Debates

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Notes

1. Somalia: Resolution 1725 (2006) adopted by the Security Council at its 5579th meeting on 6 Dec 2006 (S/RES/1725).

2. Reuters reported that the quick Ethiopian victory was not due to the efficiency of its war machine, but because of the extensive support it received from America and Britain. Accordingly, ‘The dramatic victory by Ethiopian troops was the culmination of months of preparation inside and outside Somalia by US and British special forces, and US-hired mercenaries’. The ‘professional assistance’ was recruited by officials based in the US embassy in Nairobi at the endof 2005 as part of a deniable operation, sources said. ‘The brief was to enter Somali territory with the objective of studying the terrain, mapping and analysing landing sites and regrouping areas, and reporting on suitable entry and exit points,’ one source said. According to a CIA source, both American intelligence and its military have been bankrolling the Ethiopians since the start of last year, as well as providing them with satellite surveillance, technical, military and logistic support but even spare parts where needed, the source said. Although it was a goal of US policy to overthrow the Council of Islamic Courts, which had taken power in mostof Somalia, ‘all the investment in the Ethiopians was ultimately to get to the three suspects’, said the source. Hala Jaber and Michael Smith, Reuters, 14 January 2007.

3. Somalia: Resolution 1725 (2006).

4. This was reported by senior members of the international community present during those events and confirmed by renegade members of parliament.

5. C. Bryson Hull, ‘US moves diplomat critical of Somali warlord aid', Nairobi, Reuters, 30 May 2006.

6. A high level Ethiopian military officer told the author in Washington, DC that his country is getting more resources from the USA than they have requested.

7. See the recent remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer: ‘I had three primary objectives for this trip: mobilize international support to help build the governance capacity of the Transitional Federal Government Institutions; move forward with the deployment of an African stabilisation force in Somalia; and encourage inclusive political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Institutions and other key Somali stakeholders … We have made clear that we see a role in the future of Somalia for all who renounce violence and extremism.’ One wonders if the Assistant Secretary understands that an invasion is a most violent act. Furthermore, the Secretary fails to indicate what every observer of the Somali scene known – incompetence of the leaders of the TFG and their sectarian project. She also fails to note that the Speaker of Parliament has been unable to go to Mogadishu under Ethiopian occupation. One wonder who the stakeholders are that she has in mind! Also, what might the US Assistant Secretary say to the fact that Martial Law has been approved by Parliament under the guard of the Ethiopian troops, and has given Abdillahi Yusuf dictatorial authority in the country. How would such an act facilitate reconciliation! Moreover, Senior UNDP officers for Somalia, based in Nairobi, have told a delegation of civil society leaders that they must work with the TFG if they want to have any assistance from that office. These developments indicate that there is a big push, that everyone toes the line of the warlord regime, despite the latter's character.

8. See S. Pausewang, K. Tronvoll, & L. Aale, Ethiopia since the Derg: A decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance (London: Zed, 2002); A. I. Samatar, ‘Ethiopian federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the Somali Region’, Third World Quarterly 25, 6 (2004): 1131–1154.

9. Associated Press, 30 December 2006.

10. It is highly lilely that a significant numberof Ethiopian troops will remain in Somali under a different guise, despite the declarations by the Ethiopian Prime Minister.

11. Abdullahi Yusuf has already brought his clan militias to Mogadishu to help enforce his dictates.

12. This division is reminiscent of the Mogadishu riots in 1948 when the Somali Youth League (SYL), the nationalist party opposed the return of Italian rule to Somalia. A Somali groupof Somalis supported the Italian agenda.

13. It is reported that the EU is exceptionally unhappy about the way in which the US endorsed the Ethiopian invasion and consequently holding back its funds for supporting the AU force.

14. Recent remarks by the deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of the TFG indicate how irresponsible the TFG is. He told the BBC Somali Service that Ethiopia and Somali will soon abolish their boundary and share the same passport as the two countries are brotherly states; http://www.bbc.co.uk/somali/index.shtml. 2 January 2007. Apparently the occupation is a sign of fraternal relations in the minds of significant number of TFG leaders. One of the key leaders of the TFG noted that he does not want to hear suggestions from the public regarding how to move the peace forward, but to simply support the agenda he brought with him. The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was formed in 1986 with a very narrow mandate around the issues of drought and desertification. Since then, and especially in the 1990s, IGADD became a vehicle for regional security and political dialogue.

15. The official Islamic Council of Ethiopia was instructed by the authorities to issue a declaration in support of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Contacts in the Council told the author that the government literally wrote the declaration which the Council was asked to issue under thinly veiled threats. This method of getting consent is part of the standard operating procedure of the TPLF regime. The author witnessed this type of operation first hand when he was a Fulbright researcher in the country in 1999.

1. The Sheffield lecture can be downloaded from: http://www.res.org.uk/society/lecture.asp

2. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About It, New York: Oxford University Press, Spring 2007.

3. Christopher Cramer has written two excellent papers critiquing this kind of research methodology and its conclusions, which have had a major impact on policymakers, especially in the World Bank; see Cramer, 2003 and 2006.