China and Namibia, 1990 to 2015: how a new actor changes the dynamics of political economy

ABSTRACT

The article identifies changes in Namibia’s society linked to China’s new role. To understand such changes, it is important to avoid isolating ‘Chinese actors’ from their host society. The author analyses links between Chinese and Namibian actors in three domains: ‘soft power’, Chinese traders and the construction industry. In all three, the presence of Chinese actors does not simply change Namibia’s relations with the world. It has important repercussions on Namibian society, it influences the distribution of capital within Namibia and it engenders shifts in the internal balance of power. Since Chinese influence does not remain external, the line between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Namibian’ actors has long become blurred – turning Namibian political elites into constituent parts of the ‘external’ dynamics they are charged with regulating.

RÉSUMÉ

L’article identifie les changements dans la société namibienne liés au nouveau rôle de la Chine. Afin de comprendre de tels changements, il est important d’éviter d’isoler les « acteurs chinois » de leur société d’accueil. L’auteur analyse les liens entre les acteurs chinois et namibiens dans trois domaines : « la puissance douce », les négociants chinois et le secteur du bâtiment. Dans les trois domaines, la présence des acteurs chinois ne change pas seulement les relations de la Namibie au monde. Cette présence a aussi des répercussions importantes sur la société namibienne : elle influence la répartition du capital au sein de la Namibie et elle engendre des modifications dans les rapports de force internes. Puisque l’influence chinoise ne reste pas extérieure, la ligne de démarcation entre les acteurs chinois et namibiens est floue depuis longtemps – transformant les élites politiques namibiennes en éléments inclus dans les dynamiques « externes » qu’ils sont chargés de réguler.

KEYWORDS:

• China and Africa
• Namibia
• trade
• soft power
• extraversion

MOTS-CLÉS:

• Chine et Afrique
• Namibie
• commerce
• puissance douce
• extraversion

Acknowledgements

I presented preliminary drafts of this article at Zürich and Freiburg Universities, SOAS London and at the conference ‘Southern Africa beyond the West’ in Livingstone, Zambia, in August 2015. I thank all conference organisers and discussants for very valuable input, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Gregor Dobler is Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Freiburg University, Germany. He has done long-term fieldwork in France and in Namibia and published extensively on political and economic anthropology and on the anthropology of religion. Writing on China and Namibia since 2006, he hopes this will be his final article on the topic.

ORCID

Gregor Dobler http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6598-1709

Notes

1 The literature has become much too extensive to do justice to it in an article. For literature reviews, see Large (2008), Melber (2013), Mohan (2008), Monson and Rupp (2013); for some excellent and differentiated recent work, see e.g. Alden and Chichawa (2014), Brautigam (2015), Corkin (2013), Gadzala (2015), Giese and Marfaing (2015), Kernen and Mohammad (2016), Lee (2014) and Mohan et al. (2014).

2 For a first overview, see e.g. Alden (2007), Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira (2008), Brautigam (2011), Kernen (2014) and Mohan (2013).

3 In such cases, travel costs are sometimes paid by the Chinese side, sometimes by the Namibian town councils; in most cases, both sides pay for some of the expenses each. The expense claims of Namibian delegations have raised eyebrows on several occasions. One example was the trip of Khomas Regional Council officials to Jiangsu in 2013. In addition to council officials, Windhoek Mayor Agnes Kafula, SWAPO’s regional coordinator and an official from the Ministry of Local Government and Housing travelled on council expenses – just as Sebastian Ndeitunga did, the Police’s Inspector General whose son studied in China with a scholarship. The latter said he had accompanied the delegation ‘to learn more about security matters in China’ (Namibian Sun, May 7, 2013).

4 While constructing Dragon City, he realised he could import cement more cheaply from China than buying in in Namibia; since 2008, his company Jack’s Trading CC has been importing cement into the country. His plans have been affected by an import duty of 60% on cement which the Namibian government introduced in 2012 as infant industry protection for a cement factory established by the German company Schwenk Zement. He is contesting the duties in court; at the time of writing, the case was pending before the Supreme Court after the High Court decided in his favour. From the proceedings, it transpired that he had a contract to import 180,000 tons of cement per year. Calculated on the taxes he stated he had to pay, this cost him around N$90 million landed in Namibia (i.e., including transport cost); the retail value is around N$216 million (The Namibian, May 10, 2012).

5 These companies are China Jiangsu International Namibia Ltd, a subsidiary of China Jiangsu Construction Group; Jiangsu Zhengtai Construction Group Namibia; China Jiangxi International (Namibia), a subsidiary of China Jiangxi Corporation for International Development CJCI; China Nanjing International (Namibia), a subsidiary of the Guangsha Group of companies; China State Construction Engineering Corporation Southern Africa; Corporation for International Economic and Technical Cooperation; China Henan International (a subsidiary of China Henan International Cooperation Group); China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation; MCC Communications Engineering Technology; China Harbour Engineering Company, a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company; Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Corporation; China City Construction Company; China Beijing Corporation for International Economic Cooperation; China Gezhouba Group International Engineering and Qingdao Construction (today Qingjian Group); Zhongmei Engineering Group and Shanghai Electric.

Additional information

Funding

Original field research for this article was, at various stages, supported by the German Research Foundation DFG and the Swiss National Science Foundation SNF.