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Abstract
When Joyce Banda became Malawi's president in 2012, she was welcomed by the international community as an antidote to the increasingly erratic and autocratic behaviour of her unexpectedly deceased predecessor Bingu wa Mutharika. Banda appeared to be the product of the twin drivers of a ‘rising’ Africa; namely a newly empowered donor-supported civil society on the one hand, and a Western-oriented political elite committed to transparency and good governance on the other. Based on several field trips to Malawi over the past five years, this article seeks to problematise the degree to which Joyce Banda and Malawi's civil society organisations represented a double transition from the more patrimonial form of politics which had dominated the political and civil society sectors throughout Malawi's postcolonial era. Although prepared prior to recent corruption scandals which have engulfed the Banda government in the run-up to elections in May 2014, this article sets the context for understanding these cases as a product of Malawi's political economy and uneven insertion into the global economy.
Lorsque Joyce Banda est devenue présidente du Malawi en 2012, elle a été accueillie par la communauté internationale comme un antidote au comportement erratique et autocratique de son prédécesseur Bingu wa Mutharika, décédé de manière inattendue. Banda est apparue comme le produit des deux moteurs d'une Afrique qui ‘promet’ ; une société civile nouvellement investie soutenue par les bailleurs de fonds d'une part, et une élite politique regardant vers l'occident engagée envers la transparence et la bonne gouvernance d'autre part. Basé sur plusieurs voyages sur le terrain au Malawi ces cinq dernières années, cet article vise à questionner la mesure dans laquelle Joyce Banda et les organisations de la société civile du Malawi ont représenté une double transition d'une forme patrimoniale de la politique qui a dominé la politique et la société civile à travers l'ère postcoloniale du Malawi. Bien qu'il ait été préparé avant les récents scandales de corruption qui ont englouti le gouvernement de Banda avant les élections de mai 2014, cet article pose le contexte pour comprendre ces cas comme un produit de l'économie politique du Malawi et l'insertion inégale dans l'économie mondiale.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank all of the interviewees who gave their time and energy to the research underpinning this paper. The author would also like to thank Carl Death, as well as the ROAPE editor, and three anonymous reviewers, who made substantial and important comments on earlier drafts.
Notes on contributor
Clive Gabay has published on international development policy as a technology of rule in sub-Saharan Africa, and issues of representation, power and legitimacy within civil society organisations in Malawi and India. His book Civil Society and Global Poverty: Hegemony, Inclusivity, Legitimacy is out now with Routledge, and his next book, The Ambiguities of an African Civil Society: Democracy and Development in Malawi, is due out in 2015 with Lexington.
Notes
1. See for example, “JB Maize Saga, Subsidy.” The Nation. Accessed May 17, 2013. http://www.mwnation.com/105-the-nation-opinion/my-turn/17157-jb-s-maize-saga-subsidy; “Stories Behind the Maize Story.” The Sunday Times. Accessed May 17, 2013. http://www.bnltimes.com/index.php/sunday-times/headlines/opinion/14006--stories-behind-the-maize-story.
2. One of many pronouncements by Mutharika on this theme: ‘Let this country go on fire if you want to … Ladies and gentlemen, I want to tell you enough is enough!’ (Nyasa Times Citation2011).
3. Mutharika sidelined his vice-president from early on in his second term, seeing her as a potential competitor if he decided to try and run for a third term. In the end he positioned his brother, Peter, to take over.
4. On my last visit to Malawi in February 2013 this included airport luggage handlers and teachers.
5. The analysis in this section is partly based on news reports to have emerged in various Malawian news outlets in 2012–13. I have attempted to verify these reports with a number of Malawi-based informants and political commentators with who I have built up relationships over the past five years of visiting Malawi. I have anonymised these individuals owing to the sensitive nature of many of our discussions, and the uncertain climate for dissent in Malawi, particularly as it builds up to the next presidential elections in 2014. It is important to note that one problem frequently identified by these contacts is the short-term nature of the news cycle, which means that many political scandals are rarely followed up (or are only followed up if there is significant political will). This is also a problem identified by Manda (Citation2004, 260), and means that some of the arguments in this section are impossible to fully verify. Where this is the case I have noted it as so.
6. Such as trades unions, university student groups, civil servants, political exiles and underground opposition groups (Dulani Citation2009, 145–146).
7. This information was derived from interviews with Malawian activists and political commentators. None were willing to identify individuals, and so the provenance of the information could be questioned, although previous regimes have done exactly the same thing, dating back to Hastings Kamuzu Banda's one-party state (see Minnis Citation1998, 139; Dulani Citation2009, 143).
8. Several civil society interviewees expressed the desire to give Joyce Banda time in order to ‘clear up the mess’ left by Mutharika. The following quote from the director of the Malawi Economic Justice Network is also indicative: ‘We are now paying the cost of the previous administration's policies but we have to stay the course to solve the economic problems’ (Banda Citation2013).