Crony capitalism in Nigeria: the case of patronage funding of the Peoples Democratic Party and the power sector reform, 1999–2015

ABSTRACT

The article argues that cronyism in the funding of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) explains the dismal record of the recent power sector reforms in Nigeria. It implies that the reforms were packaged by the then PDP-led government to benefit their major campaign financiers with contracts; thus, within this period the party financiers were able to assume a commanding position in the sector. The article further contends that the funding regime in the party reinforces corruption as financiers leveraged on their contributions to the party to ensure that the reform processes and outcomes reflected their economic interests. The case exemplifies the crony relationship between the business and the political class (that ought to act as the regulatory body), which is skewed towards primitive accumulation.

RÉSUMÉ

L’article soutient que le favoritisme issu du financement du Parti démocratique populaire (PDP) explique le bilan lamentable des récentes réformes du secteur de l’électricité au Nigeria. Il en ressort que les réformes ont été organisées par le gouvernement alors dirigé par le PDP de manière à ce que les principaux financiers de leur campagne puissent bénéficier de contrats ; au cours de cette période, les financiers du parti ont pu assumer une position dominante dans le secteur. L’article soutient en outre que le régime de financement du parti renforce la corruption, dans la mesure où les financiers ont tiré profit de leurs contributions au parti pour s’assurer que les processus et les résultats des réformes reflétaient leurs intérêts économiques. Ce cas illustre la relation de copinage qui existe entre le monde des affaires et la classe politique (qui devrait agir en tant qu’organe de régulation), et qui est orientée vers l’accumulation primitive.

KEYWORDS:

• Political party
• party financing
• power sector reform
• crony capitalism
• Nigerian political economy
• primitive accumulation

MOTS-CLÉS:

• Parti politique
• financement des partis
• réforme du secteur de l’électricité
• capitalisme de copinage
• économie politique nigériane
• accumulation primitive

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 These figures are drawn from data compiled by the authors from the Central Bank of Nigeria annual publications on sectoral budgetary allocation for the period 1999–2017.

2 As per note 1, these figures are drawn from data compiled by the authors from the Central Bank of Nigeria annual publications on sectoral budgetary allocation for the period 1999–2017.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Okorie Albert

Okorie Albert is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with a specialisation in comparative politics. His research interests cover politics of technology development, democratisation and studies in national security.

Ifeanyichukwu Abada

Ifeanyichukwu Abada is a professor of the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with a specialisation in public administration. His research interests include local government studies and governance in Nigeria.

Raymond Adibe

Raymond Adibe is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, with a specialisation in political economy. His research interests include peace and conflict studies, global political economy and politics in Arab states.