The coming crisis of Zuma's ANC: the party state confronts fiscal crisis

Abstract

Rising state expenditure threatens to outstrip the South African government's ability to pay. This danger is merely a symptom of and challenge to the predatory characteristics of the ‘party-state’ erected by the ruling African National Congress (ANC), notably as they are exhibited under the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The ANC government is increasingly looking to an oil and gas bonanza to avoid a ‘fiscal cliff’, while Zuma himself is driving a nuclear power future which threatens to bankrupt the economy. The latter strategy conforms to the party's greater disposition to corruption and patronage. Key parastatals have become headed by Zuma cronies; family and friends have been awarded government favour; and Zuma's personal interests intrude upon the governance of parastatals, the South African Revenue Service and the functioning of constitutionally protected agencies such as the office of the Public Protector. The Zuma government's repudiation of accountability highlights an official drift to secrecy. However, the increasing limitations of ANC economic policy combine with growing discontent in society to place the party's political hegemony at risk – but Zuma's presidency has compromised the ANC's capacity for internal reform.

[La crise à venir de l'ANC de Zuma : l’État-parti fait face à une crise fiscale.] Les dépenses croissantes du gouvernement menacent de dépasser la capacité du gouvernement sud-africain à payer. Ce danger est simplement un symptôme et un défi liés aux caractéristiques prédatrices de « l’État-parti » érigé par l'African National Congress (ANC) au pouvoir, notamment comme elles sont montrées sous la présidence de Jacob Zuma. Le gouvernement ANC cherche de plus en plus un filon pétrolier ou gazier afin d’éviter un déséquilibre fiscal, tandis que Zuma lui-même se lance dans le développement de l’énergie nucléaire, ce qui menace de mener l’économie à la faillite. Cette stratégie est conforme à la disposition du parti à favoriser la corruption et le patronage. Les organismes parapublics clés sont dirigés par les amis de Zuma ; la famille et les amis se sont vus octroyer les faveurs du gouvernement ; et les intérêts personnels de Zuma s'immiscent dans la gouvernance des organismes parapublics, le service des impôts sud-africain et le fonctionnement d'agences protégées par la constitution telles que le bureau du protecteur du citoyen. Le rejet par le gouvernement de Zuma de la responsabilité montre une dérive officielle vers le secret. Cependant, les restrictions accrues de la politique économique de l'ANC s'associent avec le mécontentement croissant dans la société et placent l'hégémonie politique du parti sur la sellette – alors que la présidence de Zuma a compromis la capacité de l'ANC à réformer en interne.

Keywords:

• ANC
• Zuma
• crisis
• patronage
• corruption
• unaccountability

Mots-clés:

• ANC
• Zuma
• crise
• patronage
• corruption
• manque de responsabilité

Note on contributor

Roger Southall is Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand. He is author of Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press and James Currey, 2013) and a forthcoming book on The New Black Middle Class in South Africa.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Much of the fighting seems to revolve around commercial procurements. ‘Control commercial and you control all tenders,’ commented a senior executive (Mail & Guardian 2015b).

2. Denel, the state-owned arms manufacturer, has recently become profitable, many suspect via sales to countries with a dubious respect for human rights.

3. ‘Fuck the poor,’ commented former African Bank top executive Tami Sokutu when criticised for presiding over a lending regime which sucked many borrowers into unsecured debt (Sunday Times 2014a).

4. Only 19 out of 45 government departments had a Director-General (the highest level within the public service) that completed a full five-year term of office between May 2009 and May 2014 (Mail & Guardian 2014c).

5. For Madonsela's report, ‘Secure in Comfort’, see News24 2014. For a summary of the insults heaped on her head, see Van Onselen 2014.

6. Myeni, who amidst this crisis was revealed to have faked her academic qualifications (SABC News 2014), was Chairman of the Jacob Zuma Foundation and was coyly referred to in the press as once having been involved in a ‘romantic relationship’ with the President.

7. Public enthusiasm for the brothel was dampened when it was revealed it had been run for private advantage rather than for public profit.

8. At time of writing, Dramat had successfully challenged his suspension in the courts. The battle continues.

9. Zuma's State of the Nation speech on 12 February 2015 stressed the government's commitment to proceed with the nuclear option. The Mail & Guardian (2015a) next day claimed that the ‘Russian nuke deal’ includes provisions that South Africa will not be able to conclude subsidiary deals with other countries without Russian permission; that it will indemnify Russia from any liability resulting from accidents; and that it will give Russians tax breaks with nothing in return.