The Reception of Covid-19 Denialist Propaganda in Tanzania

Abstract

In June 2020, the government of Tanzania declared that Covid-19 had been eradicated from the country. As the figures released by Tanzania’s Ministry of Health since March 2021 show, this was not true. Taking this claim as an example of authoritarian propaganda, this article tackles the issue of ‘reception’ by asking if Tanzanians believed the government. Data from a nationally representative survey conducted close to the 2020 general elections suggest that one-third of respondents did believe the government’s declaration that Covid-19 had been eradicated from the country, although the government’s prior and less audacious claim – that the number of cases was declining – appears to have been more persuasive. The article also presents other evidence regarding the behaviour of Tanzanians during this period, which is consistent with these findings, before discussing why some Tanzanians bought into the government’s propaganda while others did not. The article concludes by arguing that the Tanzanian case shows that propaganda that may appear implausible to some audiences may be far more credible to others.

Keywords:

• Covid-19
• propaganda
• authoritarianism
• Tanzania
• Magufuli

Introduction

During late 2019 and early 2020, the spread of the virus SARS-CoV-2 began to affect every country in the world, with the World Health Organization (WHO) declaring it a pandemic on 11 March 2020.¹ No two states responded in exactly the same fashion, with the strength of the measures imposed to curb transmission varying from strict lockdowns to the issuing of loose and unenforceable public health guidelines. Tanzania’s response to the crisis drew much international attention.² In the early stages of the pandemic, the government had initially implemented a range of measures to reduce the transmission of Covid-19. By May 2020, government officials had begun to claim that the number of cases was in decline in Tanzania due to traditional medicine and the power of prayer.³ This was followed, in early June, by the then president, the late John Pombe Magufuli, declaring that the virus had been eliminated from the country.⁴

From that point, until early 2021, the government continued to claim that the virus was not present in Tanzania. During this period it was impossible to objectively gauge the Covid-19 situation in Tanzania, because the government had stopped announcing statistics for confirmed infections and deaths. Following Magufuli’s death in March 2021, the Tanzanian Ministry of Health began to release Covid-19 data again, which, although the numbers were ‘likely to be underestimates’, effectively acknowledged that the virus had been in Tanzania the whole time.⁵ Despite the fact that Covid-19 had not been eradicated in the country, Magufuli, and his party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM, the Revolutionary Party), had maintained for a period of around ten months that traditional remedies and prayer had helped to eradicate Covid-19, and took steps to suppress information that contradicted their claims.

Covid-19 denialism in Tanzania provides a good opportunity to study the efficacy of propaganda. As propaganda is a common feature of all states with authoritarian tendencies, examples of governments using it are also common. However, in the literature on authoritarian propaganda, which will be discussed below, there is debate about exactly how effective certain approaches to propaganda are in changing popular beliefs. This raises two related questions: first, did Tanzanian citizens believe that the rate of Covid-19 had been reduced; and second, did they believe that the virus had been totally eliminated? This article will answer these questions by presenting a combination of qualitative and quantitative data collected around the time of the October 2020 elections, which took place during the period of Covid-19 denialism.⁶

The article will begin by setting out the debates on the efficacy of propaganda in authoritarian states and briefly summarising recent Covid-19-related literature on elections and authoritarianism. Next, it will discuss Tanzania’s authoritarian turn under Magufuli before outlining the research methods on which the findings are based. This will be followed by an overview of the country’s response to Covid-19 and a justification for describing the government’s claims of eradication as propaganda. The article will then present survey data that suggest that citizens in general perceived the risks from Covid-19 to be low and that many (although not a majority) did believe that the virus was no longer present in Tanzania. Other evidence regarding the behaviour of Tanzanians during this period, which is consistent with these findings, will then be detailed. This will be followed by a discussion of why some Tanzanians bought into the government’s propaganda while others did not. The article will conclude by arguing that propaganda that appears implausible to some audiences may be far more credible to others.

Authoritarian Propaganda

According to Thomas Huckin’s definition, ‘[p]ropaganda is false or misleading information or ideas addressed to a mass audience by parties who thereby gain advantage. Propaganda is created and disseminated systematically and does not invite critical analysis or response’ (original emphasis).⁷ Huckin explains that the five italicised features within this definition are necessary and sufficient features of propaganda. Its use is neither confined to governments nor to authoritarian regimes, nor is it the only means available to governments to gain ‘political control’.⁸ Censorship, for example, can similarly shape citizen opinions by eliminating from public discourse information or opinions that may make compliance with doctrines of political control more difficult.⁹ However, propaganda is a device that is commonly employed by all authoritarian states, and, as Daniel Mattingly and Elaine Yao note, ‘[a]uthoritarian regimes spend billions of dollars every year on propaganda’.¹⁰ This is not to say that all propaganda produced by authoritarian regimes is alike; it can encompass a range of subject matter, be promoted through a variety of mediums and serve several distinct objectives. It is common for academic literature on propaganda to focus on the ways in which authoritarian regimes use it either to create legitimacy for themselves or to delegitimise their opponents.¹¹ Even if consideration is limited to propaganda that is designed to serve this end, significant variety can still be found. Propaganda can change focus depending on current events or shifting points of social contention, while content and modes of dissemination can vary depending on the intended audience.¹² The extent to which states rely on propaganda to promote legitimacy also varies. As Alexander Dukalskis and Christopher Patane have shown, different regime subtypes use propaganda with varying degrees of intensity.¹³ Furthermore, as patterns of authoritarian rule have altered over time, and the underlying methods that regimes use to seek legitimisation have changed, there have been shifts in the ways in which propaganda is framed and the topics upon which it focuses.¹⁴

This picture is further complicated when considering propaganda in authoritarian states created for purposes other than to legitimise the regime. It has been argued that the intent of certain types of propaganda is not to change what the public believes about the topic under discussion.¹⁵ Rather, heavy-handed forms of propaganda can be designed to deter dissent, as the imposition of such messages on society acts to signal regime power.¹⁶ This has led Haifeng Huang to offer a distinction between what he terms ‘soft propaganda’ and ‘hard propaganda’.¹⁷ The former is a brand of ‘subtle, sophisticated, and credible’ propaganda designed to influence public opinion on social and political issues, whereas the latter is ‘pretentious and dogmatic’ propaganda intended to create forms of compliance conducive to regime stability.¹⁸ Studies of both hard and soft propaganda, which are disproportionately based on China, often, although generally not explicitly, carry the assumption that the regime’s propaganda output represents a rational attempt to further its goal of political control.¹⁹ However, authoritarian regimes may issue propaganda for other reasons, which may have to do with the mechanisms of authoritarian rule. Victor Chung-Hon Shih gives the example of the propaganda produced in China that arises because of junior officials’ desire to show their personal loyalty to their superiors.²⁰ There is also the possibility that much of the propaganda produced by authoritarian regimes is shaped by deluded beliefs, irrational thinking or emotional impulses. Ultimately, as Lisa Wedeen has argued, ‘[i]t is impossible to get into policymakers’ heads and come away with exact knowledge of why they do what they do’ (emphasis added).²¹

While it can be relatively straightforward to identify instances in which propaganda is used in authoritarian states, it can be more difficult to determine the extent to which citizens believe it. In some contexts, the public response to propaganda can be either apathetic or cynical. This can be seen in Václav Havel’s analysis of Communist-era Czechoslovakia in which he details the indifference to the semantic content of propaganda messages displayed in shop windows.²² It is also apparent in Wedeen’s description of Syria under Hafez al-Asad, in which propaganda created ‘a general atmosphere of sceptical ambivalence’.²³ Although both authors suggest that propaganda plays other, more subtle roles, neither of them suggest that persuasion is its main purpose. These arguments laid a foundation for the later theorisation of hard propaganda, which, by definition, is not even intended to be persuasive. Indeed, as Huang details, some propaganda messages are ‘crude, heavy-handed, or preposterous’ to such an extent that they are ‘seen through by citizens and do not induce persuasion’.²⁴ However, the potential for propaganda to shape people’s beliefs should not be discounted. Indeed, there are several qualitative studies that suggest propaganda disseminated through certain media or relating to particular topics can be effective. For example, Leonid Peisakhin and Arturas Rozenas have argued that biased television news coverage influences the behaviour of some voters in Ukraine and David Yanagizawa-Drott has shown that radio broadcasts increased some people’s willingness to participate in the Rwandan genocide.²⁵ Dan Chen and Andrew MacDonald have also demonstrated that sports propaganda in China is effective in increasing popular support for the government.²⁶ Certain styles of propaganda are likely to be more effective than others. For example, Mattingly and Yao argue that softer forms of propaganda, including entertainment and viral social media content, can be far more credible than harder varieties.²⁷ As a result of the numerous studies that show that propaganda may lead to changing attitudes among at least some citizens, it becomes more important to ask when propaganda works rather than if it works.²⁸

Covid-19, Elections and Authoritarianism

There is now a large body of academic literature that addresses the intersections between Covid-19 and political participation. There is some evidence that, early in the pandemic, the presence of voters on election days served to accelerate the spread of Covid-19 infections.²⁹ Several studies also address whether Covid-19 has resulted in reduced voter turnout, although these do not return consistent findings.³⁰ With regard to the electoral process more broadly, the pandemic has created a range of new risks that can serve to undermine administration and participation.³¹ This has included the use of Covid-19 restrictions as an instrument to hamper opposition activity, something that, for example, Martin Oswald has observed in Uganda.³² Even beyond election campaign periods, there are instances of these restrictions being used to curtail political rights and suppress protest.³³ In Egypt and Morocco, for example, Sammy Badran and Brian Turnbull demonstrate how the authoritarian regimes went far beyond WHO recommendations in the expansion of surveillance and arrest powers. In the name of limiting the spread of the virus and combating misinformation, both regimes implemented powerful and intrusive surveillance structures alongside extensive arrest campaigns.³⁴

Several researchers have been interested in how different regime types reacted to the pandemic. This has often resulted in favourable appraisals of authoritarian regimes’ ability to react quickly and keep Covid-19 mortality rates low, relative to those in more democratic countries.³⁵ However, these findings should be viewed with caution, as they often rely on statistics from authoritarian states that could be reflecting ‘a lack of transparency linked to regime type’.³⁶ As Scott Greer, Elizabeth King and Elize Massard da Fonseca have shown, when the data used derive from sources other than the official government ones, a much more mixed picture of authoritarian performance emerges.³⁷ With different governance systems reacting differently to the crisis, a lot of propaganda relating to how well states have handled the pandemic has been produced. Much of this has emerged from authoritarian states. For example, Nad’a Kovalčíková and Ariane Tabatabai have detailed attempts by Chinese, Russian and Iranian governments to downplay the impact of Covid-19 in their respective countries.³⁸ Although there have been studies about the influence of Covid-19 misinformation on people’s beliefs and actions – including a case study of Nigeria – to our knowledge there is yet to be published any systematic study into the reception of the Covid-19 propaganda produced by an authoritarian government.³⁹

Authoritarianism in Tanzania

After almost three decades as a de jure one-party state, Tanzania reintroduced multiparty politics in 1992. However, this has done little to reduce the concentration of power held by the president since the era of Julius Nyerere (president from 1964 to 1985), and CCM, Africa’s longest-serving ruling party, has deployed a similar set of authoritarian strategies under every subsequent president.⁴⁰ Although some checks and balances had been introduced during the premierships of Benjamin Mkapa (1995–2005) and Jakaya Kikwete (2005–2015), many of these were removed during the authoritarian turn that followed Magufuli’s first election victory in 2015. Unlike previous presidents, Magufuli lacked a strong political base within the ruling party, which prompted him to initiate efforts to consolidate his personal hold on power. To this end, his first term was characterised by attempts to centralise control within CCM, alongside a concerted campaign to marginalise opposition parties.⁴¹ As Michaela Collord notes, this two-pronged strategy relied heavily on the president’s appointment of officials, thereby allowing him more direct control of key state institutions.⁴²

Within CCM and the civil service, criticism of ‘the boss’ was punished, resulting in the suppression of alternative views and the installation of loyalists who would unquestioningly follow Magufuli’s agenda. Restrictions were put in place to constrain the activities of opposition politicians, the media, civil society organisations, academics, activists and pollsters.⁴³ As a result, the government had far greater control over the flow of information in the country during the Magufuli administration than it had under Mkapa and Kikwete, which severely limited the scope for the expression of critical views. The impact of these measures included heightened self-censorship among many journalists, activists, civil society organisations and civil service practitioners, who chose not to raise criticisms that may have led to their falling foul of the new regulations.⁴⁴

Laws relating to the use of social media, which were introduced in advance of the 2015 elections, enabled the prosecution of commentators who were critical of Magufuli and his government.⁴⁵ Criticism of Kikwete’s administration on social media had become increasingly common as discontent with its performance grew and as improved access to mobile phone technology drove an increase in the number of Tanzanians with access to the internet. However, the Cybercrimes Act (2015), introduced at the end of Kikwete’s tenure, began to constrain what many social media users were prepared to say online.⁴⁶ Under President Magufuli, it became clear that the government was prepared to use the ambiguously worded cybercrimes laws to prosecute its critics. More legislation that curtailed freedom of speech in Tanzania was also introduced, including the Electronic and Postal Communications Act (2018), which brought in restrictive licensing requirements and contained ambiguous phrasing that allowed government regulators to prosecute those whose online content they deemed to be ‘false’.

Magufuli’s authoritarianism continued into his second term, secured through victory in the October 2020 elections in which CCM gained 84 per cent of the vote. The elections were poorly conducted in that the restrictions on political participation and free expression fundamentally undermined opposition parties’ ability to compete with the incumbents on fair terms.⁴⁷ Additionally, there were various allegations that the conduct of the elections themselves fell below acceptable international standards.⁴⁸ As this article argues, the increased levels of authoritarianism under Magufuli are central to the story of how the pandemic was handled.

Research Methods

This paper draws upon several complimentary research methods. The authors commissioned a two-round survey in Tanzania, which was nationally representative of age, gender, profession and geographical location. The survey was specifically designed to investigate public attitudes towards both political and Covid-19-related issues and was conducted by the Tanzanian branch of Ipsos, a company that undertakes work on public opinion. The first round had a sample of 1,511 individuals and was undertaken during the campaign period in the run-up to the 2020 elections. The second round took place in the period shortly after the elections had concluded and had a sample of 1,506 individuals. Respondents provided basic demographic information and answered questions about their perceptions of the elections, their experiences of Covid-19 and their willingness to participate in political processes. The authors also collected the respondents’ personal observations about political dynamics and parties’ responses to Covid-19 in Tanzania. Victoria Lihiru was based in Tanzania throughout the period covered in this article, while Robert Macdonald and Thomas Molony were in Tanzania for three weeks during October and November 2020, including on election day. Twenty-three purposively sampled qualitative interviews were conducted in October and early November 2020 with individuals holding specific knowledge of issues relating to the status of Covid-19 in Tanzania. Those interviewed were employed in academia and research, business, government, healthcare, media, civil society and foreign diplomatic missions, among others. They were asked questions about the relationship between Covid-19 policies and politics that were tailored to their individual specialisms. Given the political sensitivities that existed at that time, these interviews were all conducted under strict conditions of anonymity. For the purposes of this article, the authors also purposively selected five Tanzanian Twitter (now renamed X) users who were prominent in their criticism of the government during the period in focus. The authors then used Twitter’s advanced search features to identify how frequently these individuals discussed the government’s Covid-19 response at various stages of the pandemic. The article also draws on international and Tanzanian media reporting on Covid-19 in Tanzania and the 2020 elections.

Covid-19 in Tanzania

The first confirmed case of Covid-19 in Tanzania was announced on 15 March 2020, just days after the WHO had declared a global pandemic. The Tanzanian government’s initial response was to enact a range of public health measures similar to those introduced in other countries.⁴⁹ For example, schools and universities were closed, most public gatherings were cancelled, advice was issued about installing handwashing stations in public areas and specific Covid-19 treatment centres were designated.⁵⁰ At this early stage it was believed that the outbreak was concentrated in urban areas, where compliance with new measures such as handwashing, social distancing and the wearing of facemasks was fairly high.⁵¹ Many private businesses and organisations also introduced their own measures that included the closing of offices. However, the government’s public health measures were only partial; it waited a month before it suspended international flights; markets and many workplaces remained open; and Magufuli actively encouraged citizens to continue attending churches and mosques.⁵² He also justified restricting the scale of his government’s response by saying – without providing supporting data – that if a full lockdown were to be applied in Tanzania, hunger, fear and panic would kill more people than the virus.⁵³ Resources allocated to addressing the pandemic were limited and local officials report that they often had to improvise their responses.⁵⁴ Some alternative approaches to treating and preventing Covid-19 were also promoted by Magufuli and other public officials.⁵⁵ These included inhaling steam and drinking natural remedies made of garlic, lemon and ginger. A shipment of herbal tonic was also imported from Madagascar.⁵⁶ There is no credible evidence that any of these alternative measures are effective in treating or preventing Covid-19.⁵⁷

By April 2020, the number of confirmed cases in Tanzania was rising and the government was receiving criticism for shortcomings in its Covid-19 response strategy. It was reported that Tanzania was at the top of a list of countries that the WHO officials were concerned about.⁵⁸ In particular, they expressed concern that the measures taken to enforce social distancing were weak, as shown by the fact that places of worship and markets were still open. At this stage, the major opposition parties were calling for more resources and stronger measures to fight the virus.⁵⁹ Online, certain elements of Tanzania’s civil society and activist community were also condemning the limited response. At the start of May 2020, Magufuli alleged that ‘imperialist foreign powers’ and staff at the National Institute for Medical Research were conspiring to sabotage the national response by artificially inflating the number of positive Covid-19 cases.⁶⁰ According to Magufuli, animals, fruits and vehicle oil had secretly been tested at the national laboratory, and a papaya, a quail and a goat were found to be positive; the head of the laboratory and the quality assurance manager were subsequently suspended.⁶¹

After this incident, the government stopped announcing statistics for Covid-19 infections, with the last official case from mainland Tanzania recorded on 29 April 2020, and from Zanzibar on 8 May.⁶² At that stage, the official number of cases was 509 with 21 deaths. However, there was speculation that the real numbers were much higher, including rumours on social media (which the government disputed) suggesting that additional deaths were being concealed by late-night burials.⁶³ There were also rumours – which were denied by the Medical Association of Tanzania – that hospitals in Dar es Salaam were full.⁶⁴

In mid May, Magufuli claimed that Covid-19 cases were declining following three days of prayer, and the government began to lift most of the public health measures it had put in place.⁶⁵ Following this announcement, the then Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner, Paul Makonda, declared that there would be a party on 24 May to celebrate the ‘defeat’ of Covid-19.⁶⁶ In early June, Magufuli pronounced that Covid-19 had been eliminated from Tanzania and he thanked God for answering the prayers of the Tanzanian people.⁶⁷ These steps led to a fresh wave of criticism from local activists and international media that viewed them as highly irresponsible.⁶⁸ Preparations for the upcoming elections continued without any significant Covid-19 mitigation measures in place.⁶⁹

Soon after the October 2020 elections, and into the beginning of 2021, reports of people dying after a brief illness associated with breathing difficulties began to spread.⁷⁰ This coincided with the Tanganyika Law Society reporting that 25 of its members had died in early 2021, and the (Roman Catholic) Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) revealing that 25 priests, 60 sisters and two elders of its laity passed away around the same period due to ‘various causes including respiratory challenges’.⁷¹ Several public institutions, including some universities, began calling on staff to take precautions against Covid-19, including wearing facemasks, washing hands and practising social distancing.⁷² Church leaders publicly broke with the government in late January 2021, with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania and the TEC both issuing statements calling for congregations and the general public to take precautions against Covid-19.⁷³ Up to that point, Magufuli and his administration had continued to insist that Covid-19 had been eradicated, to promote alternative remedies and to place restrictions on public discussion of the issue.⁷⁴ A day after the clerics had issued these statements, Magufuli – a staunch Catholic – indirectly admitted that Covid-19 was present in Tanzania.⁷⁵ Yet his administration’s attempts to downplay the reach of the pandemic persisted, amid speculation over the causes of death of a number of high-profile Tanzanians.⁷⁶

It was only in mid March 2021, almost exactly a year after the first confirmed case in Tanzania, that the end of Covid-19-denialism seemed possible. After much speculation over Magufuli’s health and whereabouts, Vice-President Samia Suluhu Hassan announced that the president had passed away in a Dar es Salaam hospital.⁷⁷ The official explanation was that the 61-year-old, who was known to have a pacemaker, had died of heart complications. As Issa Shivji has observed, ‘[i]nternal detractors and a section of the foreign Western press superficially reported and gleefully reiterated that Covid-19 [had] finally caught up with President Magufuli’.⁷⁸ One such ‘internal detractor’ was Tundu Lissu, 2020 presidential candidate for opposition Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA, the Party of Democracy and Development), who described the president’s demise as ‘poetic justice’.⁷⁹

The question of why the Magufuli administration chose first to claim that there had been a reduction in the number of cases and then to announce that the virus has been eliminated is not within the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is worth briefly considering three possible explanations that should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. First, Magufuli’s public pronouncements on the virus frequently referred to the importance of maintaining an active economy, which would only be feasible if citizens perceived their economic activities to be low risk.⁸⁰ Addressing a congregation during a church service in his hometown in May 2020, while avoiding any acknowledgement that Covid-19 was present in Tanzania, he stated that ‘our economy must come first … If we allow our economy to sleep, we will not receive salaries’.⁸¹ He then went on to explain that his decision to remove the requirement for international visitors to quarantine on arrival was a deliberate move to boost tourism, a significant contributor to national income.⁸² While the rhetoric of maintaining a strong economy is frequently used by authoritarian regimes to legitimise their actions, in deciding to avoid a lockdown Magafuli is likely to have been mindful that imposing restrictions on citizens’ economic activities would have been hugely unpopular among voters in an election year. The World Bank announced the upgrading of the Tanzanian economy from low to lower-middle income status on 1 July 2020.⁸³

Second, Magufuli was not afraid to combine politics with his stance on Covid-19 and his Christian beliefs. (Laura Meek argues that these were all influenced by Prophet T.B. Joshua, a Nigerian Pentecostal preacher.)⁸⁴ In one of his last public appearances before he passed away, the president told a church congregation that ‘even I will die, let us know what God has planned. I can die of coronavirus, or die from other disease, and that is why I am not wearing a mask – not because I don’t fear death’.⁸⁵ This statement was interpreted by some as prophetic and by others as foolhardy, but most certainly pointed to Magafuli’s resolute faith in God and predestination, and perhaps also to a fatalism that in his mind was bestowed upon all Tanzanians.

Finally, it appears that Magufuli ensured that nobody challenged his position on the virus. As discussed, he had a tight personal hold on power and closely controlled his political appointees to ensure his position on any issue would not be disputed. All civil servants and members of government knew that if they did not uphold the party and government line on Covid-19, they would lose their jobs. This included those in senior positions, such as Ummy Mwalimu, who in November 2020 was reportedly removed from her post as Minister of Health due to disagreements between her and the president over the national response to the pandemic.⁸⁶ What the president decreed on public health had to be followed by all, starting with the most senior government officials. Throughout his period in office, as some commentators have noted, Magufuli demonstrated an impulsive streak that kept officials in a constant state of anxiety.⁸⁷ His unconventional approach to Covid-19, while supported by his lieutenants when he was alive, does seem to have been driven by his own zeal. It is no coincidence that his death brought about the end of Covid-19 denialism in Tanzania.

This article argues that the government of Tanzania’s claim that Covid-19 had been eradicated met all five criteria in Huckin’s definition of propaganda: first, as mentioned in the introduction, the claim was not true; second, it was very prominently addressed to national and international audiences; third, as the above discussion reveals, it appears to have been created to produce effects deemed advantageous by the source; fourth, it was disseminated intentionally, not randomly or accidentally; and finally, as the next section will show, Magufuli’s administration showed an unwillingness to tolerate critical engagement with this claim.

How the Government Attempted to Prevent its Covid-19 Propaganda from Being Challenged

Once its propaganda was in circulation, the Tanzanian government both promoted it and took measures to suppress the circulation of contradictory information. This began by replacing government officials who did not support the official position.⁸⁸ A small number of government officials were designated as Covid-19 spokespersons, and people who publicly contradicted their positions could face a range of sanctions.⁸⁹ In June 2020, Freeman Mbowe, chair of CHADEMA, was assaulted outside his home by unknown assailants in an attack that his party alleged was politically motivated. This incident happened after Mbowe took a critical stance on the handling of Covid-19, during which he described the government as being in a ‘state of denial’.⁹⁰ There have also been suggestions that the repressive environment made medical professionals reluctant to talk about Covid-19 for fear of possible repercussions.⁹¹ Rather than contradicting the government’s propaganda, many CCM officials and civil servants followed Magufuli’s lead by bullying people to abandon precautions such as wearing facemasks in public.

The government also used the legislation relating to the media (see above) to control the discussion of Covid-19. In an environment in which numerous fines and bans were imposed upon media houses and individual journalists for allegedly reporting ‘misleading information’ on Covid-19, the media largely acquiesced.⁹² State-controlled outlets such as The Daily News predictably sold the government story, while in time more probing newspapers such as The Citizen – which had earlier offered some critical coverage of the state’s handling of the virus – came to avoid explicitly challenging the government’s line. The Magufuli administration also began to use legislation to exert control over online discussion of the pandemic.⁹³ In this context, many Tanzanian social media users may have wanted to avoid touching upon the sensitive subject of the response to Covid-19. The deteriorating situation led the United Nations Human Rights Commission to issue a report in July 2020 in which it stated that ‘Covid-19 has further compounded pre-existing human rights concerns, notably regarding the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and impart information’.⁹⁴

Did Tanzanians Believe the Government’s Covid-19 Propaganda?

The fact that the government proclaimed that Covid-19 had been eliminated from Tanzania does not mean that its citizens believed this to be the case. However, data from the two rounds of our Ipsos survey undertaken either side of the 2020 elections strongly suggest that, during the campaigns (survey round 1) and in the period shortly after the elections had concluded (round 2), few Tanzanians were greatly concerned about Covid-19 in general.

Responses to several of the surveys’ questions offer insight into general perceptions of Covid-19 at the time the elections took place. As Figure 1 shows, when asked, ‘[h]ow concerned are you that you or somebody in your household might contract Covid-19?’, most respondents answered either ‘not concerned at all’ (48.97 per cent in round 1, 64.01 per cent in round 2) or ‘not too concerned’ (36.93 per cent in round 1, 24.90 per cent in round 2). The survey data are also useful for gauging how respondents viewed Covid-19 relative to other health concerns. When, in round 1, respondents were asked, ‘[w]hat are the top three health conditions affecting people in your local area now?’, the most common answers were malaria and tuberculosis. Only four out of 1,370 respondents who replied to this question mentioned Covid-19 in their three answers.

Figure 1. Survey results for the question, ‘[h]ow concerned are you that you or somebody in your household might contract Covid-19?’ Bars indicate a 95 per cent confidence interval. (Source: Ipsos survey for a representative sample of 1,511 (pre-election) and 1,506 individuals (post-election), based on age, gender, profession and geographical location, commissioned for the African Elections during the Covid-19 Pandemic project.)

We also asked ‘[h]ow well do you think your country is doing in fighting Covid-19?’, and found high levels of approval, with ‘good’ (51.36 per cent in round 1, 47.28 per cent in round 2) and ‘very good’ (43.55 per cent in round 1, 46.88 per cent in round 2) as the most common responses (see Figure 2). During the second round, we posed some more direct questions about the government propaganda. In a section of the survey where respondents were asked ‘[w]hich of the following statements do you agree with?’, 33.27 per cent agreed that ‘Covid-19 was eradicated in this country’. (In response to the other statements, 2.66 per cent agreed that ‘Covid-19 is not real’; 3.72 per cent agreed that ‘Covid-19 has never existed in this country’ and 19.59 per cent agreed that ‘[t]he threat of Covid-19 was exaggerated’.) Although the survey gives a clear impression that the pandemic was not viewed as a significant concern around the time of the election, and people were generally not critical of the government response, the data show that only one-third of respondents actually accepted the precise terms of the government’s propaganda.

Figure 2. Survey results for the question, ‘[h]ow well do you think your country is doing in fighting Covid-19?’ Bars indicate a 95 per cent confidence interval. (Source: Ipsos survey for a representative sample of 1,511 (pre-election) and 1,506 individuals (post-election) based on age, gender, profession and geographical location, commissioned for the African Elections during the Covid-19 Pandemic project.)

Although a variety of sampling and response biases can affect surveys in all contexts, some specific concerns about the accuracy of survey data from Tanzania should be addressed here. Keith Weghorst argues that, when topics are politically sensitive, Tanzanian survey respondents will often give answers they perceive to be ‘safe’ or ‘correct’.⁹⁵ As both rounds of the survey occurred after Magufuli’s contentious announcement in June 2020 that Covid-19 had been eliminated from Tanzania, it is important to consider whether the topic of the pandemic falls into this politically sensitive category – particularly in a context where intolerance of criticism was exhibited by Magufuli’s government. There is evidence to suggest that some respondents avoided simply repeating the government’s position, and were prepared to counter the official narrative. (For example, when 66.73 per cent of respondents in the second round did not agree that the virus had been eliminated.) Nonetheless, it is still crucial to draw upon other research methodologies to confirm that the survey data give an accurate picture.

The authors’ contemporary observations of the public behaviour of Tanzanians appear to support the surveys’ general findings that there was a perception among the citizens that Covid-19 rates were at least low during the election period. There were several clear signs that daily life had largely returned to something resembling a pre-pandemic normal by the time that the official election campaign window opened at the end of August 2020. A range of social and economic activities, including some which had been curtailed following the first confirmed case of Covid-19 in Tanzania, were back in full swing. For example, schools had been reopened, daladala minibuses were full and popular bars and restaurants were filled with customers. There was very little evidence that a fear of Covid-19 was preventing people from taking part in their regular daily activities. Even the use of precautions to limit the risk of infection and transmission were no longer common in public. For example, the wearing of facemasks, which some Tanzanians had earlier moderately embraced, particularly in urban areas, was seldom observed. This is consistent with the surveys’ findings that many Tanzanians did not believe themselves to be particularly at risk at that time.

Factors that Influenced whether the Government’s Propaganda was Believed by Tanzanian Citizens

One of the reasons why the government of Tanzania’s claims about the eradication of Covid-19 garnered so much attention in the international media is that, in the view of some audiences, these claims simply did not seem possible. However, it should not be assumed that all Tanzanian citizens found the government’s propaganda similarly implausible. It should be noted that Tanzanians were not required to believe that Covid-19 had simply receded by itself. Rather, there were several reasons why they might have already believed that significant action had been taken to reduce the number of cases before the government claimed that total eradication had been achieved. Although the initial public health response was criticised by a range of international and domestic experts for not going far enough, the common measures that were imposed can nonetheless be used to give a science-based account of why the number of infections might have declined. In addition to this, other pandemic responses, which were based on alternative medicine and religion, should be considered.

While the government was ridiculed in the international media in part for including these unscientific recommendations in its response to the pandemic, some Tanzanian citizens themselves continued to believe that these measures were effective. Indeed, this was apparent during the second round of our survey when we asked, ‘[w]hich of these do you think are effective treatments in curing and/or preventing Covid-19?’, before listing alternative approaches. Among respondents, 40.64 per cent said that ‘inhaling steam’ was effective and 36.92 per cent said that ‘drinking mixtures including garlic, lemon and ginger etc.’ worked. Although, in both cases, this represents less than half of the respondents, it is nonetheless telling that many Tanzanians did believe that the alternative remedies being pushed by the government were effective. The number of respondents who replied that ‘prayer’ was effective – 67.53 per cent – was much higher. Although alternative remedies and prayer do not stand up to scientific scrutiny, these data show that many Tanzanians thought that they were effective. When combined with the (limited) public health measures that were put in place, there was, therefore, clear potential for Tanzanians to believe that something had been done to reduce the number of Covid-19 cases. The fact that some Tanzanians understood Magufuli to be a leader who got things done effectively may have enhanced this belief.⁹⁶ Any citizen who thought that effective action had been taken against Covid-19 might accept the government’s initial claim that Covid-19 infections had been reduced, and find the propaganda claiming the total eradication of the disease plausible.

When the surveys were conducted around the time of Tanzania’s elections, citizens also appear to have been picking up some signs that the situation concerning Covid-19 in Tanzania was less grave than it had been earlier in the pandemic. To be clear, the absence of Covid-19 data between May 2020 and April 2021 makes it impossible to know with certainty what the prevalence of Covid-19 was in Tanzania at that time. Rather, it is popular perceptions of the pandemic that are being considered here. Our qualitative interview data suggest that many citizens continued to look for sources of evidence other than government proclamations that could speak to this issue. Several of our interviewees noted that reports of deaths and illness from within networks of friends and families had become less frequent in this period. Additionally, with daily life having returned to something close to normal (as described above), there were few signs that a pandemic was taking place. Both factors are consistent with the government’s original claim that the number of cases was declining. Although the government’s eradication propaganda would have seemed far less plausible if, in their daily lives, people had been encountering widespread evidence that Covid-19 was a major problem, even the circulation of small amounts of evidence that the virus was still present in the country is likely to have made this claim less persuasive to some Tanzanian citizens.

Despite the fact that Tanzania had become more authoritarian under Magufuli, the state was not able to disseminate its propaganda in an uncontested fashion. For other politically sensitive topics, such as party politics, electoral fraud and a spate of allegedly politically motivated disappearances that occurred during Magufuli’s time in power, there were critics who were prepared to risk the repercussions of speaking out about them in public. These included a number of opposition politicians, online activists and some journalists.

The major opposition parties, which had initially been critical of the government’s response to Covid-19, seemed to lose interest in the issue as the elections approached. Although the largest opposition party, CHADEMA, referred to the pandemic at times, it did not make it a major campaign issue, preferring to focus on economic and developmental issues, as well as highlighting the deteriorating democratic situation.⁹⁷ Tundu Lissu was seen wearing a facemask at rallies during the first few days of the campaign, but quickly abandoned the practice. After that, CHADEMA rallies proceeded with no Covid-19 precautions in place, much like those of the ruling CCM party. There are several potential explanations for this. First, CHADEMA may have viewed capitalising on the pandemic as a poor strategy. After all, day-to-day life had largely returned to normal, and a proposal to (re)impose Covid-19 restrictions may have been unpopular with voters, particularly as it was likely to have interfered with citizens’ economic activities. As shown above, at that time there was also much support for the government’s position on this issue. Second, recent elections had shown that holding political rallies, which tend to be well attended in Tanzania, is one of the opposition’s major methods for disseminating their messages and party-building.⁹⁸ The importance of the rallies during the campaign period had been increased by Magufuli’s 2016 ban on holding opposition rallies and meetings outside the election period.⁹⁹ Holding mass rallies, in which the audience members are generally in close proximity to each other, while simultaneously arguing that there was a great threat from Covid-19 in the country, would clearly be contradictory messaging. The fact that the opposition reduced its Covid-19-related criticism of the ruling party at that time meant that the government’s claims were relatively unchallenged in the field of formal politics at the time of the elections. This increased the likelihood that the government propaganda would have been believed by citizens.

Although government censorship was effective in curtailing criticism from journalists in the traditional media, several online commentators remained critical of the government. It is important to note that legislation designed to restrict online expression (see above) had been inconsistently applied and inadequate technical capacity and staffing meant that there were still limits to the government’s ability to control what was posted on the internet.¹⁰⁰ There remains today a community of online activists from Tanzania who take personal risks to criticise the government on a range of issues. During the first few months of the pandemic, many of them were among the most vocal critics of the government’s response, including the government’s decision to stop releasing official statistics. The data presented in Table 1 show that several of the most prominent activists discussed Covid-19-related issues on Twitter less frequently than usual during the period of the election campaign. There are several possible explanations for this lull in Covid-19-related criticism. It could be argued that, following the announcement that Covid-19 had been eradicated in Tanzania, the issue became more sensitive. However, as Table 1 shows, online activists once more became very vocal in their criticism of the government’s Covid-19 denialism early in 2021. The fact that an issue is politically sensitive has also never entirely curtailed Tanzanians’ online criticism.¹⁰¹ It is also possible that the government increased its control over social media in preparation for the elections. The internet blackout that was put in place around election day certainly shows that the government was particularly keen to reduce online criticism at that time.¹⁰² However, many activists were very vocal in criticising various aspects of the elections themselves, including allegations of electoral fraud. They were also generally able to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to circumvent the blackout. The focus on the democratic concerns during this period does suggest a third explanation: that their attention had temporarily shifted onto other issues. Yet, the downgrading of a global pandemic in terms of priority also suggests that they did not perceive Covid-19 to be an all-encompassing crisis at the time of the election. This would both reflect and encourage a more widely held perception that the Covid-19 situation had improved during that period.

Table 1. The number of Covid-19-related tweets by selected users during specific time periods

	April–May 2020	September–October 2020	February–March 2021
@fatma_karume	187	9	25
@kigogo2014	445	13	191
@mangekimambi	4	80^†	16
@MariaSTsehai	146	15	200
@ThabitSenior	13	3	30

Source: Twitter.com. Search terms used: changamoto (za)* upumuaji, corona, Covid, Covid-19, kifua, korona, korona-19, mfumo (wa)* upumuaji, mafua, pandemic, UVIKO, UVIKO-19. (Please note that wa* and za* (‘of’ in English) have been dropped from the search because of the frequency of the word).

^† These Tweets almost exclusively relate to COVID-19 in the US, where the user is based

Another group that had been critical of the government’s initial response to Covid-19 was healthcare workers. Following the announcement of the eradication of Covid-19, the government tried to control information coming out of hospitals, and there were suggestions that healthcare workers were pressured into labelling Covid-19 cases as other pulmonary conditions.¹⁰³ However, it is unlikely that this information was being totally suppressed. Many Tanzanians either work in healthcare or know people who do. Several interviewees suggested that the informal reports coming from hospitals and health centres around the time of the election were consistent with the number of Covid-19 cases being relatively low when compared with the early months of the crisis. Again, this lent support to the government’s claim that the number of cases had reduced. As with the other sources of information detailed in this section, the eradication propaganda would have been harder to believe if the situation being reported in hospitals was worse. However, as even rumours of a small number of cases are inconsistent with claims of eradication, this information may have led citizens to doubt the government propaganda.

Conclusions

This article has evaluated the reception of Covid-19-related propaganda promoted by the government of Tanzania. The survey and observations that have been presented suggest that there was a popular perception around the time of the election that the risk from Covid-19 was low. However, survey data suggest that only one-third of respondents actually believed that the virus had been eradicated in Tanzania. It has been argued that a combination of prior beliefs, personal experience and conflicting accounts were important in establishing the context in which citizens evaluated the government’s propaganda. Specifically, the government took some measures to combat Covid-19 that many Tanzanians believed were effective, and, in the period following the announcement that the virus had been eradicated, reports of Covid-related issues and criticism of the government’s responses to them were rarer than they had been at the start of the pandemic. All these factors were conducive to creating the perception that the number of cases had declined following the initial period of infection. Acceptance of the eradication propaganda required not only believing that a reduction had occurred but also an additional belief that the virus was no longer present in Tanzania. Therefore, it was harder for the government to persuade citizens that this was true. Although the context in which this propaganda was promoted was favourable enough for many Tanzanians to accept it, there was still enough contradictory information circulating to prevent that group from becoming a majority.

In the context of Covid-19 denialism, the concerns in the literature about Covid-19-related restrictions being used to stifle political participation do not appear to have been realised in Tanzania. Although a range of political restrictions had already been put in place before the pandemic, the 2020 election campaign was conducted without measures to address Covid-19 interfering with political rights. The low levels of concern about Covid-19 described in this article also suggest that the pandemic was not dissuading large numbers of people from participating in the political process due to concerns about contracting the virus. However, the Tanzanian government’s decision not to publish accurate Covid-19 data does make the country a clear example of the dangers of using the statistics produced by authoritarian regimes when evaluating their performance in tackling the Covid-19 pandemic.¹⁰⁴

With regard to propaganda, the Tanzanian case has interesting implications for academics who distinguish between hard and soft propaganda. From the perspective of many international commentators, the heavy-handed approach by the government of Tanzania and the implausibility of its claim to have eradicated Covid-19 may appear to fit Huang’s description of hard propaganda. However, it appears to have been effective in persuading a significant proportion of the Tanzanian population (although not a majority) that Covid-19 was no longer present in the country. This suggests that care should be taken when classifying propaganda as either hard or soft, as claims that appear crude or preposterous to one audience may seem far more credible to another.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Denis Konga for research assistance and Jean-Benoît Falisse for commenting on an early draft and his support in creating the two figures. They are also thankful for the contributions to survey design from Mychelle Balthazard, Jean-François Daoust, Jean-Benoît Falisse, Paul Nugent and Patrick Vinck, and the comments from the three anonymous reviewers. The research on which this article was based was funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund and the Newton Fund (EP/V028464/1).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Robert Macdonald

Robert Macdonald Research Fellow in African Studies, Centre of African Studies, The University of Edinburgh, Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15a George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9LD, UK. Email: [email protected] http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0404-0256

Thomas Molony

Thomas Molony Senior Lecturer in African Studies, Centre of African Studies, The University of Edinburgh, 18 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9LN, UK. Email: [email protected] http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7336-5527

Victoria Lihiru

Victoria Lihiru Lecturer, Department of Public Law, The Open University of Tanzania, Second Floor, Block C, Kawawa Road, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam, 23409, Tanzania. Email: [email protected] http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2666-5804

Notes

1 The SARS-CoV-2 virus causes the infectious disease known as coronavirus disease (Covid-19). Covid-19 is short for ‘coronavirus disease 2019’, which WHO first learned of on 31 December 2019. World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Coronavirus disease (Covid-19)’, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/coronavirus-disease-covid-19, retrieved 9 December 2023; WHO, ‘Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 22’, available at https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200211-sitrep-22-ncov.pdf, retrieved 9 December 2023.

2 ‘Covid-19: Magufuli Must Stop Burying His Head in the Sand’, The Star, Nairobi, 22 February 2021, available at https://www.the-star.co.ke/opinion/leader/2021-02-22-covid-19-magufuli-must-stop-burying-his-head-in-the-sand/, retrieved 24 February 2021; J. Devermont and M. Harris, ‘Implications of Tanzania’s Bungled Response to Covid-19’, CSIS, Washington DC, 26 May 2020, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-tanzanias-bungled-response-covid-19, retrieved 30 May 2020; L. Chutel, ‘Africa’s Covid-19 Denialist-in-Chief’, Foreign Policy, Washington DC, 17 February 2021, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/17/tanzania-president-magufuli-coronavirus-pandemic-denial/, retrieved 25 February 2021.

3 ‘Tanzania President Magufuli Says Hospital Numbers Reducing’, BBC, London, 17 May 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52697508, retrieved 19 May 2020.

4 ‘John Magufuli Declares Tanzania Free of Covid-19’, BBC, 8 June 2020, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52966016, retrieved 19 July 2020.

5 B. Taylor, ‘Omicron Wave Reaches Tanzania’, Tanzanian Affairs, London, 1 January 2022, available at https://www.tzaffairs.org/2022/01/health-coronavirus/, retrieved 9 January 2022; United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Health, ‘Covid-19 Situation Report #27’, available at https://www.moh.go.tz/storage/app/uploads/public/623/bf6/9a3/623bf69a3d819268181372.pdf, retrieved 6 July 2022.

6 This was part of a broader UKRI-funded research project (Grant Number: EP/V028464/1) on African elections during the Covid-19 pandemic, which also involves case studies of the Central African Republic and Ghana. Available at https://aecp.sps.ed.ac.uk/, retrieved 9 December 2023.

7 T. Huckin, ‘Propaganda Defined’, in G.L. Henderson and M.J. Braun (eds), Propaganda and Rhetoric in Democracy: History, Theory, Analysis (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 2016), p. 126.

8 M. Hassan, D. Mattingly and E.R. Nugent, ‘Political Control’, Annual Review of Political Science, 25, 1 (May 2022), pp. 155–74.

9 Ibid., p. 161.

10 D. Mattingly and E. Yao, ‘How Soft Propaganda Persuades’, Comparative Political Studies, 55, 9 (2022), p. 1570.

11 See, for example, M. Edel and M. Josua, ‘How Authoritarian Rules Seek to Legitimize Repression: Framing Mass Killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan’, Democratization, 25, 5 (2018), pp. 882–900; A. Dukalskis and C. Patane, ‘Justifying Power: When Autocracies Talk about Themselves and Their Opponents’, Contemporary Politics, 25, 4 (2019), pp. 457–78.

12 M. Josua, ‘Legitimation Towards Whom? Managing the Legitimacy Crisis in Algeria During the Arab Uprisings’, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 11, 2 (2017), pp. 301–24.

13 Dukalskis and Patane, ‘Justifying Power’.

14 A. Dukalskis and J. Gerschewski, ‘What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation’, Contemporary Politics, 23, 3 (2017), pp. 251–68.

15 H. Huang, ‘The Pathology of Hard Propaganda’, The Journal of Politics, 80, 3 (2018), pp. 1034–38; L. Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999).

16 Huang, ‘Pathology’.

17 Ibid.

18 H. Huang, ‘Propaganda as Signalling’, Comparative Politics, 47, 4 (2015), p. 435.

19 See, for example, Huang, ‘Pathology’; Huang, ‘Propaganda as Signalling’; Mattingly and Yao, ‘How Soft’.

20 V. Chung-Hon Shih, ‘“Nauseating” Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China’, The Journal of Politics, 70, 4 (2008), pp. 1177–92.

21 Wedeen, Ambiguities, p. 6.

22 V. Havel, ‘The Power of the Powerless’, East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 32, 2 (2018, [1978]), pp. 353–408.

23 Wedeen, Ambiguities, p. 2.

24 Huang, ‘Pathology’, p. 1034.

25 L. Peisakhin and A. Rozenas, ‘Electoral Effects of Biased Media: Russian Television in Ukraine’, American Journal of Political Science, 62, 3 (2018), pp. 535–50; D. Yanagizawa-Drott, ‘Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129, 4 (2014), pp. 1947–94.

26 D. Chen and A. MacDonald, ‘Bread and Circuses: Sports and Public Opinion in China’, Journal of Experimental Political Science, 7, 1 (2020), pp. 41–55.

27 Mattingly and Yao, ‘How Soft’.

28 Peisakhin and Rozenas, ‘Electoral Effects’, p. 536.

29 J. Palguta, R. Levínský and S. Škoda, ‘Do Elections Accelerate the Covid-19 Pandemic?: Evidence from a Natural Experiment’, Journal of Population Economics, 35, 1 (2022), pp. 197–240.

30 G.C. Chirwa, B. Dulani, L. Sithole, J.J. Chunga, W. Alfonso and J. Tengatenga, ‘Malawi at the Crossroads: Does the Fear of Contracting Covid-19 Affect the Propensity to Vote’, The European Journal of Development Research, 34, 1 (2020), pp. 409–31; A. Santana, J. Rama and F.C. Bértoa, ‘The Coronavirus Pandemic and Voter Turnout: Addressing the Impact of Covid-19 on Electoral Participation’, Center for Open Science, Virginia, 17 November 2020, available at https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/3d4ny, retrieved 9 December 2023; and M. Picchio and R. Santolini, ‘The Covid-19 Pandemic’s Effects on Voter Turnout’, European Journal of Political Economy, 73, 102161 (2022), pp. 1–15.

31 T. Landman and L.D.G. Splendore, ‘Pandemic Democracy: Elections and Covid-19’, Journal of Risk Research, 23, 7–8, special issue on ‘Covid-19’ (2020), pp. 1060–6.

32 M. Oswald, ‘Covid-19 Pandemic and Electoral Participation in Africa: Likelihood of Ugandans Voting in the 2021 Pandemic Elections’, Journal of African Elections, 21, 2 (2022), pp. 23–52.

33 A. Spadaro, ‘Covid-19: Testing the Limits of Human Rights’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11, 2 (2020), pp. 317–25; see also E. Chenoweth, ‘Can Nonviolent Resistance Survive Covid-19?’, Journal of Human Rights, 21, 3 (2022), pp. 304–16.

34 S. Badran and B. Turnbull, ‘The Covid-19 Pandemic and Authoritarian Consolidation in North Africa’, Journal of Human Rights, 21, 3 (2022), pp. 263–82.

35 C.B. Frey, C. Chen and G. Presidente, ‘Democracy, Culture and Contagion: Political Regimes and Countries Responsiveness to Covid-19’, Covid Economics, 18 (2020), pp. 222–38, available at https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:06808503-78e4-404f-804f-1f97ab2c7d7e, retrieved 9 February 2023; G. Cepaluni, M. Dorsch and R. Branyiczki, ‘Political Regimes and Deaths in the Early Stages of the Covid-19 Pandemic’, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 37, 1 (2022), pp. 27–53; J.A. Cheibub, J.Y.J. Hong and A. Przeworski, ‘Rights and Deaths: Government Reactions to the Pandemic’, SSRN, 9 July 2020, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3645410, retrieved 9 December 2023; see also L. Yao, M. Li, J.Y. Wan, S.C. Howard, J.E. Bailey and J.C. Graff, ‘Democracy and Case Fatality Rate of Covid-19 at Early Stage of Pandemic: A Multi-Country Study’, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 29, 6 (2022), pp. 8694–704.

36 M.M. Kavanagh and R. Singh, ‘Democracy, Capacity, and Coercion in Pandemic Response: Covid-19 in Comparative Political Perspective’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 45, 6 (2020), p. 1004.

37 S.L. Greer, E.J. King and E. Massard da Fonseca, ‘Introduction: Explaining Pandemic Response’, in S.L. Greer, E.J. King, E. Massard da Fonseca and A. Peralta-Santos (eds), Coronavirus Politics: The Comparative Politics and Policy of Covid-19 (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2021), pp. 3–33.

38 N. Kovalčíková and A. Tabatabai, ‘Five Authoritarian Pandemic Messaging Frames and How to Respond’, GMF, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington DC, 4 August 2020, available at https://www.gmfus.org/news/five-authoritarian-pandemic-messaging-frames-and-how-respond, retrieved 17 January 2022.

39 J.A. Goldstein S. Grossman and M. Startz, ‘Belief in Covid-19 Misinformation in Nigeria’, Journal of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1086/727605 [forthcoming; accepted August 2023], retrieved 9 December 2023.

40 N. Cheeseman, H. Matfess and A. Amani, ‘Tanzania: The Roots of Repression’, Journal of Democracy, 32, 2 (2021) pp. 77–89.

41 M. Collord, ‘Tanzania’s 2020 Election: Return of the One-Party State’, Études de l’Ifri, report, Paris, 9 February 2021, p. 12, available at https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/tanzanias-2020-election-return-one-party-state, retrieved 15 April 2021.

42 Ibid., p. 16.

43 ‘At the Edge of Democracy: Tanzania towards 2020. A Pre-Election Report’, Tanzania Elections Watch, 22 October 2020, available at https://dc.sourceafrica.net/documents/120785-Tanzania-Election-Watch-At-the-Edge-of-Democracy.html, retrieved 17 November 2020; B. Taylor, ‘Tanzania’s Election Results are Predictable. What Happens Next is Not’, African Arguments, London, 27 October 2020, available at https://africanarguments.org/2020/10/tanzania-election-results-are-predictable-what-happens-next-is-not/, retrieved 1 November 2020.

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45 L. Kuo, ‘Tanzania is Threatening More Citizens With Jail For Insulting the President on Social Media’, Quartz Africa, New York, 15 September 2016, available at https://qz.com/africa/782239/five-tanzanians-were-charged-with-cybercrime-for-insulting-president-john-magufuli-on-social-media/, retrieved 26 July 2022.

46 C. Cross, ‘Cybercrime and the Policing of Politics in Tanzania’, in M. Dwyer and T. Molony (eds), Social Media and Politics in Africa: Democracy, Censorship and Security (London, Zed Books, 2019), pp. 195–213.

47 D. Paget, ‘Tanzania: The Authoritarian Landslide’, Journal of Democracy, 32, 2 (2021), pp. 61–76.

48 ‘At the Edge’, Tanzania Elections Watch.

49 The Citizen Reporter, ‘Tanzania Bans All Public Gathering, Closes Schools, Suspends the Premier League over Coronavirus’, The Citizen, Nairobi, 17 March 2020, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-bans-all-public-gathering-closes-schools-suspends-the-premier-league-over-coronavirus-2705760, retrieved 20 March 2020.

50 C. Kombe, ‘Tanzania Confirms First Case of Coronavirus’, Voice of America, Washington DC, 16 March 2020, available at https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/tanzania-confirms-first-case-coronavirus, retrieved 18 October 2021.

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53 B. Mutahi, ‘Tanzania President John Magufuli: The Man Who Declared Victory Over Coronavirus’, BBC, 2 November 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54603689?piano-modal, retrieved 16 June 2022.

54 R. Carlitz, T. Yamanis and H. Mollel, ‘Coping with Denialism: How Street-Level Bureaucrats Adapted and Responded to Covid-19 in Tanzania’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 46, 6 (2021), pp. 989–1017.

55 See S.R. Kamazima, D.C.V. Kakoko and M. Kazaura, ‘“Manifold Tactics Are Used to Control and Prevent Pandemics in Contemporary Africa”: A Case of Tanzania’s Fight Against Covid-19’, International Journal of Advanced Scientific Research and Management, 5, 11 (2020), pp. 20–33.

56 See L.A. Richey, L.E. Gissel, O.L. Kweka, P. Bærendtsen, P. Kragelund, H.Q. Hambati and A. Mwamfupe, ‘South–South Humanitarianism: The Case of Covid-Organics in Tanzania’, World Development, 141, 105375 (2021), pp. 1–11.

57 ‘Fact-Checking Tanzanian President John Magufuli on Inhaling Steam to Treat Covid-19’, Africa Check, Johannesburg, 6 May 2020, available at https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/reports/fact-checking-tanzanian-president-john-magufuli-inhaling-steam-treat-covid-19, retrieved 17 February 2021; A. Vaughan, ‘No Evidence “Madagascar Cure” for Covid-19 Works, Says WHO’, New Scientist, 15 May 2020, available at https://www.newscientist.com/article/2243669-no-evidence-madagascar-cure-for-covid-19-works-says-who/, retrieved 12 August 2020; Reuters, ‘False Claim: Steam Therapy Kills Coronavirus’, Reuters, Toronto, 30 March 2020, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-steam-kills-coronavirus-idUSKBN21H2LK, retrieved 17 February 2021.

58 A. Adeoye, S. Allison, A.B. Atabong and A.S. Brima, ‘Crisis, What Crisis? How Not to Handle a Pandemic’, Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg, 27 April 2020, available at https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-04-27-crisis-what-crisis-how-not-to-handle-a-pandemic/, retrieved 15 September 2021.

59 Staff reporter, ‘Head of Opposition Mbowe Outlines Suggestions For the Fight Against Covid-19’, The Citizen, 30 April 2020, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/Mbowe-outlines-suggestions-for-virus-fight/1840340-5538448-f2dg0uz/index.html, retrieved 1 November 2020.

60 S. Awami, ‘Tanzania’s John Magufuli – the Man Vowing to Defeat Coronavirus and Imperialism’, BBC, 18 June 2020, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52983563, retrieved 18 June 2020.

61 Staff reporter, ‘Tanzania Covid-19 Lab Head Suspended as President Questions Data’, Al Jazeera, Qatar, 5 May 2020, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/5/tanzania-covid-19-lab-head-suspended-as-president-questions-data, retrieved 6 May 2020.

62 B. Materu, ‘Covid-19: Tanzania’s Semi-Autonomous Island of Zanzibar Records 29 New Cases’, The East African, Nairobi, 8 May 2020, available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Covid19-Tanzania-Zanzibar-island-records-29-new-cases/4552908-5546092-h9r79bz/index.html, retrieved 10 May 2020.

63 B. Mutahi and A. Mtulya, ‘Night Burials Amid Tanzania’s Coronavirus Defiance’, BBC, 4 May 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52505375, retrieved 5 May 2020; R. Kondowe, ‘Tanzania’s President is under Pressure after Three MPs Die in 11 days and Covid-19 Cases Spike’, Quartz Africa, 1 May 2020, available at https://qz.com/africa/1849684/tanzanias-magufuli-panned-as-covid-19-cases-jump-three-mps-die/, retrieved 8 May 2020.

64 ‘Tanzania Hospitals Overwhelmed – US’, BBC, 13 May 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52646640, retrieved 13 May 2020.

65 BBC, ‘Tanzania President Magufuli Says Hospital Numbers Reducing’.

66 K. Said, ‘A Problem of Denial: Why Tanzania Could Lose the War Against Covid-19’, The Elephant, Nairobi, 29 May 2020, available at https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/05/29/a-problem-of-denial-why-tanzania-could-lose-the-war-against-covid-19/, retrieved 3 June 2020.

67 ‘John Magufuli Declares Tanzania Free of Covid-19’, BBC, 8 June 2020, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52966016, retrieved 19 July 2020.

68 A.C. Kwayu, ‘Tanzania’s Covid-19 Response Puts Magufuli’s Leadership Style in Sharp Relief’, blog, Down to Earth, New Delhi, 1 June 2020, available at https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/africa/tanzania-s-covid-19-response-puts-magufuli-s-leadership-style-in-sharp-relief-71475, retrieved 16 July 2020; A. Sguazzin, ‘Africa’s “bulldozer” Runs into Covid-19, Claims God on His Side’, Bloomberg, New York, 19 June 2020, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-19/africa-s-bulldozer-runs-into-covid-19-claims-god-on-his-side, retrieved 21 June 2020; A.L. Dahir, ‘Tanzania’s President Says Country is Virus Free. Others Warn of Disaster’, The New York Times, 4 August 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/world/africa/tanzanias-coronavirus-president.html, retrieved 11 August 2020.

69 V. Lihiru, R. Macdonald and T. Molony, ‘Covid-19 and Tanzania’s 2020 Elections’, African Elections During the Covid-19 Pandemic Project: Working Paper (Edinburgh, African Elections During the Covid-19 Pandemic Project, 2021), pp. 10–11, available at https://aecp.sps.ed.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/COVID-19-and-Tanzanias-2020-Elections.pdf, retrieved 9 December 2023.

70 S. Buguzi, ‘Covid-19: Counting the Cost of Denial in Tanzania’, BMJ, 373, 1052 (London, 27 April 2021), p. 1; ‘The Country Where Covid-19 Doesn’t Exist’, The Continent with Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 6 February 2021, pp. 9–12, available at https://bucket.mg.co.za/wp-media/eef46173-thecontinentissue36.pdf, retrieved 17 February 2021; P. Sippy, ‘Covid-Skeptical Tanzania is Experiencing a Spike in Pneumonia’, Quartz Africa, 17 February 2021, available at https://qz.com/africa/1973320/covid-skeptical-tanzania-is-experiencing-a-spike-in-pneumonia/, retrieved 23 February 2021; P. Mwai and C. Giles, ‘Covid: Does Tanzania Have a Hidden Epidemic?’, BBC, 17 March 2021, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/56242358, retrieved 18 March 2021.

71 R. Mirondo, ‘Lawyers, Clerics Issue New Messages on Covid-19’, The Citizen, 20 February 2021, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/lawyers-clerics-issue-new-messages-on-covid-19-3298278, retrieved 22 February 2021; The Citizen reporter, ‘Over 25 Priests, 60 Nuns Have Died in 60 Days, Says TEC’, The Citizen, 3 March 2021, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/over-25-priests-60-nuns-have-died-in-60-days-says-tec-3310428, retrieved 5 March 2021.

72 G. Njogopa, ‘Tanzania yazipiga marufuku taasisi kuzungumzia Corona’, DW (Deutsche Welle), Bonn, 10 February 2021, available at https://www.dw.com/sw/tanzania-yazipiga-marufuku-taasisi-kuzungumzia-corona/a-56521342, retrieved 7 December 2022; M. Hussein, ‘Profesa aliyetoa tahadhari ya Corona atakiwa kuomba radhi Tanzania’, BBC, 11 February 2021, available at https://www.bbc.com/swahili/live/habari-56021038, retrieved 7 December 2021.

73 L. Kalumbia, ‘Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania Cautions its Faithful of Covid-19 Risk’, The Citizen, 31 January 2021, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/evangelical-lutheran-church-of-tanzania-cautions-its-faithful-of-covid-19-risk-3274962, retrieved 6 February 2021; F. Nzwili, ‘Tanzania Bishops Urge More Covid Protection’, The Tablet, London, 4 February 2021, available at https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/13824/tanzania-bishops-urge-more-covid-protection, retrieved 11 February 2021. See also K. Said, ‘In the Name of Jesus: How the Church Forced Tanzania to Change its Stance on Covid-19’, The Elephant, 12 March 2021, available at https://www.theelephant.info/long-reads/2021/03/12/in-the-name-of-jesus-how-the-church-forced-tanzania-to-change-its-stance-on-covid-19/, retrieved 17 November 2021.

74 B. Materu, ‘Tanzanians Urged to Use Traditional Medicine for Covid-19’, The East African, 1 February 2021, available at https://allafrica.com/stories/202102030058.html, retrieved 8 February 2021; J. Otukho, ‘Mbeya Regional Commissioner Chalamila Warns Against Usage of Phrase “sudden death”‘, Toku, Nairobi, 7 February 2021, available at https://www.tuko.co.ke/402215-tanzania-mbeya-regional-commissioner-chalamila-warns-usage-phrase-sudden-death.html, retrieved 19 March 2021.

75 Mwanahalisi Digital, Twitter, 27 January 2021, available at https://twitter.com/Mwanahalisitz/status/1354360740010995713, retrieved 6 May 2022.

76 ‘Death Robs Tanzania of 10 Prominent Persons in February’, The East African, 23 February 2021, available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/-death-robs-tanzania-of-10-prominent-persons-in-february-3301530, retrieved 23 February 2021.

77 ‘President Magufuli’s Death Announcement by VP Samia Suluhu Hassan’, NTV Kenya, Nairobi, 17 March 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMV4GiybKY4, retrieved 26 May 2021.

78 I. Shivji, ‘The Dialectics of Maguphilia and Maguphobia’, CODESRIA Bulletin Online, Dakar, 13 June 2021, p. 1, available at https://www.journals.codesria.org/index.php/codesriabulletin/article/view/735, retrieved 17 November 2021.

79 ‘Magufuli Died from Coronavirus, Says Tanzania Opposition Leader’, Capital FM, Nairobi, 18 March 2021, available at https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/03/magufuli-died-from-coronavirus-says-tanzania-opposition-leader/, retrieved 20 March 2021.

80 See L. Mwainyekule and F. Frimpong, ‘The Pandemic and the Economy of Africa: Conflicting Strategies Between Tanzania and Ghana’, Digital Government: Research and Practice, 1, 4 (2020), pp. 1–8.

81 ‘Magufuli: Our Economy Comes First in Covid-19 Fight’, The Citizen, 17 May 2020, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/Magufuli–Our-economy-comes-first-in-Covid-19-fight/1840340-5555628-iu5ti6z/index.html, retrieved 18 May 2020.

82 Ibid.

83 Dukalskis and Gerschewski, ‘What Autocracies’; World Bank, ‘Maintaining Tanzania’s Lower-Middle Income Status Post-Covid-19 Will Depend on Strengthening Resilience’, press release (Washington DC, World Bank, 3 March 2021), available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/03/03/maintaining-tanzanias-lower-middle-income-status-post-covid-19-will-depend-on-strengthening-resilience, retrieved 7 March 2021.

84 L. Meek, ‘Intersections of Political Power, Religion, and Public Health in Africa: Covid-19, Tanzanian President Magufuli, and Nigerian Prophet T.B. Joshua’, Somatosphere, 12 November 2021, available at http://somatosphere.net/2021/magufuli-joshua-public-health-covid-tanzania-meek.html/, retrieved 2 February 2022.

85 ‘Magufuli Dies: The Cause of Death is Shrouded in Mystery’, Africa Research Bulletin, 58, 3 (2021), p. 23080B, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2021.09903.x?saml_referrer, retrieved 23 April 2021.

86 Taylor, ‘Omicron Wave’.

87 ‘Government by Gesture’, The Economist, 26 May 2016, available at https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/05/26/government-by-gesture, retrieved 7 February 2022; T. Gwaambuka, ‘Is Magufuli an Impulsive Mad Dictator?’, Jamiiforums, 22 June 2016, available at https://www.jamiiforums.com/threads/is-magufuli-an-impulsive-mad-dictator.1069507/, retrieved 7 February 2022.

88 Lihiru, ‘Covid-19’, p. 8.

89 Collaboration on International ICT Policy (CIPESA), ‘Tanzania Tramples Digital Rights in Fight Against Covid-19’, blog (Kampala, CIPESA, 19 October 2020), available at https://cipesa.org/2020/10/tanzania-tramples-digital-rights-in-fight-against-covid-19-as-elections-loom/, retrieved 25 October 2020.

90 ‘Tanzania Opposition Leader Attacked Months before the Elections’, Al Jazeera, 9 June 2020, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/9/tanzania-opposition-leader-attacked-months-before-the-elections, retrieved 10 June 2020.

91 S. Awami, ‘“My Tanzanian family is split over coronavirus”’, BBC, 29 July 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53492436, retrieved 1 August 2020.

92 CIPESA, ‘Tanzania Tramples Rights’.

93 Ibid.

94 United Nations Human Rights (UNHR) Office of the High Commissioner, ‘UN Experts Call on Tanzania to End Crackdown on Civic Space’, press release, Geneva, 22 July 2020, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26117&LangID=E, retrieved 17 March 2021.

95 K. Weghorst, ‘Political Attitudes and Response Bias in Semi-Democratic Regimes: A Survey Experiment Comparing the List Experiment and Randomized Response in Tanzania’, (unpublished online paper, Nashville, 2015), available at https://www.keithweghorst.com/uploads/9/0/4/7/9047071/weghorst_lerrt_2015.pdf, retrieved 8 August 2021. See also K. Croke, ‘Tools of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania: Evidence from Surveys and Survey Experiments’, Democratization, 24, 2 (2017), pp. 189–208, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1146696, retrieved 12 March 2021.

96 For example, ‘Democracy vs Development in Magufuli’s Tanzania’, The East African, 14 October 2016, available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/democracy-vs-development-in-magufuli-s-tanzania-1356634, retrieved 15 March 2021; ‘Magufuli Keeps Nation on a High’, The Citizen, 12 February 2016, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/magufuli-keeps-nation-on-a-high–2547230, retrieved 15 March 2021.

97 ‘The Overriding Issues in Tanzania’s 2020 Election Campaign So Far’, The Citizen, 7 September 2020, available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/-the-overriding-issues-in-tanzania-s-2020-election-campaign-so-far-2715810, retrieved 8 September 2020.

98 D. Paget, ‘The Rally-Intensive Campaign: A Distinct Form of Electioneering in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 24, 4 (2019), pp. 444–64, https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161219847952, retrieved 19 March 2020.

99 ‘Magufuli Criticised as Tanzania Bans Rallies’, The East African, 11 June 2016, available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/magufuli-criticised-as-tanzania-bans-rallies–1351138, retrieved 22 February 2022.

100 Cross, ‘Cybercrime and Policing’.

101 C. Cross, ‘Dissent as Cybercrime: Social Media, Security and Development in Tanzania’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 15, 3 (2021), pp. 455–6, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2021.1952797, 7 August 2021.

102 D. Sakpa, ‘Tanzania Restricts Social Media During Election’, DW (Deutsche Welle), 29 October 2020, available at https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-restricts-social-media-during-election/a-55433057, retrieved 3 November 2020.

103 X. Aldekoa, ‘Tanzania, el país del virus del no’, La Vanguardia, 21 March 2021, available at https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20210321/6603110/tanzania-coronavirus-covid-negacionismo-libre-virus.html, retrieved 6 April 2021; Sippy, ‘Covid-Skeptical’.

104 The Tanzanian government has a track record of manipulating statistics. See R.D. Carlitz and R. McLellan, ‘Open Data from Authoritarian Regimes: New Opportunities, New Challenges’, Perspectives on Politics, 19, 1 (2020), pp. 160–70.