounters with the world. To be sure, there are a number of works on the subject for a principally Anglophone audience; however, to the extent that such discussions exist, these are to be found in volumes on Quebec that either provide a panoramic overview of Quebec as a whole (such as the first and recently released second edition of Québec Questions: Québec Studies for the Twenty-First Century, edited by Jarrett Rudy, Stéphan Gervais, and Christopher Kirkey), are grounded in a distinctly disciplinary perspective (the two most significant being Québec State and Society edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and The Québec Democracy: Structures, Processes and Policies by Guy Lachapelle, Gérald Bernier, Daniel Salée and Luc Bernier), or are episodic journal articles focused on but one isolated topic (appearing mostly in Québec Studies or in this journal).

There are clearly compelling reasons to explore Quebec in the world. Most immediately is the opportunity such an exploration affords for gaining a greater understanding and appreciation of Quebec society. There is, admittedly, a strong correlation between the acceleration and intensification of Quebec’s international activity since the 1960s and the evolution of nationalism and political life in Quebec. The rise to power of a more Quebec-centric version of French Canadian nationalism in the period following the Second World War was accompanied by Quebec’s government asserting by the mid-1960s that the ambiguities of Canada’s federal system, the cause of provincial rights, and the survival of North America’s fait français—the French fact—meant that Quebec’s constitutional jurisdiction did not stop at its borders or Canadian shores. The opening of délégations générales around the world, the cultivation of direct and privileged relations with France, the achievement of a distinct participation in la Francophone—all of these are examples of how Quebec nationalism has been manifested in the international sphere. The achievement by the late 1960s of a distinct—albeit circumscribed—international personality was a major accomplishment of Quebec nationalism. In addition to setting the stage for an enduring dispute with Ottawa over foreign affairs, this position has served as the basis of Quebec’s international activity ever since.

Yet, as was alluded to above, placing too much of an emphasis on the “nation” as a subject and as an analytical frame of analysis risks missing a great deal of the story. Such an outcome is all the more regrettable given that the Quebec government’s international activities since the 1960s have been innovative, even trailblazing, and not simply within the framework of Canadian federalism but in the post-1945 evolution of international affairs.

It is important to underscore, however, that the link between globalization and Quebec’s international relations is by no means limited to the governmental realm. Long before the Quiet Revolution, elements of Quebec civil society were forging and maintaining links—religious, cultural, economic, and even political—with the international community. The Quebec government’s increased international action associated with the Quiet Revolution—indeed, the Quiet Revolution itself—may be understood as flowing in part from the long-standing links between Quebeckers and the world. More recently, Quebec has had to grapple with issues related to shifting global migration patterns, the question of cultural identity in an era marked by a rapidly changing media landscape; international terrorism; the ongoing challenges of climate change and sustainable development; and the political, economic, and social consequences flowing from the global economic upheaval since 2008. To these challenges may be added the ongoing transformation of the international system provoked by the rise of Russia, China, India, and Brazil to positions of regional and global prominence.

All told, exploring the array of Quebec responses to contemporary global affairs sheds light onto the nature, opportunities, and challenges of our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. This naturally involves exploring the history of Quebec governmental action, not least the growing range of areas in which Quebec is active internationally, in order to compare the Quebec example to that of other Canadian provinces and other regional governments around the world. Yet, the links between the acceleration of globalization and the expansion and institutionalization of Quebec’s international action underscore the importance of taking an expansive view of Quebec in the world, one that goes beyond the governmental sphere and state-to-state relations to recognize the crucial significance of transnational forces on Quebec society, as well as Quebec’s contribution to the global conversation. This special issue of American Review of Canadian Studies is therefore deliberately structured around an expansive interpretation of international relations. All of this is meant to obtain a greater understanding of Quebec’s multiple points of engagement, including a wide range of regions, actors, and issues in the world.

Quebec’s engagement: empirical insights and theoretical considerations

Since the birth of Canada in 1867, the Quebec government has pursued its own international policy parallel to that of the Canadian federal government, a practice sometimes known as paradiplomacy. Quebec is today part of a small, select group of non-sovereign federated states very active on the international stage. In 2014–2015, the Ministère des Relations internationales et de la Francophonie (MRIF) had a budget of close to CAD$95 million, and employed 486 civil servants (with some 208 posted abroad), which is collectively designed to support Quebec’s international engagement in the world. (MRIFCE 2015, 2).¹

At present, Quebec has twenty-six offices in fourteen foreign countries: seven general delegations (including a Paris office whose status approaches that of an embassy) focused on economic, education, culture, immigration, and public affairs; four delegations of similar responsibilities with the exception of immigration; eight bureaus active in limited areas; five trade offices; and two areas of representation in multilateral affairs (as a member of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNECSO, and Francophone and Multilateral Affairs Delegations) (MRIF 2016).²

Since 1965, Quebec has concluded more than 700 international agreements or “ententes” with sovereign or federated states in close to 80 different countries. Over 370 of these agreements remain in force today.³ Most involve sovereign countries such as France, Belgium, or the United States. The most important of these bilateral and multilateral arrangements concern labor force mobility, education, social security, telecommunications, and the environment. Quebec is also an integral participant as part of Canadian delegations in many international negotiations, the most obvious recent case being the free trade negotiations between Canada and the European Union, and global climate change negotiations (Paquin 2013; Chaloux, Paquin, and Séguin 2015).

As an active subnational actor in the international arena, Quebec’s engagement is most frequently labeled and identified by scholars of international relations and foreign policy with one of three theoretical descriptors—paradiplomacy, identity paradiplomacy, and protodiplomacy. Panayotis Soldatos, who coined the term paradiplomacy, defines it as “[…] direct and, in various instances, autonomous involvement in external-relations activities” of federated states (Soldatos 1990, 37). Paradiplomatic activities occur when a subnational or noncentral government, like the government of Ontario, mandates an actor, often a minister, to negotiate or enter into relations with other actors in the international system in an effort to maintain and advance its interests. These actors may be sovereign states, federated states, NGOs, or private sector actors. Paradiplomacy is thus similar to the conduct of state diplomacy with the major difference being that subnational governments are not recognized as actors of independent standing in international law. Subnational actors cannot become full members of international organizations, nor be a signatory to, nor a full participant, as part of an international treaty (with some exceptions, as in the case of Belgium). They often do, however, participate in international negotiations and engage in the working of international organizations, albeit within the context of the national delegation.

The conduct of paradiplomacy by subnational governments principally focuses on economic and trade policy, foreign investment, efforts to attract decision-making centers, export promotion, science and technology, energy, environment, education, immigration, labor force mobility, multilateral relations, international development, and human rights. Paradiplomacy is also increasingly concerned with security issues, most especially transborder security.⁴

Identity paradiplomacy can be most fully understood to be located on a continuum between paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy. The fundamental aim of identity paradiplomacy is decidedly more focused in purpose and application: namely, to construct and consistently reinforce Quebec’s national identity by undertaking regularized, significant international actions on the world stage. Consistent engagement on the international scene can also be a strategy to strengthen identity domestically. There has been, and remains, a consensus among political parties in Quebec in favor of high-intensity “identity paradiplomacy.” The concept of protodiplomacy, on the other hand, is most closely associated with attempts by subnational governments who actively seek international recognition as part of an effort to become an independent actor—as Quebec did in 1995, or Catalonia in the past few years. Becoming an international actor able to meet with heads of state was a giant symbolic leap for Quebec—and a highly attractive prospect for identity builders (Lecours and Moreno 2001, 4).

These distinctions between the analytical concepts of paradiplomacy, identity paradiplomacy, and protodiplomacy are important. They inform our understanding of Quebec international activities abroad, and explain the relative continuity of engagement (despite variations on specific policies) between the Quebec Liberal Party and the Parti Québécois. Finally, it helps to explain why Quebec’s international activities are highly institutionalized, as the province purposely seeks to emulate the practices utilized by sovereign states, albeit on a much smaller scale.

The empirically observable workings associated with paradiplomacy are hardly new, growing in importance since the 1960s, and certainly not simply in Quebec (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). In reaction to globalization, subnational governments have been expanding their own presence abroad. Several Canadian provinces have long maintained an international presence to protect their interests in a number of fields, including energy, education, trade, environmental issues, and security (Michaud and Ramet 2004; Stevenson 1982). In the case of the United States, for example, four states maintained offices abroad in 1970; contrast that to 2008, when forty-two states and Puerto Rico operated 245 foreign offices in almost thirty different countries. By way of comparison, the US federal government maintains 267 embassies and consulates (Fry 2013). In Germany, the Länder have established about 130 offices around the world since the 1970s, of which twenty-one exist in the United States. In Spain, Catalonia has four delegations (in France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Germany), thirty-four commercial offices, four cultural and linguistic representations, nine cooperation agencies, ten tourist centers, and five individuals representing the cultural industry. In Belgium, Flanders operates more than 100 commercial offices around the world while the federated states, Wallonie-Bruxelles, ranks as the subnational government with the most commercial offices on a per capita basis in the world. The phenomenon is also present in more centralized countries. In France, for example, the Rhône-Alpes region with its partner Entreprise Rhône-Alpes International, fields twelve economic missions abroad (Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin 2015; Criekemans 2010).

Quebec paradiplomacy: federalism, nationalism, and globalization

The first significant source propelling Quebec’s paradiplomatic engagement in the international community directly stems from the very structural construction underpinning the Canadian federation. The British North America Act, 1867, and the Constitution Act, 1982, explicitly establish and codify the creation and workings of a federated state whose chief political characteristic is a decentralized, power-sharing (i.e., between the federal government and the provinces) model. Within Canada’s federal system, the province of Quebec has many constitutional jurisdictions (the economy, natural resources, labor, health, education, and culture), large civil services, and important financial resources. The division of power with regard to the conduct of foreign affairs has been, and remains, the object of debate in Canada. Several scholars including Grace Skogstad, reflecting on the division of powers, have identified and advanced what she terms a “de facto shared jurisdiction” (Skogstad 2012, 202). Two major reasons inform this perspective. First, although the Canadian government is empowered to negotiate international treaties (including in fields of jurisdiction germane to Canadian provinces), it is, under the aforementioned power-sharing arrangements, unable to compel the provinces to implement a given treaty (Skogstad 2012, 204; VanDuzer 2013; Kukucha 2013, 2009; Paquin 2013; 2006). International treaties, in Canada, must be implemented through a law of incorporation by the federal government, the provinces, and municipalities. Given this arrangement, Canadian provinces have become, most especially in the past fifty years, more visible and significant actors in international negotiations. This issue is increasing importance and standing for subnational actors like Quebec, according to de Mestral and Fox-Decent, since “roughly 40 percent of federal statutes implement international rules in whole or in part” (De Mestral and Fox-Decent 2008, 578).

A second reality informing the de facto shared jurisdiction perspective is that a fair number of international treaties increasingly engage both international and domestic issues, and as such, it is becoming harder than ever to determine the boundary between the two. Today, virtually all government activity directly engages the competence of at least one intergovernmental organization, and frequently many more, on public policy issues related to education, public health, cultural diversity, the environment, business subsidies, the treatment accorded to investors, the removal of non-tariff barriers, barriers to agriculture, services, and so forth. Foreign policy decisions now, for federal and subnational governments alike, typically involve review and input from all ministries—from the least to the most important. In short, the activities of all ministries, departments, and agencies, have all effectively been internationalized. This implies that federal ministries of foreign affairs, while still exercising and wielding decision-making authority (subject to consultation with relevant subnational actors), largely do so in an increasingly, nonexclusive manner.

Sovereign states generally seek to fully exercise their constitutional jurisdictions. The same applies to federated states, which are, at least in theory, sovereign within their fields of jurisdiction. It is in the interest of provincial governments, such as Quebec, to protect their fields of jurisdiction against federal interference, and at times to seek greater independence or autonomy from Ottawa. Consequently, provinces are not inclined to yield matters of provincial jurisdiction to the federal government when such areas extend to the international arena. There is, of course, substantial asymmetry among Canadian provinces: the greater a province’s resources, the greater its means to protect its constitutionally enshrined interests. The precise timing and priorities of a province, including Quebec, are largely a question of prevailing political preferences.

In the decades following Confederation, the international interests of the provinces, like those of the Dominion of Canada, were essentially limited to attracting immigrants and forging commercial ties (Beaudoin 1977). Since then, however, the scope of the provinces’ interests has broadened to the point where today provincial governments are as concerned with issues such as free trade and climate change as their federal counterpart.

The second principal source underpinning Quebec’s paradiplomatic activities in the world can squarely be traced and linked to Quebec nationalism. There is, admittedly, a strong correlation between the acceleration and intensification of Quebec’s international engagement since the 1960s and the evolution of nationalism and political life in Quebec. The emergence of a decidedly Quebec-centric version of French Canadian nationalism in the period following the Second World War was accompanied by the Government of Quebec, asserting by the mid-1960s, that the ambiguities of Canada’s federal system, the cause of provincial rights and powers, and the very survival of North America’s fait français, meant that Quebec’s constitutional jurisdiction did not stop at its borders or Canadian shores.

Even if nationalism in Quebec predates 1960, something profoundly changed with the emergence of the Quiet Revolution. In short, an unapologetically nationalist discourse emerged in Quebec at this time—a discourse that directly contributed to, among other elements in Quebec society, a platform for the expansion of the province’s international relations. Premier Jean Lesage, in a speech inaugurating the Maison du Québec in Paris, stressed that Quebec was more than just another Canadian province. He presented the “state” of Quebec—not the province—as a lever against the threat of assimilation in North America.

For Claude Morin, deputy minister in the Quebec government under Lesage, Quebec’s international actions were not motivated by a conspiratorial plot of like-minded politicians and civil servants working to discreetly lay the groundwork for Quebec independence, but instead by a desire to serve domestic ends: international policy decisions were “related to concrete problems or needs felt in that time.”⁵ One significant factor for Morin was the strong desire felt by politicians and officials for Quebec to have an expanded international presence. In doing so, the new wave of 1960s’ Quebec nationalism sought to break with understandings and practices associated with traditional nationalism in Quebec, particularly the policies of the Union Nationale as the “Grand Noirceur” period.

In 1965, Quebec’s Deputy Premier and Minister of Education Paul Gérin-Lajoie would employ nationalist arguments in establishing the intellectual foundation for Quebec’s engagement in the international community: a foundation, since known as the Doctrine Gérin-Lajoie, that today still serves as the guiding light animating official Quebec external policies. In his view, Quebec was inadequately represented in the international arena by the federal government and the Canadian Foreign Service. The French-speaking world had most acutely, in Gérin-Lajoie’s view, been consistently ignored by Ottawa and he felt it necessary for Quebec to forge closer ties with Francophonie countries on a range of significant policy issues.

Globalization, and Quebec’s desire to take its place in the world, is a third pivotal force contributing to Quebec’s paradiplomatic activities (Paquin 2001; Keating 1997). Quebec nationalism, once a protectionist, autarkic impulse, decisively shifted toward sustained, meaningful international engagement which today champions free trade and international expansion. According to Alain Dieckhoff (2000), the re-focus of Quebec nationalism cannot be reduced to a simple shift in mood or the awakening of a primitive tribal force, but is rather a fundamental manifestation of modernity.

Protecting and promoting business interests abroad has historically proven to be the principal driving force behind Canadian provincial government activity. “Business interests” refers notably to Quebec strategies to promote exports, attract foreign investments and international events including international congresses and major sporting events (e.g., the 1976 summer Olympics), coupled with a desire to build a positive image to spur investment in the province. The establishment and maintenance of delegations abroad, and the organization of trade missions, are done so primarily with a view to stimulating economic growth through increased business, investment, or tourism. Quebec seeks to expand foreign markets—especially in manufacturing and natural resource extraction—develop secondary sectors, and raise new capital.

This is far from a new phenomenon. Between 1867 and the end of the nineteenth century, historian Jean Hamelin notes, Quebec was engaged in actively pursuing foreign capital. In 1881, Quebec Premier Adolphe Chapleau spent nearly six months in France, largely to secure loans for the province, returning to Quebec intent on further developing Quebec–France relations. The following year he appointed a general agent for Quebec in Paris—Senator Hector Fabre, who held the position until 1910—whose mandate was to attract French immigrants and promote cultural exchanges and trade. Fabre was also a driving force behind the establishment of Montreal’s French Chamber of Commerce. Honoré Mercier was yet another premier who spent time in Paris to secure loans for Quebec. From the beginning of the twentieth century through the post–World War II period, Quebec took an increasingly expansive view of the significance of global markets (especially with respect to exports and investment from the United States), opening new offices in London, Brussels, and New York City.

Accelerated economic and financial globalization, as witnessed in the post-1945 period and most acutely since 1960, placed even greater focus on business imperatives for Quebec’s presence in the international community. Policies to attract foreign investment and promote exports have shown to be of critical importance to Quebec (Lisée 2006). The formal expansion of Quebec’s international presence begins in the 1960s and 1970s with the opening of a delegation in Paris in 1961, London in 1962, Rome and Milan in 1965, and Chicago in 1969. In 1970, Quebec established several offices in Boston, Lafayette, Dallas, Los Angeles, Munich (1970), Berlin (1971), Brussels (1972), Atlanta (1977), Washington, DC (1978), Mexico City and Tokyo (1980), Beijing and Santiago (1998), Shanghai and Barcelona (1999), Mumbai (2007), Sao Paulo (2008), and Silicon Valley (2015). It should come as no surprise that the United States, by far Quebec’s (and Canada’s) biggest trading partner, is today—against a backdrop of globalized international economic forces—the primary focus of Quebec paradiplomacy.⁶

Quebec’s engagement: scholarly articles in this issue

This exploration of Quebec and the world begins with a discussion of three of Quebec’s most important bilateral relationships—the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

Stéphane Paquin’s examination of Quebec–US relations, presented and analyzed over the course of five successive historical periods, provides an omnibus account of the origins, development, and significant institutionalization that characterizes the relationship. Formal engagement by Quebec with the United States has, Paquin writes, been principally motivated and propelled by economics—most notably, a consistent desire by Quebec’s political leaders to attract and secure foreign direct investment in large-scale economic development projects. The United States has evolved into, and will indefinitely remain, Paquin notes, the principal international partner of Quebec. The “future prosperity of the province,” he writes, is inextricably linked to American political and economic developments.

Accordingly, Jérémie Cornut charts the evolution of Franco–Québécois relations throughout the 1970s. Cornut’s article, “The special relationship transformed: Canada–Quebec–France triangle after de Gaulle,” challenges conventional wisdom about the “special relationship” between Paris and Quebec City in arguing that French policy, aimed at refraining from interfering in Canadian affairs, enabled both the flourishing of Quebec diplomacy and the deepening of relations between the French and Quebec governments.

Tony McCulloch, in turn, explores Quebec’s links with a country too often neglected in the literature: the United Kingdom. Since the imperial era, after all, the British Isles have been a crucial location of Quebec’s overseas activity. Beyond the lengthy history of economic exchanges between Britain and Quebec, engaging with Quebec’s “Britishness” is crucial to understanding the origins and evolution of Quebec’s international engagement, not least the efforts to compel Canada’s federal system to adapt to such action. McCulloch’s examination of the Quebec–UK relationship since 1960 illustrates how Quebec’s policy has been consistently motivated, from the time of Jean Lesage to Philippe Couillard, by a drive for foreign investment. We also learn in intimate detail the forces—principally political as opposed to economic—that have shaped London’s approach to Quebec. Britain’s interests, during such pivotal periods as the October Crisis of 1970, the rise of the Parti Québécois and subsequent referendums, or the patriation of the Canadian constitution, have been, as McCulloch demonstrates, decidedly practical with an eye toward working with Quebec regardless of changing political developments.

As has already been discussed, however, the story of Quebec in the world is not limited to the governmental sphere; there is a long and rich history of civil society playing a crucial role in linking Quebec to the global community, one that continued beyond the Quiet Revolution. Nor, in this regard, should discussion be arbitrarily limited to the world beyond Quebec’s borders. To the contrary, just as the surge in Quebec’s international action during the 1960s can be understood as a consequence of global factors intersecting with local conditions, so too must we understand that elements within Quebec society actively and importantly shape the province’s relations with the wider world.

Understanding this dimension of our subject is crucial for a number of reasons. Most immediately, it permits us to move beyond an exclusively state-centric approach and appreciate the crucial contribution of civil society. More broadly, it permits us to de-center the Quebec nation and pay greater attention to those members of Quebec society that have been occluded in accounts that privilege a Quebec nationalist perspective (or conversely, that oppose it). In this regard, Maurice Demers provides a crucial historical gateway to “the world in Quebec.” Demers demonstrates that Quebec’s engagement with Latin America—fueled by ongoing missionary works of the Catholic Church—was principally focused on establishing and building cultural and social relations. Demers finds that the network of present-day paradiplomatic international activities between Quebec and Latin American can, in significant measure, be traced back and attributed to the earlier initiatives of nongovernmental organizations. This engagement was reflected in the distinctly Latin American echoes that were audible amid the recent cacophony of Quebec cacerolazo—the banging of pots—in May 2012.

The importance of civil society to a more robust understanding of Quebec’s international engagement also draws attention to a larger question, that of culture, as a source of Quebec’s international relations. Of fundamental importance is the way in which cultural exchanges—government-sponsored or nongovernmental—have served as a vehicle for encounters between Quebec and the world. There is indeed a long history of Quebec cultural diplomacy—one predating the Quiet Revolution and that by no means is limited to the governmental domain—as Robin Gendron demonstrates in his exploration of the history of how education and intellectual exchanges have shaped Quebec’s international activity. Gendron pays particular attention to what has been referred to as Quebec’s educative diplomacy (Mesli 2009), grounding this in a broader history of missionary work and development assistance. Education, Gendron writes, has proven to be an especially significant vehicle by which Quebec has successfully worked to “develop its own international identity.”

Economic concerns also loom large in the range of Quebec responses to the post–9/11 world, one that has been characterized by concerns to avoid a “thickening” of the border between Quebec and its southern neighbor, along with a certain strain in the cross-border relationship owing to events related to the “war on terror.” David Haglund and Justin Massie offer an important insight into this period, and of Quebec attitudes about the United States, in assessing the nature and scope of the impact of Quebec opinion on Canadian foreign policy regarding the war in Iraq in 2003, as well as Canada’s participation in the war in Afghanistan. Their contribution engages directly with notions of Quebec exceptionalism, as well as the Canadian dimension of Quebec’s international action. More broadly, events since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have encouraged a preoccupation with border security. David Morin and Myriam Poliquin round out this discussion of the implications of border security through their analysis of how the Quebec government has employed the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine to justify and promote a Quebec action regarding border security, and how this action has been manifested in the context of Canadian federalism, as well as in Quebec’s links with the northeastern American states. Security, as defined and approached by Quebec, Morin and Poliquin note, is fundamentally anchored to “increasing politicization” in the post–9/11 world. Claire Turenne Sjolander and Jérémie Cornut complement this discussion through their exploration of notions of motherhood and militarization in Quebec surrounding a recruitment controversy flowing from Canada’s participation in the war in Afghanistan. In addition to highlighting the importance of looking beyond the governmental sphere to understand international relations, their contribution challenges us to reexamine the conventional wisdom of an inherently pacifist Quebec. “Quebec society,” the author’s observe, “has not been able to escape militarization.”

To conclude, this special issue of the American Review of Canadian Studies is not a normative academic exercise designed to advance justifications for or against Quebec’s international engagement. To the contrary, the reality of Quebec in the world is taken as a given, and the aim here is to use multiple perspectives to examine the myriad ways in which the government and population of Quebec engage with the global community, as well as how Quebec has been and continues to be shaped by events and ideas far beyond its borders. Readers will, we trust, thus gain a greater appreciation of and sensitivity to Quebec’s international actions as an actor in its own right, as a part of the Canadian federation, and as home to a diverse array of peoples with links to the wider world. As such, the story of Quebec’s international engagement is the compelling narrative of a society and a world marked by rapid, fluid, and significant exchange.⁷

Acknowledgments

The authors of this introductory article (and guest editors of this special issue) wish to acknowledge the formative role played by David Meren of the Département d’histoire at Université de Montréal. David’s insights, historical and contemporary, on the forces that shape Quebec’s engagement with the international community, and the range of actors within Quebec committed to making substantive contributions in international affairs, have proven invaluable to the overall direction and specific results of this project.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

Support for the workshop convened at ENAP was generously provided by The Institute on Quebec Studies at State University of New York College at Plattsburgh, the Centre interuniversitaire de recherché sur les relations du Canada et du Québec at École nationale de l’administration publique, and the Quebec Ministry of International Relations and la Francophonie.

Notes on contributors

Christopher Kirkey

Christopher Kirkey is Director of the Center for the Study and Institute on Quebec Studies and Professor of Political Science at State University of New York College at Plattsburgh. His scholarship focuses on international relations theory and Canadian foreign policy.

Stéphane Paquin

Stéphane Paquin is a tenured Professor at the École nationale d’administration publique (ENAP) where he is the director of the GERIQ (Groupe d’études sur l’international et le Québec). He has written, co-written, or edited twenty books including Theories of International Political Economy (Oxford University Press, 2016) and several articles about paradiplomacy and the international relations of noncentral governments.

Stéphane Roussel

Stéphane Roussel is Professor at Ecole nationale d’Administration publique (ENAP). He is the director of the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Quebec (CIRRICQ). From 2002 to 2012, he was Professor at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal (UQAM) where he held the Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy. His books include The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (McGill-Queen’s, 4th ed., 2015), Culture strategique et politique de defense; l’experience canadienne (Athena, 2007), and L’aide canadienne au developpement, with Francois Audet and Marie-Eve Desrosiers (Presses de l’Universite de Montreal, 2008).

Notes

1. An accurate count would also include employees of other government ministries who work on such international matters as international trade negotiation, border security (growing in importance since 11 September 2001), immigration policy, environmental issues, education, and culture. The government of Quebec estimates total Quebec government expenditures on international affairs at more than CDN$350 million yearly. In comparison, this is the highest figure of any federated state in the world (Criekemans 2010).

2. In 2014–2015, the Quebec government carried out 31 international missions, an average of 2.5 per month compared with 54 in 2011–2012, 45 in 2010–2011, and 64 in 2009–2010 (MRIF 2015, 34; MRIFCE 2012, 21). The MRIF (Ministry of International Relations and la Francophonie) is also active on social media with a total of 41 different accounts on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, and Flickr.

3. http://www.mrifce.gouv.qc.ca/fr/Ententes-et-Engagements/Ententes-internationales.

4. It is sometimes difficult to tell the difference between paradiplomacy, which is the work of actors duly mandated by a noncentral government to enter into relation with another actor, and what Anne-Marie Slaughter calls a “network of government officials.” According to her, networks of government officials, like police investigators, financial regulators, central bank employees, judges, and legislators, “increasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to combat global crime and address common problems on a global scale” (Slaughter 2004, 2). These government networks are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century. These networks of government officials increasingly impact multiple areas of government jurisdiction (Paquin 2004). The critical difference between paradiplomacy and network of government officials is that these networks, also present at the subnational level, are not empowered with a mandate to direct the entire range of international activities of the subnational government, nor to defend its national interest abroad.

5. Translation by the authors.

6. In the mid-1990s, every Canadian province traded more with bordering US states than with the neighboring provinces (Courchene 2000, 159–180, 2003, 263–285).

7. For further information see Bélanger (1994), Bernier (1996), Chaloux (2009), Dehousse (1989) Dyment (2001), Gagnon (2004), Gervais et al. (2016), Gouvernement du Canada (2005), Hamelin (1969), Hicks (2006), Hocking (1995), Lachapelle et al. (1993), Lubin (1993), Martin (1995), Mesli (2014), Michelmann and Soldatos (1990), Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux (2006), Ministère des Relations internationales du Québec (2006, 2011), Morin (1987), Schiavon (2010), Smouts (1999), UN (2004) and Wilson (2006).