“This is Your Brain on Rhetoric”: Research Directions for Neurorhetorics

Abstract

Neuroscience research findings yield fascinating new insights into human cognition and communication. Rhetoricians may be attracted to neuroscience research that uses imaging tools (such as fMRI) to draw inferences about rhetorical concepts, such as emotion, reason, or empathy. Yet this interdisciplinary effort poses challenges to rhetorical scholars. Accordingly, research in neurorhetorics should be two-sided: not only should researchers question the neuroscience of rhetoric (the brain functions related to persuasion and argument), but they should also inquire into the rhetoric of neuroscience (how neuroscience research findings are framed rhetorically). This two-sided approach can help rhetoric scholars to use neuroscience insights in a responsible manner, minimizing analytical pitfalls. These two approaches can be combined to examine neuroscience discussions about methodology, research, and emotion, and studies of autism and empathy, with a rhetorical as well as scientific lens. Such an approach yields productive insights into rhetoric while minimizing potential pitfalls of interdisciplinary work.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Scott Huettel, Nico Boehler, Debra Hawhee, and Katie Rose Guest Pryal for their valuable comments on this article.

Notes

¹For a rhetorical-cultural analysis of brain-based lie detectors, see Littlefield.

²The scientific evidence for these devices varies considerably. For instance, one 2006 study suggested that each hour of television or video viewing (regardless of type) was actually associated with a 16.99-point decrease in MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory CDI score, an indicator of early language proficiency. See Zimmerman et al.

³See, for instance, Mooney and Kirshenbaum; Specter.

⁴Scholars hoping to work with fMRI research findings might wish to consult a textbook explaining basic methodological procedures, such as Scott A. Huettel's Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging.

⁵While this is typical, not all fMRI experimental designs test hypotheses about the specialization of localized regions of the brain. For example, a large number of recent papers have focused on decoding the information that is represented across the whole brain at a particular point in time to a particular class of stimuli.

⁶At the time of writing, The American Psychiatric Association (APA) was considering proposed changes to the criteria for autism for the next edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, DSM-5. Previously, there were separate diagnostic categories for Asperger's Syndrome and Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD), to variants of autism. According to the APA, the new category would help to simplify diagnosis, since deciding where to draw the lines between sub-categories was akin to trying to “cleave meatloaf at the joints.” See American Psychiatric Association..

⁷Recent examples include Mozart and the Whale (2005), Adam (2009), and the HBO biopic Temple Grandin (2010).

⁸Women can possess “male” brains, or men “female” brains, depending on how the individual scores on a test of systemizing versus empathizing, a fact that calls into question the use of the terms male and female to describe these brains in the first place.

⁹For instance, the “intense world” hypothesis suggests that ASD stems from a hyperactive, hypersensitive brain, producing exaggerated (and confusing) reactions to sensory input (see Markram et al. 19). Autistic individuals often protest the “lack of empathy” or “mind-blindness” characterization. One autistic person writes: “sometimes doctors describe autistics as though they are emotionless automatons. This is far from the truth, especially as many autistics have parents or close relatives who have bipolar disorder. You can't get more emotional than bipolar disorder. I feel things very deeply. A lack of empathy isn't central to autism, it's just a feature of the social withdrawal.” See Alien Robot Girl.

¹⁰See Feigenson for a discussion of the admissibility and persuasiveness of fMRI data as courtroom evidence.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jordynn Jack

Jordynn Jack is Assistant Professor in the Department of English at the University of North Carolina, 512 Greenlaw Hall CB#3520, Chapel Hill, NC 27514, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

L. Gregory Appelbaum

L. Gregory Appelbaum is a Post-Doctoral Associate in the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience at Duke University, Box 90999 LSRC Building, Durham, NC 27708, USA. E-mail: [email protected]