A LAND RENTAL MARKET IN KWAZULU: IMPLICATIONS FOR FARMING EFFICIENCY

Abstract

This paper emphasises efficiency and equity aspects of a rental market in rural KwaZulu. Most households have little incentive 10 farm land intensively. Almost 22 per cent of arable land is unused. Evidence from a sample survey suggests that land rental is precluded by high transaction costs. Transaction costs are high because lessors consider renting to be risky as they could lose their right to land unless they farm it themselves. Nearly 70 per cent of households perceived that they would be dispossessed if they did not show some use of their arable land. Rental transactions were observed only where the risk was low, i.e. where the government or chief was lessor. Results of a diseriminant analysis show that surplus farmers rent in more land, invest more in agriculture and make greater use of credit and extension services than do deficit producers. Area rented was the most important of these discriminating variables. Of those respondents renting, 84 per cent claimed they would increase production if they could access more land. Expansion of farm sizes through renting improves the incentive to farm by lowering unit production costs and by increasing potential gains, as returns to information, innovation and management are scale dependent. Equity improves because rental transactions are voluntary. Inefficient land use is the result of an inefficient land market. Solutions may be found in efforts to reduce transaction costs in the rental market.

Uitreksel

Hierdie artikel beklemtoon die doellreffendheid en billikheidsaspckte van 'n huurmark vir landbougrond in landelike KwaZulu. Die meeste huisgesinne het min aansporing om intensief te boer. Bykans 22 persent van verboubare landbougrond word nie benut nie. Volgens 'n steekproefopname blyk dit dat hoë transaksiekoste verhinder dat die grond verhuur word. Transaksiekoste is hoog omdat die huurders glo dat dit te veel van 'n waagstuk is om die grond te verhuur want hulle staan gevaar om hulle grond te verloor tensy hulle self boer. Bykans 70 persent van die huisgesinne glo dat die grond teruggeneem sal word deur die stamowerheid indien hulle nie kan bewys dat hulle dit benut nie. Huurtransaksies het alleenlik plaasgevind waar die risiko laag was bv. waar die regering of hoofman die verhuurder was. Resultate van 'n diskriminant ontleding het bewys dat boere wat 'n surplus produseer meer grond huur, meer belê in die landbou en meer gebruik maak van krediet en voorligting dienste as die boere wat ontoereikende produksie lewer. Die grootte van die grond wat verhuur word, is die belangrikste veranderlike in die ontleding. Bykans 84 persent van respondente beweer dat hulle, hul produktiwiteit kan verhoog as hulle toegang sou hê tot meer grond. Konsolidasie van landbougrond deur middel van verhuring verhoog die aansporing om in die landbou te belê, deurdat eenheidskoste daal en wins verhoog omdat die rendement op inligting, innovasie en bestuur afhang van die skaal van die boerdery. Billikheid verbeter omdat huurtransaksies vrywillig is. Ondoeltreffende grondverbruik is as gevolg van 'n ondoeltreffende grondmark. Pogings om die transaksiekoste van die verhuringsmark te verlaag mag 'n oplossing bied.