Mutual gain or resource drain? Attitudes toward international financial assistance during the early COVID-19 pandemic

ABSTRACT

Despite the need for international cooperation on COVID-19, the United States displayed reluctance to contribute to a global response. To shed light on the domestic politics that may underlie this foreign policy, we investigate how the US public viewed financial assistance to international organizations (IO)s and developing countries during the early stages of the pandemic. On one hand, the pandemic may illustrate the importance of cooperation; on the other hand, voters may be reluctant to engage internationally during a national crisis. In a survey fielded to 2,500 Americans in early April 2020, we find that personal exposure to the effects of COVID-19 is associated with increased support for IOs but decreased support for foreign aid. We suggest that Americans, especially those most affected by COVID-19, perceive benefits to supporting IOs but not to assisting developing countries. Partisanship moderates this relationship: although Republicans are less likely to support both forms of economic engagement, the positive relationship between exposure and support for IOs is actually stronger for Republicans. These findings are consistent with the notion that Americans, and especially Republicans, support international engagement when they feel it benefits them.

A pesar de la necesidad de cooperación internacional en materia de la COVID-19, los Estados Unidos demostraron renuencia a contribuir a una respuesta global. Con el fin de esclarecer la política nacional que puede ser la base de esta política exterior, investigamos qué opinó el público de los EE. UU. sobre la ayuda financiera a las organizaciones internacionales y a los países en vías de desarrollo durante las primeras etapas de la pandemia. Por un lado, la pandemia puede ilustrar la importancia de la cooperación; por el otro, los votantes pueden ser reacios a participar a nivel internacional durante una crisis nacional. En una encuesta realizada a 2500 estadounidenses a principios de abril de 2020, observamos que la exposición personal a los efectos de la COVID-19 se relaciona con un mayor apoyo a las organizaciones internacionales, pero un menor respaldo a la ayuda extranjera. Esto nos hace pensar que los estadounidenses, especialmente aquellos que se vieron más afectados por la COVID-19, perciben beneficios de apoyar a las organizaciones internacionales, pero no de ayudar a los países en vías de desarrollo. El partidismo modera esta relación: a pesar de que es menos probable que los republicanos apoyen ambas formas de participación económica, la relación positiva entre la exposición y el respaldo a las organizaciones internacionales es, de hecho, más sólida en el caso de los republicanos. Estos resultados son coherentes con la noción de que los estadounidenses, en especial los republicanos, apoyan la participación internacional cuando sienten que esta los beneficia.

Malgré le besoin d’une coopération internationale contre le COVID-19, les États-Unis se sont montrés réticents à contribuer à une réponse mondiale. Pour apporter un éclairage sur la politique intérieure qui peut sous-tendre cette politique étrangère, nous avons étudié la manière dont le public américain percevait l’aide financière apportée aux organisations internationales (OI) et aux pays en développement durant les premières phases de la pandémie. D’une part, la pandémie peut illustrer l’importance de la coopération, et d’autre part, les électeurs peuvent être réticents à s’engager à l’internationale durant une crise nationale. Dans une enquête menée auprès de 2 500 Américains début avril 2020, nous avons constaté que l’exposition personnelle aux effets du COVID-19 était associée à une augmentation du soutien aux OI mais à une réduction du soutien à l’aide étrangère. Nous suggérons que les Américains, tout particulièrement ceux qui sont les plus affectés par le COVID-19, perçoivent les avantages de l’apport d’un soutien aux OI, mais pas ceux d’aider les pays en développement. L’attachement à un parti modère cette relation : bien que les Républicains soient moins susceptibles de soutenir les deux formes d’engagement économique, la relation positive entre exposition et soutien aux OI est en réalité plus forte pour les Républicains. Ces conclusions sont cohérentes avec la notion selon laquelle les Américains, tout particulièrement les Républicains, soutiennent l’engagement international lorsqu’ils estiment qu’il leur est bénéfique.

KEYWORDS:

• International financial assistance
• covid-19 pandemic
• international organizations
• foreign aid
• partisanship

Supplementary Material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.

Notes

¹ Elites can shape public opinion on these issues through messaging (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021). But our survey was fielded before President Trump vocally indicted the WHO or withheld funds. Also, Kushner Gadarian, Goodman, and Pepinsky (2021) find no effect of partisan cues on COVID-19 policy attitudes.

² Data of confirmed cases at county level come from the New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html. We use the U.S. Census estimated population for 2019.

³ Specifically, we take the log of cases divided by county population +1, to accommodate instances in which there were no cases per capita.

⁴ Table 3 presents our preferred model with full controls. For illustrative purposes, we replicate Columns 1 and 2 in the Appendix, introducing our controls gradually.

⁵ This contrasts with one conclusion from Kobayashi, Heinrich and Bryant (2021), who find that experimentally induced worry about the personal effects of COVID-19 does not depress support for assisting developing countries. We suggest this experimentally manipulated but subjective feeling differs considerably from the more objective, albeit endogenous, measures we use as our primary independent variables – virus exposure and job loss. See Naoi (2020).

⁶ Given our research design, we are unable to parse whether these partisan differences result from differential awareness of benefits or differential valuation of benefits. We suggest this as a promising avenue for future theoretical development.

⁷ This is an individual-level finding. County-level patterns were the opposite at this stage of the crisis: in late spring 2020, COVID-19 affected Democratic-voting counties more than Republican-voting counties. See Medina and Gebeloff (2020).

⁸ It could also result if Republicans were more likely to associate illness with COVID-19, but since there is evidence of increased skepticism of COVID-19 among Republicans, we think this unlikely.