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Abstract
The challenges of understanding gerrymandering are primarily related to its conceptual ambiguity and measurement. This is true despite landmark legal rulings and a rich literature on the subject. In an attempt to alleviate some of the confusion, theories of the gerrymandering process are combined with advanced quantitative and mapping techniques. The focus is on Chicago, where it is frequently claimed that gerrymandering is institutionalised; however, there has not been sufficient study of the causal connections between gerrymandering and a ward’s racial makeup. Employing a mixed methods approach which combines a case study of the 2011–2012 redistricting in Chicago with quantitative analysis of Decennial Census and data from the Chicago Data Portal, this article examines the remapping of Chicago from early 2012 (effective in 2015 and matched with 2010 Census data) to assess how potentially gerrymandered districts are diluting or concentrating vote share of racially homogeneous groups.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to recognise the data collection and curation efforts of W. David Work, as well as the IIT College of Sciences’ Summer Research Award program.
Notes
1. See Venkatesh (Citation2001) and Owens (Citation2012) for details about such communities specifically in Chicago.
2. Note that reports on City Council behaviour have missed the extent to which Ald. Bob Fioretti (2nd) had been voting against the administration for several years, such as Studenkov (Citation2012).
3. See Engstrom and Wildgen (Citation1977) for documentation of such violations.
4. This approach has been attempted for other analyses of city-based gerrymandering, such as Engstrom and Wildgen (Citation1977) study of racial gerrymandering in New Orleans.
5. Chicago’s black-white dissimilarity score is 75.9, where a score greater than 60 indicates ‘very high segregation’ (Logan and Stults Citation2011).
6. This is distinct from the system of political patronage that was severely weakened until the Shakman ruling, the details of which are presented in detail in Johnson (Citation1988).
7. Inabilities to properly identify these communities have led to deficiencies in how aldermen represent their constituents (Zhang Citation2011).
8. See Ill. Rev. State ch. 24 sec. 21–36 (1973) as originally passed, now part of 65 ILCS 20/21-36.
9. See 65 ILCS 21, 20-36.
10. See Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago, Civ. A. No. 70 C 3202, 322 F.Supp 428 (1971) in particular the sections at 322 F.Supp 431 and 322 F.Supp 432.
11. See Bonilla v. City Council of City of Chicago, No. 92 C 2666, 809 F.Supp 590 (1992).
12. See Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir.), on remand, 17 F.Supp. 753 (N.D.Ill. 1998)
13. Source: Fran Spelman, ‘Dispute over boundaries could get ugly: Black caucus hits Lyle in ward fight’, Chicago Sun-Times, 2 August 2011.
14. Source: Fran Spielman ‘Black Caucus map hits Daley’s 11th ward’, Chicago Sun-Times, 8 December 2011, page 13.
15. Source: Joe Boyle, ‘Zalewski Opposes New Remap: Alderman Says Latest Versions are Ripping Apart 23rd Ward.’ Southwest News Herald, 20 January 2012.
16. Source: Kristen Mack and Hal Dardick, ‘Message to Emanuel: Black aldermen not happy with remap’, Chicago Tribune, 2 December 2011.
17. Source: Greg Hinz, ‘City ward remap takes turn toward the bizarre’, Crain’s Chicago Business, 14 December 2011.
18. See City of Chicago, Legislative Information Center; Ordinance 2011-10252. Accessed at https://chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1020581&GUID=F4D2D0BC-22DF-4AC2-8810-220F6188325D&Options=Advanced&Search.
19. Source: Charles Thomas, ‘Aldermen still hammering out details of new ward map,’ ABC7 Eyewitness News, 14 December 2011.
20. The latter would be consistent with Marschall, Ruhil, and Sha (Citation2010) findings as well as the high degree of racial segregation in Chicago.
21. Dawson, for many years by far the most significant African American politician in Chicago, and an often reluctant agent of Mayor Richard J. Daley’s machine in his later years (Grimshaw Citation1992), served as second ward alderman from 1933 to 1939, second ward Democratic committeeman from 1939 until his death in 1971 and member of Congress from 1946 to 1971.
22. This runs counter to arguments for redefining representative contiguity to allow for virtual proximity through such innovations as telecommunications or transportation infrastructure, as in North Carolina’s 12th Congressional District, often referred to as the ‘I-85 District’ (Monmonier Citation2001: 154). This may pass muster in certain such cases where state legislators can justifiably connect separate but demographically similar population centres strung out along an interstate corridor or waterfront, but in the smaller-scale context of municipal/urban representation, this is not sufficiently reasonable. Yet, for example and with regard to the Chicago case, the Dan Ryan Expressway forms an obvious geographic barrier between Bridgeport and Bronzeville/Canaryville (or the 11th and 3rd wards, respectively), and it is reasonable to expect different demographic characteristics to cluster on each side of the divide.
23. See Polsby and Popper (Citation1991, Citation1993) and Taylor (Citation1973) for less technical descriptions.
24. The use of multiple compactness scores is consistent with Niemi et al. (Citation1990) work.
25. There are also notable cases, such as the 23rd, 32nd and 45th wards, that experience large area shifts and voted against redistricting. It should also be noted that the alderman for the 15th ward was absent for the vote.
26. This article opted to use proportions (and changes in proportions) as key measures vis-à-vis raw population numbers, which are less indicative of dominance by a single race or balance among multiple races.
27. In other words, the proportion measure is the racial proportion after redistricting minus the racial proportion before redistricting but using 2000 census data.
29. At the state level, this does not appear to be the case (Masket, Winburn, and Wright Citation2012).
30. It is worth noting that gerrymandering affects our understanding of individual voting losses; that is there is no clear evidence of a negative effect of gerrymandering until the group of which the individual is a member has been disenfranchised to a certain degree (Gerken Citation2001).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Matthew A. Shapiro
Matthew A. Shapiro is associate professor of political science and an East Asia Institute Fellow at the Illinois Institute of Technology. His research lies at the intersection between economics and public policy and has been published in The Pacific Review, American Politics Research, Environment & Planning A, International Journal of Public Policy and Scientometrics among others.
Daniel Bliss
Daniel Bliss is an assistant professor of political science at Illinois Institute of Technology. His research focuses on urban politics and state and local government agency and autonomy, particularly in the fields of economic development and public policy. He won the American Political Science Association’s 2012 best dissertation award in urban politics, for work comparatively studying economic and institutional development in small Midwestern towns.