Three-player game-theoretic allocation of indivisible resources during natural disasters

Abstract

Resource allocation is an integral part of disaster management. After a natural disaster, multiple concurrent emergencies in distinct locations often make resource allocation challenging for the disaster management authority. This article focuses on disaster resource allocation based on a novel three-player, non-cooperative, single-stage, strategic game where the emergency locations are considered as the players. The decision-making authority solves a game-theoretic algorithm to determine a suitable strategy for allocating indivisible resources among three disaster locations where the available resources are insufficient to satisfy all the players simultaneously. Based on a unique non-monetary cost function, each player incurs a penalty for any possible allocation strategy. Mathematical analysis shows that, for the proposed game, at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) always exists, which can be a desirable allocation to the players. Payoff dominance and utopia-point-based solutions are used to select a single PSNE from a set of multiple PSNEs.

Keywords:

• Disaster resource allocation
• game theory
• Nash equilibrium
• payoff dominance
• utopia point

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed in this study.

Additional information

Funding

This work is supported by a Global Challenge Research Fund project “Emergency Flood Planning and Management using Unmanned Aerial Systems” through an international multi-institutional grant [Grant No. EP/P02839X/1].