Mozambique’s Neglected Nationalists in Exile: Retracing Coremo’s Relations with the Congolese Government and the FNLA

Abstract

Even though the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (Coremo) was Mozambique’s second largest liberation movement, historians have neglected its role in the struggle for Mozambican independence. This neglect has resulted in an imbalanced understanding of how Mozambicans fought to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule throughout the second half of the 20th century, including how Mozambican liberation movements navigated the precarious exile environment. By retracing and examining Coremo’s relations with Joseph Mobutu’s Congolese government and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), this article adds to the growing literature on competing anti-colonial movements during Mozambique’s liberation struggle. Coremo’s relationship with these two actors is intertwined with and was founded on the earlier relations that Paulo Gumane’s reconstituted National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Udenamo) had established with the FNLA and Cyrille Adoula’s Congolese government. Reconstructing the story of this relationship deepens our understanding of the different transnational and transregional strategies that smaller liberation movements like Coremo employed in exile. The story of Coremo’s relations with Kinshasa and the FNLA highlights the importance of and difficulties in establishing support structures in the context of competitive liberation politics. The history of these long-standing relations also adds to our understanding of the formation and development of working relationships between lusophone African liberation movements, which have traditionally focused on the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies, and brings to our attention the role of alternative African support hubs in southern Africa’s liberation struggle.

Keywords:

• Coremo
• FNLA
• Mozambique
• Angola
• Democratic Republic of Congo
• Paulo Gumane
• southern Africa
• liberation movements

Introduction

Exile defined the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee’s (Coremo’s) existence. It was established in exile in 1965 and dissolved in exile in 1974. Unlike the Mozambique Liberation Front’s (Frelimo’s) experience, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) never officially recognised Coremo as a liberation movement, making its time in exile particularly precarious. Due to the lack of OAU recognition, this small liberation movement depended solely on the aid that foreign governments, organisations and fellow liberation movements directly provided. One of the governments from which Coremo sought assistance was Joseph Mobutu’s Congolese government (the modern-day Democratic Republic of the Congo).¹ At the same time, Coremo established a relationship with Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which operated out of Congo.² The relationship between the FNLA and Coremo is interconnected with their mutual relationship with the Congolese government. I therefore examine Coremo’s relations together with these two sources of support.

I also analyse the earlier alliance that Paulo José Gumane’s reconstituted National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Udenamo) established with the Congolese government and the FNLA. The original Udenamo had been formed in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) in 1960, and Adelino Gwambe and Paulo Gumane became two of its leaders. This Udenamo was absorbed into Frelimo in 1962. After Gwambe and Gumane were expelled from Frelimo in 1963, each leader formed their own competing version of Udenamo. Gumane’s Udenamo and Gwambe’s National Democratic Union of Monomotapa (Udenamo-Monomotapa) briefly operated in exile and were amalgamated into Coremo in 1965.³ Including Udenamo in this history of Coremo is essential, as Udenamo’s earlier efforts formed the basis for Coremo’s relationship with both the FNLA and the Congolese government.

Examining Coremo’s endeavours to establish relations with the Congolese government and the FNLA is insightful for two reasons. First, it deepens our understanding of the relations and support structures of smaller liberation movements like Coremo, even if they often failed to achieve their desired outcomes. From the 1960s onwards, establishing and expanding international support networks became central to the survival of the lusophone African liberation movements. Portuguese colonialism in Africa was increasingly exposed to and condemned by the world, and liberation movements and their leaders and members were systematically forced to survive in exile. While the dynamics of transnational support networks of lusophone African liberation movements have been well documented,⁴ including those of Frelimo,⁵ the literature has been centred on the experiences of the so-called authentic liberation movements. The label of authenticity emerged in the competitive Cold War and decolonisation environment, where liberation movements from the same territory battled to become the ‘true’ representatives of the people’s interests in the struggle for freedom. Those movements that were labelled as authentic received OAU recognition, were usually not splinter groups, and were generally backed by the Soviet Union. Historians have, however, neglected the tactics and networks of smaller ‘inauthentic’ liberation movements like Coremo. Gerhard Liesegang and Joel das Neves Tembe rightly argue that shifting our focus to neglected Mozambican movements will not only complete missing parts of the historical liberation narrative but also add new perspectives on how other movements conceived and envisioned Mozambican liberation.⁶

My research on Coremo contributes to a growing body of renewed interest in reconstructing how overlooked or ‘inauthentic’ African liberation movements navigated the complex regional, continental and international political arena. The recent work by Gerald Mazarire on the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Vilho Amukwaya Shigwedha on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), George Roberts on the National Liberation Movement of the Comoros islands (Molinaco) and Brooks Marmon on the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) are good examples of such research.⁷ As will become clear, Coremo’s image as an inauthentic liberation movement influenced how its support networks developed, including its decision to seek assistance from the Congolese government and FNLA. Congo became a central link in Coremo’s exile network, shaping its identity as a liberation movement. This article, therefore, contributes to our understanding of how continental and global factors shaped southern Africa’s liberation struggles and shifts the historiographical focus to alternative hubs of support in Africa.

Second, Coremo’s relationship with the FNLA foregrounds overlooked attempts by lusophone African liberation movements to work together in exile. Recently, there has been a growth of literature that documents and analyses how ideas and bonds of unity between different lusophone African liberation movements emerged and developed. This mainly focuses on the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP).⁸ The CONCP was a working alliance composed of Frelimo, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe. The CONCP allowed only one movement from each colonial territory to represent the struggle. While existing research provides a reasonably comprehensive understanding of the CONCP, other attempts by lusophone liberation movements to develop working relations have not yet been explored. However ineffective Coremo and the FNLA ultimately were, both movements made sustained efforts to assist each other in their struggle to overthrow Portuguese colonialism in Africa. These efforts were based on earlier relations that emerged at the time of Gumane’s reconstituted Udenamo. Due to its precarious existence, Coremo extensively relied on the ‘social and cultural capital’ that its leaders accumulated, an essential aspect of survival in exile that Daniel Kaiser has discussed.⁹ But in contrast to Kaiser’s or Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali’s research, which highlights the relations that emerged among a small elite of African leaders who were studying in Europe and the USA, the relations between Coremo and the FNLA were forged among the Mozambican and Angolan diaspora who lived in southern and central Africa and worked in lower- to middle-class jobs.¹⁰ This shared background and experience is likely to have shaped their interpretation of African nationalism. As such, this article contributes to a growing body of research on the formation and development of transitional support networks between lusophone liberation movements.

Coremo’s Neglected Contribution to Mozambique’s Liberation Struggle

Frelimo’s role in the Mozambican war for independence overshadows that of Coremo and other smaller liberation movements like Udenamo. While Frelimo was undoubtedly the largest and most successful liberation movement, it was not the only one that Mozambicans joined to oppose Portuguese colonial rule. The contributions of the so-called losers of Mozambique’s liberation struggle exist in the historiographical margins, despite efforts in post-civil-war Mozambique to widen the discourse on national liberation.¹¹ Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman’s influential study, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, only mentions Coremo once, in a footnote.¹² Later publications, like those of João Cabrita or John Marcum, make a notable effort to document Coremo’s role in Mozambique’s liberation struggle.¹³ While they discuss Coremo’s contribution more extensively and treat Coremo as a genuine liberation movement, these publications still do not provide the same level of detail and nuance on Coremo as they do for Frelimo.

While the historiographical focus on Frelimo is understandable in view of Coremo’s comparative size and effectiveness, increasing research is being conducted on other Mozambican anti-colonial movements. Such literature is usually framed around the concept of competing alternatives to Frelimo during Mozambique’s liberation struggle that are linked to contemporary issues of multiparty politics and political conflict during Mozambique’s postcolonial period. Liesegang, das Neves Tembe and Corrado Tornimbeni have conducted valuable work in documenting the history of the smaller Mozambican liberation movements, including those that opposed Frelimo and eventually agreed to form Coremo.¹⁴ In their unpublished paper, Liesegang and das Neves Tembe trace the history of the various liberation movements that formed Frelimo and discuss the subsequent breakaway of smaller parties, including Udenamo. Tornimbeni’s article has a similar focus but also discusses the formation of Coremo and other movements that opposed Frelimo. In turn, Calisto Baquete’s unpublished work provides a more detailed overview of the establishment and evolution of Coremo while still placing it in the broader history of opposition to Frelimo.¹⁵ Baquete’s research on Coremo is primarily based on the information provided in four International and State Defence Police/Directorate-General of Security (hereafter PIDE/DGS) files on the movement and several other Coremo documents that were made available online by the Aluka project.¹⁶ However, Baquete’s work does not go into great detail about Coremo’s exile relations and does not mention its relationship with the FNLA nor with the Congolese government.

Finding Coremo’s Voice in the Archives

Despite the crucial efforts mentioned above, much of Coremo’s history remains under-studied both in terms of the movement’s internal dynamics and its relations in exile. This article documents part of this history by examining Coremo’s efforts to establish relations with the Congolese government and the FNLA. Writing histories of African liberation movements that no longer exist is challenging – especially those of movements like Coremo, whose existence was marred by controversy. Such liberation movements do not usually have a party archive and many of their members have died or are hard to track down, as no official organisational structures exist. Biographies by or interviews with leaders are also scarce since their accounts do not usually fit the national liberation narrative.¹⁷ Such personal accounts, as Liesegang and das Neves Tembe argue, have also been tainted, as memories have been coloured by hindsight.¹⁸ These circumstances force historians to consult alternative repositories and work with more unorthodox sources. While scholars have highlighted the need for the use of innovative methodologies to uncover new perspectives on southern Africa’s liberation struggle,¹⁹ this tactic is particularly true for neglected movements like Coremo. In this article, I reconstruct parts of Coremo’s exile relations by using primary sources from various repositories in Portugal, the USA and Zambia. This material mainly consists of information on Coremo and its members that foreign governments and intelligence departments compiled.

The most useful repositories for this article were three Portuguese archives: the Diplomatic-Historical Archive, the National Defence Archive and the Torre do Tombo National Archive. Each of these archives contains a wide array of information on Coremo and its members collected by departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and information and intelligence divisions such as the PIDE/DGS, Information Centralisation and Co-ordination Services (SCCI) and Portuguese military intelligence (known as 2REP). Correspondence between and reports by different government departments, as well as information based on intelligence sources, dominate these archived files.²⁰ But the files also contain the ‘voice’ of Coremo itself, audible in private correspondence by Coremo members, in Coremo’s publications and official statements, as well as in newspaper articles relating to Coremo.

As the colonial state compiled this collection of documents, we must be cognisant of the pitfalls and inherent limitations – particularly regarding information provided by intelligence sources. In his latest book, Jacob Dlamini critically discusses the problems of intelligence gathering during South Africa’s liberation struggle.²¹ Focusing on the apartheid police’s so-called terrorist album, Dlamini reveals how intelligence operatives often made mistakes and highlight how intelligence was sometimes based on misinformation. I nevertheless contend that Dlamini’s valid critique does not mean that historians should disregard archives compiled by intelligence departments. David Birmingham argued that the lack of a well-cared-for, written archive of the Angolan liberation movements and the problems associated with oral testimonies by members of these movements make the archive of the Portuguese colonial state a precious source of information on the history of Angolan liberation movements.²² The same applies to Mozambique. Over the years, historians of southern Africa’s liberation struggle have proven that these colonial archives contain revealing fragments and clues about their subject.²³ Even in Dlamini’s book, some individuals who were under surveillance by the apartheid police, for instance, indicated that many of the details gathered about them were accurate, even if the narrative constructed around them was wrong.²⁴ Whenever possible, I validate and complement the information from the Portuguese archives with information from other repositories and sources. These include the Zambian National Archives, the John Marcum papers, Wikileaks, several newspaper articles and media interviews by former Coremo members. Yet there remains plenty of information in the archives that cannot be verified; and many details about the movement of Coremo members or specific operations were not recorded in the written archive. While the story of Coremo’s relations with the Congolese government and the FNLA still contains several gaps that my sources cannot fill, this article nevertheless provides a foundation for further research on Coremo’s exile relations.

Udenamo’s Relationship with the Congolese Government and the FNLA

To understand Coremo’s relations with the Congolese government and the FNLA, we need to go back to the political divisions that surrounded the creation of Frelimo and the early years of its existence. Soon after Frelimo’s formation in June 1962 – which saw the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the Independent Mozambique African Union and the original Udenamo join forces to form a united movement against Portuguese colonialism – cracks had begun to appear in the newly formed Mozambican liberation front. In 1963, Frelimo’s leadership expelled founding members Gumane and David Mabunda. Although both men held important positions in Frelimo’s leadership structure, Tornimbeni and Liesegang and das Neves Tembe have shown that conflicts of personality, combined with ideological differences over the nature of Mozambique’s struggle for independence, had plagued Frelimo ever since its founding.²⁵ Gumane and Mabunda, together with several other disgruntled members such as Fanuel Mahluza, subsequently decided to relaunch Udenamo in May 1963.²⁶ Gumane became president, Mabunda secretary general and Mahluza secretary of defence. They established their headquarters in Egypt (then the United Arab Republic), where Mahluza had previously served as Frelimo representative. From their office at ‘Africa House’ (the name of the building allocated to representatives of liberation movements) in Cairo’s Zamalek neighbourhood, they began seeking financial, diplomatic and military assistance from various sources.²⁷

Since its formation, Udenamo had expressed a keen interest in working with other liberation movements. In a press statement announcing the formation of Udenamo, Secretary General David Mabunda asserted that

to co-ordinate and speed up the liberatory struggle in Africa and believing that the liberatory struggle must go hand in hand with the move for African unity, Udenamo will fully co-operate with all nationalist organisations engaged in the struggle against foreign domination particularly with organisations of other Portuguese colonies and southern Africa.²⁸

Mabunda’s clarion call was reiterated in Udenamo’s constitution. It declared that ‘Udenamo reserves the right to constitute with other organisations engaged in anti-colonialist struggle in southern Africa, enduring white supremacy, economic exploitation, social degradation and colonial domination, a UNITED FRONT [original emphasis] to co-ordinate programmes, projects, tactics and efforts for the speedy and complete suppression of colonialism and imperialism’.²⁹ Udenamo’s collective vision was rooted in the notion of Pan-African solidarity, which its leaders probably hoped would add legitimacy to Udenamo’s liberation struggle.

One of the southern African liberation movements that Udenamo established relations with was the FNLA, which operated out of Congo. Like Udenamo, the FNLA, which represented a united front between the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA) and the Democratic Party of Angola, occasionally positioned its anti-colonial struggle in a broader continental context and highlighted the need for mutual assistance. During the one-year celebrations of the launch of the UPA March 1961 offensive into northern Angola, Holden Roberto declared, ‘let’s pause a brief moment, my brothers, and let’s think particularly of those in suffering, mainly in Mozambique, in Guinea so-called Portuguese, Cape Verde [sic], in Rhodesia and South Africa. We will pass on to them the freedom torch we are carrying’.³⁰ Such statements were not unique to Udenamo or the FNLA. Expressions of African solidarity were commonly featured in the discourse of most liberation movements.³¹ In the case of Udenamo and the FNLA, this discourse, however, translated into a genuine attempt to work together.

In mid 1963, Roberto became involved in a brief but concerted effort to assist other African liberation movements, including Udenamo. The FNLA’s formation and survival were closely tied to the Congolese government, which had supported Roberto since Patrice Lumumba’s time as prime minister. It was, however, Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula who cemented Congo’s relationship with FNLA. In mid 1963, Roberto and Adoula became involved in a brief but concerted effort to assist other African liberation movements. Such an initiative suited Adoula’s moderate foreign policy, which was committed to supporting Africa’s further decolonisation but was critical of the influence of the Soviet Union. Roberto and Adoula invited representatives of Udenamo, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the Zimbabwean African People’s Union to discuss setting up an organisational presence in Congo.³² Gumane acted as Udenamo’s representative and travelled to Kinshasa (then Leopoldville) in June 1963. He met a US Embassy official during his stay in the Congolese capital. The official noted that ‘since [Gumane’s] arrival in the Congo [Gumane] had become a firm supporter of the [FNLA]’.³³ He recalled how Gumane ‘emphasised that prior to that time he had been “misled” by reports abroad and had felt sympathy for the [MPLA]. Extensive contacts with Angolans in [Kinshasa], a visit to a military camp near [Mbanza-Ngungu], and a trip to the Angolan border … changed his views’.³⁴ According to the embassy official, Gumane characterised the MPLA, which was aligned to Frelimo through the CONCP, ‘as a group of refugees with internal difficulties and unable to mount any action inside Angola’.³⁵ It is unclear whether Gumane’s critique of the MPLA stemmed from genuine disillusionment or whether it was influenced by his desire to align himself with the FNLA to sustain his newly formed movement. At the time, the FNLA was certainly more successful than the MPLA in launching an armed struggle in Angola and was better funded and supported. Regardless of the motives, this shift marks the start of a long-standing relationship between Gumane’s and Roberto’s liberation movements.

After Gumane’s initial visit to Congo, Prime Minister Adoula gave Udenamo (and the other liberation movements the Congolese government had invited) its blessing to operate in Congo, and the FNLA was responsible for the logistical organisation.³⁶ This short-lived initiative became colloquially known as the Congo Alliance, which represents an early and important moment of Congolese support for and interference in southern Africa’s liberation struggle, a topic that has been overshadowed in the historiography by the Mobutu government’s interference in Angola’s independence struggle and civil war.³⁷

For Udenamo, the Congo Alliance had clear benefits. Establishing a relationship with Roberto’s FNLA served to connect Gumane’s newly formed Udenamo to a fellow lusophone liberation movement that was well funded and supported.³⁸ As Tornimbeni points out, forming such an alliance also made sense in the context of the growing competitive battle for legitimacy that existed among lusophone African liberation movements during the first half of the 1960s.³⁹ This working alliance offered the FNLA and Udenamo (both of which were excluded from the CONCP) an opportunity to establish an alternative collective that could aid them in securing international support and legitimacy. It also provided Udenamo with access to military training facilities, enabling it to compete with Frelimo and Udenamo-Monomotapa, which had both started giving military training to their cadres.⁴⁰ Liesegang and das Neves Tembe highlight that at the time of the Congo Alliance building up military capacity was necessary for the legitimacy of all Mozambican liberation movements, as the prospect of launching an armed struggle inside Mozambique was rapidly growing.⁴¹ Whichever movement could take the lead in armed struggle would have greater legitimacy and access to support.

As part of the Congo Alliance, about 30 Udenamo members received military training at the FNLA’s Kinkuzu camp near Mbanza-Ngungu (then Thysville) during the first half of 1964. Plans to give military training to Udenamo members in Congo appear to have been made as early as October 1963, when Mahluza arranged to transport a group of Mozambicans from Zambia to Congo.⁴² The following month, Mahluza also contacted Abilio Maville in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia), asking him to organise the transportation of 15 cadres to Congo with the help of an FNLA representative.⁴³ It is unclear, however, what happened to these earlier plans. According to Mahluza, the Mozambicans who eventually received training at Kinkuzu had been in Congo since early 1964.⁴⁴ Udenamo had recruited them in Tanzania (then Tanganyika).⁴⁵ Most of the men had lived all (or most) of their lives in Tanzania. While many of them were raw recruits, some members of the group at Kinkuzu had reportedly received prior military training in places such as Ghana and Egypt.⁴⁶ Joaquim Nawawa and Anibal Chilenge led the group of Udenamo members at the Kinkuzu camp.⁴⁷

As part of its operations in Congo, Udenamo also established an office in Kinshasa. Mahluza was in Kinshasa and signed his correspondence as Udenamo representative from as early as 6 September 1963. At the time, Mahluza noted that he was waiting to receive permission from the Congolese government to officially open Udenamo’s office in the building that housed the FNLA’s headquarters.⁴⁸ By the start of 1964, the offices seem to have been operational. In the following months, more Udenamo leaders arrived in the Congolese capital; some passed through briefly while others stayed behind more permanently.⁴⁹ Chilenge had been in Kinshasa from as early as 23 November 1963, when a PIDE source spotted him in Matadi in the presence of the FNLA representative, Francisco Nenganga.⁵⁰ By July 1964, the Portuguese embassy in Kinshasa noted that Chilenge, Nawawa, Arper Victor Linder (Victor Namunera) and Tomás Atanasa were all present in Kinshasa.⁵¹ Like Dar es Salaam and Lusaka, Kinshasa became a new hub of anti-colonial activity, as the operational presence of liberation movements increasingly began shifting southwards away from Rabat, Cairo and Algiers.⁵²

Logistical and leadership problems beset Udenamo’s operations in Congo from an early stage. While the Congolese government and Roberto had promised to aid the incoming liberation movements, little funding and logistical support was made available, apart from use of the office space in Kinshasa and camp facilities at Kinkuzu. In 1964, the Congolese government was preoccupied with quelling insurrections on two fronts, while the FNLA was struggling with growing internal factionalism. This lack of support left the Udenamo members in Congo to fend for themselves. Conditions for the regular members at Kinkuzu were challenging and were worsened by internal squabbles between Udenamo’s representatives in Congo.⁵³ Leaders such as Nawawa and Chilenge were reportedly in conflict with each other.⁵⁴ Many Mozambicans at Kinkuzu wanted to end their training and return home to their families in Tanzania. Some of the men deserted the camp but were detained by the Congolese authorities.⁵⁵ Discontent reached fever pitch as the Udenamo members in Congo complained that their FNLA hosts were not looking after them at Kinkuzu.⁵⁶

Former Katangese secessionist leader Moise Tshombe’s unexpected appointment as Congolese prime minister in July 1964 exacerbated Udenamo’s problems in Congo. Tshombe was not keen on supporting the southern African liberation movements in Congo because of his relationship with the governments of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Maintaining good relations with the governments of these three powers was imperative for Tshombe’s fragile political survival at the time. One way of keeping his allies happy was by curtailing the activities of southern African liberation movements operating in Congo. Tshombe’s right-hand man, Godefroid Munongo, promised to make the lives of the southern African nationalists in Congo difficult and end their presence in Congo.⁵⁷

Because of these difficulties, Gumane and Mahluza planned to move the Mozambican recruits from Congo to neighbouring Zambia. At the start of 1965, Nawawa escorted the group from Kinshasa to Lubumbashi (then Elisabethville), where they waited for permission to travel further to Zambia.⁵⁸ The Mozambicans stayed with some of Roberto’s men in a FNLA house on Avenue des Plaines in Lubumbashi’s Quartier Bel-Air.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, the fate of the men did not improve; life in Elisabethville was equally challenging. They had little food, were forced to do odd jobs, and relied on the charity of local religious missions.⁶⁰ The FNLA delegate pleaded with the local Katangese authorities to assist the Mozambicans with food and a means to leave Congo, as the Angolans were unable to continue to look after them.⁶¹

The Mozambican recruits complained about the hostile environment in Katanga. They noted that the police frequently beat them up and highlighted the indifference of the local authorities to their plight.⁶² One Mozambican named Simão Rafai noted in a letter that the group – together with 40 Angolans – had been arrested by Congolese soldiers and put in jail. It was only after Roberto intervened that the men were set free.⁶³ Munongo’s promise to the South African authorities to make the life of the southern African freedom fighters difficult may not have been an empty threat. Udenamo’s request for financial and material assistance from Tshombe’s government had also fallen on deaf ears.⁶⁴ The continued hardship resulted in some of the Mozambicans in Lubumbashi contacting the Portuguese authorities to negotiate assistance to alleviate their precarious situation.⁶⁵ I will return to the matter of this group later. While most of the Udenamo men were stuck in Lubumbashi, a small group of more senior Udenamo members (including Victor Namunera, Alex Nameta and Lucas Fernandes Mutamba) travelled to Zambia.⁶⁶

Although the Congo Alliance had broken down, the working relationship between Udenamo and the FNLA continued in Zambia. During the lead-up to Zambian independence, various southern African liberation movements scrambled to establish an organisational presence in Zambia, including those from neighbouring Mozambique and Angola.⁶⁷ By early February 1964, Udenamo had received permission from Zambia’s United National Independence Party to operate in Zambia and opened its Lusaka office on Cairo Road. Mahluza was transferred from Kinshasa to Lusaka to head the new office together with Abel Sazuze.⁶⁸ The Zambia News newspaper reported that the FNLA representative Ramalho Domingos Gill was sharing an office with Udenamo in Lusaka.⁶⁹ The FNLA office in Livingstone was also housed in the same building.⁷⁰ Maville reportedly acted as a representative for Udenamo and the FNLA, and was responsible for establishing support networks in Katanga, Zambia and Zimbabwe for Angolans and Mozambicans living and working there.⁷¹ According to the SCCI, Mahluza had travelled with a handful of Angolans to the Copperbelt and Livingstone to expand their operations and establish networks.⁷²

During the first half of the 1960s, Udenamo and the FNLA’s operations in Zambia and Congo were thus intertwined: a case of a relationship developing between two lusophone African movements that had been excluded from the CONCP and were competing for the same support and resources. As we will see, such co-operation continued when Coremo was formed in 1965.

The Formation of Coremo and its Quest for Recognition

A growing body of literature on the southern African liberation movements’ transnational support networks has illustrated the importance that individual African leaders had in shaping the trajectory of the region’s liberation struggles.⁷³ Their decisions to offer or withhold support and their interference in liberation politics among different movements had long-term consequences on the identity of movements, their survival in exile and their efficiency in waging an armed struggle. This becomes clear when we look at the formation of Coremo and its quest for official recognition.

Zambia’s first elected president, Kenneth Kaunda, tried to unite Mozambique’s different liberation movements to strengthen their resolve to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule. His efforts aligned with the vision of other African leaders such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and organisations such as the OAU to mediate efforts for liberation movements from the same territory to work together.⁷⁴ In March 1965 the Zambian government invited Frelimo, Gumane’s Udenamo, Gwambe’s Udenamo-Monomatapa and the Mozambique African National Congress, formed in Zimbabwe in 1962 by Peter Balamanja and previously known as the Kiliman Freedom Party, to Lusaka to discuss the creation of a new united front. While Frelimo pulled out of the conference, the other movements agreed to combine their strength and formed Coremo. The Independent Mozambique African National Union (UNAMI) and the reanimated MANU, which had been formed by Matthew Mmole after his expulsion from Frelimo, also later joined this new united front.⁷⁵ Coremo established its headquarters in Lusaka, Adelino Gwambe was elected as the movement’s first president, Gumane became general secretary and Mahluza military attaché.⁷⁶ Gwambe’s leadership was, however, short-lived. At Coremo’s first annual conference in May 1966, Gumane replaced Gwambe as president, a position he retained until Coremo’s disintegration in 1974.⁷⁷ Like that of Roberto and the FNLA, the fate of Coremo and Gumane was inseparably entwined.

Coremo’s formation reflected a broader trend in Mozambique’s liberation history. From the founding of Frelimo in 1962 to the creation of the National Coalition Party (PCN) in 1974, different Mozambican movements regularly joined forces.⁷⁸ Before the formation of Coremo, smaller unions had already been formed and talks of greater unity were held between Frelimo and other movements.⁷⁹ Often these forms of collaboration were short-lived or defined by internal conflict, contributing to the already complex and precarious nature of operating in exile. What set Coremo apart from other movements that competed with Frelimo was its longevity. Coremo was able to exist in exile from its formation in 1965 until Mozambique began the transition to independence in 1974. As an amalgamation of smaller Mozambican liberation movements, Coremo represented a new united front in the fight against Portuguese colonialism, which competed with Frelimo over representing the interests of the Mozambican masses.

In the context of such competing nationalisms, Coremo provided Mozambicans with the vision of an alternative pathway towards Mozambique’s liberation. Coremo’s ideological alignment can be defined as a radical Africanist version of African nationalism which was mixed with Pan-Africanism and Third-Worldism.⁸⁰ Unlike Frelimo, which adopted a non-racial approach, Coremo portrayed itself as a movement that specifically represented the interests of African Mozambicans, especially those Africans who before 1961 had been classified as indígenas (indigenous) rather than those who had been ‘upgraded’ to the status of assimilado (assimilated).⁸¹ It constantly argued that Africans should be the sole drivers of Mozambique’s independence and oversee the shaping of its post-colonial future. While openly anti-imperialist, critical of capitalism and supportive of socialist-aligned liberation movements worldwide, Coremo rarely featured explicit communist or socialist ideological discourse in its publications or included strong and outspoken support for such ideals.⁸² While much of Coremo’s ideology differed from that of Frelimo, and Coremo regularly attacked Frelimo publicly, its ideological position remained consistent throughout its existence. Coremo should therefore be seen as a genuine liberation movement with a different vision for Mozambique’s liberation rather than merely an anti-Frelimo opposition movement.

As a new organisation formed of small liberation movements (most of them splinter groups), Coremo made sustained efforts to gain credibility and seek international support.⁸³ Liberation movements were in great competition with each other to gain such recognition and assistance, and the OAU’s recognition was particularly important in this regard. The OAU’s Liberation Committee partly functioned as a gatekeeper of financial and material support for African liberation movements.⁸⁴ Even though the OAU’s aid was limited in comparison to other sources of support, it remained vital. OAU recognition also legitimised the efforts of liberation movements and assisted them in attaining financial and diplomatic assistance from donors.⁸⁵ At the OAU Liberation Committee’s conference in Kinshasa in January 1967, Gumane noted that Coremo had ‘appealed again and again to your Committee for assistance, but we are sorry to say that up to now we have never had a favourable reply’, and subsequently again asked for official recognition.⁸⁶ Gumane’s pleas at the conference paid off, as Ethiopia convinced the liberation committee to offer some material aid to Coremo.⁸⁷ Zambia’s OAU attaché was unconvinced that it would result in proper support, and his assessment was correct.⁸⁸ In 1968, Coremo’s information secretary, Julius Dzonzi, declared that the OAU ‘has not given a single bullet to my organisation’, grudgingly declaring that ‘the purpose of our fighting is not to satisfy the OAU but to liberate our country’.⁸⁹ Despite continual pleas, Coremo never succeeded in convincing the OAU to recognise it as a Mozambican liberation movement. It was similarly unsuccessful in applying for membership of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), despite at least three attempts in 1965, 1966 and 1967.⁹⁰ The reasons for the OAU and AAPSO’s continued refusal to officially recognise Coremo while favouring Frelimo seem to align with research that has highlighted Nyerere’s influence on the OAU’s liberation committee politics and the influence of the Soviet Union on the AAPSO (which provided a lot of funding to the OAU) throughout the 1960s. Both Nyerere and the Soviet Union favoured Frelimo and advanced it as Mozambique’s sole liberation movement,⁹¹ countering Coremo’s efforts to gain recognition. As Ana Moledo argues, Cold War and African decolonisation politics often shaped who was seen as a legitimate liberation movement worthy of support.⁹²

Coremo’s lack of official recognition and the label of being an ‘inauthentic’ liberation movement had a considerable effect on its support network. Without the backing of gatekeeper organisations such as the OAU or the AAPSO, Coremo had to rely mainly on the support of friendly governments and other liberation movements to sustain its operations in exile.⁹³ At its formation in June 1965, Coremo had its head office in Lusaka and external mission in Cairo. It also received financial and military support from Ghana and started sending some members to China for military training.⁹⁴ Many of these Coremo support structures were based on previous formal and informal relations established by its leaders.⁹⁵ As Coremo’s internal leadership structures changed and the composition or political alignment of African governments shifted, so too did Coremo’s support structures in exile. If Coremo wanted to survive in exile, it was crucial to maintain and expand its support networks. To this end, Coremo announced in early 1966 that ‘arrangements are in process for the establishment of other External Principal Missions wherever possible and necessary’.⁹⁶ With this new mandate and with certain avenues of support blocked, Coremo leaders tried to utilise their social capital in exile to acquire support – including those Gumane had established with the Congolese government and the FNLA. Their decision to do so, however, had long-term consequences,⁹⁷ further entrenching Coremo’s relationship with other ‘inauthentic’ liberation movements.

Coremo’s Contact with the Congolese Government

The timing for seeking Congolese aid was favourable. Mobutu’s coup in November 1965 had removed Tshombe from office. After taking power, Mobutu worked hard to portray himself as a pan-Africanist leader in order to cast aside his image as a western puppet. The high number of African state visits to and from Congo, Congo’s mediation efforts across the continent and various African conferences held in Kinshasa are illustrative of Mobutu’s efforts to carefully curate his image during the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s.⁹⁸ Like those of Adoula before him, Mobutu’s efforts to improve his reputation included his show of support for the further liberation of Africa. At the Tenth Session of the OAU Co-ordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa held in Kinshasa from January to February 1967, Mobutu described the OAU’s Liberation Committee as Africa’s ‘Iron Spear for an untirable fight for complete eradication of every colonial trace on this continent’.⁹⁹ During his speech, he expressed particular support for lusophone African liberation movements by condemning António de Oliveira Salazar’s Portugal, calling for co-operation between liberation movements and declaring that ‘no blackmailing nor menaces will make us deviate from our determination to help Liberation Movements in Portuguese colonies to freedom’.¹⁰⁰ Mobutu subsequently broke off formal diplomatic relations with Portugal and increased Congo’s support for Roberto’s FNLA.¹⁰¹ Under Mobutu, the FNLA’s survival became further reliant upon the Congolese government, and Mobutu’s personal relationship with Roberto strengthened this long-standing relationship. By supporting the FNLA, the Congolese government could boost its pan-Africanist credentials as a frontline state without having to associate itself with more radical leftist organisations like the MPLA or Frelimo. Congolese government representatives such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justin Bomboko, had initially made clear his aversion to Marxist-Leninist politics in a Cold War world and later, under Mobutu, adopted a position of non-alignment.¹⁰²

Coremo tried to capitalise on Mobutu’s rise to power and his public declaration of support for lusophone Africa’s liberation struggle. As Coremo’s newly elected president, Gumane wasted no time and attended the Congolese independence anniversary celebrations in Kinshasa in June 1966.¹⁰³ While in Congo, Gumane gave several interviews and held a meeting with the General Confederation of Labour of the Congo (CGTC), during which he praised Mobutu for becoming ‘one of the more militant anti-imperialist African leaders’.¹⁰⁴ Gumane stressed that ‘the liberation of our still colonised territories will only be realised the day when the Congolese take full consciousness of the leading role that nature has condemned them to play in restoring the dignity of the black man’.¹⁰⁵ While Gumane’s visit to Kinshasa had resulted in considerable publicity for Coremo in the Congolese and international press, the Mozambican leader had bigger ambitions.

Coremo’s president was intent on meeting the Congolese government and reigniting its support for Mozambique’s independence struggle. On 6 July 1966, Gumane wrote a letter to Mobutu, praising the Congolese leader’s commitment to assisting Africans in their fight for independence and highlighting Udenamo’s past relations with the Adoula government. He also asked Mobutu for diplomatic, financial and military assistance.¹⁰⁶ Gumane’s attempt was partially successful. Bomboko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited Gumane to a meeting on 25 July 1966 so that Gumane could make a case for Coremo and explain in person his requests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs secretary general, Ambroise Tshilumba-Kabishi, chaired the meeting, while the FNLA’s head of internal security, José Manuel Peterson, acted as Gumane’s interpreter.¹⁰⁷ Gumane explained to the Congolese officials how the requested weapons, explosives and other material aid had to be delivered to Zambia. He also asked for military training, medication, scholarships and financial assistance to the value of £10,000. Finally, Gumane sought permission from the Congolese government to open a Coremo office in Kinshasa that could be used to maintain contact with the Congolese government and ‘follow the evolution of the African Revolution’.¹⁰⁸

However, Congo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not persuaded by Gumane’s pleas for assistance and decided to proceed cautiously. According to its report on the meeting, the Ministry favoured following the OAU Liberation Committee’s decision to recognise Frelimo as Mozambique’s sole liberation movement. It noted that caution was needed, as supporting Coremo could obstruct a co-ordinated effort to liberate Mozambique. It did not rule out providing material and financial support to Coremo in the future, or allowing Coremo to open offices, but noted budgetary restrictions as a constraint. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did indicate a willingness to offer scholarships to Coremo members.¹⁰⁹ Gumane’s efforts had thus not resulted in the desired outcome, but the door for future negotiations was left open, and the Congolese government allowed Coremo to use Congo as a hub of activity.

Kinshasa’s initially muted response did not stop Coremo from trying to use Congo as a place of support to internationalise its struggle. Between 1966 and 1973, and with the blessing of the Congolese government, Coremo’s leadership regularly travelled to Congo, usually residing in the Congolese capital for extended periods. While Gumane conducted most of these trips, other Coremo leaders such as Mahluza, Narciso Mbule and Uria Simango (who joined Coremo in 1971) also occasionally travelled to Congo.¹¹⁰ Based on the frequency of these visits, Mobutu’s Congo became an integral part of Coremo’s exile world. Like Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Cairo or Algiers, Kinshasa served as a space on the African continent where liberation movements like Coremo could seek financial and logistical support from foreign embassies and international organisations, establish relations with other movements, and that they could use as a transit point for travel. As illustrated by Roberts in the case of East Africa and Molinaco, African cities like Kinshasa became spaces where exiled members of movements and migrants were able to form ideas, seek safety and fight for their freedom, outside their motherland.¹¹¹

Eric Burton has highlighted how these ‘hubs of decolonisation’ allowed liberation movements to connect with the wider world.¹¹² Based on the following examples, Coremo certainly tried to create such connections. In 1966, Paulo Gumane met the Israeli ambassador to Kinshasa (whose government’s military assistance to Congo was growing),¹¹³ and Coremo seems to have subsequently maintained some relations with the embassy.¹¹⁴ The following year, Coremo representative Alfredo Chembene reportedly travelled to Kinshasa and discussed funding with the Japanese embassy.¹¹⁵ In 1968, Gumane wrote to Narciso Namburete Mbule (formerly Udenamo’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs) that Mbule should establish contact with various government representatives and diplomats while in Kinshasa.¹¹⁶ In 1970, Coremo reportedly sought military support from the Tunisian and Indian ambassadors in Congo.¹¹⁷ The outcome of most of these meetings is unclear. Even though Kinshasa was not a left-leaning hub of decolonisation like Dar es Salaam or Cairo,¹¹⁸ it did serve as a notable centre of potential international support for liberation movements like Coremo to sustain their anti-colonial struggle.

Coremo leaders understood the importance of maintaining good relations with Congolese government officials who acted as gatekeepers to operations in their national territory. They consistently praised Mobutu’s government and fostered contacts with the Congolese president. In 1966, Coremo’s Gabriel Machava sent a letter to Mobutu congratulating the Congolese leader on foiling a plot by ‘imperialists’ and ‘neo-colonial agents’ to overthrow him.¹¹⁹ In his memorandum submitted to the OAU Liberation Committee meeting held in Kinshasa in January 1967, Gumane commended Mobutu for severing diplomatic relations with Portugal and for his commitment to the independence of Africa.¹²⁰ When Mobutu travelled to Lusaka to attend the anniversary celebrations of Zambia’s independence in October 1972, he met with Gumane.¹²¹ During his visit, Mobutu invited Coremo to Kinshasa to celebrate the seventh anniversary of his regime.¹²² Gumane and Coremo’s secretary general, Absolom Bahule, attended these celebrations.¹²³

Coremo also maintained contact with other representatives of the Congolese government apart from Mobutu. In April 1968, Adoula, who was serving as Congo’s ambassador to the US at the time, hosted Gumane during his tour of the US, and in September the following year Gumane travelled to Kinshasa to meet Adoula when he was acting as Congo’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹²⁴ The American consular officer in Lusaka, James Clagett Taylor, recalled that Gumane had a ‘special relationship’ with the Congolese ambassador to Zambia.¹²⁵ The ambassador visited Coremo’s military base, known as Macheka, located near the border between Zambia’s Eastern province and Mozambique’s Tete province, in July 1972. The Congolese ambassador was reportedly greeted with a salvo of three mortar rounds and shown around the base, tested some of the weapons, and took photographs to show Mobutu and members of his cabinet. The DGS, the Security Directorate-General, argued that this was in the hope of convincing Kinshasa to provide arms and money to Coremo.¹²⁶ The following year in January, the Congolese ambassador was again at Macheka, this time attending Coremo’s annual meeting.¹²⁷ Mahluza recalled that the Congolese Embassy assisted him when he was in hiding when Coremo members were arrested in Zambia in 1974.¹²⁸ Taylor also noted that Gumane and his wife Priscilla travelled on Congolese passports during 1972 and 1973.¹²⁹ Throughout its existence Coremo thus steadily maintained relations with various Congolese government representatives.

Even though Mobutu’s government initially seemed to have remained friendly but cautious in its support of Coremo, there are strong indications that the Mozambican liberation movement did receive some financial donations and logistical support from the Congolese government, and received permission to transport weapons, material and members across Congolese territory. From 1965 to 1974, several reports by Portuguese intelligence departments indicated such assistance to Coremo. What follows are some examples of such reports. In early 1967, Portuguese intelligence believed that Coremo had received arms from the Chinese government that had been transported via Congo to Zambia.¹³⁰ After several requests to Kinshasa for assistance, Mahluza was said to have transported military material from Congo to Coremo’s Macheka base in 1972.¹³¹ That same year, Coremo reportedly received money from Mobutu.¹³² Due to the lack of other primary material that could be used to triangulate information from these Portuguese archival sources, it is difficult to assess the extent and nature of this support.

The need for military assistance was particularly important to Coremo’s survival. Coremo needed to look like an active liberation movement if it wanted to receive external assistance and official recognition from the OAU. As it could not receive such assistance via the Liberation Committee, Coremo was forced to source and manage such military support itself. Coremo’s military wing, which it called the People’s Revolutionary Army of Mozambique (Erepomo), launched its first campaign in Mozambique in October/November 1965.¹³³ Apart from some action in Zambezia, Erepomo mainly operated in Tete province.¹³⁴ It is difficult to assess Coremo’s military capacity, effectiveness and operations inside Mozambique, as no proper research has been conducted on this subject. The historiography does reveal some military incursions by Coremo into Mozambique, such as those that led to the deaths in battle of Dzonzi, Mazunzo Bobo and Gabriel Machava; the PAC–Coremo joint operation in Mozambique in 1968; and Coremo’s kidnapping of Portuguese civilians in 1971.¹³⁵ The oral history accounts of the PAC–Coremo mission also indicate that there were, at the least, some small bases situated in Mozambique.¹³⁶ But throughout its existence, Coremo’s military operations in Mozambique seem to have been limited, and declined after 1972. A future study using the Portuguese military archives in combination with oral history interviews in Tete province might enable a better understanding of Coremo’s military action.

Coremo constantly tried to source military training and material through its external networks, including those in Congo. When Coremo was formed in 1965, several members had already received military training in places such as Ghana, Egypt, Congo and China, including the group of cadres that was left behind in Katanga. Immediately after Coremo’s formation, its leaders tried to transport this group of 28 trained Mozambicans to Lusaka, as mentioned earlier in this article. In July 1965, Coremo sent representatives with money to Lubumbashi to assist the men,¹³⁷ while its recently appointed deputy national secretary, Peter Simbi, sent a letter to the FNLA headquarters to request assistance, as the men had complained about a lack of food.¹³⁸ However, the disgruntled group in Elisabethville remained apprehensive about joining Coremo and seemed to have been set on creating a separate movement. This is apparent from a letter that Dzonzi wrote to the group in July 1965, encouraging them to join Coremo. He addressed his letter to the ‘Movimento Libertador de Mocambique estabelecida no Congo ao c/do GRAE Elisabethville’ (Mozambique Liberation Movement established in Congo c/o GRAE [the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile] Elisabethville).¹³⁹ In another letter Dzonzi noted that the Mozambicans in Congo were afraid to come to Zambia to join Coremo.¹⁴⁰ It was reported by Portuguese authorities that the men in Lubumbashi preferred to go to Tanzania, where they had families.¹⁴¹ Coremo leaders like Mahluza and Francisco Fole continued to seek funds from the Israeli, Danish, Swedish and Japanese embassies in Kinshasa to move the group to Zambia.¹⁴² Despite several efforts during the late 1960s and early 1970s by Coremo leaders to transport the men to Zambia, the group of Mozambicans seems to have remained in Congo.¹⁴³ While it is unclear what exactly happened to the men, some possibly received further training with the FNLA.¹⁴⁴ While PIDE reported in February 1972 that 15 Coremo members from Congo had finally travelled to Zambia and were subsequently infiltrated into Mozambique,¹⁴⁵ it is unclear whether this report was true and, if true, whether it refers to the group of Mozambicans who had been moved to Congo by Udenamo.

Throughout Coremo’s existence, Congo proved to be an essential component of Coremo’s exile network, even if its relations with Kinshasa may not always have resulted in the type or extent of aid the Mozambican liberation movement had hoped for. Its relationship with Mobutu’s government, however, further contributed to Coremo’s image as an ‘inauthentic’ liberation movement, as Mobutu was often criticised by more radical African nationalists for maintaining close relations with the US. Because of the Congolese government’s relationship with the FNLA, Coremo’s efforts to establish and maintain a relationship with its Angolan counterpart generally overlapped with its efforts to gain support from Kinshasa.

Coremo’s Relationship with the FNLA

There has been an upsurge in research into understanding not only the support networks that liberation movements developed with host governments but also the networks that emerged between liberation movements. In the case of lusophone Africa, such scholarship has been dominated by the CONCP and the ‘authentic’ liberation movements.¹⁴⁶ However, throughout its existence, Coremo made sustained efforts to maintain a relationship with the FNLA. As in the case of Kinshasa, these efforts continued the contact that Udenamo had established with the Angolans.

Since its formation, Coremo regularly declared its willingness to co-operate with other southern African liberation movements in the face of growing co-operation between the governments of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa.¹⁴⁷ In 1965, Paulo Gumane released a statement announcing that ‘the nationalist leaders of Southern Africa must unite our forces and consolidate our efforts in a united front to confront the three enemies of Africa Salazar, Smith and Verwed [sic] with confidence’.¹⁴⁸ At its first annual conference in 1966, Coremo agreed to the resolution ‘that armed struggle should be intensified with strict application of self-reliance but not neglecting the soliciting of all types of assistance from other revolutionary movements and peace-loving peoples and nations of the world’.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, during an emergency meeting of the Central Committee in 1968, one of the amendments to the organisation’s constitution was the ‘support for the armed struggle conducted by the people of Angola, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Azania and South West Africa’.¹⁵⁰ This decision was made just before Coremo members helped PAC members to infiltrate Mozambique. While Coremo’s links with the PAC have been reasonably well documented in the historiography, its relationship with the FNLA has largely been forgotten.¹⁵¹

As a result of Udenamo’s past relations with the FNLA, Coremo was keen to work together with the Angolan liberation movement and regularly expressed its desire to do so. In June 1966, Gumane explained that ‘the contacts that we will make with the leaders of [the FNLA] in Kinshasa will allow us to assess our respective forces, which we must now co-ordinate to discourage the tendencies of resistance of the Portuguese aggressive forces on the ground where our people are fighting a merciless and conclusive fight against them’.¹⁵² During his meeting with the Congolese Department of Foreign Affairs in July 1966, Gumane voiced Coremo’s and the FNLA’s shared frustration with the OAU Liberation Committee, which they accused of ‘not working for the liberation of Africa, but rather for a specific ideology’.¹⁵³ (This ‘specific ideology’ probably referred to Marxism-Leninism.) In his discussion, Gumane placed this collaboration with GRAE in the broader framework of Coremo’s informal collaboration with ZANU and the PAC,¹⁵⁴ all of which formed part of the block of so-called inauthentic liberation movements. In March 1967, Gumane went to Kinshasa to celebrate the UPA’s sixth anniversary of the 1961 uprising in northern Angola.¹⁵⁵ In an interview with the Courier d’Afrique during this trip, Gumane reiterated his desire to work with Roberto to overthrow their common enemy, Portugal.¹⁵⁶ During Coremo’s existence, Gumane regularly expressed in public the need for them both to assist each other’s movements and co-ordinate their fight against Portuguese colonialism.

Gumane’s public statements made sense when we consider the development of lusophone African co-operation. Various movements had started co-ordinating their struggle since the 1950s, mainly through the relations that were established when their leaders were studying and living abroad in Europe. Such co-operation strengthened after liberation movements established their presence in independent African countries.¹⁵⁷ However, throughout the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, Coremo and the FNLA were increasingly alienated from such broader lusophone African co-operation. Neither Coremo nor the FNLA formed part of the CONCP.¹⁵⁸ Much of the international progressive left considered liberation movements like Coremo, the FNLA and the Struggle Front for the National Independence of Guinea (FLING) as reactionary movements that were not committed to the true liberation of their people from Portuguese colonialism.¹⁵⁹ While the OAU initially recognised the FNLA as the official liberation movement for Angola, over time the FNLA’s reputation weakened and the OAU considered CONCP members as the only true representatives of the national liberation struggle, a development that greatly frustrated the FNLA.¹⁶⁰ Coremo and the FNLA were also regularly accused of being sustained by western sources of support.¹⁶¹ In the case of Coremo and the FNLA, this alienation led to sustained efforts to work together outside the confines of the CONCP. I have found only one public statement by Coremo and the FNLA reaching out to Benjamin Pinto Bull’s FLING to work together.¹⁶²

Apart from being increasingly ostracised because of their ‘inauthentic’ status and having a prior history of working together at the time of the Congo Alliance, Coremo and the FNLA movements shared some ideological similarities. Both adopted an Africanist version of African nationalism and proclaimed their commitment to Pan-Africanism,¹⁶³ which in the case of Coremo was mixed with Third-Worldism. Coremo’s party organ, O Combatante, declared in 1972 that: ‘[o]ur people under their vanguard party, Coremo, will continue to fulfil their internationalist duty and firmly support not only the colonial and oppressed people in Africa but also the anti-imperialist struggle of the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations throughout the world’.¹⁶⁴ Neither movement expressed a strong affinity to Marxism-Leninism but both were open to receiving support from the People’s Republic of China. Many Frelimo, MPLA and PAIGC leaders had studied at higher education institutions in Portugal, France or the USA, where they were influenced by leftist political ideas and joined anti-colonial organisations.¹⁶⁵ In turn, most Coremo and FNLA leaders were introduced to nationalist politics when they lived as diaspora working in lower- to middle-class jobs across southern Africa and Congo, and where they were exposed to local interpretations of African nationalism.¹⁶⁶ The similarity of Coremo’s and the FNLA leaders’ backgrounds possibly contributed to some of their shared ideological views on the liberation struggle and influenced the relationship that developed between their leaders. Their attempts to work together should therefore not be seen only through an anti-CONCP or anti-MPLA-Frelimo lens.

Coremo’s desire to form a working relationship with the FNLA went beyond public statements. Portuguese intelligence reports show that Coremo leaders usually met up with GRAE officials during their visits to Congo and that FNLA leaders accommodated and assisted them during their stay. We know that Gumane maintained contact with a number of influential FNLA leaders such as Roberto, Peterson, Eduardo Pinock and Rosário Neto.¹⁶⁷ Gumane apparently spoke affectionately about his friendship with Roberto and emphasised the relations that were developing between GRAE and Coremo.¹⁶⁸ When Mbule was experiencing problems with his travel itinerary, Gumane assured Mbule that he would contact Roberto and ask for financial assistance,¹⁶⁹ and several Coremo leaders decided to extend their stay in Kinshasa to facilitate collaboration between GRAE and Coremo in 1971.¹⁷⁰ Over time, personal bonds between members of both organisations seem to have developed.¹⁷¹ These examples contribute to Moledo’s argument that leaders and rank-and-file members of liberation movements who met at conferences, training camps and who shared office buildings regularly developed personal bonds that resulted in working relationships between movements.¹⁷²

Through their sustained contact, both liberation movements tried to assist each other in advancing their struggles. Unlike Coremo, the FNLA received financial aid from the OAU Liberation Committee and had a well-established support structure to sustain its existence. The FNLA was larger in size, and its impact on the liberation struggle was more significant.¹⁷³ As a struggling liberation movement, Coremo could potentially use the FNLA’s extensive networks to receive weapons and funds, and there are strong indications that this indeed happened on a semi-regular basis. In 1966, Gumane met Roberto in Dar es Salaam and asked him to assist Coremo with acquiring military material. Roberto was said to have informed Gumane that he would use his contacts with the Congolese and Tunisian governments (two of the FNLA’s principal supporters) to organise material for Coremo.¹⁷⁴ Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were occasional reports that Roberto either supplied Coremo with weapons or promised military assistance to Coremo.¹⁷⁵ In 1968, Roberto reportedly granted the use of the FNLA’s camp near Kolwezi to train Coremo members, while in January 1972 Mahluza was said to have transported weapons from Congo to Zambia.¹⁷⁶ However, due to the nature of the available sources and the lack of other primary material that could be used to confirm this information, it is difficult to assess the exact type or extent of support that Coremo received from the FNLA.

While the FNLA did not need Coremo for its survival, Gumane occasionally acted as a go-between for the FNLA and the Zambian government. Like Coremo, the FNLA regularly sought support from African governments to advance its struggle. The Portuguese authorities suspected that the FNLA wanted to use Coremo’s influence with Kaunda’s government to assist them in reopening their political representation in Zambia. Between 1964 and 1965, the FNLA had briefly had a small organisational presence in Lusaka, but this closed during the second half of 1965. Mobutu’s rise to power at the end of 1965 had made the need for representation in Zambia less critical to the FNLA. Mobutu’s Congo provided the FNLA with a large front line in northern and north-eastern Angola and a steady flow of material and financial support. However, from the late 1960s onwards, Roberto hoped to launch a new front from Zambia into south-eastern Angola to compete with UNITA and the MPLA, which had started operating in this part of Angola. By this time the FNLA was under increased pressure from the OAU to remain active in the struggle if it wanted to keep receiving funding and maintain its official recognition.¹⁷⁷ Lusaka had also grown into an essential hub for southern Africa’s liberation movements,¹⁷⁸ and having an official presence in the Zambian capital could expose the FNLA to new sources of support.

In August 1968 Gumane travelled to Kinshasa for a two-week visit and met Roberto. Gumane persuaded Roberto to meet with Kaunda and discuss official representation in Zambia and the launch of a second front into Angola via Zambia. The Portuguese authorities suspected that Gumane would use his good relations with the Zambian government to assist in setting up this meeting and establish the FNLA’s organisational presence in Zambia.¹⁷⁹ In October 1968, Gumane, Roberto and two FNLA members travelled from Kinshasa to Lusaka to attend Zambia’s fourth independence anniversary and, due to Gumane’s representations, held discussions with the Zambian authorities.¹⁸⁰ During their meeting with the Zambian government, Kaunda allegedly agreed to consider reopening the FNLA’s representation in Lusaka as soon as the Zambian general elections had ended.¹⁸¹ These negotiations occurred at a time when both the FNLA’s and Coremo’s relationship with the OAU Liberation Committee was under increased pressure, as the CONCP was able to extend more influence over the Liberation Committee.¹⁸² Gaining the support of Kaunda and potentially opening up a new front was beneficial to the FNLA, and Coremo could help in this regard.

Despite these and other FNLA visits to Zambia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, little progress was made towards establishing official FNLA structures on the ground in Zambia.¹⁸³ This situation changed in 1974 when Roberto travelled to Zambia with members of his cabinet to have talks once again with Kaunda about opening FNLA representation in Lusaka and launching a second front into Angola.¹⁸⁴ The FNLA was successful in getting authorisation to open a delegation in Lusaka, and its relations with the Zambian government improved considerably.¹⁸⁵ While Kaunda’s government became closer to the FNLA in the dying days of Portuguese colonialism, the Zambian government suddenly and dramatically ended its relations with Coremo. In June 1974, it closed Coremo’s offices, arrested and detained its members in Lusaka and other parts of Zambia, and seized Coremo’s military material.¹⁸⁶ Having fallen out of favour with the Zambian authorities, Coremo’s leaders joined the PCN but were quickly detained and handed over to Frelimo. As Coremo’s political relevance disappeared, so too did any signs of co-operation between the two movements in the archives.

Unlike ZANU,¹⁸⁷ Coremo had been unable to turn around its image of being an inauthentic movement and, unlike the FNLA or UNITA, it lacked both the internal and external support needed to survive the contested space of postcolonial politics.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that current efforts to better understand the external support networks of lusophone African liberation movements should be extended beyond the so-called authentic liberation movements. Gumane’s reconstituted Udenamo and Coremo were both examples of movements fighting for Mozambican liberation in a competitive exile environment, and their long-standing relationships with the Congolese government and the FNLA are illustrative of the difficulties of navigating this precarious space. After leaders such as Gumane and Mahluza split from Frelimo and established Udenamo in 1963, they reached out to the FNLA and Congolese government for support. When Udenamo merged with other Mozambican liberation movements to form Coremo in 1965, Gumane used his past relationship with the FNLA and Congolese government to gain backing for the newly formed united front of Mozambican liberation movements. Coremo subsequently tried to use this support network to advance its struggle at a time when its existence remained uncertain and competition for dominance between Mozambican liberation movements intensified. Even though Coremo’s relationship with the FNLA and the Congolese government did not bring the results that Coremo had envisioned, the Mozambican liberation movement still benefited from it in concrete ways. Coremo could (directly and indirectly) acquire some financial, logistical and diplomatic support, although the details of this support are occasionally patchy. Mobutu’s Congo became an essential link in Coremo’s exile network, and the FNLA became a friendly liberation movement that Coremo aligned itself with in the fight against Portuguese colonialism. As is the case for all liberation movements, gaining international support and recognition was central to Coremo’s survival. Coremo’s relations with the Congolese government and the FNLA, a mixture of personal and cultural capital, illustrate how ideological commonalities and pragmatic considerations shaped such relations.

The politics of African decolonisation and of the global Cold War further determined whom Coremo was able to seek assistance from and how its image and success as a liberation movement developed. Coremo did not receive assistance from traditional gatekeepers such as the OAU and instead had to rely on alternative support structures to sustain itself. Coremo’s efforts were marred by its identity as a breakaway movement and, as such, it had to rely primarily on the solidarity of particular African leaders such as Mobutu for its survival. In its quest to gain support for its struggle, the geopolitical concerns of the Tanzanian, Zambian and Congolese governments, and the internal politics of organisations like the OAU and the AAPSO shaped and complicated Coremo’s struggle. While cities such as Dar es Salaam and Algiers are well known as hubs of anti-colonial politics, paying attention to somewhere like Kinshasa as an alternative hub can provide new perspectives on the struggle for southern Africa’s liberation.

Coremo also made significant efforts to forge and foster ties with African liberation movements such as the FNLA. Coremo’s relationship with the FNLA was of long standing but never on an equal basis. Compared to its Mozambican counterpart, the Angolan liberation movement was more prominent in size, received OAU recognition, was militarily more dominant and had a more extensive support base among the population it fought to liberate. Despite this unequal power dynamic, the two movements maintained a long-standing relationship that can be traced back to Gumane’s resurrected Udenamo and the Congo Alliance. The CONCP is thus not the only example of lusophone African liberation movements from different territories co-operating in their fight against Portuguese colonial rule. Other working relationships between lusophone liberation movements that were sustained by a combination of personal relations and pragmatic and ideological factors emerged in exile and deserve scholarly attention. The actions of liberation movements such as Coremo should, therefore, be framed not just in the context of Frelimo. While in competition with Frelimo, Coremo provided Mozambicans with a genuine, alternative direction for Mozambique’s liberation.

Lazlo Passemiers
Senior Lecturer, Department of History, University of the Free State, PO Box 339, Bloemfontein 9300, Republic of South Africa. Email: [email protected]

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1906-9553

Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible without the continuous support of Ian Phimister, to whom I am eternally grateful. A special thank you should also go to Brooks Marmon, Alex Marino and the various organisers and audience members who provided valuable feedback on previous iterations of this paper that I presented in workshops and conferences, and whose input has greatly improved the quality of my arguments and insights. Finally, the guidance and suggestions of the JSAS editors and the two anonymous peer reviewers were greatly appreciated.

Notes

1 The ‘Belgian Congo’ became the ‘Republic of the Congo’ on 30 June 1960. In 1964, the name was changed to the ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’. As part of Joseph Mobutu’s Authenticité campaign, the country was renamed the ‘Republic of Zaire’ in 1971, and Mobutu himself chose to be known as Mobutu Sese Seko. Finally, in 1997, the name changed back to the ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’. For the sake of convenience, this article will refer to the country as ‘Congo’.

2 For the period under study (1963–1974), the primary sources refer to the Union of the Angolan Peoples (UPA), the FNLA and the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) interchangeably. Since UPA’s specific role in the FNLA is not the focus of this article and GRAE was the FNLA’s appointed governmental body outside Angola, I use FNLA as a shorthand.

3 Gumane’s reconstituted Udenamo was commonly referred to as Udenamo-Gumane, Udenamo-Cairo or Udenamo-Moçambique. In this article, I will refer to it as Udenamo.

4 R. Lopes and V. Barros, ‘Amílcar Cabral and the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde: International, Transnational, and Global Dimensions’, The International History Review, 42, 6 (2020), pp. 1230–7; V. Barros, ‘Connected Struggles: Networks of Anticolonial Solidarity and the Liberation Movements of the Portuguese Colonies in Africa’, in Z. Maasri, C. Bergin and F. Burke (eds), Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2022), pp. 131–53.

5 C.V.L. Munguambe, ‘Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: Frelimo–ZANU Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 43, 1 (2017), pp. 161–178; N. Telepneva, ‘Mediators of Liberation: Eastern-Bloc Officials, Mozambican Diplomacy and the Origins of Soviet Support for Frelimo, 1958–1965’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 43, 1 (2017), pp. 67–81; C. Tornimbeni, ‘Nationalism and Internationalism in the Liberation Struggle in Mozambique: The Role of the FRELIMO’s Solidarity Network in Italy’, South African Historical Journal, 70, 1 (2018), pp. 194–214.

6 G. Liesegang and J. das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo: Da fundação e dos planos de fusão da Udenamo e MANU à revolta da base da Udenamo em Junho de 1962 e o resurgimento deste partido em 1963: Um plano e primeiros resultados da recolha de fontes para permitir uma leitura sociológica’, (unpublished paper, 2005), p. 2.

7 G.C. Mazarire, ‘ZANU’s External Networks 1963–1979: An Appraisal’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 43, 1 (2017), pp. 83–106; V.A. Shigwedha, ‘The Relationship Between UNITA and SWAPO: Allies and Adversaries’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 40, 6 (2014), pp 1275–87; G. Roberts, ‘Molinaco, the Comorian Diaspora, and Decolonisation in East Africa’s Indian Ocean’, Journal of African History, 62, 3 (2021), pp. 411–29; B. Marmon, ‘“Division to Save the Country Is Wisdom”: The Short Life of the Zimbabwe National Party and Its Lasting Impact on Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle, 1961–1963’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 53, 3 (2020), pp. 361–87.

8 A. Moledo, ‘“A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation”: The Making of Liberation Alliances in 1960s’ (Unliberated) Southern Africa’, Comparativ, 29, 4 (2019), pp. 13–29; J.M. Mabeko-Tali, ‘Dreaming Together, Fighting for Freedom Together: African Progressive Nationalism and the Ideology of Unity in Portugal’s African Colonies in the 1950s and 1960s’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 46, 5 (2020), pp. 829–44; C. Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa and the OAU’s Liberation Committee: Settling Internal Disputes for the Independence of Angola and Mozambique’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 48, 6 (2022), pp. 1099–117.

9 D. Kaiser, ‘“Makers of Bonds and Ties”: Transnational Socialisation and National Liberation in Mozambique’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 43, 1 (2017), pp. 29–48.

10 C. Tornimbeni, ‘Dall’Udenamo al Coremo: Un’opposizione al Frelimo nella guerra di liberazione in Mozambico e il panorama continentale’, Afriche e Orienti, 21, 1 (2019), pp. 47–66.

11 P. Israel, ‘A Loosening Grip: The Liberation Script in Mozambican History’, Kronos, 39 (2013), p. 16; Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’, p. 2; J. das Neves Tembe, ‘Uhuru na Kazi: Recapturing MANU Nationalism through the Archive’, Kronos, 39, 1 (2013), pp. 258–9.

12 A. Isaacman and B. Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982 (Boulder, Westview Press, 1983), p. 210, n. 10.

13 J.M. Cabrita, Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); J.A. Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique (Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

14 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’; Tornimbeni, ‘Dall’Udenamo al Coremo’, pp. 49–50.

15 C. Baquete, ‘Génese da oposição à Frente de Libertação de Moçambique FRELIMO (1960-1994): Caso do Coremo’ (unpublished paper, n.d.).

16 A. Isaacman, P. Lalu and T. Nygren, ‘Digitization, History, and the Making of a Postcolonial Archive of Southern African Liberation Struggles: The Aluka Project’, Africa Today, 52, 2 (2005), pp. 55–77.

17 Stanford University (SU), John Marcum Papers (M1726), Box 34, Folder 3, Coremo 1964-74, Biography by P.J. Gumane, n.d.; Report from Fanuel Mahluza to Malcolm Smart, ‘Contribuições para a história de Moçambique, Por Fanuel Guidione Malhuza’, 3 April 1978, available at https://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/files/contribuies_para_a_histria_de_moambique_mahluza.doc, retrieved 15 February 2023; ‘Fanuel Mahluza’, interview by Emilio Manhique, 15 September 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2A5NDLBNFQ&t=1173s, retrieved 14 November 2023; B.L. Ncomo, Uria Simango: Um Homem, Uma Causa (Maputo, Edições Novafrica, 2003).

18 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’, p. 18.

19 J. Alexander, J. McGregor and B.M. Tendi, ‘The Transnational Histories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 43, 1 (2017), pp. 3–5.

20 For a good understanding of the role and functioning of the SCCI, see S. Araújo, ‘Shaping an Empire of Predictions: The Mozambique Information Centralization and Coordination Services (1961-1974)’, in E. Blanchard, M. Bloembergen and A. Lauro (eds), Policing in Colonial Empires: Cases, Connections, Boundaries (ca. 1850-1970) (Bern, Peter Lang, 2017), pp. 137–58.

21 J. Dlamini, The Terrorist Album: Apartheid’s Insurgents, Collaborators, and the Security Police (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2020).

22 D. Birmingham, A Short History of Modern Angola (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 76–7. I would like to thank Alex Marino pointing out this reference.

23 See, for instance, T. Simpson, Umkhonto we Sizwe: the ANC’s Armed Struggle (Cape Town, Penguin Random House, 2016); E. Kennes and M. Larmer, The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa: Fighting Their Way Home (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2016); H.A. Fonseca, ‘The Military Training of Angolan Guerrillas in Socialist Countries: A Prosopographical Approach, 1961–1974’, in L. Dallywater, C. Saunders and H.A. Fonseca (eds), Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War ‘East’, Transnational Activism 1960-1990 (Berlin, De Gruyter, 2019), pp. 103–28.

24 Dlamini, The Terrorist Album, p. 77.

25 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’, pp. 6–7, 11–12; Tornimbeni, ‘Dall’Udenamo al Coremo’, pp. 52–3.

26 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp. 9, 12, 17; Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique, p. 46.

27 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’, pp. 6–8; National Archive and Records Administration (NARA), RG 84, Tanganyika US Consulate and Embassy, Dar Es Salaam, Classified General Records 1947–1963, Box 9, Folder 350, Mozambique 1963, Aerogramme from the American Embassy in Leopoldville to the US Department of State, Activities of African Nationalists in Leopoldville, 19 July 1963.

28 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Lisbon, PT/TT/SCCIM[Information Centralisation and Co-ordination Services - Mozambique]/A/20/165/1, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (Udenamo) - Cairo, Cota [Number] 1358, Press Statement delivered by David J.M. Mabunda, Cairo, 1 May 1963.

29 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambqiue ‘Udenamo’ Constitution and Programme, English, printed in Cairo, n.d.

30 SU, M1726, Box 20, Folder 1, Roberto/FNLA/COMIRA/PDA Frente Nacional de Libertacau de Angola, excerpts from a speech by Mr Holden Roberto, on the occasion of the anniversary of the war, in Leopoldville, on March 15, 1962, n.d., Angola Calling.

31 See, for instance, Marmon, ‘Division to Save the Country Is Wisdom’, pp. 374–5.

32 L. Passemiers, Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the ‘Congo Crisis’, 1960–1965 (Abingdon, Routledge, 2019), pp. 83–97.

33 NARA, RG 84, Box 9, Folder 350, Mozambique 1963, Aerogramme from the American Embassy in Leopoldville to the US Department of State, Activities of African Nationalists in Leopoldville, 19 July 1963.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique, p. 61; Passemiers, Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics, pp. 85–91.

37 See for instance, F.A. Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 2001); R.B. Velez, Caetano, Spínola e Mobutu: As Relações Bilaterais Entre Portugal e o Zaire (1968-1974) (Oporto, Fronteira do Caos, 2017); C. Young, ‘The Portuguese Coup and Zaire’s Southern Africa Policy’ in J. Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (New York, Routledge, 2019), pp. 195–212.

38 L. Passemiers, ‘The Pan Africanist Congress and the Congo Alliance, 1963–1964’, South African Historical Journal, 70, 1 (2018), p. 88.

39 Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa’.

40 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’, p. 8.

41 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’.

42 Arquivo Histórico Diplomático (AHD), Lisbon, PROC 940,1(8)D, Organizações Nacionalistas, Folder PAA 531, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique - Coremo ou Mozambique Revolutionary Committee - MORECO, Vol. II, Letter from Fanuel Mahluza to Francisco Fole, 23 October 1963.

43 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Letter from Fanuel G Mahluza to Abilio Mavile, 18 November 1963.

44 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, Vol. II, Letter from Fanuel Guidion Mahluza to the Ambassador of Israel, 1965.

45 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, Vol. II, from Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete des Negócios Políticos: I) Contactos com os Macondes demorados em Elisabethville. II) Tentativa de contactos com Victor Namunera, em Lusaka. III) Proposta de criação de um sistema de pesquisa de informações no Catanga, 30 September 1965; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Contactos com Victor Namunera II - A ‘planos’ de penetração em Moçambique - sua autenticidade, n.d.; Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique, p. 62.

46 Arquivo da Defesa Nacional (ADN), Paço de Arcos, F.02, Secretariado-Geral da Defesa Nacional (SGDN), SC.02-2a Repartição (Informações) (2REP), Series 215, Movimentos Políticos de Moçambique, Box UI 735, File 002, Udenamo - União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique e Unamo, from Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete des Negócios Políticos: I) Contactos com os Macondes demorados em Elisabethville. II) Tentativa de contactos com Victor Namunera, em Lusaka. III) Proposta de criação de um sistema de pesquisa de informações no Catanga, 30 September 1965; ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, Noticia from O Adido Militar e Aeronáutico, Consulado Geral do Portugal, Salisbury, 31 July 1965.

47 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/2, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (Udenamo) - Cairo, Cota 1359, Boletim de Difusão de Informações, Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações, no. 184/64, 17 September 1964.

48 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, Organizações Nacionalistas, Folder PAA 101, ‘Representação da Udenamo em Leopoldville’, Letter from Fanuel Mahluza to Abilio Jonas Maville, 6 September 1963; AHD, File MU/GM/GNP/051, Udenamo, Folder Processo No. L-6-2-3, Comunicados - Declarações – Memorandos, F. Mahluza, Press Statement, 11 September 1963.

49 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/2, Cota 1359, Letter from Fanuel Mahluza to Lopes Tembe, [Lusaka], 18 November 1963.

50 Chilenge was formerly secretary of social affairs of the original Udenamo: see Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’, p. 3.

51 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Relatório de Noticia from Embaixada Congo-Leo, 4 July 1964.

52 Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’, p. 18.

53 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, from Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete des Negócios Políticos. I) Contactos com os Macondes demorados em Elisabethville. II) Tentativa de contactos com Victor Namunera, em Lusaka. III) Proposta de criação de um sistema de pesquisa de informações no Catanga, 30 September 1965; ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, Noticia from O Adido Militar e Aeronáutico, Consulado Geral do Portugal, Salisbury, 31 July 1965.

54 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Contactos com Victor Namunera II - A ‘Planos’ de Penetração em Moçambique - sua Autenticidade, n.d.

55 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/2, Cota 1359, document no. 535; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/2, Cota 1359, Boletim de Difusão de Informações, Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações, no. 184/64, 17 September 1964.

56 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, from Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete des Negócios Políticos: I) Contactos com os Macondes demorados em Elisabethville. II) Tentativa de contactos com Victor Namunera, em Lusaka. III) Proposta de criação de um sistema de pesquisa de informações no Catanga, 30 September 1965; ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, Noticia from O Adido Militar e Aeronáutico, Consulado Geral do Portugal, Salisbury, 31 July 1965.

57 Passemiers, Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics, pp. 161–2; J. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962–1976 (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1978), p. 142.

58 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, from Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete des Negócios Políticos. I) Contactos com os Macondes demorados em Elisabethville. II) Tentativa de contactos com Victor Namunera, em Lusaka. III) Proposta de criação de um sistema de pesquisa de informações no Catanga, 30 September 1965.

59 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 003, UNAMO e Udenamo, Report from Comando-Chefe das Forças Armadas de Angola, Gabinete Militar, Serviço de Informações Militares, Actividades dos ‘Nacionalistas’ de Moçambique, 7 April 1965.

60 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 003, Report from Secretariado Geral de Defesa Nacional 2a Repartição, Moçambicanos treinados no Congo, 1 April 1965.

61 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/163/8, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (Udenamo), Cota 1356, Boletim de Difusao de Informacoes SCCIM, no. 140/65, 7 April 1965.

62 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 003, Report from Secretariado Geral de Defesa Nacional 2a Repartição, Moçambicanos treinados no Congo, 1 April 1965; ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, Noticia from O Adido Militar e Aeronáutico, Consulado Geral do Portugal, Salisbury, 31 July 1965.

63 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 003, Letter from Simão Rafai tTo F.C. Mahlusa, n.d.; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/2, Cota 1359, Letter to F.G. Mahluza, n.d.

64 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/2, Cota 1359, Letter from Fanuel Mahluza to His Excellency the Prime and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 10 March 1965.

65 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/2, Cota 1359, from O Director, Gabinete dos Negócios Políticos to Senhor Governador Geral de Moçambique, 26 March 1965.

66 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-2, Processo Coremo: 2.º Vol, from Pide Moçambique, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique - Coremo, 4 February 1966.

67 M. Mainga Bull and L. Habasonda, ‘Zambia Analysis’, in A. Temu and J. das Neves Tembe (eds), Southern African Liberation Struggles, Contemporaneous Documents, 1960-1994, Vol. 7 (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, 2014), pp. 5–49; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Letter from Fanuel Guidion Mahluza, 9 June 1964; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Secreto, SCCI RES.NO.9/1964 Fls.20.

68 SU, M1726, Box 38, Folder 2, Udenamo 1963-5/COSERU, from Fanuel J. Mahluza to John Marcum, 27 February 1964; ‘Ten Nationalist Groups now Based in Lusaka’, The Northern Star, 15 October 1964. The same building housed the PAC, UPA and SWAPO.

69 ‘Portuguese rebels in Lusaka’, Zambia News, Kitwe, 15 March 1964.

70 ANTT, PIDE/DGS/DEL.A/Pinf/131.07.17/NT.2751, Escritórios da Udenamo em Livingstone-Zâmbia, Relatório Imediato from PIDE Angola, UPA/Udenamo, 21 December 1964.

71 AHD, Arquivo do Consulado Geral de Portugal em Salisbúria, File M.10, Folder 2813, Faunuel Guidion Malhuza, Udenamo, 1963-64, PIDE, copy of a Letter from William Crabtree, Udenamo Activities, n.d.; AHD, Arquivo do Consulado Geral de Portugal em Salisbúria, File M.10, Folder 2813, Letter from David J. Mabunda to Abilio Jonas Mavile, 12 December 1963; ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 215, Box UI 735, File 002, Relatório de Notícia, Possíveis Ataques a Moçambique, 9 July 1964.

72 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/165/1, Cota 1358, Boletim de Difusão de Informações, from Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações, 13 June 1964; ANTT, PIDE/DGS/Del.A/Pinf/131.07.08/NT.2751, GRAE-Lusaka-Representação, Letter from Domingos [Livingstone] to Holden Robert, 16 March 1964.

73 See M. Grilli, Nkrumaism and African Nationalism: Ghana’s Pan-African Foreign Policy in the Age of Decolonization (Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); C. Chongo, ‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice: Aspects of Zambia’s Contribution to the Liberation Wars in Southern Africa, 1964-1975’, Zambia Social Science Journal, 6, 1 (2019), pp. 1–27; S.L. Ishemo, ‘“A symbol that cannot be substituted”: The Role of Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere in the Liberation of Southern Africa, 1955–1990’, Review of African Political Economy, 27, 83 (2000), pp. 81–94.

74 Tornimbeni, ‘Dall’Udenamo al Coremo’, p. 51; K. van Walraven, Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa, 1963-1993 (Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1999), p. 247; E. Dube, ‘Relations between Liberation Movements and the OAU’, in N.M. Shamuyarira (ed.), Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), pp. 28–9; 43; Tembe, ‘Uhuru na Kazi’, pp. 264–5.

75 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp. 37–8. There remains contention about whether UNAMI and Mole’s reanimated MANU eventually joined Coremo. In his article ‘Uhuru na Kazi’, das Neves Tembe notes that Matthew Mmole’s name was also written as Mathews Mmole and Mateus Mole.

76 ‘Memorandum Submitted to the 3rd Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity Accra/Ghana’, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.chilco221, retrieved 14 November 2023.

77 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-2, Coremo press conference, Lusaka, n.d.; Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique, p. 68.

78 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’, p. 4; Cabrita, Mozambique, pp. 9, 73. Baquete, ‘Génese da oposição à Frente de Libertação de Moçambique FRELIMO’.

79 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp. 37–8; Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique, pp. 60, 66.

80 Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’, pp. 15–16; Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa, pp. 1106, 1109; see also L. Passemiers, ‘“Our Country or Death”: Reconstructing the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee’s (Coremo) Political Ideology through its Public Discourse’, unpublished paper.

81 O Combatente 1, 2, 24 August 1967.

82 This assessment is based on a thematic reading of Coremo’s public discourse, especially its party organs: The Voice of Coremo, The Valiant Hero, O Combatante, and Coremo Newsletter, undertaken for the paper Passemiers, ‘Our Country or Death’.

83 See Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (Coremo), ‘Memorandum Submitted to the Summit Conference of Heads of African States held in the Democratic Republic of Congo-Kinshasa, January 1967’, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/al.sff.document.chilco267, retrieved 14 November 2023; AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Organizações Nacionalistas, Folder PAA 531, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique - Coremo ou Mozambique Revolutionary Committee - MORECO, Vol III, From DGS Moçambique, Actividades do Coremo, 15 October 1971.

84 Dube, ‘Relations Between Liberation Movements and the OAU’, p. 39; van Walraven, Dreams of Power, pp. 239, 241–2.

85 van Walraven, Dreams of Power, pp. 244–5.

86 Coremo, ‘Memorandum Submitted to the Summit Conference of Heads of African States’.

87 Zambian National Archives (ZNA), FA/1/28, Location 496, OAU Liberation Committee, Report from K.A.J. Kangwa, Zambian OAU Attaché, Summary Report of the Tenth Session of the OAU Co-ordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa held in Kinshasa, Congo, from 30 January to 4 February 1967, 11 February 1967; Coremo, Memorandum Submitted to the Summit Conference of Heads of African States, 11 September 1967, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/al.sff.document.chilco267, retrieved 14 November 2023.

88 ZNA, FA/1/28, Location 496, Report from K.A.J. Kangwa, Zambian OAU Attaché.

89 ‘Coremo Lashes OAU on Arms Aid’, Times of Zambia, 22 January 1968.

90 COREMO, ‘Documents Relating to Coremo Application for AAPSO Membership’, Council Meeting in Nicosia, Cyprus, 13 February 1967, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/al.sff.document.chilco264, retrieved 14 November 2023.

91 Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa’; Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’.

92 Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’, p. 21.

93 Cabrita, Mozambique, p. 39.

94 I. Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (London, Routledge, 2006), p. 95; Grilli, Nkrumaism and African Nationalism, pp. 253, 335; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205/1, Mozambique Revolutionary Council (Coremo), Cota 1403, Boletim de Informação, 29 November 1965.

95 For Gwambe’s relationship with Nkrumah, see Tornimbeni, ‘Dall’Udenamo al Coremo’, p. 52.

96 SU, M1726, Box 34, Folder 3, Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (Coremo), press conference, 1966.

97 Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa’, p. 1107.

98 For a detailed overview of Mobutu’s foreign policy, see K. Mwene-Kabyana, ‘La politique étrangère du Zaïre (1965-1985): Illusion de puissance et clientélisme’ (PhD, Université Laval, 1999); Young, ‘The Portuguese Coup and Zaire’s Southern Africa Policy’.

99 ZNA, FA/1/28, Location 496, Report from K.A.J. Kangwa, Zambian OAU Attaché.

100 Ibid.

101 For a detailed study of Mobutu’s relationship with Portugal, see Velez, Caetano, Spínola e Mobutu.

102 P. Monaville, Students of the World: Global 1968 and Decolonization in the Congo (Durham, Duke University Press, 2022), pp. 116, 171.

103 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 218, Coremo, Box UI 758, File 002, Transmissão Imediata de Notícias, Direcção Geral dos Negócios Políticos e da Administração Interna, 30 June 1966.

104 ‘M. Gumane: “Nous nous tournons vers le Congo … pour la libération de notre pays’, Le Progrès, Lyon, 7 July 1966; ‘Le Président du “Comite Révolutionnaire de Mozambique a Kinshasa”, Le Courrier d’Afrique, 2 July 1966; AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, Actividades de Indivíduos Relacionada Comos Movimentos Nacionalistas, PAA 529, Paulo José Gumane, Congo: Paulo Gumane Talks to the CGTC Leaders, n.d.

105 ‘Le Président du ‘Comité Révolutionnaire de Mozambique’ à Kinshasa’, Le Progrès, 28 June 1966.

106 AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Folder PAA 531, Letter from Paulo Jose Gumane to Joseph Mobutu, 6 July 1966.

107 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, PAA 529, Report from Le Secrétaire General, Compte-rendu de la visite de Monsieur José Gumane Président du Comité révolutionnaire de Mozambique, 3 August 1966.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, PROCESSO COREMO: 3.º VOL, from PIDE Angola, COREMO/UPA, 19 December 1968; Ncomo, Uria Simango, p. 258.

111 Roberts, ‘Molinaco’.

112 See J. Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, & the Third World Order (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019); G. Roberts, Revolutionary State-Making in Dar es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961–1974 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021); E. Burton, ‘Hubs of Decolonization: African Liberation Movements and “Eastern” Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar es Salaam’, in Dallywater, Saunders and Fonseca, Southern African Liberation Movements, pp. 25–56.

113 Z. Levey, ‘Israel’s Involvement in the Congo, 1958–68: Civilian and Military Dimensions’, Civil Wars, 6, 4 (2003), p. 30.

114 ANTT, Phy.PIDE/DGS/Sdel.L/GAB/1757/NT.8084, Paulo José Gumane, from PIDE Director, Coremo, 19 September 1966; ANTT, Phy.PIDE/DGS/Sdel.L/GAB/1757/NT.8084, from PIDE Angola, Actividades do IN, 27 September 1969; ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, Ataque ao Acompamento do Cabinete do Plano do Zambeze em Mucangádeze por Terroristas do Coremo.

115 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, Processo Coremo: 4.º Vol., Relatório de Notícia from Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional 2ª Repartição, Actividades do Coremo, 16 May 1967.

116 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from PIDE Angola, Coremo/UPA, 19 December 1968. This is a transcribed letter from Paulo Gumane to Narciso Namburete Mbule, who was in Kinshasa at the time.

117 AHD, File Malawi, M. 10, Folder Processo 1.7.4, Coremo, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do Coremo, 21 December 1970.

118 Monaville, Students of the World, p. xiv.

119 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205/2, Mozambique Revolutionary Council (Coremo), Cota 1404, from Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações, Coremo, 28 October 1966.

120 ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 218, Coremo, Box UI 758, File 004, from O Chefe do Gabinete Militar, 18 July 1967.

121 AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Folder PAA 531, Dirigentes dos Movimentos de Libertação do Sul da Africa Avistaram-se Hoje com o Presidente do Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, Segundo anuncia a Agencia de Imprensa do Zaire, 24 October 1972.

122 AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Folder PAA 531, Telegram from Ministro to Governador-Geral de Angola, 30 October 1972; AND, SGDN, 2REP, Series 218 - Coremo, Box UI 759, File 007, Coremo, from O Chefe da 2ª Repartição to Representante Militar em Salisbúria, Uniao Frelimo-Coremo, 29 December 1972.

123 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, From DGS/SUB BR, Coremo: Visita ao Zaire. Apoios, 14 December 1972.

124 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from PIDE Angola, Actividades do Coremo, 7 October 1969.

125 Cable from the American Embassy in Caracas to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, ‘Frelimo Pardons 240 “Traitors”‘, 20 March 1975, available at http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975CARACA03133_b.html, retrieved 14 November 2023.

126 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do ‘Coremo’, 21 July 1972.

127 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205/5, Mozambique Revolutionary Council (Coremo), Cota 1407, Relatório Imediato from DGS, Coremo: Conferencia Anual Actividades, 4 April 1973.

128 Report from Fanuel Mahluza to Malcolm Smart, ‘Contribuições para a história de Moçambique, por Fanuel Guidione Malhuza’, 3 April 1978. It is more likely that Mahluza meant the Congolese ambassador to Zambia. Interview transcript available at https://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/files/contribuies_para_a_histria_de_moambique_mahluza.doc, retrieved 14 November 2023.

129 Cable from the American Embassy in Caracas to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, ‘Frelimo Pardons 240 “Traitors”‘, 20 March 1975.

130 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205/3, Mozambique Revolutionary Council (Coremo), Cota 1405, document no. 342; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205/3, Cota 1405, Relatório Imediato from SCCIM, Coremo, 10 August 1967; AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Folder PAA 531, from PIDE Moçambique, Actividades do Coremo, 28 February 1967.

131 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do ‘Coremo’, 10 February 1972.

132 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do ‘Coremo’, 18 December 1972; ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, from Direcção-Geral de Segurança Delegação em Moçambique, Coremo: EFICIENCIA.APOIOS, 7 April 1973.

133 AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Organizações Nacionalistas, Folder PAA 531, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique - Coremo ou Mozambique Revolutionary Committee - MORECO, Vol. I, Letter from Director Gabinete dos Negócios Políticos, 14 December 1965; ADN, SGDN, 2REP, Series 218, ‘Coremo’, Box UI 759, File 005, ‘Coremo’, from PIDE Moçambique, [untitled], 22 August 1968. Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique, p. 67.

134 Cabrita, Mozambique, p. 39.

135 Ibid., p. 40; Marcum, Conceiving Mozambique, pp. 68–9.

136 S. Ndlovu, G. Houston and B. Magubane, ‘The South African Liberation Struggle’, in A.J. Temu and J. das Neves Tembe (eds), Southern African Liberation Struggles, Contemporaneous Documents, 1960-1994, Vol. 3 (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2014), pp. 583–6.

137 AND, SGDN, 2REP, Series 218, Coremo, Box UI 758, File 001, Transmissão Imediata de Notícias, from Direcção Geral dos Negócios Políticos e da Administração Interna, 2 July 1965.

138 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205, Cota 1403, Letter from Peter Simbi to UPA Elisabethville, 17 July 1965.

139 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-1, Processo Coremo: 1.º Vol, from PIDE Angola, 28 July 1965.

140 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-1, Tradução (Resumo), n.d.

141 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, Vol. II, Letter from Director Geral to Senhor Secretario Adjunto da Defesa Nacional, 29 April 1966.

142 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, Vol. II, Letter from Fanuel Guidion Mahluza to the Ambassador of Israel, 1965; AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, Vol. II, Letter from Francisco Fole to the Danish Ambassador, Leopoldville, 8 October 1965.

143 AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Folder PAA 531, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do Coremo, 28 September 1971; ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205/4, Mozambique Revolutionary Council (Coremo), Cota 1406, Relatório Imediato from DGS, Coremo: Actividades, 12 August 1971.

144 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from DGS Moçambique, Frelimo/Coremo, 12 September 1970.

145 ANTT, PT/TT/SCCIM/A/20/205/3, Mozambique Revolutionary Council (Coremo), Cota 1405, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do Coremo, 12 February 1972.

146 See Munguambe, ‘Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity’; Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’; Mabeko-Tali, ‘Dreaming Together’; Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa.

147 See F. Ribeiro de Meneses and R. McNamara, ‘Parallel Diplomacy, Parallel War: The PIDE/DGS’s Dealings with Rhodesia and South Africa, 1961–74’, Journal of Contemporary History, 49, 2 (2014), pp. 366–89.

148 P.J. Gumane, ‘Clarion Call’, Cairo, 1 January 1965, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/al.sff.document.chilco298, retrieved 14 November 2023.

149 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-2, Resolution Passed by the First Annual Conference of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee - Coremo, n.d.

150 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-2, from PIDE Moçambique: Coremo - Comunicado - Lusaka (Zambia), 25 May 1968. Azania was the name for South Africa used by some liberation movements, including the PAC.

151 Cabrita, Mozambique, p. 39.

152 ‘Le Président du “Comité Révolutionnaire de Mozambique” à Kinshasa’, Le Progres, 28 June 1966.

153 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, PAA 529, Report from Le Secrétaire General, Compte-rendu de la visite de Monsieur José Gumane Président du Comité révolutionnaire de Mozambique, 3 August 1966.

154 Ibid.

155 AHD, PROC 940,1(8)D, PAA 529, from O Director dos Serviços de SCCIM, Coremo, 21 April 1967.

156 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-2, from PIDE Angola, Pan-Africanismo, 31 March 1967.

157 Mabeko-Tali, ‘Dreaming Together’; Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’, p. 15.

158 Mabeko-Tali, ‘Dreaming Together’, p. 840; Fonseca, ‘The Military Training of Angolan Guerrillas in Socialist Countries’, pp. 115, 124.

159 Mabeko-Tali, ‘Dreaming Together’, p. 838.

160 ‘Documento do GRAE “Le GRAE et la CONCP”‘, available at https://www.tchiweka.org/documento-textual/0073000017, retrieved 14 November 2023.

161 Mabeko-Tali, ‘Dreaming Together’, p. 838.

162 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, Information Bulletin from Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Embaixada da Portugal em Londres, 19 August 1968; Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 223.

163 Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa’, pp. 1108–9.

164 O Combatente 5, no. 1, 2 January 1972.

165 Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’, pp. 14–15.

166 Liesegang and das Neves Tembe, ‘Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo’; ‘Lista dos membros do GRAE e minibiografias’, available at https://www.tchiweka.org/documento-textual/0033000009, retrieved 14 November 2023.

167 See series of photographs in ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-2.

168 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, Resumé du Rapport, n.d.

169 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from PIDE Angola, Coremo/UPA, 19 December 1968.

170 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, Resumé du Rapport, n.d.

171 ANTT, Phy.PIDE/DGS/Sdel.L/GAB/1757/NT.8084, from PIDE Angola, Coremo/GRAE, 6 October 1970; ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from DGS-Luanda, Paulo José Gumane, 20 March 1971.

172 Moledo, ‘A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation’, p. 20.

173 For a detailed overview of the strength of the FNLA, see Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II.

174 AND, SGD, 2REP, Series 218, Box UI 758, File 002, Relatório de Notícia, from Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional 2ª Repartição, Actividade Do Coremo no Congo (Leo), 25 March 1966.

175 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-2, from PIDE Moçambique: Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique - Coremo, 4 February 1966; ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from DGS Moçambique, Coremo Apoios Externos, 21 September 1970; ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do ‘Coremo’, 28 July 1972.

176 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, From SUBPIDEBR: Coremo - Ordem de Batalha, 4 January 1968; ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from PIDE Angola, Actividades da ‘UPA’, 16 December 1968; ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-4, from DGS Moçambique, Actividades do ‘Coremo’, 10 February 1972.

177 Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, pp. 207–9.

178 M. Mainga Bull and L. Habasonda, ‘Zambia Analysis’, pp. 5–49.

179 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from PIDE Moçambique, Apoio do Governo Zambiano aos Partidos Emancipalistas, 24 September 1969.

180 ANTT, Phy.PIDE/DGS/Sdel.L/GAB/1757/NT.8084, Relatório Imediato, from PIDE Angola, Actividades do GRAE, 4 August 1968; ANTT, Phy.PIDE/DGS/Sdel.L/GAB/1757/NT.8084, from Relatório Imediato PIDE Angola, Actividades do GRAE, 9 November 1968; ANTT, Phy.PIDE/DGS/Sdel.L/GAB/1757/NT.8084, from PIDE Angola, Actividades do GRAE, 17 July 1969.

181 ANTT, PT/TT/PIDE/D-C/001/4126-3, from PIDE Moçambique, Apoio aos Movimentos Terroristas, 27 December 1968.

182 Tornimbeni, ‘The CONCP in Southern Africa’, p. 1115.

183 See ANTT, PIDE/DGS/Del.A/Pinf/131.07.08/NT.2751, for an overview of such developments.

184 ANTT, PIDE/DGS/Del.A/Pinf/131.07.08/NT.2751, from DGS Angola, Actividades da FNLA - Deslocação de H. Roberto, 8 April 1974.

185 C. Chonga, ‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice: Aspects of Zambia’s Contribution to the Liberation Wars in Southern Africa, 1964-1975’, Zambia Social Science Journal, 6, 1 (2016), pp. 18-20; F.A. Guimares, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, p. 115.

186 AHD, File PROC 940,1(8)D, Organizações Nacionalistas, Folder PAA 1305, Coremo, Aerogramme from Portuguese Embassy, Zomba, 17 June 1974; Cable from the American Embassy in Lusaka to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, ‘Alleged Embassy Lusaka Contacts with Paul Gumane’, 19 March 1975, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975LUSAKA00478_b.html, retrieved 14 November 2023; Cable from the American Embassy in Lusaka to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, ‘Some Coremo Personnel still Detained in Zambia’, 15 July 1974, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LUSAKA01453_b.html, retrieved 14 November 2023.

187 Mazarire, ‘ZANU’s External Networks’.