Canadian Multiculturalism, Identity, and Reconciliation: Evidence from a National Survey

ABSTRACT

Indigenous-settler reconciliation seems to enjoy widespread support, yet progress has stalled. At the same time, multiculturalism, a concept that celebrates diversity and equality, is a point of pride for many Canadians. Should reconciliation not be included in Canada’s imagining of multiculturalism? This study aimed to analyze the possible relationship between symbols of Canadian multiculturalism and support for further reconciliation using responses to a representative survey of non-Indigenous Canadian adults (n = 5,203). Political affiliation, knowledge of residential schools, and demographic variables were also analyzed. Only one multicultural variable was a predictor of support for further reconciliation efforts, along with measures of political ideology, home language, and views on individual responsibility for reconciliation were meaningful. Components of individual identity are more influential in reconciliation support than the collective (multicultural) identity. This contrasts many claims by citizens and the federal government alike, that multiculturalism is an important part of Canadian identity. The study revealed that while multiculturalism is a touchstone of Canadian identity and pride, it may have a minimal role in reconciliation, positive or negative.

KEYWORDS:

• Reconciliation
• multiculturalism
• Canada
• political ideology
• Indigenous and settler relations

Introduction

It’s easy, in a country like Canada, to take diversity for granted. In so many ways, it’s the air we breathe.

-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Diversity is Canada’s Strength”

This statement from Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau exemplifies one of the core pieces of the Canadian national identity, multiculturalism or at least pride in the concept. Ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity are core components of Canadian multiculturalism and often play a part in how Canadians see themselves and each other (Brosseau and Dewing 2018; Uberoi 2021; Tsukamoto, Gonzales, and Karasawa 2010; Wayland 1997). Multiple studies and surveys from the past ten years state that multicultural values are widely held by the Canadian population (Uberoi 2021; Tsukamoto, Gonzales, and Karasawa 2010; Neuman 2016; Blake 2019). If many Canadians uphold multicultural values such as intercultural respect and support for diversity, those beliefs could positively influence opinions toward reconciliation. Reconciliation efforts are supposed to ensure Indigenous rights, improve relations between Indigenous Peoples and non-Indigenous Peoples, and support access to heritage language learning (Sinclair, Littlechild, and Wilson 2015b), all goals shared by multiculturalism (Berry 2013; Department of Justice Canada 1988). As will be discussed in greater detail below, the more negative similarities (Alfred 2017; Landry 2022; Stein 2020) could also influence the potential relationship between reconciliation and multiculturalism.

Examining potential barriers to reconciliation is important as there are concerns that progress is stalling and that the impacts are not being felt by Indigenous Peoples and their communities (Jewell and Mosby 2020). In recent years, non-Indigenous survey respondents shared that anti-Indigenous beliefs are a problem throughout the country (Neuman 2018b). Systematic racism was highlighted during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic as Indigenous communities had higher rates of infections than the rest of the population owing to substandard healthcare and overcrowding (Lei and Guo 2022). These examples of discrimination and stereotyping are in opposition to the TRC’s 94 Calls to Action, with the COVID-19 example highlighting the limited progress in meeting calls 18 through 24 (Sinclair, Littlechild, and Wilson 2015b). Hence, examining the possible interplay between multicultural values and reconciliation is key. A quantitative study of facilitating factors and barriers to reconciliation is timely as recent studies were primarily qualitative or a few years old (Wotherspoon and Milne 2021; Clark, de Costa, and Maddison 2016; McGuire and Denis 2019).

To assess the possible relationship between multicultural values and reconciliation, this article uses data from a Canada-wide representative survey (n = 5,814 adults) to explore the variables that contribute to supporting further reconciliation with Indigenous groups. The first set of variables asked respondents whether Canadians have shared values and how they view immigration. The second set examines knowledge of residential school history and its perceived role in reconciliation. These variables were chosen because they represent components of Canadian multiculturalism and reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians.

Indigenous-Settler Relations and Attempts at Reconciliation

It is first necessary to provide a brief history of Indigenous-settler relations in Canada with a view to current efforts for reconciliation and the role of multiculturalism. With European invasion, settlement, and the creation of a white settler government, Indigenous Peoples of what we now call Canada faced various forms of governmental control and assimilation efforts (Chalmers 2016; Hiller 2016; Lawrence and Dua 2005). One example of control was the Indian Act, which identified who was an “Indian,” and therefore a treaty member; where Indigenous Peoples could live; and, starting in 1894, forced children to attend residential schools (Department of Justice Canada 1985; Willow 2012). However, not all status Indians are members to a treaty with the government, and treaty membership is not exclusive to Indigenous Peoples (Palmater 2014; Indigenous Services Canada 2023). As stated above, Canadian governments also sought to eradicate Indigenous cultures and traditions. One example was the residential school system, where Indigenous children were taken from their families, with occasional visits home, forced to speak only English or French, and forbidden from practicing their national or community traditions (Leeuw 2009; Sinclair, Littlechild, and Wilson 2015a). Similarly, the “60s Scoop” was an attempt to forcefully assimilate Indigenous children by placing them with white families and away from their cultures (MacDonald and Gillis 2017). During this era, government-affiliated agencies removed from their families approximately one-third of all Indigenous children in Canada and placed them in adoption or foster care by white families (Allan and Smylie 2015; Fournier and Crey 1997; Sinclair 2007). Indigenous efforts for redress for the residential schools led to the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement and, later, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

As a result of calls for reparation, the government developed the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) and later a truth and reconciliation commission. The IRSSA was a settlement agreement for the abuse and mistreatment Indigenous children experienced while living in residential schools (Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada 2021). At the request of the IRSSA, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Canada was formed in June 2008. The TRC was a seven-year fact-finding mission that detailed 94 Calls to Action (CTAs) to redress and strengthen relations between Indigenous Peoples and nations with the Canadian government and settlers (Sinclair, Littlechild, and Wilson 2015b). Since 2015, 13 CTAs have been completed, 30 CTAs have projects underway, 32 CTAs have proposed projects, and the remaining 19 have not started (Barrera et al. 2023). The limited progress is not ideal, considering the importance of momentum for any large-scale change (Jansen, Shipp, and Michael 2016). Limited progression indicates that investigating reconciliation barriers and enabling factors is worthwhile.

The 94 Calls to Action are not the only form of public, or even international, pressure to advance reconciliation. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) appeals for many of the same changes and recognitions the Calls to Action list. UNDRIP calls for greater societal recognition and respect of Indigenous Peoples’ rights and ending discrimination (United Nations General Assembly 2007). While the Canadian government did not immediately become a signatory of the declaration, it is in the process of incorporating its articles into parts of Canadian law (Government of Canada 2021). Even with the TRC’s 94 Calls to Action and increasing acknowledgment of UNDRIP, amongst the ongoing tireless work by Indigenous Peoples across Canada, reconciliation has stalled.

Reconciliation in Canada is not without its problems. From the slow progress of meeting the 94 calls to action (Jewell and Mosby 2022) and a greater focus on non-Indigenous Canadians (Stein 2020) to the ideological and political groundings behind the movement (MacDonald 2014; Wylie 2018), reconciliation faces many challenges. At the end of 2020, the Yellowhead Institute in Toronto released a progress report for the TRC’s calls to action. Since 2015 and the release of the TRC’s calls to action, 13 calls have been completed, with two CTAs in 2021 and 2022, respectively (Jewell and Mosby 2022). While the limited progress in 2020 is understandable within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the overall completion rate is concerning, and the Yellowhead Institute states that if the rate of change stays steady, all 94 calls to action will not be completed until 2065 (Jewell and Mosby 2022). Another substantial issue facing reconciliation is the greater focus on non-Indigenous Canadians compared to Indigenous peoples and communities (Landry 2022). Reconciliation programs and initiatives often place non-Indigenous Canadians, specifically white Canadians’ interests above that of Indigenous Peoples or only make symbolic changes (Tuck and Yang 2012; Stein 2020). This issue has some of its roots in the political and philosophical basis of Canadian reconciliation (Corntassel, Chaw-Win-Is, and T’lakwadzi 2009; MacDonald 2014; Wylie 2018). Reconciliation underscores the needs of the individual over the needs of the community, a concept that is often the antithetical to Indigenous worldviews (Wylie 2018; Hickey 2020). The focus on the individual over the needs of the collective only perpetuates allowing the transgressor to speak and decide what is “best” for Indigenous Peoples (Palmater 2017; Bentley 2018). By taking control of reconciliation and meetings the calls to action, the Canadian government further practices settler paternalism and deeper embeds settler colonialism into the political structure of Canada (Corntassel, Chaw-Win-Is, and T’lakwadzi 2009; Alfred 2017). Reconciliation is not perfect and needs to be amended to better meet the needs and wishes of Indigenous Peoples (Corntassel, Chaw-Win-Is, and T’lakwadzi 2009). That change would likely take time, but it is still worth working toward the CTAs and forging respectful and equitable relationships. To move reconciliation forward, we need to know the enabling factors and barriers to its progress.

Canadian Multiculturalism: Its Supporters and Detractors

Canada’s diversity is often seen as a strength; however, that was not always the government’s position. In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government feared the possible negative impacts of the increasingly diverse population (Blake 2019; Davis 2017). To counteract the more undesirable risks of diversity, including separatism and violence alongside promoting national unity, parliament passed the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy (Uberoi 2008; Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 3) and later the 1988 Multiculturalism Act (Uberoi 2021). Since the introduction of these acts and the continuing multiculturalism promotion efforts, governmental or not, multiculturalism has been central to the idealized Canadian national identity and holds sizable support (Blake 2019; Gulliver 2018; Kymlicka 2003); although, multiculturalism does remain unpopular among some groups within Canada.

Age and education can be important variables in whether an individual supports or opposes multiculturalism. A 2015 survey on diversity and tolerance by Ekos Politics found that respondents with a university education and those under 35 are slightly less likely than less educated and older respondents to believe that there are too many visible minorities in Canada (Graves 2015). Support for multiculturalism is often combined with positive views toward immigrants and asylum seekers (Neuman 2018a). In 2018, the Canada’s World Survey reported that 28% of 18- to 24-year-olds credit multiculturalism for growing Canada’s role on the global stage in contrast to 18% of 25–39-year-olds and 17% of 40–59-year-olds (Neuman 2018a). In 2003, approximately 58% of Canadians who identify as a visible minority reported high levels of pride in multiculturalism (Parkin and Mendelsohn 2003). Overall, multiculturalism appears to hold greater support with young, highly educated Canadians who have concurrent positive views toward immigrants.

Not all Canadians support the idea of multiculturalism. One-way issues with multiculturalism are evident is discontent with perceived immigration rates (Wu and Finnsdottir 2021; Kymlicka and Banting 2006). The classic xenophobic and racist views on immigration are present in Canadian anti-immigration discourse (Thobani 2000). However, it is essential to note that people can accept immigration with the caveat that immigrants assimilate or at least integrate into the country’s dominant culture (Triadafilopoulos and Rasheed 2020). Right-leaning Canadians also consider multiculturalism to be divisive, with concerns about pitting groups against each other rather than creating one “collective” identity and culture (Blake 2019; Wayland 1997). Some in Québec also fear that continuing multiculturalism efforts could reduce the influence of the French language, a concern for a province with an ongoing history of independence aspirations (Blake 2019; Kymlicka 2003). These racialized fears related to outcomes of multiculturalism and its policies highlight that racism is still highly prevalent in Canadian society. In 2021, an Angus Reid Institute reported that over 30% of survey respondents believed that Canadian is a racist country, and around 40% of respondents believed that claiming discrimination where there is none is worse for the country than unrecognized discrimination (Korzinski 2021). Multiculturalism-based racialized fears in Canadian might weaken the influence of multiculturalism in reconciliation efforts.

The Relationship Between Reconciliation and Multiculturalism

Reconciliation and multiculturalism might be complementary concepts for the Canadian public. Reconciliation and multiculturalism proclaim to share many values, such as respect, tolerance, and learning about one another (Department of Justice Canada 1988; Sinclair, Littlechild, and Wilson 2015b; Department of Justice Canada 2021; Brosseau and Dewing 2018). Some believe that multiculturalism has the potential to support reconciliation efforts (Smolicz 2002). In an October 2000 speech, the former Chairperson for Australia’s Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Evelyn Scott, stated that multicultural values could bolster reconciliation efforts (Scott 2000). Either through the fact of shared values or supportive ideals, the potential relationship between reconciliation and multiculturalism is worth exploring.

Alongside the more positive similarities between multiculturalism and reconciliation are the more negative parallels. One of the core issues was briefly mentioned above, that Indigenous Peoples’ needs are less of a focus than the needs of white Canadians (Landry 2022; Stein 2020). Reconciliation efforts seemed more concerned with upholding the status quo than meeting the needs and demands of Indigenous Peoples and their communities (James 2017; Alfred 2017). If reconciliation is supposed to support Indigenous language learning and revitalization and ease access to culturally safe healthcare, amongst many other goals (Sinclair, Littlechild, and Wilson 2015b), incorporating Indigenous epistemologies and worldviews could be beneficial (Hickey 2020). However, this is not the case, as current governmental conceptions of reconciliation are informed by colonizer epistemologies of power, individualism, and are often limited to only talking about residential schools (Wylie 2018; MacDonald 2014). Multiculturalism faces similar issues, such as the minimization of Indigenous Peoples and cultures (along with other People of Color and their cultures) in favor of white Canadians (Hayday 2010). Dislike of Indigenous sovereignty efforts is also a commonality between multiculturalism and reconciliation; both try to partially absorb Indigenous cultures and nations while claiming to protect distinctiveness (Alfred 2017; Sabzalian 2019; Gaztambide-Fernández 2012). These negative similarities could also influence a possible correlation between multiculturalism and reconciliation. While reconciliation and multiculturalism have many problematic facets that need to be addressed for meaningful change to occur (Alfred 2017; Tuck and Yang 2012), completely dismissing reconciliation is unlikely to help alleviate anti-Indigenous discrimination as its general values are popular (Parkin 2019), and could still be beneficial, so it is still worthwhile to analyze the possible interactions between multiculturalism and reconciliation.

Overview

This study aims to show which multicultural attitude variables are predictors for supporting further reconciliation efforts. As far as the author is aware, there have not been any quantitative studies examining Canadian multiculturalism’s influence on reconciliation prospects. Multiculturalism could still be important for Indigenous Peoples because respecting and learning about other groups could help Indigenous Nations’ work toward self-determination and sovereignty. It is also necessary to include political ideology and demographic variables as controls, as past studies and surveys have shown that people with higher levels of formal education are more likely than those with lower levels of education to highlight Indigenous Peoples as frequent victims of racism and many socio-demographic factors are not significant variables in predicting support for reconciliation (Neuman 2016, 2021).

The hypotheses for this article are:

H₁:

Belief in multiculturalism and its values would make a respondent more likely to support further reconciliation.

H₂:

Younger respondents and those with higher education levels are more likely to support continuing reconciliation efforts (Neuman 2016; Pedersen et al. 2004).

Methods

Sampling Procedure and Respondents

The survey utilized in this study is the Confederation of Tomorrow 2021 from the Environics Institute for Survey Research in Toronto. The survey ran from January 24 to February 17, 2021 and surveyed 5,814 adults¹ (Parkin 2021b). These dates included only the Canadian provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Québec, and Saskatchewan) and were online (Parkin 2021b). The territories (Northwest Territories, Yukon, Nunavut) were surveyed between January 25 and March 1, 2021 online and over the phone (Parkin 2021b). Online respondents came from multiple online panels, and the phone surveys were conducted with random digit dialing (Parkin 2022). Elemental Data oversaw the online and phone surveys.

Indigenous respondents (611 people, 10.5% of the survey sample) were overrepresented in the survey as they comprise approximately 5% of Canada’s total population (Statistics Canada 2022). However, they are not included in the sample as this study aims to find predictors for supporting further reconciliation within Canada’s non-Indigenous population. Respondents who answered “neither” (24.6%, n=1,280) for the dependent measure were also excluded from the final analysis because they might support reconciliation, but at the current pace as opposed to respondents who answered, “not far enough.” Another 656 non-Indigenous respondents were excluded as they answered “cannot say” for the dependent measure. Once these groups were excluded, the remaining sample contained 3,267 respondents (56.1% of the original sample). The final sample comprised of 1,762 women (53.9%) and 1,490 men (45.6%).² Women were overrepresented in the survey, as 50.7% identify as female³ (Statistics Canada 2022). Correspondingly, males were underrepresented, as 49.1% of the Canadian population identify as male. Fifteen (0.45%) survey respondents’ gender identity was classified as missing. Five respondents (0.15%) stated that they were under 18 years of age, 244 (7.4%) were between 18 to 24, 680 (20.8%) were 25 to 34, 432 (13.2%) were 35 to 44, 537 (16.3%) were 45 to 54, 429 (13.1%) were 55 to 64, and 770 (23.5%) of respondents were 65 years old and above. 170 (5.2%) of respondents’ ages were classified as missing. Survey results were weighted by the following measures: age, gender, language, education levels, region, and immigrant backgrounds (Parkin 2021b).

Variables

This study assessed one response variable, which asked respondents whether governmental reconciliation efforts had gone too far; not far enough; or neither. “Gone too far” was coded with 0, and “not far enough” was coded with 1. 42.6% (n = 2,217) believe that reconciliation has not gone far enough, and 20.1% (n = 1,050) believe that reconciliation has gone too far.

Demographic variables included gender (male or female), age (details provided above), ethnicity, language spoken at home (French, English, other), education levels (some high school or less; completed high school; some university, college, CEGEP or technical school; completed college, CEGEP, or technical school; undergraduate university degree; post-graduate university degree or higher), and perception of household income (good enough for you, and you can save from it; just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems; not enough for you and you are stretched; not enough for you and you are having a hard time). Some of the study variables had to be recoded for the analysis. Please see the appendix for the table of recoded variables.

Multiculturalism

Perspectives on immigration was assessed with levels of agreement to the question, “Overall, there is too much immigration to Canada.” Respondents could state strongly disagree to strongly agree. Assessment of shared values was presented with the question, “Canadians basically have the same values regardless of which region of the country they live in.” Respondents had the same choice as the previous question.

Support for the federal system and viewing the country as multicultural was measured by their level of agreement with the following statement: “A federal system of government is the best one for Canada because we are a country made up of different peoples and nations.” Respondents could answer strongly disagree to strongly agree. The last multicultural variable asked respondents their perspectives on whether they support the federal government being required to hire a minimum number of people from each province every year to better support national unity. Respondents chose from strongly oppose to strongly support. Both questions provide insight into whether respondents viewed the country as multicultural and if they supported moves to increase feelings of multiculturalism.

Political Ideology

The model included two political ideological variables to test the relationship between support for further reconciliation and political beliefs. The first measure in this category was “if a Canadian federal election were held today, which one of the following parties would you vote for” and if a respondent was unsure, a second question asked, “perhaps you have not yet made up your mind; is there nevertheless a party you might be inclined to support?” (Parkin 2021a). The political ideology variable combined these two questions into one variable with the center-right to right-leaning parties given the value of 0 and the center-left to left-leaning parties given the value of 1. The second measure was opinions on government size and the corresponding number of services. Possible responses were larger government with more services or smaller government with fewer services.

Indigenous Rights and Indigenous/non-Indigenous Relations

Multiple reconciliation and Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations measures were included in the analysis. Role in reconciliation was measured with the item “do you believe that individual Canadians do, or do not, have a role to play in efforts to bring about reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples?” Respondents could answer—do have a role, do not have a role, or cannot say. Knowledge of the residential school system was assessed with the question “How familiar do you feel you are with the history of Indian Residential Schools in Canada?” Respondents could state—not at all familiar, not too familiar, somewhat familiar, or very familiar. The final measure in this category asked survey respondents if they thought Indigenous Peoples should be consulted before works such as oil drilling or logging are done on their lands. Respondents had five options—strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, or cannot say.

Analysis Procedure

A binomial logistic regression was conducted in SPSS to assess non-Indigenous respondents’ support for further reconciliation efforts.

Results

A binomial logistic regression was run on demographic, multicultural, political ideology, and Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations measures to predict support for further reconciliation. Results are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1. Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Support for Further Reconciliation.

	B	S.E.	Wald’s χ^2	OR	95% C.I. for OR		p
					Lower	Upper
Age [1= Under 18–7 = 65+]	−.045	.043	1.080	.956	.878	1.041	.299
Language [0=English, 1= French]	.580	.192	9.140	1.786	1.226	2.601	.003**
Gender [0= Male, 1=Female]	.079	.136	.335	1.082	.829	1.413	.563
Education [1 = Some high school or less − 6= post-graduate university degree or higher]	.025	.016	2.584	1.026	.994	1.058	.108
Income [1= Not enough − 4= Enough to save]	−.095	.078	1.467	.909	.780	1.061	.226
PoC [0= white, 1= Non-Indigenous Person of Color]	.207	.208	.992	1.230	.819	1.847	.319
Too much immigration [1= Strongly disagree − 4= Strongly agree]	−.210	.058	13.191	.811	.724	.908	<.001***
Shared values [1=Strongly disagree − 3= Strongly agree]	−.021	.073	.082	.979	.849	1.129	.775
Federal system reflects diversity [1= Strongly disagree − 3= Strongly agree]	−.019	.087	.049	.981	.826	1.164	.825
New government employees should reflect regional diversity [1=Strongly disagree − 3= Strongly agree]	−.098	.077	1.602	.907	.780	1.055	.206
Party [0= the Conservative Party and the Peoples Party of Canada, 1= the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, Bloc Québécois, and the Green Party]	.660	.148	19.762	1.935	1.446	2.588	<.001***
Government size [0= Smaller, 1= larger]	.426	.091	21.874	1.531	1.281	1.829	<.001***
Informed consent [1=Strongly disagree − 3= Strongly agree]	1.099	.074	220.164	3.000	2.595	3.469	<.001***
Role in reconciliation [1=Strongly disagree − 3= Strongly agree]	1.201	.175	47.167	3.325	2.360	4.685	<.001***
History [1= Not at all familiar − 4= Very familiar]	−.249	.085	8.548	.780	.660	.921	.003**
Constant	−6.105	.799	58.318	.002			<.001

Note. n = 3,267 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Cox & Snell R² = .347 Nagelkerke R² = .483. Variables in bold are statistically significant.

Multicultural Values

The only significant multicultural variable was immigration. Those who did not believe that there was too much immigration (b=−.210, OR = .811, p=<.001) were more likely to support further reconciliation than those who think there is too much immigration.

Political Ideology

Both political ideology measures were significant predictors for supporting further reconciliation efforts. Those more likely to vote for center-left to left-wing political parties in federal elections (b = .660, OR = 1.935, p < .001) in contrast to those likely to vote right-wing to center-right were 93% more likely to support further reconciliation.

Wanting a larger government with more services (b = .426, OR = 1.531, p= <.001) compared to desiring a smaller government with fewer services is correlated with a 53% increase in supporting further reconciliation.

Indigenous Rights and Indigenous/non-Indigenous Relations

Believing that individuals have a role in reconciliation (b = 1.201, OR = 3.325, p < .001) was statistically significant. With an odds ratio of 3.325, agreeing with this statement correlated to a 232% increase in odds of support for further reconciliation efforts. The second significant predictor for supporting further reconciliation was believing natural resource development should not occur on Indigenous lands without the Nation or tribes’ informed consent (b = 1.099, OR = 3.000, p < .001). Those who agreed with the statement were more likely to support further reconciliation. Being somewhat familiar or very familiar with the history of residential schools (b=−.249 OR=,780 p .003) was the third significant predictor in this category for supporting continued reconciliation efforts. Individuals who reported low levels of familiarity were 22% more likely to believe that reconciliation had not gone far enough compared to those who reported high levels of familiarity with residential school history.

Demographic Variables

Only one of the five demographic variables was a significant predictor of believing reconciliation had not gone far enough. Those who spoke French at home (b = .580, OR = 1.786, p = .003) relative to those who spoke English were 78% more likely to support further reconciliation efforts.

Discussion

In summary, believing that there is not too much immigration, being left-leaning, preferring large government, believing that individuals have a role in reconciliation, being less familiar with the history of residential schools, thinking that Indigenous communities should have a say in resource development on their lands, and speaking French at home were all significant predictors of support for further reconciliation.

This article aimed to investigate the relationship between supporting further reconciliation efforts and endorsement of Canadian multiculturalism values. The study also examined the influence of demographic variables, political ideology, and issues related to reconciliation and Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations. The first hypothesis was that multicultural measures would be positive predictors of supporting further reconciliation efforts. The analysis results partially supported this, as one multiculturalism variable was found to be significant. Regression results found that views on immigration levels, political attitudes, perspectives on Indigenous rights, and Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations, alongside one demographic variable indicated support for further reconciliation. The second hypothesis was that younger respondents would be more likely to believe that reconciliation had not gone far enough, which was not supported by the results.

Multiculturalism

The only significant multiculturalism variable was perspectives on immigration, whether the number of new immigrants was acceptable (coded 1) to too high (coded 4). Believing that current levels of immigration were acceptable was correlated with increased odds of supporting further reconciliation efforts. This relationship is not incredibly surprising, given that opposition to immigration has been found to be correlated with racist views (Berg 2013). However, as mentioned earlier, there is an important caveat: it is possible to support immigration and believe in assimilationist policies (Triadafilopoulos and Rasheed 2020). Belief in assimilationist policies would likely hinder support for reconciliation as the residential schools, the 60s Scoop, and the 1969 White Papers, amongst other policies, sought to assimilate Indigenous Peoples into white Canadian culture (MacDonald 2014). Unfortunately, the survey does not ask for opinions on assimilation for recent immigrants, so we cannot know precisely how it might have influenced survey respondents. The significance of opinions on immigration levels suggests that components of multiculturalism could play a positive role in reconciliation efforts.

Political Ideology

The political ideology leanings of respondents had a statistically significant impact on support for further reconciliation. The first political ideology variable, voting intentions, found that those likely to vote for a center-left to left-wing party were more likely to support further reconciliation efforts than those likely to vote for center-right to right-wing parties. This result aligns with the general understandings and positioning of political ideology and supporting the concept of reconciliation (Carleton 2021). Individuals with more conservative political beliefs generally do not believe that remembering negative parts of history and trying to rectify that impact is important (Reichelmann and Hunt 2021). This can be seen in many examples worldwide, with right-wing German politicians calling for a change in the remembrance and education of the Holocaust and US Republicans fighting the idea of reparations for slavery (Becker 2023; Oltermann 2017; Sotomayor 2021). Reconciliation and redress are concepts espoused by left-leaning parties, though it is important to highlight that often these calls are tied with performative actions or not what Indigenous groups are calling for (Lightfoot 2010, 2012, 2018). Nevertheless, it is unsurprising that those with left-leaning political positions support reconciliation.

The second political ideology measure examined preference for government size and the number of corresponding services. As stated above, those who preferred more services over less were more likely to support reconciliation. Often, support for more government spending and, therefore, services associates with a left-leaning political ideology (Rudolph and Evans 2005), which supports the finding from the previous measure. Also of interest is the relationship between perspectives on government spending and governmental responsibility for social change. One study found that individuals who view governments as responsible for protecting the environment also support increased spending to protect the environment (Kulin and Sevä 2019). While official government-directed reconciliation is not focused on environmental issues, the measure’s result reflects the connection between support for many social services and viewing the government as an actor in social change. Respondents supportive of more social services may consider reconciliation programs to be a continuation of governmental responsibility (Moorcroft 1998/1999). While it is unlikely that many government employees involved in residential schools and the 60s Scoop are still a part of the government, the 2023 Canadian federal government is responsible for making amends or redressing past injustices (Copp 2010). Political ideology, specifically left-leaning stances, is a core component of supporting continuing reconciliation efforts.

Indigenous Rights and Indigenous/non-Indigenous Relations

Two variables within the reconciliation and Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations category were statistically significant. The first measure was agreeing that Indigenous communities should have a say in works done on their lands. This result could be related to the increasingly prominent concept of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) within Indigenous Data Sovereignty (Walter et al. 2021; Walter and Anderson 2013; Walter and Carroll 2021; United Nations General Assembly 2007). Some could view the question as a way for Indigenous Peoples and Nations to have unfair special privileges. There is also a chance that it is indicative of the belief that Indigenous Peoples should have a greater voice and power regarding actions that impact them and their communities. This slightly contrasts the values proclaimed in liberal Canadian multiculturalism, as it could be seen as “special” treatment or valuing one culture over another. However, respondents could view this as a land rights issue where all people in an area should have the right to participate in decision-making that affects their lives and possibly health. The second significant measure for supporting further reconciliation in this category is believing that individual Canadians have a role in reconciliation.

Believing that individual Canadians have a role in reconciliation was the second predictor in this category for supporting further reconciliation. Suppose a respondent believes that individuals and not just government ministries and corporations must play a role in furthering reconciliation. In that case, they are likely to see the status of reconciliation as incomplete. This is especially important because the question states “governments in Canada” and their efforts to advance reconciliation. Respondents who agreed with the question might feel like governments are not seriously and actively working toward reconciliation and that individuals might have to take the lead.

There are some government-directed programs, holidays, and days of remembrance that include the individual and their communities, such as Orange Shirt Day on September 30th. On Orange Shirt Day, also known as Every Child Matters, many Canadians wear orange shirts to commemorate the Indigenous children forced to attend residential schools (Webstad 2023). However, this is only one day out of the year, and while important discussions are had in person and online, the entire country does not contribute to the conversation and movement. This variable requires further research as Canada is generally considered an individualistic society (Bokhorst‐Heng 2007), and it could be illuminating to examine the interaction between individualistic norms and values with collective responsibility.

The final variable in this category, knowledge of residential school history, was surprising. The analysis found that low levels of self-reported knowledge of residential schools were connected to believing that reconciliation had not gone far enough. Past research has found a positive relationship between knowledge of a subject and support for mitigating its harms (Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins 2012), which was the presumed result for this variable if found to be significant. People who reported low levels of knowledge may believe their knowledge gap could be closed by continued reconciliation, considering the role of public and workplace education-related calls to action (Sinclair, Littlechild, and Wilson 2015b). It would have been interesting to know some examples of this self-reported knowledge because it is possible that some of the self-proclaimed knowledge was incorrect, given the ability of social media to spread misinformation (Wang et al. 2019). Unfortunately, a knowledge test or follow-up questions did not accompany the survey, so it is not possible to examine the reported knowledge.

Demographic Variables

People who speak French at home were more likely than respondents who speak English at home to support reconciliation. Speaking French at home could be a way to retain Québécois identity and distance the province from Canadian-English dominance (Kymlicka 2003). The significant relationship between speaking French at home and supporting further reconciliation highlights the need for further research on possible interactions between Québec independence movements and views on Indigenous rights. However, it must be stated that not all French speakers in Canada are Quebecois. For instance, approximately 30% of the New Brunswick population speak French as their first language (Statistics Canada 2022).

Limitations

This study was limited by access to secondary data and limited prior research on the interplay between support for reconciliation and multicultural values. Using secondary data meant that some survey questions and their corresponding answers were not exact fits for the research question, nor did I have the ideal control during the surveying period. This meant that some of the measures acted more as a proxy for multiculturalism rather than overtly pertaining to a specific component of Canadian multiculturalism. Another limitation is the lack of previous research explicitly examining the relationship between Canadian multiculturalism and reconciliation. This meant that, at times, discussion conclusions leaned toward educated speculation rather than completely grounded in literature. The last limitation is the final sample size. Once Indigenous respondents and those who answered “neither” for the dependent measure were excluded from the sample, the study included only 3,267; while it is not too small to invalidate the statically significant measures, it decreases result representativeness for the entire population.

Conclusion

This study set out to examine the ways Canadian multiculturalism’s values impacted survey respondents’ views of furthering reconciliation efforts. The significant demographic measures included language spoken at home (French speakers more likely to support further reconciliation), and education (higher formal education levels were correlated with supporting further reconciliation). As discussed above, only one measure of Canadian multiculturalism, perspectives on immigration, was a predictor for supporting continuing reconciliation efforts. Both political ideology variables were significant measures, with people preferring a larger government with more services more likely to support further reconciliation. Respondents who were more likely to vote for a center-left to left-wing party in federal elections were more likely to support further reconciliation. Another significant predictor was believing that Indigenous Peoples should be consulted if any work to be done on their lands. The last significant measure was thinking that individual Canadians have a role in progressing reconciliation. The research and findings from this study present a starting point for a deeper analysis of the factors that influence Canadians’ support for continuing reconciliation efforts. Prime Minister Trudeau was correct in the opening epigraph; the country is demographically diverse. However, the diversity is not used as a starting point for building better relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples. More impactful are identity markers and political beliefs over the intangible values of Canadian multiculturalism.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Associate Professor Lara Greaves, Professor Jennifer Curtin, and the anonymous reviewers for their support and feedback. The analysis is based on the Environics Institute for Survey Research Microdata file Environics Confederation of data 2021, which contains anonymized data collected in the Confederation of Tomorrow surveys 2021. All computations on these microdata were prepared by Kaylee Grace Brink and the responsibility for the uses and interpretation of these data is entirely that of the author.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Refer to Environics survey reports for further information.

2. The survey only allowed for binary gender responses.

3. Statistics Canada states that the gender binary is used in census reporting as “the non-binary population is small, [so] data aggregation to a two-category gender variable is sometimes necessary to protect the confidentiality of responses. In these cases, individuals in the category ‘non-binary persons’ are distributed into the other two gender categories” (Statistics Canada 2022).

Appendix

Table

Dependent variable: ‘Reconciliation:’ “In your opinion, have governments in Canada gone too far or have they not gone far enough in trying to advance reconciliation with Indigenous peoples?”	Gone too far Not gone far enough
Independent variable: ‘GenderNew:’ “Please indicate your gender”	Male Female
Independent variable: Age: “Please indicate your age”	Under 18 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 64 +
Independent variable: ‘Values’: “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?− Canadians basically have the same values regardless of which region of the country they live in”	Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
Independent variable: ‘GovSize:’ “Generally speaking, would you say you favor”	A smaller government with fewer services A larger government with more services
Independent variable: ‘FederalGood:’ “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?− A federal system of government is the best one for Canada because we are a country made up of different peoples and nations”	Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
Independent variable: ‘Informed:’ “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?− No one should be allowed to develop natural resources on Indigenous land unless the Indigenous community that lives there agrees”	Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
Independent variable: ‘HireRange:’ “Do you support or oppose the following measures to help promote national unity in Canada?− Making it mandatory for the federal government to hire a minimum number of new employees each year from every region of the country”	Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
Independent variable: ‘Role:’ “Do you believe that individual Canadians do, or do not, have a role to play in efforts to bring about reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples?”	Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
Independent variable: ‘History:’ “How familiar do you feel you are with the history of Indian Residential Schools in Canada?”	Not at all familiar Not too familiar Somewhat familiar Very familiar
Independent variable: ‘FullParty:’ “If a Canadian federal election were held today, which one of the following parties would you vote for?”	The Conservative Party and the People’s Party of Canada The Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, the Bloc Québécois, and the Green Party
Independent variable: Education: “What is the highest level of education that you have reached?”	Some high school or less Completed high school Some university, college, CEGEP, or technical school Completed college, CEGEP, or technical school Undergraduate university degree Post-graduate university degree or higher
Independent variable: ‘Language:’ “Which language is spoken most often at home?”	English French
Independent variable: ‘Income:’ “Would you say your total household income is:”	Not enough for you and you are stretched Not enough for you and you are having a hard time Just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems Good enough for you, and you can save from it