State intervention, external spoilers, and the durability of peace agreements

ABSTRACT

How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement status quo, and in instances of multiple interventions, b) whether state interveners converge or diverge in their level of satisfaction. I trace state interveners’ level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo in the economic and political signals they send in the post-agreement period. I examine the durability of intra-state peace agreements signed between 1985 and 2004 and find that a) improving economic and political interactions between state interveners and the post-agreement state increase the durability of the peace agreement and b) the divergence between each state intervener’s economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state decreases the durability of the peace agreement. Findings indicate that intervener states’ satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is a primary determinant of durable peace.

¿Cómo afecta la intervención del estado durante los conflictos civiles en la variación de los resultados posteriores a la firma de un acuerdo? Si bien la intervención en conflictos civiles es un tema muy estudiado, la literatura vinculada a la resolución de conflictos ignora cómo la intervención del estado en un conflicto afecta la durabilidad del acuerdo de paz que se firma después. En este trabajo, argumento que los interventores del estado continúan influenciando las decisiones y acciones de su aliado de guerra durante el período posterior a la firma del acuerdo. Los interventores del estado que solo se enfocan en sus intereses propios pueden usar la influencia que poseen sobre su aliado para destruir o cultivar el orden tan frágil que les brinda el acuerdo de paz. Esto depende de cuán satisfechos estén con los resultados de las políticas establecidas en dicho acuerdo. Por lo tanto, sostengo que la durabilidad del acuerdo de paz depende de a) el nivel de satisfacción que tengan los interventores del estado con el statu quo posterior a la firma del acuerdo y, en caso de que haya múltiples interventores, también influirá b) si sus niveles de satisfacción son similares o diferentes. Además, rastreo el nivel de satisfacción de los interventores del estado con el statu quo posterior al acuerdo, teniendo en cuenta las señales económicas y políticas que demuestran durante ese período. Asimismo, examino la durabilidad de los acuerdos de paz que fueron firmados entre 1985 y 2004 y concluyo en que a) mejorar las interacciones económicas y políticas entre los interventores del estado y el estado luego de firmar el acuerdo aumentará su durabilidad. Además, b) la diferencia entre las interacciones económicas y políticas de cada interventor con el estado, luego de firmar el acuerdo de paz, disminuye su durabilidad. Las conclusiones indican que la satisfacción de los interventores del estado con el statu quo posterior al acuerdo constituye el principal determinante de una paz duradera.

Comment l’intervention de l’État durant un conflit civil affecte-t-elle la variation des résultats après l’accord de paix ? Bien que l’intervention dans un conflit civil soit un sujet largement étudié, la littérature sur la résolution des conflits ignore généralement la mesure dans laquelle l’intervention de l’État durant un conflit affecte la durabilité de l’accord de paix qui s’ensuit. Dans cet article, je soutiens que durant la période suivant l’accord de paix, les intervenants étatiques continuent à influencer les décisions et actes de leur allié en temps de guerre. Les intervenants étatiques qui agissent dans leurs propres intérêts peuvent utiliser l’influence qu’ils ont sur leur allié pour rompre ou soutenir l’ordre fragile établi par l’accord de paix selon leur niveau de satisfaction envers les résultats politiques de cet accord. J’affirme donc que la durabilité d’un accord de paix dépend a) du niveau de satisfaction des intervenants étatiques envers le statu quo après l’accord, et b) en cas d’interventions multiples, de la convergence ou de la divergence du niveau de satisfaction des intervenants étatiques. Je retrace le niveau de satisfaction des intervenants étatiques envers le statu quo après l’accord en me basant sur les signaux économiques et politiques qu’ils envoient durant la période suivant l’accord. J’examine la durabilité des accords de paix intra-étatiques signés entre 1985 et 2004 et je constate que a) l’amélioration des interactions économiques et politiques entre les intervenants étatiques et l’État post-accord accroît la durabilité de l’accord de paix, et b) la divergence entre les interactions économiques et politiques de chaque intervenant étatique avec l’État post-accord réduit la durabilité de l’accord de paix. Mes conclusions indiquent que la satisfaction des États intervenants envers le statu quo après l’accord est l’un des principaux déterminants de la durabilité de la paix.

KEYWORDS:

• Civil war
• peace agreement
• negotiated settlement
• state intervention
• duration analysis/duration model
• external spoilers

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Seden Akcinaroglu, Erica Chenoweth, Christian Davenport, Andrew Enterline, Albert Fu, Michael McDonald, the editors, the managing editor, and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. The author would also like to thank Dumar Burgess and Renee Halsey for their research assistance.

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.

Notes

¹ Data are from the Non-State Actors Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009, 2013).

² Senese and Quakenbush (2003), Werner (1999), and Werner and Yuen (2005) discuss the relationship between distribution of benefits and satisfaction of parties, but focus on inter-state conflicts.

³ For a longer discussion of satisfaction and how it relates to the concepts of opportunity and willingness, please see the Appendix.

⁴ This can come in the form of weapons, funds, or aiding potential spoilers.

⁵ Data are from the Non-state Actors Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009, 2013).

⁶ There are no peace agreements signed between 1980 and 1984.

⁷ I further explain this variable through the example of El Salvador’s Chapultepec Peace Agreement in the Appendix.

⁸ For the years 1990 to 1992, where data overlap, I cross-checked data from WEIS with data from IDEA.

⁹ I also replicate Model 2 (only economic independent variables) and Model 3 (only political independent variables) using the Weibull model. The independent variables continued to be significant at the 0.01 level in both models. You can find these models in the Appendix Table A1.

¹⁰ Examining hazard and survival rates for 191 million dollars of economic relations, one percent increase in agreement duration translates into about 3 months of increase. One million dollar increase in divergence of economic relations variable to 0.3% decrease in agreement duration.

¹¹ Comparing the impact of economic relations and intervener behavior on agreement duration, the effect of political behavior is significant at the 0.01 level throughout all models whereas that of economic relations is significant at the 0.05 level in the Cox models. Moreover, one unit increase in intervener behavior has a higher impact on agreement duration than one unit increase in economic relations. Yet, comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2, the mean value of economic relations is more impactful in decreasing the risk of agreement failure than the mean value of political behavior.

¹² The results can be found in Tables A2 and A3 of the Online Appendix.

¹³ The logit model can be found in Appendix Table A4.

¹⁴ The model can be found in Appendix Table A5.

¹⁵ The model can be found in the Online Appendix Table A6.

¹⁶ This model is available in Appendix Table A7 Model 1.

¹⁷ This variable was therefore excluded from some robustness checks in the Appendix.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Lincoln University Mellon Foundation Summer Research Award.