Lost in Translation: The Problem of Perceptual Limitations in Civil War Peace Negotiation

Abstract

This article examines the negative role that actors' perceptual limitations play in civil war peace negotiation by reviewing the Sino-Khmer Rouge interplay during the Cambodian peace negotiations (1987–1993). The study contends that China continually failed to challenge the Khmer Rouge's negotiation strategies, which were founded on the faction's flawed understanding of its situation. Moreover, the inadequate communication between China and its client faction and the Khmer Rouge's lack of institutions for obtaining and analyzing information are identified as the two main reasons for the failure of Chinese intervention.

Keywords:

• bounded awareness
• Cambodia
• civil war
• peace negotiation
• perception

Notes

¹Despite the importance of the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from the peace process as a key event that had a fundamentally negative impact on the Cambodian process, few studies have examined this subject. Of those that have, most have been either superficial explanations lacking substantial evidence or examinations of the cultural and ideological motivations of the Khmer Rouge with no exploration of the dynamics of the negotiation process. Hence, the reasons behind the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal still remain unidentified.

²Although “Western society” is a broad concept, the term in this context indicates the major European or American intervening states and organizations that were involved in peace processes during the 1990s.

³In fact, China had never sought outright victory for the faction because the four years of Khmer Rouge rule had not been beneficial to Chinese interests.

⁴It is not clear whether the Khmer Rouge did not realize that the PAVN's withdrawal had actually been implemented or simply refused to accept it. All former Khmer Rouge military commanders that I interviewed stated that the PAVN withdrawal in 1987 was a deception. Nevertheless, none of them provided concrete evidence of this, and most of their answers were very brief and many were identical. Considering that these commanders are prominent information sources on the Khmer Rouge leadership, it is possible that the leadership shared what limited information was available to it and judged the situation accordingly, or the commanders believed similar information released by one or a small number of source(s).

⁵It remains a matter of dispute whether China stopped its military aid completely in 1990. However, it appears to be the case that the amount of military aid post-1990, if any, was significantly less than the aid provided in the previous periods.

⁶The domestic dynamics of the Khmer Rouge's two-level game partly caused these misunderstandings. The hardliners in the leadership, such as Ieng Sary, were excluded from major decision making in this period, and the reformists' ideas dominated the internal discussions. However, as with the hard-liners' arguments, the new ideas were a result of their “bounded awareness” and were based on very limited information.

⁷Evaluating the success of a negotiation is complicated not only by the complexity of the concept but also because interpretations of what constitutes “success” differ according to people's perceptions. The author takes the view that the main purpose of peace negotiation is “discontinuing ongoing military conflicts and providing the foundation for further peacebuilding.” Hence, this article defines a “successful negotiation” as one in which the following minimalist conditions are met: (a) the fighting came to an end, (b) demobilization of forces was completed, (c) key provisions of the accords provided for a restructuring of the armed forces and police, and (d) the holding of free and fair elections occurred. These criteria are consistent with the goals that China pursued in the Cambodian peace negotiation from August 1990.