Can the Poor Help GM Crops? Technology, representation & cotton in the Makhathini flats, South Africa

Abstract

The adoption of Genetically Modified (GM) cotton in South Africa's Makhathini Flats in 1998 was heralded as a case in which agricultural biotechnology could benefit smallholder farmers, and a model for the rest of the continent to follow. Using historical, political economic and ethnographic data, we find the initial enthusiasm around GM technology to be misguided. We argue that Makhathini's structured institutional framework privileges adopters of GM technologies through access to credit and markets. The adoption of GM cotton is symptomatic not of farmers’ endorsement of GM technology, but a sign of the profound lack of choice facing them in the region.

Acknowledgments

This project could not have been completed without the invaluable skills of our workshop facilitators and translators Nonhlanhla Dlamini, Thulani Ndlazi, and Dumisani Nyathi. We are grateful to Zeph Nyathi, Gama Mathe, Sjoerd van den Heuve, Vusi Zikhali and the many officials and community members who were willing to speak with us. We would also like to thank Benjamin Cousins, Bill Freund,Mariam Mayet, Vishnu Padayachee and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the initial draft. A version of this paper was presented at a workshop hosted by the School of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. This project was funded by the Centre for Civil Society, School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041, South Africa. All authors contributed equally to the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

1. See, for example, the rationale behind the Global Environment Fund's ‘West Africa RegionalBiosafety Project’, GEF Project 2911, which explicitly mentions insecticide resistance as a rationale for the development of GM crops, available at http://www.thegef.org/Documents/ Council_Documents/GEF_C28/WP.html

2. The first trials in South Africa of genetically modified cotton had, however, taken place almost a decade earlier. In 1989 the Department of Agriculture received its first application for GM cotton. In 1990 Calgene had conducted field trials with GM cotton to test for Bromoxynil tolerance. The first trials with Bt cotton were initiated in 1993.

3. Interview, Pete Derman, Director, Community Outreach Research and Development (CORD), 1 December 2003.

4. Settlement on the irrigation scheme began in 1982 and by 1988/89 there were 284 farmers on3,500 ha. Average area per farmer was about 10 ha (Bembridge 1991).

5. The SADT was gradually phased out and replaced by Natal Trust Farms but continued to berepresented locally by Mjindi Farming. In November 1993 Mjindi Farming (Pty) Ltd was established and the shareholdings were transferred from the SADT to the national Department of Agriculture. The new structure reported to a board of directors which comprised of shareholders and local representatives.

6. Ndumo A Workshop, 26 January 2005.

7. Interview, Phineas Gumede, Cotton SA Representative, 7 February 2005.

8. Interview, Barry Janse van Rinsberg, Operations Manager, Makhathini Cotton, 3 February 2005.

9. These observations were corroborated by Monsanto employees; Interview. Andrew Bennett,Biotechnology Lead, Monsanto, 28 February 2003 and Charles Motlu, Monsanto Field Representative, Makhathini, 4 February 2005.

10. Originally created by Clark Cotton and the Tongaat Cotton Company. Clark Cotton had cometo dominate the local market since its arrival in 1978.

11. Interviews with David McAllister, Makhathini Cotton Company Agricultural DevelopmentManager, 3 February 2005; Mr. Nkosi, Municipal Manager, Jozini Municipality, 4 February 2005; Juri Stein, Cotton Researcher, Makhathini Research Station, 28 January 2005.

12. Water Committee Workshop, Mboza, 1-2 February 2005.

13. Interview, Charles Motlu, Monsanto Field Representative, Makhathini, 4 February 2005.

14. Interview, Pieter Pretorious, Irrigation Manager, Mjindi Farming, (Pty) Ltd, 2 February 2005.

15. Interview, Pieter Pretorious, Irrigation Manager, Mjindi Farming, (Pty) Ltd, 2 February 2005.

16. The KwaZulu Finance Corporation had begun lending in the area in 1985-86 for small-scalecapital goods such as tractors.

17. Additional development funding for the expansion of the Irrigation Scheme was also madeavailable by the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA).

18. Water Committee Workshop, Mboza, 1-2 February 2005.

19. Tim Bradley, Agricultural Loans Manager, Ithala Bank (successor to KwaZulu FinanceCorporation), response to email questions, 22 February 2005.

20. Personal Communication, Graham Hefer, Director, NSK, 24 March 2005.

21. Personal Communication, Harry Strauss, Head, KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture, 1 April 2005.

22. According to Harry Strauss, the principal actors were Mr.J.S. Eriksen, Mr. P. Sokhela, Mjindi(Pty) Ltd and the provincial government (Personal Communication, 1 April 2005). It should be noted that Mr P. Sokhela also has extensive interests in sugar where recent acquisitions such as Illovo Sugar's Gledhow and Umfolozi sugar mills have also been heralded as major BEE advances.

23. Interview, Barry Janse van Rinsberg, Operations Manager, Makhathini Cotton Company, 3 February 2005

24. Interview Barry Janse van Rinsberg, Operations Manager, Makhathini Cotton Company 3 February 2005. According to its website, Makhathini Cotton Farming (Pty) Ltd successfully negotiated with the government to lease 15 000ha of state land and has obtained water rights for 4 000ha. As at the end of 2004, 1 500ha of land has been developed under irrigation (Makhathini Cotton Company 2005).

25. Interview Barry Janse van Rinsberg, 3 February 2005.

26. Interview Barry Janse van Rinsberg, 3 February 2005.

27. Thirtle et al. did not consider access to water as a variable in their adoption model. Althoughthere were floods in the year they conducted their survey, the infrastructure for water is a more permanent feature of the area, and their omission of it as a variable is surprising. Their findings on economies of scale are inconclusive – their sample found that there were returns to scale for adoption of Bt cotton, but could not rule out that adoption was scale-neutral. Qualitative data suggests that there are indeed returns to scale, and the business strategy of MCC is based partly on this assumption.

28. Interview, David McAllister, Agricultural Development Manager, Makhathini Cotton Company,3 February 2005.

29. Interview, David McAllister, Agricultural Development Manager, Makhathini Cotton Company,3 February 2005. Economies of scale in cotton farming are also suggested by qualitative data from a forthcoming study by Van der Hueve, who found that farmers who reported increasing their cotton hectarage did so because they thought that in so doing, they might be able better to recoup their costs, having failed to do so with smaller areas under cultivation.

30. One woman, who would give her name only as Mrs. X for fear of reprisals, reported that her localcommittee had intimidated her into signing over the rights to her land as without her consent the entire project would have had to be halted.

31. Interview with Mr. B. C. Nkabinda, Manager Jozini District Office, Department of Agriculture,25 Jan 2005

32. Interview, Barry Janse van Rinsberg, 23 November 2004.

33. Interview, David Macallister, 3 February 2005.

34. Water Committee Workshop, 1-2 February 2005. Gross crop water requirements at Makhathinivary between 1475-1522 mm for sugar and 593-649 mm for cotton (Cedara Agricultural Development Institute 1994).

35. Interview, Koot Louw, Statistician, Cotton S A, 30 January 2003.

36. Interview, David Macallister, 3 February 2005.

37. Water Committee Workshop, 1-2 February 2005.

38. Ndumo A Workshop, 26 January 2005.

39. Ndumo B Workshop, 27 January 2005.

40. Water Committee Workshop, 1-2 February 2005.