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Abstract
This article analyzes the civil-military and political-bureaucratic issues and relationships, both conflictual and cooperative, surrounding the deployment of the Canadian Forces to Kandahar. It examines the role played by former Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier in the Kandahar decision, and chronicles the development and fate of two of Hillier's organizational innovations, CEFCOM and SAT-A. It also explores the efforts of the Manley Panel to “civilianize” Canada's Afghanistan mission and assesses the effectiveness of two associated administrative innovations: the Afghanistan Task Force inside the Privy Council Office, and the RoCK (Representative of Canada in Kandahar) on the ground. While the Kandahar decision may ultimately have been a mistake for Canada, and while bureaucratic conflict pervaded much of the atmosphere in Ottawa, whole-of-government cooperation often succeeded on the ground in Kandahar, and its lessons need to be captured in organizational memory.
Acknowledgments
The author's research was supported by a Canadian Studies Grant from the Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC. She is grateful to Karin Imas, Alain Pellerin, George Petrolekas, Stephen Saideman, and Joel Sokolsky for their help in arranging interviews, and to George Petrolekas and Stephen Saideman for their comments on an earlier draft, which was presented at the American Political Science Association's Annual Convention in Toronto in September 2009. The author is solely responsible for the analysis and conclusions reached here, which do not necessarily reflect the views of these organizations or individuals.
Notes
Notes
1. See Jockel (Citation1994) and Marten (Citation2006).
2. For examples, see Lenarcie (Citation1996) and Hay (Citation1999).
3. Author's interview with Col. Ian Hope, the first commander of the Canadian Battle Group in Kandahar from January through August 2006; Royal Military College Kingston, September 2, 2009.
4. There were always smaller numbers of troops representing other nations, including the US, the UK, Portugal, and Nepal, included under Canadian command; see Smith and Chase (Citation2008). In August 2008 ISAF's Task Force Kandahar was augmented with 800 US troops from the 2-2 Infantry; see “Joint Task Force Afghanistan: Composition during Rotation 7 of Operation Athena,” fact sheet available at http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca.
5. The two books which best epitomize this match are Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007), which lays the responsibility for the Kandahar decision primarily on Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier, and Hillier (Citation2009), who argues that he wanted to stay in Kabul and that it was Liberal politicians and civilian bureaucrats who pushed for the Kandahar deployment.
6. Malcolm (Citation1993); Marten (Citation2004).
7. For recent analyses exploring this civil-military divide on the peacekeeping question, see Anker (Citation2005); Wagner (Citation2006/7); and Maloney (Citation2007).
8. See Department of National Defence, Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Ottawa,1997, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm; Fisher (Citation1997, 14); Bercuson (Citation2009).
9. Marten (Citation2006).
10. Jockel and Sokolsky (Citation2008).
11. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 18–20).
12. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 40–2).
13. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 181).
14. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 139–55); Tymchuk (Citation2008, 100).
15. Bland (Citation2008, 56).
16. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 147–55).
17. Bland (Citation2008, 56).
18. Department of National Defence (Citation2005).
19. Email communication from Col. George Petrolekas to the author, September 5, 2009.
20. Coombs and Hillier (Citation2005).
21. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009, who served in fall 2004 as the Deputy Chief of Staff under Gen. Rick Hillier in the Canadian-commanded ISAF mission in Kabul.
22. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 135).
23. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 135–7, 183).
24. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009, who served in fall 2004 as the Deputy Chief of Staff under Gen. Rick Hillier in the Canadian-commanded ISAF mission in Kabul in 2004, the Deputy Military Representative of Canada's mission to NATO from 2005–2007, and the commander of the final Strategic Advisory Team rotation in Kabul from 2007–8. Eventually the PRT in Chagcharan was put under Lithuanian command, and received Japanese civilian support for its humanitarian activities.
25. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
26. Email communication to the author from Col. George Petrolekas, September 5, 2009.
27. Email communication to the author from Col. George Petrolekas, September 5, 2009.
28. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 135).
29. Ottawa Citizen (Citation2006).
30. Gross Stein and Lang (Citation2007, 133).
31. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
32. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
33. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
34. Author's interview with Col. George Petrolekas, Ottawa, June 24, 2009.
35. Email communication from Col. George Petrolekas to the author, September 5, 2009.
36. Author's interview with Col. Ian Hope, Royal Military College Kingston, September 2, 2009.
37. Author's email communication with Col. George Petrolekas, September 6, 2009.
38. Author's interview with Col. Ian Hope, Royal Military College Kingston, September 2, 2009.
39. Jockel and Sokolsky (Citation2008, 107–8).
40. Gen. Rick Hillier, interviewed by Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher, “Transforming force,” Vanguard, March 2008, available at http://www.vanguardcanada.com/Defense.
41. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
42. Karin Philipps, “Afghanistan: Canadian Diplomatic Engagement,” Parliamentary Information and Research Service PRB 07-38E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Feb. 4, 2008), available at www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0738-e.htm.
43. Gosselin (Citation2007/8, p. 83); author's interview with Lt-Gen. Michel Gauthier, Ottawa, June 22, 2009.
44. Gosselin (Citation2007/8); Gen. Rick Hillier, interviewed by Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher, “Transforming force,” Vanguard, March 2008, available at http://www.vanguardcanada.com/Defense.
45. Author's interview with Lt-Gen. Michel Gauthier, Ottawa, June 22, 2009.
46. Author's interview with Lt-Gen. Michel Gauthier, Ottawa, June 22, 2009.
47. Hillier, interviewed by Parkins and Thatcher, “Transforming force,” Vanguard, March 2008, available at http://www.vanguardcanada.com/Defense; Auerswald and Saideman, (Citation2009).
48. Author's interview with Maj. Gen. Peter Devlin, Deputy Commander of CEFCOM, Ottawa, June 22, 2009.
49. Author's interview with Col. Ian Hope, September 2, 2009, Royal Military College, Kingston.
50. Author's interview with Col. Ian Hope, September 2, 2009, Royal Military College, Kingston.
51. This point was raised by David Last, a civilian professor at the Royal Military College and a retired Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer with a great deal of experience on peace operations; author's interview, September 2, 2009, Kingston.
52. Gosselin and Stone (Citation2005/6, 11).
53. (Department of National Defence Citation2008).
54. Gosselin and Stone (Citation2005/6, 11).
55. Author'sinterview with Maj. Gen. Peter Devlin, Deputy Commander of CEFCOM, June 22, 2009.
56. Lagassé (Citation2009, 614–15).
57. Lagassé (Citation2009, 612–13). Col. Ian Hope emphasizes that this contributed to the top-heavy command structure; interview with the author, Royal Military College Kingston, September 2, 2009.
58. Chris Thatcher, “Canadian Expeditionary Force Command,” Vanguard Magazine, April 2006, available at http://www.vanguardcanada.com/CanadianExpeditionaryForceCommand.
59. Author's interview with Maj. Gen. Peter Devlin, Deputy Commander of CEFCOM, Ottawa, June 22, 2009.
60. Author's interview with Lt-Gen. Michel Gauthier, Ottawa, June 22, 2009.
61. Hillier, interviewed by Parkins and Thatcher, “Transforming Force,” Vanguard, March 2008, available at http://www.vanguardcanada.com/Defense.
62. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
63. St-Louis (Citation2009, 60).
64. Author's interview with Col. Ian Hope, Royal Military College Kingston, September 2, 2009.
65. Capstick (Citation2006, 13–14).
66. Author's telephone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
67. Blatchford (Citation2006).
68. St. Louis (Citation2008).
69. Author's interview with Col. Ian Hope, Royal Military College Kingston, September 2, 2009.
70. Capstick (2006, 14).
71. St. Louis (Citation2008, 50).
72. Capstick (Citation2008, 24).
73. “National Solidarity Program,” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, available at http://www.nspafghanistan.org/.
74. Capstick (Citation2008, 22–5).
75. Col. M.D. Capstick, “Commander's Report to CDS and COMD CEFCOM,” OP ARGUS/ SAT-A ROTO 0, undated document provided to the author by Capstick.
76. Author's phone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
77. Freeman (Citation2007).
78. Blatchford (Citation2008); LeBlanc (Citation2008).
79. Author's phone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
80. Author's phone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé, September 12, 2009.
81. Phillips, “Afghanistan.”
82. Montreal Gazette (Citation2007).
83. This included Gen. Egon Ramms of Germany, Commander of Allied Joint Force Command at Brunssum Headquarters, in a letter addressed to SACEUR Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, June 27, 2008, NATO Unclassified Document 3050/JBJ5FP/0139/08.
84. This argument was made strongly in a special report published on the Globe and Mail website and widely distributed elsewhere on the web, by Col. George Petrolekas: “In Afghanistan, our rivalries conspire to make a great nation small,” January 16, 2008, available at http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2008/january/jan162008.html#19.
85. Author's phone interview with Gen. (ret.) Serge Labbé and email exchange with Col. (ret.) Mike Capstick, September 12, 2009.
86. Bercuson (Citation2009).
87. Bland (Citation2008, 58).
88. Author's interview with Lt-Gen. Michel Gauthier, Ottawa, June 22, 2009.
89. For examples, see Lagassé (Citation2009).
90. Ottawa Citizen (2006).
91. Lagassé (Citation2009).
92. Jeff Davis, “New Afghan team, new Afghan tasks,” Embassy Magazine, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.embassymag.ca.
93. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, Final Report (Ottawa, January 2008).
94. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, 21.
95. Chris Roberts, “Afghanistan's lessons for a Whole-of-Canada Africa Strategy,” Vanguard, January 2008, available at http://www.vanguardcanada.com/defense.
96. Jeff Davis, “New Afghan team, new Afghan tasks,” Embassy Magazine, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.embassymag.ca.
97. This is the author's personal assessment based on her research experiences. For example, while the author was able to speak with a number of civilian agency representatives about Canada's Afghanistan policy in Ottawa in June 2009, she was not permitted to reference any of their statements even in a not-for-attribution format. Almost all of these conversations at civilian agencies occurred in a group or paired-official setting, rather than as individual interviews, further encouraging message control.
98. Davis (Citation2009).
99. Collins (Citation2009).
100. Rudd (Citation2006).
101. Paul Wells, “Q and A: Elissa Golberg,” Inkless Wells column for Maclean's online, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.macleans.ca.
102. These numbers were reported by Stephen Wallace, Vice President of the CIDA Afghanistan Task Force, in a public meeting sponsored by the Canadian Consulate in New York at New York University, January 26, 2009.
103. Government of Canada, “Interview with Elissa Golberg,” January 1, 2009, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/speeches-discours/yir-2.aspx?lang=en.
104. Author's interview with Brig. Gen. Denis Thompson, Ottawa, June 24, 2009, and further email communication, August 31, 2009.
105. Author's interview with Brig. Gen. Denis Thompson, Ottawa, June 24, 2009.
106. Government of Canada (Citation2009).
107. For a description of the program, see DFAIT, “START – Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force,” available at http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/index.aspx.
108. Smith (Citation2008a).
109. Smith (Citation2009); Smith and Chase (Citation2008).
110. Smith and Chase (Citation2008).
111. Fisher (Citation2009).
112. Smith (Citation2008b); Armstrong (Citation2009); and Galloway (Citation2009). This was confirmed by two maps. One showed that much of Ghorak was among the “districts controlled by Taliban,” whereas Zhari, Panjwai, and several other districts including ShahWali Kot and Maywand were “districts where government has minimal control” (Gall Citation2009). Another, dated April 2009 and reportedly leaked from the Afghanistan government itself, showed Ghorak as one of two districts labeled “enemy control,” while the entire remainder of Kandahar is labeled “high risk” (Tait Citation2009).
113. Smith (Citation2007).
114. Adam Day, “Operation Medusa: The battle for Panjwai, part 3: The fall of Objective Rugby,” Legion Magazine, January 26, 2008, available at http://www.legionmagazine.com.
115. Maloney (Citation2009).
116. Hutchinson (Citation2008); Smith (Citation2008c).
117. Pearson (Citation2009); Akkad (Citation2009).
118. Montreal Gazette (Citation2009).
119. MacKenzie (Citation2009).
120. MacKenzie (Citation2009).
121. Quoted in Stewart (Citation2009).
122. Woods (Citation2009).
123. Author's interview with Jane Boulden, Kingston Royal Military College, September 2, 2009.
124. Clark and Séguin (Citation2010).