Abstract
Traditionally, Canadian foreign policy was committed to maintaining a middle ground between large and minor powers. Canada dedicated itself to ensuring its national security and participated heavily in international institutions to do so. Canadian Forces' participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan since 2001 may prove that the ideas of middlepowermanship and peacekeeping have been replaced as the dominant Canadian military strategies in favor of peacebuilding. As the timeline for Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan approaches, it is time to determine how successful the shift in Canadian military practice has been and what its consequences may be for Canada on the international stage. By examining Canada's traditional role as a middle power and comparing that role with Canada's modern counterinsurgency strategy, we argue that, until the Canadian Forces are given the adequate tools, Canadian military policy should adhere to the traditional peacekeeping model and not be overly eager to erode national military power.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the insights, guidance, and support of Tom Keating, Dan Madar, James McHugh, Andrew Holman, Jane McCoy, and Peter Crosman in the writing of this piece.
Notes
1. In the case of Canada this premise is supported by Middlemiss and Stairs (Citation2008).
2. The conception of peacekeeping used in this essay refers to the traditional variant: “traditional peacekeeping aimed to contain and stabilise volatile regions and interstate conflicts until such time as negotiations produced lasting peace agreements” (Thakur Citation2006, 39).
3. See Holmes (Citation1970, 1) and Maloney (Citation2002, ch. 3–5).
4. For more on discussions of the security dilemma, see Herz (Citation1950).
5. For a more in-depth analysis on what PM Pierre Trudeau saw as some of the normative goals of Canadian foreign policy during the 1970s, see SSEA (Citation1970).
6. This point does concede that the notion of middlepowermanship was constructed, but was done so out of material power constraints. For more on this, see Tom Keating (Citation1993, 16–20).
7. It is noted here that the Conservative government under PM Stephen Harper has moved away from the human security agenda since his election in 2006.
8. For more on the expectations of middle powers in military terms, see Wight (Citation1986).
9. In their analysis of the defence establishment's influence on foreign policy decisions Middlemiss and Stairs (Citation2008, 86) conclude, “If critics dislike what the government is doing in the politico-security field abroad, they should hold the prime minister and the cabinet to account, rather than assuming that policy is somehow under the nefarious control of the DND or the armed forces.”