ABSTRACT
Due to their common history, Finland and Sweden share many similarities. However, important differences have also developed in constitutional law, political culture and governance models. These differences have affected the implementation of international trends in the governance of higher education in the two countries. Both the Finnish and Swedish governments have strived to give institutions of higher education more formal autonomy through legislative and constitutional measures while increasing the external representations in their governing boards. However, in Finland, strong constitutional safeguards for university autonomy have counteracted the growth of external influence. The differences between the countries in this regard have their roots in political culture. There is a stronger emphasis on the division of power in Finland, as in other states that have experienced periods of political turmoil, while in Sweden, long dominated by strong social democracy, checks and balances have been considered undemocratic obstacles to the will of the people.
因其共同的历史，芬兰和瑞典享有许多相似之处。但在宪法、政治文化和治理模式方面也发展出重要差异。这些差异影响了两国对高等教育治理中国际趋势的实施。芬兰政府和瑞典政府都力图通过立法与宪法途径赋予其各自高等教育机构更多正式自治权，但同时增加大学校务委员会中的外部代表。然而，芬兰宪法对大学自治的有力保障，抵消了外部影响的扩大。两国在这方面差异源于政治文化。与其它历经政治动荡的国家一样，芬兰更加强调分权，而在社会民主主义长期主导的瑞典，权力制衡被认为是对人民意愿的阻碍，是非民主的。
The Nordic countries have, because of their historical roots and close connections, been described as a legal family with two twins, Finland and Sweden (Husa Citation2015, 228). However, the two East-Nordic countries are not identical twins, since their constitutional and legal frameworks as well as political and administrative practices have developed under different circumstances since the split in 1809. This article analyses how international governance trends regarding university autonomy have been modified by national constitutions, political cultures and governance models in Swedish and Finnish reforms of higher education. In doing so, it contributes to a larger research field regarding how international governance trends, when implemented in national contexts, are affected by historically rooted political, administrative and legal structures. University autonomy can be understood as an important aspect of academic freedom, a wider concept referring to the possibility for faculty to conduct research and teaching independently of outside interests. For example, a report by The Association of Swedish Higher Education Institutions stated that university autonomy is a prerequisite, but not a guarantee, for academic freedom (Casson Citation2019).
After the Second World War, universities were relatively small and in most countries controlled by meritocratic collegial governance, where the professors ruled quite independently. Often this is portrayed as a state of affairs unchanged since teachers formed guilds at the first medieval universities. Although the ideal of autonomous, collegially governed universities have medieval origins, in practice universities have often been controlled by other forces, such as state, church or student guilds. The collegial ideal has, however, been reinvigorated repeatedly, for example with the creation of the German research universities in the early 1800s, and was particularly strong in the first half of the 1900s (Alleman, Cliburn Allen, and Haviland Citation2017, 36–56).
However, during the build-up of the welfare state from the 1960s to the 1980s, government spending on universities expanded and came under increased regulation and control. This was linked to the government ambition to use the universities as vehicles for the democratisation of society, and to demands for internal democracy by expanding influence to students and other groups within the universities. This democratising wave of reforms was particularly strong in the Nordic countries, such as Sweden and Finland, which during this period achieved a high level of equality within their educational systems, including higher education (Piketty Citation2014, 246, 307). However, after the 1980s there followed a period of reforms promoted by international organisations such as the OECD, which prescribed that public organisations should not be governed through regulation but through performance targets. The new ideals for university governance were borrowed from the managerial leadership of large corporations rather than from representative democracy. This reform package is often called New Public Management (NPM) (Gruening Citation2001, 1–25).
There was, however, a paradoxical tension built into the core of the NPM-inspired university governance reforms. The reforms were intended to ensure that the system of higher education better catered to the needs of society, market and industry, while the means proposed were loosening regulation and increasing university autonomy. Goal fulfilment should be ensured by a system of evaluations, benchmarking and performance indicators. It was assumed that information technology had made such indirect governance practices effective enough to combine the goal-oriented control of centralisation with the efficiency and flexibility of decentralisation (Yliaska Citation2014, 177). In practice, governments have continued to strive for more hands-on power. They have tried to solve the goal fulfilment-autonomy paradox by ensuring that while university boards are given more independence, they are staffed with numerous representatives from external stakeholders, a solution that has been attempted by legislators in both Sweden and Finland.
However, although the ambitions were similar, the outcomes differ. Based on a study of the constitutions and legislation regarding higher education of the two countries, as well as on the rules of procedure for individual universities, the present article establishes that Finland’s universities are more autonomous than Sweden’s because government has a stronger direct influence there. The divergences in the Finnish and Swedish processes of university reforms are explained by national differences in political culture and models of governance, some of which are enshrined in the constitution.
The many political, legal and administrative similarities between the two countries make it easier to discern the effects of the important differences that also exist in political culture and governance models. In comparative studies using what political scientists call ‘most similar system design’ (Anckar Citation2008), in constitutional law described as ‘most similar cases’ (Hirschl Citation2005), the objects of investigation should ideally be identical except for the variable that is studied. In practise, this is never fully accomplished, but with their common roots, Sweden and Finland are more similar to each other than they are to any other country in the world. The variables studied in this article are differences in political culture and governance model, and their effect on the implementation of reforms regarding university autonomy. Because of the broad basic similarities between the two countries, the effects of the studied variables are more easily discerned, as they are not lost in ‘noice’ from a range of other uncontrollable differences.
Studies of university autonomy have tended to become either case studies or broad surveys that code a range of variables, such as the ‘autonomy scorecard’ (Pruvot & Estermann Citation2017). The survey methodology tends to steer researchers into investigating easily quantifiable variables – for example, is or is not university autonomy mentioned in the constitution. As a consequence, dimensions such as political culture, which concerns how historically rooted practices have evolved together with and interact with constitutions and legislation, are generally lost. Even the most thorough and insightful comparative studies of academic organisation have generally stopped at carefully investigating where countries should be placed in various typologies and categorisations, such as Burton R. Clarke’s (Citation1983, 143) triangle of authority, where academic oligarchy, state and market constitute the points. However, this study attempt to go one step further, and offer historical explanations to why the Swedish and Finnish systems of higher education are positioned as they are in regard to collegial power, government influence and market forces. A study utilising most similar system design can through careful selection of cases combine the analytical strength of comparisons with the depth and contextualisation of case studies. Thereby, a comparison of Sweden and Finland can contribute to the general theoretical understanding of how contextual factors such as political culture and governance models affected international trends regarding university autonomy, an area into which previous studies in the field have not ventured.
Political culture and governance models in Sweden and Finland
In the old Swedish kingdom that existed until 1809, when what was to become present-day Finland was conquered by Russia, a common political culture had developed as delegates from all corners of the kingdom convened at the estates and formed tacit and implicit conventions that influenced political practice (Sennefelt Citation2001). Also after 1809, the developments in the two parts of the former kingdom resembled each other, largely because Finland was often inspired to copy reforms carried out in the old motherland. The Finnish parliament came to issue legislation that built on the Swedish legal tradition and constitution (Jansson Citation2009; Engman Citation2009). However, it has been stressed that despite these common origins, the particular historical developments of the Nordic countries have rendered some aspects of their constitutions and modes of governance surprisingly dissimilar, and differences in these regards can also be found between the East-Nordic countries Sweden and Finland (Krunke and Thorarensen Citation2018).
The common development in the Nordic countries has created a model for public governance that gives extensive autonomy to public administration in the management of everyday operations. Researchers have differentiated between a West-Nordic and an East-Nordic model, where the latter (in Sweden and Finland) is associated with the prohibition of ministerial rule, collective decision making in government and a clear distinction between the government level, where policies are formed, and the agencies that are free to implement these policies without government intervention. It has been claimed that the division in West- and East-Nordic models of governance are no longer applicable, since today only Sweden deviates from the others, as Finland has since the 1990s approached the Danish and Norwegian model. Finnish ministries have gained more direct influence in governance by dissolving many independent agencies, and collective decision making in government in Finland is only necessary regarding questions of general importance. Swedish agencies still enjoy a unique freedom from government intervention in the running of daily affairs but have few possibilities to influence general policies. Internationally, in recent years there has been a move towards independent agencies, in accordance with the principal-agent theory. The Nordic model of governance, and particularly the Swedish that strictly separates ministries that formulate and agencies that implement policies, anticipated the current international process of ‘agencification’, which has become an important aspect of the global NPM trend (Balle Hansen et al. Citation2012; Ahlbäck Öberg and Wockelberg Citation2016; Peters Citation2018, 145).
Besides these recently evolved differences in governance models between Sweden and Finland, there is also a century-old difference in political culture regarding the balance between democracy and rule of law – the principle of the Rechtsstaat. The democratic demand for implementing the will of the majority is not easily reconciled with the Rechtsstaat’s emphasis on human rights and checks and balances. For historical reasons, the balance between these principles has been different in Sweden and Finland (Holmén Citation2018).
Swedish democratic development has been society-oriented rather than individual-oriented. The dominating Social Democrats saw constitutional checks and independent institutions as conservative hindrances to their reform policies, and they were backed by a philosophy of law, Scandinavian legal realism, which distanced itself from natural and human rights. Sweden’s constitution of 1809, which contained some principles of division of power, was out of sync with actual political practises with the advent of democracy in 1921, and a half century described as non-constitutional followed until the constitution underwent a major revision in 1974. The new constitution was dominated by Social Democratic legal realism and was not based on a division of power. A stronger tradition of constitutional checks and division of power has taken form in countries that have experienced periods of authoritarian or despotic rule (Rothstein et al. Citation1995, 87–91; Olsen Citation1990, 26–33; Hermansson Citation1986, 258–259; Holmström Citation1994; Bull Citation2018; Wenander Citation2019).
In nineteenth-century Finland, the Swedish constitution of 1772 was used to safeguard the rights of the Finnish people against the Russian tsar, whose powers were otherwise unlimited by formal constraints (Suksi Citation2018). For the same reason, towards the late nineteenth century, leading Finnish politicians and intellectuals sought strength in the German tradition of the Rechtsstaat, which has since had a strong position in Finland (Sipponen Citation1996, 752). The Finnish Civil War in 1918 strengthened the conviction that popular will had to be curbed through division of power and rule of law. Similar processes have taken place in the state formation of most other European countries.
However, it has to be taken into account that the Swedish emphasis on independent agencies developed for similar reasons as the strong constitutions in Finland and commonplace in continental Europe: as a conservative safeguard against uncurbed political power at the democratic breakthrough in the early 1900s (Wenander Citation2019).
The difference between Sweden and Finland in these regards is a matter of degree; Sweden and Finland should not be understood as absolute opposites. In addition, the differences have been reduced since admission to the EU in 1994, when European law forced Sweden to adapt to mainstream European thinking regarding, for example, human rights and division of power (Holmström Citation1994; Wenander Citation2019). However, this article will illustrate that the differences have been tangible enough to significantly influence how international governance trends in higher education have been implemented in the two countries. In order to understand that development, it is necessary to get an orientation in earlier research regarding the international adaptation of governance trends in higher education.
International trends in university governance
The general international trends in the development of university governance, with a democratising and centralising wave in the 1960s to the 1980s superseded by market-oriented, decentralised reforms, can be found in most countries. Not surprisingly, countries similar to Sweden and Finland, such as Denmark, display a development that mirrors theirs. Lise Degn and Mads Sørensen (Citation2015) have described how Danish higher education has been transformed from a ‘republic of science’, autonomously ruled by professors, through a period of democratic ideals to a view of the university as an instrument of politics, in particular servicing the ambition to create a ‘competition state’.
However, the development is similar also further away from home. As Zapp, Marques and Powell (Citation2021) has claimed, globalisation increases the isomorphic features of universities worldwide. Li Wang (Citation2010) makes it evident that also China, where political development has markedly differed from that of the Western world in the last half century, has followed the same general pattern with a strict government-controlled equality-focused period superseded by liberalisations and increased university autonomy from the 1980s. Also there, the government has struggled with methods for maintaining control while allowing some autonomy that can improve efficiency and ease the burdens of the central administration.
Other Asian countries with different political systems are performing similar balancing acts. Morshidi Sirat and Sarjit Kaur (Citation2010) conclude that although reforms of university governance in Japan and Malaysia have formally increased autonomy, the reforms are still influenced by principal-agent theory, as government asserts control over goal fulfilment through evaluations and other control mechanisms.
Tero Erkkilä and Ossi Piironen (Citation2014) claim that the recent trends towards university autonomy have to be understood in the context of attempts to increase their accountability, driven by the competition provided through international comparative ranking systems. Therefore, they argue that a form of transnational university governance is in place. This might help explain the similarities in university governance trends found in countries from different circumstances.
Although the general influences and legitimisations behind reforms are the same more or less all over the world, the resulting legislation can be very different, not least regarding the role of academic freedom. Lise Degn (Citation2015) concludes that international governance ideas are received very differently depending on national contexts. Although the EU countries have strived to harmonise their higher education through the Bologna process, huge discrepancies can be found between them. Terence Karran (Citation2007) compared the legal protection of academic freedom in EU countries according to five criteria: constitutional protection, specific legislative protection, self-governance, appointment of rector, and protection for academic tenure. Finland had – together with Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Spain – the best protection for academic freedom, scoring ‘high’ on all five parameters. The fact that Hungary, despite its high score, exposed academic freedom to difficult challenges in the following decade illustrates the problem with reducing complex questions into quantitative parameters, and the importance of complementing studies of constitutions with analyses of political culture.
In Karran’s study Sweden scored ‘high’ on protection for tenure, ‘medium’ for constitutional protection and appointment of rector, and ‘low’ on the rest. Thereby, Sweden had the fifth weakest protection for academic freedom of the 23 surveyed EU-states. On the very bottom was the UK, scoring ‘low’ on four variables. The fifth criterion regarding constitutional protection was not applicable, since the country lacks a written constitution. Thus, Karran confirms that Sweden and Finland, despite their cultural and historical affinity, display important differences regarding university autonomy. In order to fully understand how this came to be, we need to understand the circumstances in play when strong constitutional guarantees for university autonomy are generally formed.
Constitutional guarantees for academic freedom and the special historical status of Helsinki University
Although academic freedom is a cherished concept in the world of higher education, there is great variation in what this concept has entailed in different times and geographical settings. A common denominator is, however, that the universities should be able to conduct teaching and research independently from undue political interference. Sometimes it has been tied to tenure for life for professors, and at other times, it has been associated with the rights of students to study freely at the faculty of philosophy, as in Sweden before quotas were introduced in 1969 (Eklund Citation2017). However, certain historical circumstances produce political cultures where academic freedom is also perceived to be in need of strong constitutional guarantees, for example in the form of university autonomy.
In political cultures based on the Rechtsstaat tradition, some important institutions are placed outside the control of parliamentary democracy. Although the most common examples are probably an independent judiciary and free media, academic freedom and university autonomy also belong to this category. An extreme case, the University of California, has been described as the fourth branch of Californian government, on equal standing with the judiciary, the executive and the legislative. According to the state constitution from 1879, the Regents of the university have full power over its organisation and government, while the role of the legislature is limited to securing university funding. In California, the 1870s was a period of economic crisis and political divisions. In addition to unrest among workers in the larger cities, the rural populist Grange movement opposed new urban elites and initially wanted to develop the university into a vocational school emphasising agriculture and mechanics. The constitution of 1879, approved in a referendum, aimed to place the university outside such political conflicts (Douglass Citation2015). The autonomy has been criticised for allowing the university to ignore state legislation on, for example, minimum wages (Scully Citation1987). However, the University of California has maintained its autonomy to this day.
The strong safeguards for the autonomy of Helsinki University in the Finnish constitution were introduced under similar circumstances as those formative for the Californian constitution. After the tumultuous years following Finland’s independence in 1917, including a civil war, the constitution of 1919 shielded Helsinki University from party politics (Klinge Citation1991, 45). However, it did not ‘grant’ Helsinki University autonomy but specifically ‘preserved’ it, reflecting that the university had been outside the control of the senate, the antecessor of Finland’s parliament, already in the nineteenth century, when what was then the Imperial Alexander University was directly connected to the emperor through its chancellor. According to Matti Klinge (Citation1991, 34–35), the university actually lost some of its former administrative autonomy in the governance reform after Finland’s independence.
However, Helsinki, Finland’s only full university at the time of independence, came to retain a preeminent autonomous role in the sphere of Higher Education that developed in the 1900s. Until the late 1970s, degrees at other Finnish universities had to be modelled on those of Helsinki University (Eskola Citation2002, 253–255). The chancellor of Helsinki University still has the right to attend government meetings when questions that concerns the university are discussed (FFS 558/2009).
Still, the law of Helsinki University from 1991 (FFS 854/1991) stipulated the university’s privileges: a national monopoly on calendars in the Finnish and Swedish languages and the right to maintain a pharmacy in Helsinki. The monopoly on calendars disappeared when Finland joined the European common market (RP 256/2006). From 1 May 2007, all Finnish universities were allowed to have their own funds, as had already been the case with Helsinki and Åbo Akademi Universities. The change was in part motivated by the ambitions of the Bologna process (RP 256/2006; FFS 1535/2006). Also in Sweden, the oldest universities, Uppsala and Lund, had by tradition been allowed to keep their own funds (Marcusson Citation2005, 12).
Thus, the law of 2009 is the latest step in a long development during which the difference between the autonomous and privileged Helsinki University and other institutions have gradually decreased, both because of a curbing of Helsinki’s prerogatives and as a consequence of the strengthening of university autonomy in general. European integration seems to have been an important driving force behind this levelling of status. Although Helsinki still maintains some unique privileges, it can be argued that the strong autonomous position of Helsinki University has functioned as a model for the formation of an entire system of higher education that with time has acquired most of Helsinki’s autonomous characteristics.
In Sweden, no single university has had as dominating a position as Helsinki had in Finland. After having lost Turku University in 1809 and the University of Greifswald in 1815 through territorial concessions, two universities remained in Sweden: Uppsala and Lund. Thus, Sweden already had an embryo of a university system. Still today, traces of this difference can be seen. While Helsinki, with approximately 30,000 students is still home to a fifth of Finland’s total (CitationVipunen), Sweden has four universities with between 30,000 and 40,000 students (CitationUKÄ). However, in the twentieth century, a system of higher education took form in both countries. The following section presents an overview of the organisation of these systems and clarifies the legal status of the different institutions within them.
The Finnish and Swedish systems of higher education
Since 1977, the Swedish system of higher education has consisted of universities and university colleges, while the Finnish has consisted of universities and universities of applied sciences. The universities in both countries conduct undergraduate education as well as graduate education and research. The Swedish university colleges still do not have a general right to conduct postgraduate education, but can apply for this right within particular fields. However, they have undergraduate programs leading to traditional academic bachelor and master’s degrees. Studies at Finnish universities of applied sciences lead to a separate degree. The universities of applied sciences are still expected to do research, primarily in cooperation with the local industry and labour market. Both countries have experienced some ‘academic drift’, as university colleges and universities of applied science have attempted to strengthen their academic credentials. This has led to a decrease in the difference between them and the universities.
In both Sweden and Finland, some institutions of higher education are regulated by special legislation. The Swedish Defence University and the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences have their own laws (SFS 2007:1164; SFS 1993:221), but the stipulations regarding their governance are almost identical to those of the Higher Education Ordinance (SFS 1993:100) that regulates other public universities. Each country has two foundation universities: Tampere Technical University and Aalto University in Finland and Jönköping University and Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden. Finland has a National Defence University, which is not regulated by the university law of 2009 but is subject to the Ministry of Defence. The Universities of Applied Sciences are all subject to the Ministry of Education, with the exception of the Police University College, which is under the Ministry of the Interior, and Åland University of Applied Sciences. The latter is regulated by a separate law issued by the regional government on Åland and has not become a joint stock company (Narikka and Nurmi Citation2013, 31; FFS 1164/2013; ÅFS 81/2002).
Most Swedish and Finnish institutions of higher education, whether state universities or private foundations, get the bulk of their funding from the government. In the 2010s, Swedish government funding has been more generous while Finnish universities have experienced budget cuts. Of course, the dependence on government funding affects the real autonomy of higher education, but this is not an aspect that will be explored further in this article because the focus here is on regulations of governance. However, it should be noted that the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE) is an exception with predominantly private funding. SSE also has a uniquely independent legal position. It is neither an association, a government agency, a foundation, or a joint stock company, but an independent legal subject sui generis, in a category of its own (SSE Annual Report Citation2018, 6).
In Sweden, a number of agencies govern the system of higher education, the most important of them the Swedish Higher Education Authority (Universitetskanslersämbetet) and the Swedish Council for Higher Education (Universitets och högskolerådet). In Finland, there are no comparable agencies, and higher education is governed directly by the Department of Education. This reflects a general pattern where Sweden has substantially more agencies than Finland, 360 compared to 134 (Balle Hansen et al. Citation2012, 260). Finland has since the 1990s reduced the number of agencies and retracted their areas of responsibility to the ministries. However, the field of higher education has never had any independent agencies.
Both Swedish and Finnish institutions of higher education are subject to a diverse flora of evaluations, as has been international custom under the NPM paradigm, and often these evaluations are merely perceived as a time-consuming nuisance. However, the evaluations conducted by the Swedish Higher Education Authority carries more weight, since the agency is tasked with monitoring the higher education institutions’ regulatory compliance and with granting them the power to award degrees.
Another important difference in the judicial status of Finnish and Swedish public institutions of higher education is that the Finnish ones are independent legal subjects, while the Swedish are considered parts of the legal subject the state. In Finland, such associations under public law (julkisoikeudellinen yhteisö/offentligrättsligt samfund) exist as an intermediate form between public and private that would be difficult to combine with the Swedish constitution (Wenander Citation2019, 128). This means that Swedish universities are not allowed, for example, to own real estate or enter into contracts. The latter has been increasingly problematic as universities are today expected to interact with the public sector and take part in international collaborations (Heckscher Citation2015). The smaller difference between public and private universities in Finland facilitates their regulation by the same law, while the Swedish law of higher education only applies to public institutions.
The legal foundation of academic freedom and university autonomy
Already at the constitutional level, there are important differences between Finland and Sweden. The Finnish constitution – as most constitutions – mainly list the rights of citizens, thus putting limits on the influence of government. However, the Swedish constitution also lists a number of values that the government is obliged to promote. Thereby, it induces the government to influence citizens in a desirable political direction. The sentence ‘The public institutions shall promote the ideals of democracy as guidelines in all sectors of society’ (RF Chapter Citation1 §Citation2) has especially caused criticism, since it might encourage a politicisation of all institutions (Rothstein Citation2019). Thus, there is a discernible difference between a Swedish political culture that emphasised democracy, empowering the democratically elected parliament, and a Finnish political culture where rule of law is allowed to put more checks on the influence of politics.
The Constitutional Law Committee of the Finnish parliament, which was introduced through the constitution of 2000, has had a substantial influence on the legislative process. It has been claimed that the Committee has been politicised, since the MPs in the committee have objected to bills on the grounds of party politics rather than out concern for the constitution. The nine political experts in the committee do, however, have an important role, and since they are mostly professors of law, the committee not only moderates the balance between the legislature and the judiciary but also between parliament and academia.
In addition, academic freedom and university autonomy has a much stronger protection in the Finnish constitution than in the Swedish, which lacked any provisions regarding academic freedom until an addition in 2011 protected the freedom of research (SFS 2010:1408, Chapter 2, §18), but did not mention university autonomy. Finland’s first constitution from 1919 only mentioned Helsinki University, the country’s only university at the time (FFS 94:1919, §77). The new constitution of 2000 safeguards the freedom of science, art and higher education, and guarantees autonomy for higher education (FFS 731/1999. §16, §123). The Finnish constitutional guarantees have not remained mere rhetoric, but have had a tangible influence on legislation in the field of higher education, as illustrated by how the membership of university boards has developed in the two countries.
In Sweden, legislation has gradually increased the influence of external representatives in university boards since they were first introduced in 1977. Initially, they were in a minority, but from 1988 they should constitute the majority of the board. Until 1998, the vice chancellor of the university should be chair of the board, but from then also the chairman was external (Ahlbäck Öberg and Sundberg Citation2016, Citation2017). Also at the foundation universities, Chalmers University and Jönköping University, the majority of the foundations’ boards are elected directly by the government (CitationChalmers University; CitationJönköping University).
Until 1997, separate laws regulated all Finnish universities. The University law issued that year declared that all universities have autonomy and enjoy freedom of education and research as well as artistic freedom. It also declared that the vice chancellor should be chairman of the university board. In addition, the three groups – (1) professors and assistant professors, (2) other staff, and (3) students – should be represented on the board, but none of these groups should have more than half of the seats on the board. External members, not belonging to any of the three internal groups, could constitute a maximum of one-third of the board members, according to the law of 1997 (FFS 645/1997). In general, the universities elected only one external member of the board (Narikka and Nurmi Citation2013, 54).
The Finnish parliament issued a new university law in 2009, and under influence of the constitution from 2000, its provisions for university autonomy became stronger than the legislators had originally intended. In preparation for the university law of 2009, the government originally suggested that the university boards should consist of between 6 and 14 members, half of them from the universities and half external, with the chairman chosen from among the external board members. The university community opposed this suggestion and claimed that such a large number of external representatives was unconstitutional. The Constitutional Law Committee also objected to the original bill, which would have allowed external members to comprise a majority on university boards. According to the committee, external majority was incompatible with §123 of the constitution, which granted universities autonomy. Consequently, the law was rewritten to make external majority impossible. The final version stated that the chairman and at least 40% of the board members should represent external interests. These external board members should, however, be elected by the university collegium. The board should consist of 7 or 9–14 members. The alternatives 6 or 8 were removed, since in those cases a minimum of 40% was equal to 50%, which had been deemed unconstitutional (FFS 558/2009; Narikka and Nurmi Citation2013, 54–55, 61–62).
Through the law of 2009, Finnish universities became independent legal subjects, either under public law or as foundations. Of Finland’s 16 universities, 14 are legal subjects under public law while the Aalto University in Helsinki and Tampere Technical University have chosen to become foundations. The foundation form is intended for universities specialising in sectors where sufficient private funding is available. The current foundation universities are both technical with close ties to industry (Narikka and Nurmi Citation2013, 30, 32).
Also in the case of the foundation universities, the Constitutional Law Committee defended university autonomy. The government had intended to give the collegial bodies power in academic matters, but let the foundation decide over the financials. However, the committee claimed that economy belonged to the university autonomy safeguarded in the constitution. Therefore, in the final legislation the universities’ representative bodies elected the board, not the founders of the foundation as originally intended. Despite these checks by the constitutional committee, the share of external members on university boards increased through the 2009 reform (FFS 558/2009; Narikka and Nurmi Citation2013, 54–55, 61–62).
Until 2014, Finland’s 25 Universities of Applied Sciences were not independent legal subjects but under the auspices of a principal, which could be a municipality, a federation of municipalities, or an association. However, the law of 2014 transformed them into joint stock companies (FFS 932/2014, 351/2003, 255/1995). Also, the universities of applied sciences have experienced an increase in the share of external board members. In the legislation from 2003, a maximum of 30% of the board could represent external interests, while the law of 2014 gave them between 71% and 78% of the seats (FFS 351/2003 §11, 932/2014 §17). The universities of applied sciences do not enjoy the autonomy that the constitution grant the universities, and therefore the constitutional law committee does not object to them having over 50% external board members, mostly representing the regional industries. However, in the legislation of 2014, the universities of applied sciences were granted freedom of instruction and research (FFS 932/2014, 351/2003).
Thus, Swedish and Finnish legislation has strengthened the rhetorical support for academic freedom, while external interests have increased their foothold on university boards. At Finnish universities, this trend has been curtailed by the Constitutional Law Committees’ interpretation that the external majority in university boards runs contrary to the autonomy granted to universities by the constitution. A similar demand has not been put on the boards of the universities of applied sciences. On the contrary, the substantial external influence in their boards is in harmony with the law’s prescription that they should cooperate with local industry.
The collegial bodies
According to the Finnish university law of 2009, all universities should have a collegial body at the university level, as well as at each faculty. The collegium decides the size of the board, as well as, within the limits of the law, the distributions of chairs in the board among the different groups represented there. The university level collegial body is also responsible for electing the external members of the university board. At foundation universities, they are elected among candidates proposed by the founders, but at other universities, the collegium can choose freely. In addition, the collegium is – except at the foundation universities – responsible for granting discharge or bringing actions for damages to the president and board members. Thus, there is no doubt that the 2009 university law places the ultimate power over Finnish universities at the collegium, although to a lesser degree at the foundation universities, where some influence has been transferred to the founders (FFS 558/2009, §15, §22, §24, §26).
The Swedish so-called Autonomy Reform of 2011 was a step in the other direction. The report that prepared the reform suggested that universities were transformed from government agencies to independent legal subjects. This was never implemented, but the reform did instead allow universities to organise their internal decision making freely, removing the demand for collegial bodies. This enabled several universities to transform into top-down organisations inspired by business management, with a reduced influence for collegial bodies at faculty or department level, while the power of the vice chancellor was strengthened (SOU Citation2008:Citation104; SFS 2009:764; SFS 2009:933; Sundberg, Citation2013, Citation2014). In effect, the Swedish ‘autonomy’ reform meant that the government gave the university boards, where the majority was elected by the government, the power to abolish all governing bodies within the university not dominated by direct or indirect government appointees.
However, the extent to which that happened varied between different universities. The younger and smaller universities and university colleges have mainly implemented a top down-line management. The older and larger universities – Uppsala, Lund and Stockholm – have maintained most of the old collegial structures. In the last of Sweden’s four largest universities, Gothenburg, the autonomy reform led to a reduction of collegiate influence in many respects (Sundberg Citation2013, Citation2014). In spite of this, Gothenburg is the university that has most strongly emphasised collegiality on a rhetorical level in their internal regulations ever since the reform. Following an intense debate in the 2010s, universities such as Uppsala and Lund have rewritten their internal regulations, stressing the importance of collegial forms of governance in the introduction. While Lund and Gothenburg mention both ‘collegiality’ and the opposing principle ‘line management’ (linjestyrning), Uppsala only speaks of collegiality. In Uppsala and Lund, new collegial bodies at the university level have appeared on the organisational schemas – in Lund directly after the autonomy reform, in Uppsala in 2020, when it replaced the older ‘senate’ (LS Citation2010/Citation625; STYR Citation2019/Citation1903; Dnr V Citation2011/Citation155; Dnr Citation2020/Citation1571; UFV Citation2011/Citation1724; UFV Citation2017/Citation95).
Superficially, Lund’s and Uppsala’s organisational schemas now look similar to those of Finnish universities. However, the Swedish university level collegial bodies have a merely advisory role, except in electing faculty representatives to the university boards – where they constitute a minority, outnumbered by government-elected external board members. In Sweden, where collegial bodies exist, power is delegated to them by the board and the vice chancellor, while in Finland the power of the board and vice chancellor ultimate stems from the collegium, which elects the board majority.
Conclusions
Although recent reforms of higher education in Sweden and Finland have been inspired by the same international trends, the outcomes differ markedly, since the reforms have been shaped by differences in constitution, political culture and governance models. Both countries have struggled with how to combine the ambitions of increasing the societal and market value produced by universities, with the ideals of increased autonomy. The trend over the recent decades, internationally as well as in Sweden and Finland, has been to strengthen the emphasis in legislation on autonomy and academic freedom. However, the strengthened autonomy ultimately rests at the university board, where the teachers and researchers have seen their representation and influence dwindle.
In Sweden as well as in Finland, the protection for academic freedom and university autonomy has been strengthened rhetorically in the legislation, while the influence of external stakeholders over the governance of higher education has increased. At Finnish universities, this trend has, however, been slowed by the Constitutional law committee’s interpretation of the strong constitutional safeguards for university autonomy.
Another difference between Sweden and Finland is the exceptional historical status of Helsinki University. Although this initially limited the autonomy of other universities, as they were obliged to follow the lead of Helsinki, it can be argued that the strong autonomy of the present Finnish university system has been modelled on Helsinki’s older position.
These differences fall back on the greater emphasis in Finnish political culture on institutions that can counterbalance the power of political government. In Finland, academic freedom is supposed to be safeguarded by the universities’ autonomy, which is enshrined in the constitution. Similar checks and balances on political power over universities have been introduced in other constitutions revised after periods of societal upheaval, such as in California in the 1870s. Thus, many of the differences in how new public management in recent decades was implemented in the Swedish and Finnish systems of higher education have their roots in old differences in political culture that took form during Finland’s period as a part of the Russian empire and during the first years of independence, which included a civil war. The prospects that the country could be ruled by autocrats or revolutionaries made Finnish political culture value institutions independent of political power. Swedish history lacks similar experiences, and the government has generally been perceived as benevolent. Swedish political culture was shaped in the 1900s by the long reign of the Social Democratic party, and constitutional barriers to political power were considered undemocratic, as they functioned as conservative brakes on the will of the people. Thus, the unhindered implementation of government policies in all areas of society has been equated with democracy.
The Swedish version of the East-Nordic governance model also strictly reserves the formulation of policies to government, while execution is left in the hands of independent agencies. That the ultimate control of the Swedish universities is firmly in the hands of government, who elects the board majority, is in line with this principle. The defence of collegiality at Swedish universities after the autonomy reform has mainly focused on maintaining collegial bodies at the faculty and at the departmental level, and autonomous universities of the Finnish model, where the majority of the board is elected by the collegium and not the government, has not been envisioned. Only recently, after the emergence of a strong populist party, the constitution’s stipulation that government is obliged to promote its values in all areas of society have been put into question.
It also has to be pointed out that the strong provisions against ministerial rule in the Swedish political system give all agencies, including universities, a certain level of autonomy vis-à-vis government in their execution. Since this part of the Swedish model of governance was introduced as a conservative safeguard at the introduction of parliamentarism and democracy, it has a similar origin and functions as constitutionally guaranteed division of power in other countries such as Finland. It is possible that this has contributed to the fact that strong specific constitutional guarantees for academic freedom and university autonomy have not been considered necessary in Sweden. However, an academic freedom that entails the right for academia to not only execute but also formulate its own goals would be foreign to the role of agencies in Swedish political culture.
Globalisation and European integration have levelled out some differences between the countries’ systems of higher education, as well as between universities within each country. It can be expected that internationalisation will continue to assert pressure on higher education reform. For example, Swedish state universities are still ill-adapted to enter into agreements in international collaborations, as they are not independent legal subjects. Future reforms will, however, not be created from a blank slate, but will inevitably be influenced both by global trends and by the political environment in which they originate. An understanding of how international currents interact with historically evolved national cultures of governance is of vital importance when evaluating alternative paths forward.
Although this study has focused on Sweden and Finland, its findings might help explain the status of university autonomy in general. The most important conclusion of the study is that university autonomy cannot be analysed in isolation, but should be understood as part of a broader politico-cultural and constitutional framework of checks and balances and independent institutions. In political cultures where undivided political power is looked upon with suspicion, often for historical reasons, independent centers of power such as autonomous universities are allowed to develop. However, in political cultures where government is more unproblematically associated with the will of the people, phenomena such as autonomous universities are looked upon with suspicion as bastions outside democratic control.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Janne Holmén
Janne Holmén is Associate Professor of History of Education at Uppsala University, Sweden, and researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University, Sweden. His research focuses on comparative studies in educational history with an emphasis on the Nordic countries. He has published studies on Cold War textbooks, reforms of teacher education, as well as mental maps and historical consciousness.
References
- ÅFS. Ålands författningssamling [Åland Code of Statutes]. https://www.regeringen.ax/alandsk-lagstiftning/alands-forfattningssamling.
- Ahlbäck Öberg, Shirin, and Elin Sundberg. 2016. “Avkollegialiseringen av den Svenska Högskolan.” In Det Hotade Universitetet, edited by Shirin Ahlbäck Öberg, Li Bennich-Björkman, Jörgen Hermansson, Anna Jarstad, Christer Karlsson, and Sten Widmalm, 52–57. Stockholm: Dialogos.
- Ahlbäck Öberg, Shirin, and Elin Sundberg. 2017. “Vad har Hänt med det Kollegiala Styret.” In Det Ostyrda Universitetet?: Perspektiv på Styrning, Autonomi och Reform av Svenska Lärosäten, edited by Linda Wedlin, and Josef Pallas, 91–119. Göteborg: Makadam.
- Ahlbäck Öberg, Shirin, and Helena Wockelberg. 2016. “Nordic Administrative Heritages and Contemporary Institutional Design.” In Nordic Administrative Reforms: Lessons for Public Management, edited by Carsten Greve, Per Lægreid, and Lise H. Rykkja, 57–78. London: Palgrave Mac Millan.
- Alleman, Nathan F., Cara Cliburn Allen, and Don Haviland. 2017. “Collegiality and the Collegium in an Era of Faculty Differentiation.” ASHE Higher Education Report 43 (4): 7–122.
- Anckar, Dag. 2008. “On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11 (5): 389–401.
- Balle Hansen, Morten, Per Lægreid, Jon Pierre, and Ari Salminen. 2012. “Comparing Agencification in Nordic Countries.” In Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries, edited by Koen Verhoest, Sandra van Thiel, Geert Bouckaert, and Per Lægreid, 259–264. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bull, Thomas. 2018. “Institutions and Division of Powers.” In The Nordic Constitutions : A Comparative and Contextual Study, edited by Helle Krunke, and Björg Thorarensen, 43–66. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Casson, Andrew. 2019. A Reasonable Autonomy – Some Questions About Academic Autonomy in the Nordic Countries. Stockholm: Sveriges universities- och högskoleförbund.
- Chalmers University. “Om Chalmersstiftelsen.” Accessed 26 January 2021. https://www.chalmers.se/sv/stiftelse/om-stiftelsen/Sidor/default.aspx.
- Clark, Burton R. 1983. The Higher Education System. Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Degn, Lise. 2015. “Translating Governance Ideas in Danish Higher Education.” Higher Education Policy 28 (3): 295–313.
- Degn, Lise, and Mads P. Sørensen. 2015. “From Collegial Governance to Conduct of Conduct: Danish Universities Set Free in the Service of the State.” Higher Education 69 (6): 931–946.
- Dnr 2020/1571. Arbetsordning vid Göteborgs universitet. [Rules of Procedure for Gothenburg University.] Available through Registrator, Gothenburg University.
- Dnr V 2011/155. Arbetsordning vid Göteborgs universitet [Rules of Procedure for Gothenburg University]. Available through Registrator, Gothenburg University.
- Douglass, John Aubrey. 2015. “How the University of California Got Its Autonomy.” Research and Occasional Paper Series. Berkeley: University of California. https://cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/publications/rops.cshe_.4.15.douglass.ucautonomy.4.1.2015.pdf.
- Eklund, Alexander. 2017. Kampen om Vetenskapen: Politisk och Vetenskaplig Formering Under den Svenska Vänsterradikaliseringens era. Göteborg: Daidalos.
- Engman, Max. 2009. Ett Långt Farväl: Finland Mellan Sverige och Ryssland Efter 1809. Atlantis: Stockholm.
- Erkkilä, Tero, and Ossi Piironen. 2014. “Shifting Fundaments of European Higher Education Governance: Competition, Ranking, Autonomy and Accountability.” Comparative Education 50 (2): 177–191.
- Eskola, Seikko. 2002. “Tiedepolitiikka ja Korkeakoulut.” In Suomen Tieteen Historia 4, edited by Päiviö Tommila, 222–391. Helsinki: WSOY.
- FFS. Finlands författningssamling [Finnish Code of Statutes]. https://www.finlex.fi/sv/laki/kokoelma/
- Gruening, Gernod. 2001. “Origin and Theoretical Basis of New Public Management.” International Public Management Journal 4 (1): 1–25.
- Heckscher, Sten. 2015. Ökad Handlingsfrihet för Universitet och Högskolor. Stockholm: En rapport till Stockholm – Uppsala universitetsnätverk.
- Hermansson, Jörgen. 1986. “Demokrati i Västerländsk Mening.” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 89 (4): 258–259.
- Hirschl, Ran. 2005. “The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 53 (1): 125–156.
- Holmén, Janne. 2018. “Den Demokratiska Skolan: Om Likvärdighet och Delaktighet 1960–2020.” In Demokratins Drivkrafter: Kontext och Särdrag i Finlands och Sveriges Demokratier 1890–2020, edited by Henrik Meinander, Petri Karonen, and Kjell Östberg, 257–294. Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet. [In English as Holmén, Janne. 2020. Nordic Models for a Democratic School: Educational Reform and Political Culture in Sweden and Finland 1960–2020. Independently published.].
- Holmström, Barry. 1994. “The Judicialization of Politics in Sweden.” International Political Science Review 15 (2): 153–164.
- Husa, Jaakko. 2015. A New Introduction to Comparative Law. Oxford: Hart.
- Jansson, Torkel. 2009. Rikssprängningen som kom av sig: Finsk-Svenska Gemenskaper Efter 1809. Atlantis: Stockholm.
- Jönköping University. “Stiftelsestyrelse.” Accessed 26 January 2021. https://ju.se/om-oss/jonkoping-university/organisation/stiftelsestyrelse.html.
- Karran, Terence. 2007. “Academic Freedom in Europe: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis.” Higher Education Policy 20 (3): 289–313.
- Klinge, Matti. 1991. Helsingfors Universitet 1917–1990. Helsingfors: Otava.
- Krunke, Helle, and Björg Thorarensen. 2018. “Concluding Thoughts.” In The Nordic Constitutions : A Comparative and Contextual Study, edited by Helle Krunke, and Björg Thorarensen, 203–218. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- LS 2010/625. Arbetsordning för Lunds universitet [Rules of Procedure for Lund University]. Available through Registrator, Lund University.
- Marcusson, Lena. 2005. Universitetens Rättsliga Ställning. Stockholm: Sveriges universitets- och högskoleförbund.
- Narikka, Joukko, and Eerikki Nurmi. 2013. Uudet Yliopistot ja Uudistuvat Ammattikorkeakoulut. Tietosanoma: Helsinki.
- Olsen, Johan P. 1990. Demokrati på Svenska. Stockholm: Carlsons.
- Peters, B. Guy. 2018. The Politics of Bureaucracy. An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration. 7th ed. New York: Routledge.
- Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pruvot, Enora Bennetot, and Thomas Estermann. 2017. University Autonomy in Europe III. The Scorecard. Brussels: EUA.
- RF Chapter 1 §2. Regeringsformen. [The Instrument of Government.] Stockholm.
- Rothstein, Bo. 2019. “Populisterna Använder sin Makt för att Kolonisera Staten.” Dagens Nyheter 23), March. https://www.dn.se/debatt/populisterna-anvander-sin-makt-for-att-kolonisera-staten/.
- Rothstein, Bo, Peter Esaiasson, Jörgen Hermansson, Michele Micheletti, and Olof Petersson. 1995. Demokrati som Dialog: Demokratirådets Rapport 1995. Stockholm: SNS.
- RP 256/2006. Regeringens Proposition Till Riksdagen med Förslag Till lag om ending av Universitetslagen. Helsinki.
- Scully, Caitlin M. 1987. “Autonomy and Accountability: The University of California and the State Constitution.” The Hastings Law Journal 38 (5): 927–955.
- Sennefelt, Karin. 2001. Den Politiska Sjukan: Dalupproret 1743 och Frihetstida Politisk Kultur. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- SFS. Svensk författningssamling [Swedish Code of Statutes]. https://svenskforfattningssamling.se/.
- Sipponen, Kauko. 1996. “Julkinen Valta ja Yksilö.” In Suomen Keskushallinnon Historia 1809–1996, edited by Jaakko Numminen, and Raimo Savolainen. Edita: Helsinki. 1996.
- Sirat, Morshidi, and Sarjit Kaur. 2010. “Changing State–University Relations: The Experiences of Japan and Lessons for Malaysia.” Comparative Education 46 (2): 189–205.
- SOU 2008:104. Självständiga lärosäten: Betänkande av autonomiutredningen. Stockholm.
- SSE. Stockholm School of Economics, Annual Report 2018. Accessed 10 January 2021. https://www.hhs.se/contentassets/cceda259e4804f5fbdda194d8c430b5e/arsredovisning-2018.pdf.
- STYR 2019/1903. Arbetsordning för Lunds universitet [Rules of Procedure for Lund University]. Available through Registrator, Lund University.
- Suksi, Markku. 2018. “Common Roots of Nordic Constitutional Law? Some Observations on Legal-Historical Development and Relations Between the Constitutional Systems of Five Nordic Countries.” In The Nordic Constitutions : A Comparative and Contextual Study, edited by Helle Krunke, and Björg Thorarensen, 9–42. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Sundberg, Elin. 2013. Autonomireformen: Vad Hände med det Kollegiala Styret? C-Uppsats. Uppsala: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala Universitet. Accessed 21 May 2019. http://docplayer.se/7153704-Autonomireformen-vad-hande-med-det-kollegiala-styret.html.
- Sundberg, Elin. 2014. Autonomireformen: En Kompletterande Studie av Förändringar i Beslutsmakt vid fem Lärosäten. Uppsala: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala Universitet. Accessed 21 May 2019. https://docplayer.se/4367883-Autonomireformen-en-kompletterande-studie-av-forandringar-i-beslutsmakt-vid-fem-larosaten.html.
- UFV 2011/1724. Arbetsordning vid Uppsala Universitet [Rules of Procedure for Uppsala University]. Available Through Registrator. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- UFV 2017/95. Arbetsordning vid Uppsala Universitet [Rules of Procedure for Uppsala University]. Available Through Registrator. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- UKÄ. Universitetskanslersämbetet statistical database (Accessed February 10, 2021) https://www.uka.se/statistik–analys/statistikdatabas-hogskolan-i-siffror/statistikomrade.html?statq=https://statistik-api.uka.se/api/totals/1.
- Wenander, Henrik. 2019. “Den Statliga Förvaltningens Konstitutionella Ställning i Sverige och Finland – Pragmatism och Principer.” Tidskrift Utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland 154 (3): 103–150.
- Vipunen. statistical database (Accessed February 10, 2021) https://vipunen.fi/fi-fi/_layouts/15/xlviewer.aspx?id=/fi-fi/Raportit/Yliopistokoulutuksen%20opiskelijat-n%C3%A4k%C3%B6kulma-yliopisto.xlsb.
- Wang, Li. 2010. “Higher Education Governance and University Autonomy in China.” Globalisation, Societies and Education 8 (4): 477–495.
- Yliaska, Ville. 2014. Tehokkuuden Toiveuni: Uuden Julkisjohtamisen Historia Suomessa 1970-Luvulta 1990-Luvulle. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.
- Zapp, Mike, Marcelo Marques, and Justin J. W. Powell. 2021. “Blurring the Boundaries. University Actorhood and Institutional Change in Global Higher Education.” Comparative Education.