Norms, non-combatants’ agency and restraint in jihadi violence in northern Mali

ABSTRACT

In 2012, several Jihadi armed groups stormed the northern part of Mali and became the unchallenged rulers of two-thirds of the country. Each group governed based on Islamic Law, codifying violence against their enemies in combat and the populations they controlled. Despite drawing on similar jihadist ideology, these governing systems differed significantly in their uses of violence and jurisprudence. What explains the emergence and legitimization of such contrasting norms? We compare patterns of violence and restraint in the regions of Kidal and Gao based on interviews with diverse protagonists of the occupation, including former members of Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). In Kidal, the Ansar Dine commander’s decision to follow local Islamic jurisprudence limited violence. In contrast, MUJAO rule over Gao used forms of punishment encompassing physical violence to assert political hegemony despite opposition from influential local imams and youth movements. Figures among the noncombatant population also influenced the formation and interpretation of norms among these groups, though less so under strong military imperatives. The findings highlight the importance of searching for a common language over norms of government between insurgents and populations as a key source of restraint.

En 2012, varios grupos armados yihadistas irrumpieron en la parte norte de Malí y se convirtieron en los gobernantes indiscutidos de dos tercios del país. Cada grupo gobernaba con base en la ley islámica, codificando la violencia contra sus enemigos en combate y las poblaciones que controlaban. A pesar de basarse en una ideología yihadista similar, estos sistemas de gobierno diferían significativamente en su uso de la violencia y la jurisprudencia. ¿Qué explica el surgimiento y legitimación de normas tan contrastantes? Comparamos los patrones de violencia y moderación en las regiones de Kidal y Gao a partir de entrevistas con diversos protagonistas de la ocupación, incluidos exmiembros de Ansar Dine y el Movimiento para la Unidad y la Yihad en África Occidental (MUYAO). En Kidal, la decisión del comandante de Ansar Dine de seguir la jurisprudencia islámica local limitó la violencia. En contraste, a pesar de la oposición de influyentes imanes locales y movimientos juveniles, el gobierno del MUYAO en Gao utilizó formas de castigo que incluían la violencia física para afirmar la hegemonía política. Las figuras entre la población no combatiente también influyeron en la formación e interpretación de las normas entre estos grupos, aunque en menor medida bajo los fuertes imperativos militares. Los hallazgos destacan la importancia de buscar un lenguaje común sobre las normas de gobierno entre los insurgentes y las poblaciones como una fuente clave de moderación.

En 2012, plusieurs groupes djihadistes armés ont pris d’assaut le nord du Mali et sont devenus maîtres incontestés des deux tiers du pays. Chaque groupe gouvernait par la loi islamique en codifiant la violence contre leurs ennemis au combat et contre les populations contrôlées. Bien qu’ils s’inspiraient d’une idéologie djihadiste similaire, ces systèmes de gouvernement étaient significativement différents dans leurs usages de la violence et de la jurisprudence. Comment expliquer l’émergence et la légitimation de telles normes contradictoires ? Nous avons comparé des schémas de violence et de retenue dans les régions de Kidal et de Gao en nous basant sur des entretiens avec divers protagonistes de l’occupation, notamment avec d’anciens membres d’Ançar Eddine et du Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’ouest (MUJAO). À Kidal, la décision du commandant d’Ançar Eddine de suivre la jurisprudence islamique locale a limité la violence. À l’inverse, le MUJAO a régné sur Gao en ayant recours à des formes de sanction englobant la violence physique pour affirmer son hégémonie politique malgré l’opposition d’imams et de jeunes mouvements locaux influents. Des figures de la population non combattante ont également influencé la formation et l’interprétation des normes au sein de ces groupes avec un succès moindre lorsque les groupes armés faisaient face à de forts impératifs militaires. Nos conclusions mettent en évidence l’importance de la recherche d’un langage commun pour les normes de gouvernement entre insurgés et populations qui serait une source clé de retenue.

KEYWORDS:

• Civil war
• Mali
• violence
• restraint
• Islam

Notes

¹ According to Ould Hamaha, a Timbuktu leader and spokesperson of the jihadi coalition, which ruled Northern Mali in 2012. In footage circulated on social media in 2012, he declares: “To cut hands or stone adultery couples [i.e., enforce Sharia Law as recommended by the AQ doctrine], one needs to establish power first.” For the near future, Ould Hamaha insists that holding territory is not a priority, revealing an intention to conquer populations first (“We’re here for Islam, we’re not here for a territory, we’re not here for air conditioning!”).

² While relations between jihadis and separatists turned violent in Gao, in Kidal, the armed groups cooperated de facto and the MNLA managed to maintain some military presence. In May 2020, Ansar Dine and the MNLA signed an agreement of joint governance over the Azawad, which was soon contested by a branch of the MNLA rejecting any collaboration with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Bouhlel 2020).

³ The group is known locally after its French acronym.

⁴ However, we can hypothesize that the nature of violence perpetrated and the ethnic divide prevailing in the city has some proximity with the Gao configuration we describe herein.

⁵ While MUJAO’s protagonists' mind-set and practice inherit from their former affiliation, the political configuration they encountered in Gao created a fairly new entity, organizationally distant from AQIM.

⁶ There is certainly some overlap between Islamic Law (Shah 2013), International Humanitarian Law, and populations’ expectations about what is right.

⁷ Interview with Ansar Dine cadre, Nouakchott, July 2013.

⁸ The notion of asabiyya (group feeling) has been discussed at length by Khaldoun (1997).

⁹ Iyad Ag Ghaly refers here to the pre-war state of affairs, during which the central authorities entertained murky relations with jihadis to keep a check on Tuareg separatist aspirations.

¹⁰ A consensus emerged among fuqahas (Islamic juridical specialists of fiqh), to whom defensive jihad is licit against French forces. Tactical considerations nuanced the statement though, as the risk of fitna and violence was invoked by some to opt for a negotiated, peaceful solution.

¹¹ This fragile state hegemony was paradoxically based on a network of non-state actors, locally influential in the economy and the security sector and loyal to Bamako’s authorities.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross.