Delivering electoral integrity under pressure: local government, electoral administration, and the 2016 Brexit referendum

ABSTRACT

The management and delivery of elections is a core task for local government officials in many countries but often overlooked by research and policymakers. This article charts the nature and consequences of emerging pressures on local government officials to deliver high profile electoral events in an established democracy. Through a rigorous and comprehensive survey of local electoral administrators and in-depth interviews, it examines how electoral administration functioned in the 2016 UK Brexit referendum. In so doing, it provides broader lessons about the dynamics of electoral integrity at the local level. Problems with insufficient funds, growing distrust of public officials and late legislation were particularly problematic. Inappropriate campaigner behaviour was concentrated amongst Leave campaigners, reflecting new challenges for electoral integrity as populist movements arise. Problems were less frequent in Scotland, suggesting that different organisational factors are important. The effects of funding deficiencies suggest that austerity agendas can affect electoral integrity.

KEYWORDS:

• Local government
• electoral integrity
• electoral administration
• electoral management
• referendums
• Brexit

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The devolution of electoral law for Scottish elections, and the unique history of Northern Ireland have led to slightly different arrangements there.

2. Van Ham (2014) identified 23 different conceptualisations of well-run elections. These include frameworks proposed by (Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Norris, Frank, and Coma 2013). However, most tend to be broader than just electoral administration and management.

3. The outcome of these initial pilots was contested, with the government claiming success and opponents claiming many had been deterred from voting.

4. Conducted for LBC, Fieldwork 13th-14 June 2016, sample size 1656. Full tables are available at: http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/463g4e5e0e/LBCResults_160614_EUReferendum_W.pdf .

5. http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/196248/EU-Ref-Part-A-Role-and-responsibilities.pdf, p. 8.

6. Para 7(5) Schedule 3 European Union Referendum Act 2015 .

7. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/209419/Briefing-European-Union-Referendum-Management-2016-06-14.pdf Gibraltar was a separate electoral area and overseen by the South West RCO. The Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland (CEONI) was the CO for the whole of Northern Ireland.

8. Nine hard copy responses were received and added to the dataset manually. These are included in the overall response rates.

9. Two interviews were conducted face to face: a joint interview with the CCO and DCCO; and another with one RCO.

10. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information, date accessed 28 October 2017.

11. Student population (Table KS501UK) for ‘Schoolchildren and full-time student: Age 18 and over (Percentage)’; population density (Table QS102EW); Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were taken from Table KS201UK.

12. Migrant population levels for local authorities for 2016 taken from ONS Migration Indicators Tool, published on 24 August 2017, ‘Migrant NINo registrations per thousand resident population aged 16 to 64ʹ, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom.

13. The Electoral Commission routinely published and updated a risk register throughout the EU referendum process summarising these issues and helping to identify any potential difficulties.

14. http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/file/0004/198229/EU-Referendum-timetable-23-June-Final.doc.

15. Commonly explained as caused by the weight of applications. For other suggestions, see Public Administration & Constitutional Affairs Select Committee (2017).

16. For data on suspected electoral fraud cases see: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/electoral-fraud/data-and-analysis.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the UK Electoral Commission.

Notes on contributors

Toby S. James

Toby S. James is Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of East Anglia. He has published widely on electoral integrity, political leadership and the policy process. Books include Elite Statecraft and Election Administration (2012, Palgrave) and Comparative Electoral Management (2020). He is co-convenor of the global Electoral Management Network.

Alistair Clark

Alistair Clark is Reader in Politics at Newcastle University, UK. His research focuses on electoral integrity and administration, political parties and parliament. His work has been published in leading international journals, and he is the author of Political Parties in the UK (2^nd edn 2018, Palgrave).