Shaping Botswana’s Economy: Chinese Counterfeits as Catalysts of Globalisation and Local Development

Abstract

Chinese counterfeiting has dominated the global counterfeit market, earning a negative reputation even in African countries such as Botswana and South Africa. Often perceived as low quality (even when it is not) and cheap, Chinese merchandise has shaped Botswana’s economy through its role as a catalyst of globalisation and promoted local development. Data were gathered over 13 months (four research trips) between 2011 and 2015. Follow-up interviews were conducted via WeChat in 2018 and 2022. In a context that reveals the tension between local consumers starved of products and aggressive marketing by Chinese merchants, the unfolding of the counterfeit phenomenon in Botswana points towards broader questions about the dynamic interplay between local consumers and Chinese merchandise, and between local trading policies and Chinese investors. Therefore, by studying specific Chinese cases – which demonstrate the progression from selling low-quality goods, counterfeit goods and Chinese-branded goods to the manufacturing of ‘made in Botswana products’ – we can better reflect on the importance of local trading policies. Evidence has shown that local strategic policies can guide seemingly rampant foreign investment towards contributing to the local economy and local development.

Keywords:

• Botswana
• China shop
• counterfeit products
• local policy
• manufacturing
• fong kong

Introduction

In 2016 alone, the sale of counterfeit¹ products accounted for 3.3 per cent of all global trade.² According to the Department of Homeland Security, counterfeit goods confiscated at US borders, most of which arrive from mainland China or Hong Kong, have increased 10 times since the mid 1990s.³ The inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China has received considerable criticism and garnered much academic and legal attention worldwide over the years.⁴ The history of counterfeit production in China can be traced back to the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912).⁵ Since 2008, shan zhai has been a vernacular term for counterfeits and copies in mainland China.⁶

As China’s presence grows in Africa, ‘made-in-China’ goods have gradually dominated African markets.⁷ In some African countries, its counterfeit products have even received new nicknames, such as fong kong in Botswana and South Africa, zhing zhong in Zimbabwe and chakachua in Tanzania.⁸ These terms generally have negative connotations and are used to describe something fake or inauthentic. Some of these neologisms have meanings in the local context (for example, chakachua means ‘mixing’ in Swahili), while others represent an onomatopoeia of what the Chinese language sounds like to African ears.

The literature on counterfeits can generally be categorised into five groups: general descriptions of the phenomenon, impact analyses, supply- and demand-side investigations, legal issues, and strategies to avoid counterfeit trade.⁹ The negative effect of counterfeit trade on rights holders – and consequently on innovation, employment and long-term economic growth – has been widely discussed and reported.¹⁰ Research shows that counterfeit consumption typically occurs in societies with a demand for affordable goods and a lack of effective intellectual property protection, enforcement or consumer awareness.¹¹ Throughout history, the issue of counterfeit goods has been universal. When Charles Dickens visited America in 1842, he found that pirated copies of his early works had spread quickly amongst American readers.¹² Similarly, late 19th-century Germany and mid-20th-century Japan also experienced issues with counterfeit production.¹³

This study examines the counterfeit phenomenon in a broader context – not only as consumer behaviour, but as a phenomenon that arises during certain stages of economic and social development. How did some countries overcome counterfeit production and eventually develop a strong global brand? What role has the ‘counterfeit phenomenon’ played in the local economy? This article navigates Chinese counterfeit production and consumption throughout history and the implications of Chinese counterfeit goods in Botswana in order to understand first, how Chinese merchandise has shaped the Botswana economy in a globalising society with limited resources and uneven development; second, how Chinese counterfeit goods have been shaped by Botswana society and, more broadly, by local trading policies; and third, how counterfeiting functions as a catalyst for globalisation and local development.

The research data were gathered in Botswana over a period of 13 months (involving four research trips) between 2011 and 2015. The researcher made multiple visits to 64 randomly selected Chinese-owned shops (47 in the capital city Gaborone, 17 in other cities and rural towns) and 24 locally owned shops (20 in Gaborone, four in other rural towns) to ensure a balanced qualitative data set. The primary data sources were informal and in-depth interviews with a total of 132 people, including Chinese merchants, managers of large South African chain shops, owners of local shops, local retail traders, local customers, and government officials from the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry and the Central Police Station. The English and Mandarin languages were used when conversing with the local people of Botswana and Chinese people, respectively. Follow-up interviews were conducted via WeChat in 2018 and 2022 by both text and voice call. Furthermore, an analysis of documents, that included newspaper articles, government websites, and so on, was conducted to incorporate the views of local media and government officials.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows: first, China’s experience of transferring unfair trade practices into production power is introduced as a lens to understand that China’s current reluctance to enforce intellectual property rights is related to western colonial exploitation and urgent market needs. Second, the history of Chinese merchants and merchandise in Botswana is described to present the mechanism of how Chinese merchandise, local consumer needs and trading policies affect one another, followed by a case study of a Chinese merchant couple’s business upgrade. Then, by analysing the trading policies pertaining to Chinese merchants, I argue that implementing a consistent and long-term strategic trading policy is indispensable to guiding Chinese investment and incubating tomorrow’s manufacturing and industry in Botswana.

From Counterfeit Consumption to the Factory of the World

In this section, we will analyse the ‘copy culture’ from political, economic and social angles to explain how the Qing dynasty government managed to transform the importation of unprocessed material from foreign countries to cultivate the domestic industry and eventually fuel its own export trade.

The culture of ‘copying’ has been a respected tradition in the arts and crafts of East Asia from ancient times.¹⁴ In Chinese history, study by duplication was the accepted calligraphy method because copies of past masters were seen as models to be carefully imitated; also, the term ‘copying’ was closely linked to craftsmanship in jade and the rare antiques during the Qing dynasty’s reign.¹⁵ It was the pursuit of foreign technology during the self-strengthening movement (1861–1895) that allowed the notion of the ‘copy’ to move from the field of local art to that of foreign imports, contributing to the pursuit of foreign technology. The notion of imitation became the linchpin of an economic scheme against the colonial power, while the self-strengthening movement crumbled during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Later, a tariff was introduced to bolster national products by condemning the use of foreign goods as being ‘unpatriotic’.¹⁶ During that time, public media, lectures, and even museums were committed to publicising the notion that every citizen was obliged to buy ‘national products’.¹⁷ Driven by the need to create first-rate imitations as a defence against imported merchandise, imitation production was greatly encouraged and prizes were even conferred on the best available copies.¹⁸

Linda Grove, who has examined the production mechanism of foreign-style cotton textiles in the early 20th century in China, discovered that the counterfeit market in China was launched through a collaboration between Qing government representatives and private businesses that intended to compete with imports and eventually push them out of the market.¹⁹ Grove suggested that the inception of China’s ‘copy culture’ occurred during the 18th century when western trading bases were set up in Canton, leading to the move to delegate the production of goods for export to local artisans.²⁰ The combination of state initiatives and private investment was one of the characteristic features of this movement. Once the production and consumption of made-in-China merchandise were linked to patriotism, the political impact escalated to economic nationalism. The Chinese government did not object to the foreign tastes that could be copied in China, but to the foreign manufacture of imports that threatened the nation’s economy. The succeeding Chinese governments and their officials eventually inherited economic nationalism as ‘a political DNA’, which led to the reluctance to enforce the intellectual property rights of foreign companies operating in China.²¹

Following the first Opium War and the opening of the first treaty ports, Western, particularly British, manufacturers began to ship large volumes of cotton textiles produced in their modern spinning and weaving mills to China. As the import volume rose, Chinese political leaders began to worry about the destruction of indigenous handicraft industries and undertook initiatives to create new production systems in China to produce copies of modern goods. In the first several decades of the twentieth century, small factories and workshops began to produce a wide variety of goods that imitated foreign imports – everything from fabrics and shoes to cosmetics, soaps, interior decorations, and machinery.²²

Simultaneously, consumer preferences contributed to imitation production as ordinary people encouraged the local industry to make more affordable copies of desired imports. Consumers’ ravenous demand for cheap alternatives to the more expensive European manufacturers in the late 19th century spurred Chinese manufacturers to offer similar articles at a lower price.²³ Those counterfeits were mainly consumed when the product was not readily and locally available or by ordinary people who would otherwise not be able to afford the imported product. However, the elites wanted the ‘real thing’ and could afford scarce and expensive products. Although national goods were promoted, many consumers considered them to be shoddy, and they were frequently discarded. Therefore, the Republican Period (1912–1949) was described as an ‘era in which the worship of foreign goods was relatively widespread’.²⁴ In reality, evidence reveals that lower pricing, rather than economic nationalism, was the key factor that attracted local consumers to purchase imported goods.

The copy culture was distinguished not only by domestic producers’ fervent emulation of foreign producers’ merchandise, but also by persistent rivalry among China-based manufacturers in their pursuit of market dominance. Local consumers were the eventual beneficiaries of constant product innovation and lowering of prices.²⁵ Since local imitations immediately replaced popular imports, relatively few imports remained throughout the Qing dynasty.²⁶ In this manner, local imitation production turned nearly all raw products into saleable goods and consolidated the importation of unprocessed material from abroad.²⁷

As a by-product of the copy culture in China, a ‘two-tier economy’ was born to enlarge social differentiation.²⁸ During that time period, China was divided between the poverty of the many and the wealth of the few. Imported luxury merchandise was used by elites as a symbol of social status, whereas cheap imitations satisfied ordinary people’s desire for new products. To compete with foreign goods, local businesses used fundamental technologies requiring low investments to focus on goods that were cheap, simple and often inferior to expensive imports. This strategy was implemented in response to the needs of the huge number of comparatively poor people in China. Skills and knowledge were transferred quickly through innovative enterprises to management, production and retail.²⁹ The foreign elements were rapidly Sinicised to blend into local production to the extent that products often became indistinguishable from each other, as the Chinese and western elements were successfully integrated.³⁰ Due to the spread of small businesses in a booming market from the 16th century onwards and the cheap labour market in a speedily growing population, Chinese counterfeit production was sustained.

Imitations produced in China were also exported to other countries. Before the 1930s, the global market was dominated by manufactured goods produced in Europe. China gradually showed its presence in international commerce by not only manufacturing commodities, but also exporting them.³¹

138,000 tonnes of yarn were imported into China in 1912, but twenty years later 158,000 tonnes were exported from Shanghai alone. In some cases, continuities in design and manufacture could stretch over several centuries: the metal spittoons made by Lucky Enamel Factory in Hong Kong in the 1940s were directly inspired by designs for cuspidors drawn in the Netherlands and sent to Canton in 1763 to be produced and decorated for export back to Europe: they were now made for a local market but also exported to other parts of the world in response to a demand for cheap goods.³²

Therefore, the colonial powers not only fell short in their attempts to transform modern China into a nation reliant on European imports, but actually solidified the contrary tendency – China’s importation of unprocessed material from foreign countries to fuel its export trade.³³ Even today, made-in-China counterfeits continue to offer affordable alternatives to branded products for low-income populations worldwide, infiltrating nearly every market across the globe.

Chinese Merchandise in Gaborone: From ‘Caca’ to ‘Fong Kong’ to ‘Made in Botswana’

As Botswana is a landlocked country, its service sector is the largest contributor to its gross domestic product and accounts for 63.6 per cent of the economy, employing more than half of the labour force. The industrial sector occupies 29.7 per cent of the gross domestic product, and includes diamond processing, food processing, textiles and mining.³⁴ Since 1975, when diplomatic relations between Botswana and China were established, economic and technological cooperation has been a prime motivating force in the relationship.³⁵ As a previous British colony, Botswana’s economy was dominated for a long period by people originating from Europe and India.³⁶

At the beginning of the 1990s, some pioneering Chinese business-people started to arrive in Botswana. Although they found that the local people desired affordable goods, the law did not permit the Chinese to open shops because the Botswana government believed that retail business should be reserved only for citizens of Botswana. Given the situation, many Chinese traders had to sell watches and essential balm oil on the street, which provoked the Botswana government to discipline them to keep the market in order. The local Chinese population did not increase until the Botswana government granted permission for the Chinese to establish their own shops. This was coincident with the global Chinese migration boom during the latter half of the 20th century.³⁷

When former Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Botswana in 1988, ‘ni hao’ became the synonym for Chinese.³⁸ In the early 90s, when many Chinese street traders were selling essential balm oil, the Chinese were called ‘caca’ by the locals.³⁹ Then Chinese merchants’ selling counterfeits in the 2000s earned notoriety – fong kong – for the Chinese.⁴⁰

The family chain migration model contributed to the boom in Chinese migration to Botswana. After the Chinese pioneers settled and established steady businesses on a self-employment model, they started recruiting family members back in China as assistants. This kind of chain migration eventually increased the numbers of both Chinese migrants and ‘China shops’.⁴¹ Most Chinese merchants in Gaborone came from the Fujian and Jiangxi provinces in China. Before coming to Botswana, most had made a living by working manual jobs or running small businesses. The merchants’ education level was generally below senior high school, and they could not communicate well in English, which is the official language of business communication in Botswana.

By 2013, approximately 1,000 China shops were spread across the country, covering almost every city and rural town in Botswana. Clothes, shoes, cell phones and items used on a daily basis (for example tools, electronics) could be easily found in the shops, which made China shops the main location for interaction between indigenous Botswanans and the Chinese population. Over the years, the power struggle between Chinese businesses and the local government has never stopped (Table 1). The Chinese merchants have constantly sought opportunities to maximise their profits, while the local government has scrutinised the evolution of Chinese businesses and optimised the local economy accordingly. These China shops served as a ladder for Chinese merchants to upgrade their businesses, from retail to wholesale, and then to manufacturing and industry, while simultaneously meeting local market needs, raising up local traders, and even incubating domestic manufacturing.

Table 1. The transition of China shops in Botswana

Period and market conditions	Style and location	Changes in China shops	Interaction with local people	Government attitude
Start –2002	Street stalls	Set up street stalls at shopping malls	Local customers welcomed ‘low-quality and low-price products’ and named the Chinese products ‘caca’	Did not permit the Chinese to open shops
Spread 2002–2008	Shops opened in urban and rural areas	Open shops in shopping malls Open chain shops around the country	Local customers despised ‘low-quality goods’ gradually and named them ‘fong kong’	Gave the Chinese permission to open shops Welcomed the Chinese and Chinese goods due to their needs
Saturation 2009–2013	Shops moved from urban to rural and border areas	In a competitive and hostile environment Create good quality goods and original brand	Local people named all Chinese goods ‘fong kong’ Local customers welcomed Chinese counterfeit products	Restricted Chinese businesses
Struggle February 2013–August 2013	Shops moved to neighbouring countries	Hand over shops to local assistants Look for loopholes in policies Look for markets in neighbouring countries	Local shop assistants entrusted by some Chinese merchants to look after the shops Local customers welcomed Chinese ‘original brands’	Stopped extending work permits for Chinese merchants
Polarisation 2014–	The number of China shops reduced	Open new shops Upgrade business Look for business opportunities in neighbouring countries	Local traders shipped goods (some counterfeits) from China as ‘suitcase traders’ Local traders opened their own shops	Reissued work permits to some well-established Chinese shop owners

Source: A revised version of ‘Table 4. The Development and Transition of China Shop Business in Botswana’, in Y. Zi, Iron Sharpens Iron: Social Interactions at China Shops in Botswana (Cameroon, Langaa RPCIG, 2017), p. 206.

Most Chinese merchandise sold in the Botswana market is produced in Yiwu and Jinjiang in China.⁴² Products from the Yiwu market are often considered inferior, according to the market standards of developed countries.⁴³ However, the same products are generally welcomed by consumers in developing countries, such as those in Africa and Latin America.⁴⁴ Once Chinese merchandise arrives in Botswana, both Chinese and local retailers distribute it from the Chinese wholesale market to cities and towns across the country. A growing number of African ‘suitcase traders’ ship merchandise directly from Yiwu to their respective home countries.⁴⁵

The Chinese merchandise sold in the Botswana market can be categorised into three groups: (1) low-quality cheap goods, (2) counterfeit goods and (3) Chinese brand novelty goods.⁴⁶ Although goods sold in China shops are called fong kong, not all of them are counterfeit. The perceptible fong kong sold in China shops are goods such as copies of brand-name sneakers, T-shirts and cell phones. Ironically, Chinese merchants who sold cheap, low-quality goods received the most respect during the 1990s due to the great local need for affordable goods. Later, to survive in a competitive and hostile environment, Chinese merchants offered counterfeits that combined affordable prices, above-standard quality and fashion sense. However, owing to the government’s regulation of counterfeit products, the activities of China shops were widely criticised; consequently, many Chinese merchants lost the respect of the local people. To save the tarnished Chinese brand and survive in a competitive business environment, some Chinese merchants were prompted to introduce their own brands by selling novelty goods with original brand names.

Low-Quality Cheap Goods

Following the arrival of Chinese merchants in Botswana in the 1990s, the Chinese merchandise sold was typically low in price to match the local buying power. Despite the low quality, it was highly appreciated by locals.

Most local people went barefoot in those days. A pair of shoes could cost 300 pula (1 pula = US$0.5 in those days) in shops owned by white people and Indians. Local people’s salary was around 200 pula per month. The quality of Chinese goods was lower because most were leftovers from the factory, but at least local people could buy a pair of shoes for 10 or 20 pula, even if they only lasted one month. Poor people would never spend 300 pula on a pair of shoes, no matter how good the quality.⁴⁷

We are so thankful for the China shops. Because of them, we have a TV to watch, and clothes to wear. Although some people say that Chinese clothes are smelly, not all of them are bad quality … I think they are kind people and they sell goods of good quality as well.⁴⁸

The low-quality, cheap goods effectively clothed the local people, especially those on a limited income, thus promoting equality in local societies. These goods were shipped to Botswana to match the purchasing power of the majority of the population and to counter monopolies in the Botswana market, which had been dominated by Indians and Europeans before the Chinese arrived.⁴⁹ Despite the contribution to local society, the Chinese merchants’ sale of third-rate goods resulted in the shabby image that ‘Made in China’ goods have in Africa.⁵⁰ To the pioneer Chinese merchants, the experience of selling low-quality, cheap goods helped them accumulate ‘the first bucket of gold’ in a short period of time and lay a solid foundation for opening shops in later years. Even today, such low-quality cheap goods have not totally disappeared from the market. Some Chinese merchants still manage to find unpopular or outdated goods from Chinese factories and sell them to underprivileged local consumers. However, not a single shop sells only cheap goods because they do not generate profits.

Counterfeit Goods

Chinese counterfeit goods were brought to the Botswana market after 2000. As China shops boomed in Botswana, competition among Chinese merchants grew fiercer and created tensions in the community. To avoid competition with other China shop owners, some Chinese merchants began selling counterfeit sneakers and sports shirts to serve medium income customers. Since counterfeit goods entered the Botswana market, they have been sold and consumed covertly, but have never lost their appeal.

Botswana is no exception to the phenomenon of the poor forever imitating the rich depicted by Veblen.⁵¹ As Botswana’s economy developed, local people gradually gained a sense of fashion and brand names through the media, which intensified counterfeit market activities. The wealthy locals, who travelled internationally, dressed in Western brands and pursued a Western lifestyle, while the medium-income locals used counterfeit goods as a feasible means to imitate the rich. A sizeable medium-income-level population comprises a majority of counterfeit goods consumers. Counterfeit clothes and pirated DVDs are particularly popular. When the government tried to purge China shops in 2009, some local people advocated for Chinese businesses, arguing that ‘Batswana women are able to watch their favourite South African soap operas thanks to the Chinese’.⁵² Besides, some local fashions were also copied by Chinese merchants, as a local business owner revealed:

We travel to Asian countries every year to find uniquely designed clothes that may be popular in Botswana … Chinese come to spy on our clothes. One Chinese lady was caught taking pictures of our clothes in the fitting room … We were told by customers that in China shops there was a dress with the same design as ours but sold at a much lower price with greatly inferior material.⁵³

In addition to a demanding market in Botswana, the policies and attitudes of the government contributed to the extended survival of counterfeit goods in the local market. For years, Botswana’s government seemed to deliberately overlook some counterfeit trading activities in China shops, provided that Chinese merchants paid taxes and helped address local unemployment. Even after the government started to restrain counterfeit consumption at a later stage, several loopholes remained at the executive level, which caused many Chinese merchants to question the intention of ‘anti-counterfeiting campaigns’.

First, anti-counterfeiting campaigns were often initiated by ‘outsiders’, such as brand producers from the US and South Africa, and not the Botswana government. In 2007, Botswana was rated 15th on the list of countries where software piracy was prevalent.⁵⁴ Since 2008, Chinese merchants have increasingly been targeted by the tightening of regulations, which have been enforced under pressure from global institutions that intend to curb piracy. Much of the initial pressure on China was exercised by the US government, supported by Hollywood and Silicon Valley lobbyists.⁵⁵

Second, anti-counterfeiting campaigns opened doors for local authorities to exploit China shops. According to Chinese merchants, since the anti-counterfeiting campaign, the government has constrained the renewal of trading permits for China shops and these permits are frequently checked by city council officers and the police. Some Chinese merchants whose work permits had expired or were being renewed have had to pay ‘fines’ to the officers. Therefore, many Chinese merchants view the checking of permits as a means for local officials to obtain ‘extra income’. Chinese merchants who were put on a long waiting list to renew documents had to use guanxi (personal connections) to secure a quick renewal, which could lead to bribery, extortion or forms of unfair treatment.

Third, although many anti-counterfeiting campaigns were conducted, it seems that ‘China shops’, rather than local traders, were the only target. Among Chinese merchants, anti-counterfeiting campaigns are considered a means to restrict the number of China shops, rather than to control counterfeit goods. Even without Chinese merchants, the supply chain of counterfeit goods has been established through a growing number of African ‘suitcase traders’ who travel to China. These traders restock uniquely designed clothes from China to dodge competition with China shops and South African chain shops. This process has increased the variety of counterfeit goods and allowed the local traders to gradually take over the counterfeit supply chain from the Chinese merchants. At the same time, the anti-counterfeiting campaign played a role in preserving the local consumer market for the local street hawkers who benefited greatly from conducting illicit trade. Observing the Botswana government’s empowerment in local business initiatives, many Chinese merchants believed that ‘anti-counterfeiting campaigns’ were a disguised form of ‘local protectionism’, which intended to eventually drive Chinese businesses away and offer trading business to the locals, ultimately revitalising the sluggish economy.

Local street hawkers obtain great profits from selling counterfeits. One of them used to buy 20 to 30 pairs of fake brand shoes at my shop every time. I gave him 50 pula (US$5.2) for one pair, and he sold them for more than 300 pula (US$31). He nagged me for a discount every time. It took him only three years to build a big house.⁵⁶

I used to get these shoes (fake brand sneakers) from China shops, but they cannot sell them now. I now have to go to South Africa every month to restock.⁵⁷

These Chinese will leave very soon, and their shops will be ours.⁵⁸

Therefore, the anti-counterfeiting campaigns expedited driving out China shops and promoting local business ownership. Over the years, China shops not only provided business opportunities for local street hawkers, but also offered management training for local shop assistants.⁵⁹ After gaining management and business experience from the China shops, some local people preferred to open their own shops. The local trading policies supported their entrepreneurship intentions by treating them as a priority. This became obvious in 2013 when the local government stopped extending trading permits for Chinese merchants as China-Botswana relations faced challenges.⁶⁰ As a result, some locals were able to break away from being mere consumers, learn business skills from the Chinese shop owners or even inherit businesses from Chinese merchants.

China Brand Novelty Goods

Novelty goods were introduced to the market around 2009 as a solution to the growing needs of local society and the reduced profit in counterfeit trading. These novelty products have challenged the existing inferior image of fong kong because most of them are of good quality. When there is a request for a special item, such as handmade wood furniture, specially designed leather bags or tailored suits, local people often turn to Chinese merchants for help. Customers can even order custom-made suits from China through a catalogue book, allowing them to choose the material, size and style at a much cheaper price. The latest local fashion trends have been carefully observed, as Chinese merchants must design merchandise that appeals to the local population. A Chinese pioneer who runs a clothing shop stated:

I observe what designs local people prefer and order similar designs from factories in China. My goods are of the same standard as those sold in white people’s shops [representing good quality] in terms of design and quality but are of a cheaper price. If they sell the same goods as mine, they are like a commercial for me. Since my materials are even better than theirs, I manage to keep regular customers.⁶¹

Chinese merchants can put their own registered brand label on the local customer’s preferred fashion without infringing the law. Thus, a nameless China shop can be upgraded to a local Chinese brand. These novelties have improved part of the Chinese image in Botswana by offering reasonably priced and specially designed goods of high quality, which have garnered much popularity among local customers. They have not only spurred Chinese designers to incorporate local African culture into the design, but also stimulated creativity and improved cultural awareness among Chinese merchants. Local African print patterns have been applied to some new dress designs. Some Chinese merchants have even tried to sell traditional Chinese dresses made from local African cloth.

There have been changes in the supply chain and the types of Chinese merchandise sold over the years. The supply chain has been gradually transferred into the hands of local merchants. Simultaneously, Chinese merchants have been encouraged to upgrade their businesses from retail to manufacturing.

Business Upgrade

A few Chinese businesses have successfully upgraded from trading to industry, as anticipated by the Botswana government. Mr Chen arrived in Botswana in 2004 and Ms Chen followed him in 2007.⁶² Both managed China shops for their relatives for several years until they got married in 2011 and opened their own retail shop. When the researcher visited their shop in 2011, much of the merchandise sold was sourced from the Chinese wholesalers, meaning that the merchandise was similar to that of other China shops.

When the Botswana government began to restrict trading permits in 2013, the couple tried several ways to seek new business. To increase business profits, they also sold some counterfeit products, such as branded T-shirts and pirated DVDs. This was the only way the business could survive in the face of serious competition among Chinese merchants. Simultaneously, they tried to order unique goods, such as leather bags and shoes, directly from factories in China. However, as Botswana trading policies were in a state of flux during that period, Mr and Ms Chen were unsure whether Botswana was a good destination for business:

Those people who came earlier and earned a lot of money have left already. This retail business takes a long journey to accumulate enough capital for the next step. Although the government is pushing the Chinese to move into industry, we do not even know the right direction to move in.⁶³

In the summer of 2013, many Chinese merchants thought they would no longer be able to renew their retail trading licences, as the government tightened restrictions on Chinese business. After the Christmas season of 2013, Mr Chen visited the neighbouring country of Zambia to conduct market research. He visited China several times in 2015 to seek business opportunities. Initially, the couple intended to travel to Zambia together, but they had reservations about whether their local assistants would faithfully manage the business during their absence. Ms Chen eventually decided to remain in the shop while Mr Chen embarked on the market research trip alone.

Eventually, in March 2016, the couple opened a bottled water factory. Considering the water shortage in Gaborone every summer, they believed that bottled water could be a good business opportunity for the future. They imported all the bottling and labelling equipment from China, and learned the skills for bottling water, managing finances and selling by themselves. They continued to operate their China shop and managed both businesses as they were unsure if the bottling enterprise would be successful. So far, they have managed to sell their products in the university cafeteria, some supermarkets and even some casinos. Ms Chen said, ‘[i]t’s a totally new business from running a shop; we have so many things to learn. We need encouragement’.⁶⁴ The young couple bravely entered the industry after careful market research but the anxiety and pressure were real, as revealed through their conservative business plan.

The Dynamic Interplay between Chinese Counterfeits and Local Policies

Throughout history, both the Chinese Qing government and the Botswana government have, to some extent, deliberately ignored counterfeit consumption in the domestic market. In both cases, counterfeit production was utilised to meet domestic market needs and incubate the domestic industry. The industry in China was initially stimulated by counterfeit production, but later managed to export China-made goods to Europe and gradually transform itself into ‘the factory of the world’. From ‘caca’, ‘fong kong’ and ‘China brand novelty goods’, to ‘made in Botswana’, this journey not only represents how Chinese merchandise has shaped Botswana’s trading and industrial environment, but also reveals how Chinese merchandise has been shaped to stimulate the local economy and meet consumer needs.

Although the Botswana government has established policies to initiate business, manufacturing and industrialisation have been long-term challenges.⁶⁵ The fastest-growing export commodities in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are fabrics and textiles. The Botswana government has invested considerable financial resources to build an export-oriented textile centre.⁶⁶ However, the tiny boom in textile exports to the US was primarily a result of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade initiative active between 2000 and 2008, which granted duty-free access to the American market for over 6,500 products from sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁷ Researchers assert that, due to the small size of its domestic market, Botswana lacks the capacity to accommodate extensive textile mills.⁶⁸ Therefore, agreements like AGOA and the SADC Trade Protocol play a crucial role in enabling Botswana’s textile exports. Owing to geographical disadvantages, Botswana has not only faced challenges in developing a strong domestic industry but has also been unsuccessful in attracting foreign direct investment in the first place. In this context, Chinese investors have been expected to solve the challenges hindering local industrialisation, which was expressed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Mmusi Kgafela, at the opening of the Business Botswana Northern Trade Fair.⁶⁹

Over the years, the Botswana government has successfully guided some Chinese merchants in contributing to local economic development. As explained in Table 1, the expectation gap was in evidence at every stage of China–Botswana business relations. On the one hand, the government created the Economic Diversification Drive and the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency to encourage local entrepreneurs to move into the trading businesses initiated by the Chinese; on the other hand, it has gradually nudged Chinese investors into the manufacturing and industrial sector. The Botswana government clearly established its applicable regulations and expectations at the outset of these processes. For example, that retail business would be reserved for the Batswana people alone was clear from the very beginning. However, in executing the policy the government revealed its pragmatic side by permitting Chinese merchants to open retail shops when they imported affordable merchandise in early 2000. By doing so, local customers benefited from Chinese merchandise, local traders managed to tap into the provider chain and local employees received job opportunities by working in China shops. After that, the government still placed certain restrictions on Chinese retail businesses from time to time (for example, by limiting the period given for permission to trade and adding extra requirements to existing permits), expecting local traders to eventually take over the business chain from the Chinese merchants.

The pragmatic control over China shops has stimulated local development to some extent, while simultaneously creating an uncertain atmosphere for the Chinese merchants, which discouraged Chinese long-term investment. Very few Chinese merchants eventually upgraded their businesses, while the majority either remained in trading or withdrew their investments from Botswana.⁷⁰ Those who remained in trading usually did so for the following reasons: first, some were approaching retirement. After conducting business for years, some Chinese merchants had reached the age of retirement. They had no long-term vision for the future and intended to return to China once they accumulated a certain sum of money. Second, some had failed to accumulate sufficient social capital. Many merchants only associated with other merchants or family members and therefore had no local business partner for upgrading their trading business even after living in Botswana for many years. Third, some merchants lacked confidence in managing local labour. Owing to the difference in work ethic between the Chinese and Batswana, many Chinese merchants found it difficult to manage the local workforce, which discouraged them from scaling up their business.⁷¹

The China–Botswana case shows us that Chinese business could be a building block for the local economy, depending on how it is guided. Forcing Chinese merchants to move into manufacturing and industry by limiting their trading business and requiring all businesses to implement indigenous shareholding only deterred them from developing a long-term business plan in Botswana, or pushed them into other services, such as opening supermarkets or selling airline tickets.⁷² Evidence has shown that gentle guidance and far-sighted policy are crucial when encouraging more Chinese to enter the manufacturing and industrial sector. Some local Botswana politicians think the relocation of Chinese manufacturing from China to Botswana has the potential to drive economic structural transformation in Botswana. In her book, The Next Factory of the World, Irene Yuan Sun depicts the ways in which tough Chinese entrepreneurs have transformed Africa into a global manufacturing powerhouse, just as the Chinese had recently learned to build factories in China.⁷³ With the expectation of fostering this development, the local Botswana politicians intend to get more Chinese companies involved at local trade fairs, which would not only promote cooperation with Chinese companies, but also motivate local residents to venture into the realm of light industrial manufacturing.⁷⁴

While counterfeiting is generally considered illegal and harmful to legitimate businesses, it can also have complex and nuanced effects on globalisation and local development, depending on how local policy guides it. This article has shown that counterfeit goods could facilitate market penetration; this is particularly the case with those goods produced in low-cost manufacturing countries that can flood global markets at significantly lower prices than genuine products. This leads to increased access to affordable goods for consumers worldwide, facilitating their integration into the global marketplace. Furthermore, counterfeit goods also activate supply chain dynamics such as networks of production, distribution and retail, which creates a web of interconnectedness and dependence between China and Africa, thereby promoting globalisation and intercontinental trade. When it comes to local development, in regions with significant informal economies counterfeit goods can provide an alternative income source for marginalised individuals and communities. While not ideal from a legal standpoint, these activities can help sustain livelihoods and mitigate poverty in the short term. Moreover, engagement in counterfeit production leads to the development of local skills in manufacturing, design, marketing and distribution. Over time, these skills can be transferred to legitimate industries, fostering local development and economic diversification. It is important to note that while counterfeit goods may have certain positive aspects in terms of globalisation and local development, they also pose several negative consequences.

Local policymakers require considerable wisdom to guide counterfeit businesses on a path that is beneficial to society in the long run. The ‘counterfeit phenomenon’ can be perceived as a state of ‘creative destruction’ – a mixture of innovation, lower quality and illegality. Legalising the production and consumption process while not destroying the innovation ecosystem is key for policymakers. As shown in the cases of the Chinese Qing government and the Botswana government, fighting directly against counterfeit consumption or production may not necessarily be the best strategy, as it could destroy the conditions that foster the creation of new products and the transfer of business ideas. Long-sighted trading policies, rather than legal restrictions, are sometimes the solution to regulating the manufacture of counterfeit products and promoting local development.

Conclusion

This study provides some insights on China shop businesses and the Chinese counterfeit phenomenon that exploded in Botswana in the 2000s. The findings not only further our understanding of China’s copy culture and its current influence in Africa, but also provide clues about how Chinese merchandise has influenced the African local economy while simultaneously being shaped by local African policies and market conditions. Although Chinese businesses have been perceived as ravaging the local market and dumping cheap merchandise, evidence has shown that local policy can play a crucial role in leading Chinese businesses to benefit the local economy instead of being manipulated by its momentum. As many developed countries have experienced the threat of counterfeit production and consumption throughout history, the China–Botswana case has shown that the mechanism of counterfeiting could also be a catalyst in promoting globalisation and local development. To assess the applicability of conclusions drawn from China–Botswana interactions to other African cases, a comparative analysis between Botswana and other African nations is required.

To generate a transition from a nation’s ‘counterfeit phenomenon’ to a stage where the innovation ecosystem can contribute to local market growth and development, a sustained, coherent strategic policy is imperative. Counterfeit production may always be judged as stealing ideas by nation-states that have long secured the higher end of the value-added chain.⁷⁵ As China evolves into a producer of globally recognised brands (for example, Huawei), the role of intellectual property rights is also undergoing a transformation – shifting from one governed by international regulation that curbs grassroots-level innovation within China, to one that serves as a legal safeguard for domestic enterprises. The transition of both China and some African nations from ‘counterfeit consumers’ to ‘brand creators’ may be different from the trajectory of developed nations; it remains uncertain and will only be revealed over time.

Acknowledgments

I express my sincere gratitude to the Chinese merchants and Batswana individuals who generously agreed to participate in this project. Additionally, I extend my heartfelt thanks to the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable constructive feedback. Special appreciation goes to Akira Takada, Yoichi Mine, and Caroline Hau for their insightful comments on the initial draft. I am also indebted to Yoon Jung Park, Thomas Brotherhood, Kevin Garvey, Miikka Lehtonen and Gil Hizi for their thoughtful contributions. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the financial support provided by the International Training Program and International On-Site Education Program at ASAFAS, Kyoto University, which facilitated the field research.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yanyin Zi

Yanyin Zi Assistant Professor, Department of Intercultural Communication, College of Intercultural Communication, Rikkyo University, 3-34-1 Nishi-Ikebukuro Toshima-Ku, Tokyo 171-8501, Japan. Email: [email protected] https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3338-2119

Notes

1 This study uses the term ‘counterfeit’ to describe tangible goods that infringe trademarks, design rights or patents, and ‘pirated’ to describe tangible goods that infringe copyrights.

2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Trends in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods (Paris, Illicit Trade, OECD Publishing/European Union Intellectual Property Office, 2019), p. 11, available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/g2g9f533-en.pdf?expires=1711680374&id=id&accname=oid030722&checksum=33F91E348DC832665D3043E5A924E489, retrieved 27 October 2022.

3 E. Schulze, ‘Counterfeit Goods from China are Crushing American Small Businesses – and They’re Calling on Trump to Fight Back’, CNBC, news website, 29 February 2020, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/small-businesses-are-pushing-trump-to-fight-chinese-counterfeits.html, retrieved 10 July 2021.

4 C. Zhang and J. Cao, ‘How Fair is Patent Litigation in China? Evidence from the Beijing Courts’, The China Quarterly, 241 (2020), pp. 247–61.

5 F. Dikötter, Exotic Commodities: Modern Objects and Everyday Life in China (New York, Columbia University Press, 2007); K. Furuta, ‘Imitation, Counterfeiting, and the Market in Early Twentieth Century Japan and China: Intra-Asian Trade in Modern Small Sundry Goods’, in K. Furuta and L. Grove (eds), Imitation, Counterfeiting and the Quality of Goods in Modern Asian History (Singapore, Springer, 2017), pp. 139–60.

6 E. Tse, K. Ma and Y. Huang, Shan Zhai: A Chinese Phenomenon (Booz and Company, 2009), available at https://cthr.ctgoodjobs.hk/doc/exe_corner/20100212_Booz_Shan_Zhai_A_Chinese_Phenomenon.pdf, retrieved 10 July 2021; F. Yang, Faked in China: Nation Branding, Counterfeit Culture, and Globalization (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2016).

7 K. Giese, ‘Same-Same but Different: Chinese Traders’ Perspectives on African Labor’, The China Journal, 69 (2013), pp. 134–53; S. Liu, ‘China Town in Lagos: Chinese Migration and the Nigerian State Since the 1990s’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 54, 6 (2019), pp. 783–99; T. Tu Huynh, ‘“It’s not copyrighted”. Looking West for Authenticity: Historical Chinatowns and China Town Malls in South Africa’, China Media Research, 11, 1 (2015), pp. 99–111.

8 On ‘fong kong’ in Botswana, see Y. Zi, ‘Unravelling the “Fong Kong” Phenomenon in Botswana through Analysing the Relationship among Mass Media, Governmental Activities and Local Voices’, Psychologia, 57, 4 (2014), pp. 259–74; Y. Zi, ‘The “Fong Kong” Phenomenon in Botswana: A Perspective on Globalization from Below’, African East-Asian Affairs, 1–2 (2015), pp. 6–17. On ‘fong kong’ in South Africa, see Y. Park, ‘“Fong Kong” in Southern Africa: Interrogating African Views of China-Made Goods’ (ASA Annual Meeting, 2013), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2237316, retrieved 10 July 2021; R. Simbao, ‘China-Africa Relations: Research Approaches’, African Arts, 45, 2 (2012), pp. 1–7; in Zimbabwe, see Park, ‘“Fong Kong” in Southern Africa’, and in Tanzania, see S. Ogawa, ‘Why Chinese Smartphones and Mobile Phones Have Permeated the Lives of Tanzanians (Tanzania no seikatsu ni chukokusei sumatohon keitai ga shintou shita wake)’, Wedge Online, 31 July 2015, available at https://wedge.ismedia.jp/articles/-/5208, retrieved 10 July 2021.

9 T. Staake, F. Thiesse and E. Fleisch, ‘The Emergence of Counterfeit Trade: A Literature Review’, European Journal of Marketing, 43, 3/4 (2009), pp. 320–49.

10 OECD/EUIPO, Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2016), available at https://www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity/reports/trade-in-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods-9789264252653-en.html, accessed 15 March 2024; L. Pang, ‘China Who Makes and Fakes: A Semiotics of the Counterfeit’, Theory, Culture and Society, 25, 6 (2008), pp. 117–40; J. Ho, ‘ShanZhai: Economic/Cultural Production through the Cracks of Globalization’, plenary lecture, Crossroads: 2010, Association for Cultural Studies Conference, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, 18 June 2010; E. Tse, K. Ma and Y. Huang, Shan Zhai: A Chinese Phenomenon; J. De Kloet and L. Scheen, ‘Pudong: The Shanzhai Global City’, European Journal of Cultural Studies, 16, 6 (2013), pp. 692–709; B. Han, Shanzhai: Deconstruction in Chinese (Boston, MIT Press, 2017); X. Leng and M. Zhang, ‘Shanzhai as a Weak Brand in Contemporary China Marketing’, International Journal of China Marketing, 1, 2 (2011), pp. 81–94; F. Yang, ‘China’s “Fake” Apple Store: Branded Space, Intellectual Property and the Global Culture Industry’, Theory, Culture and Society, 31, 4 (2014), pp. 71–96; J. De Kloet, Y.F. Chow and L. Scheen, Boredom, Shanzhai, and Digitisation in the Time of Creative China (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2019).

11 N.B. Amaral, ‘What Can be Done to Address Luxury Counterfeiting? An Integrative Review of Tactics and Strategies’, Journal of Brand Management, 27 (2020), pp. 691–709; OECD/EUIPO, Mapping the Real Routes of Trade in Fake Goods (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2017); B. Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Cambridge, MS, Harvard University Press, 2016); Dikötter, Exotic Commodities; Z. Yi, M. Yu, and K. L. Cheung, ‘Impacts of Counterfeiting on a Global Supply Chain’, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 24, 1 (2020), pp. 159–78.

12 D. Kluft, ‘Charles Dickens and Copyright Law: Five Things You Should Know’, Foley Hoag’s Trademark & Copyright Law, 17 January 2017, available at https://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2017/01/charles-dickens-and-copyright-law-five-things-you-should-know, retrieved 11 August 2021.

13 Y. Tang, ‘Consumer Psychology Analysis of Counterfeit Brand-Name Sports Shoes’, Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, 571 (2021), pp. 555–60.

14 B.G. Jordan, ‘Epilogue: From Technique to Art’, in B.G. Jordan and V.L. Weston (eds), Copying the Master and Stealing His Secrets: Talent and Training in Japanese Painting (Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), pp. 178–87.

15 Dikötter, Exotic Commodities, p. 38.

16 The ‘self-strengthening movement’ was also known as the Westernisation or Western Affairs Movement (c.1861–1895). It was a period of radical institutional reforms initiated in China during the late Qing dynasty following the military disasters of the Opium Wars; see Dikötter, Exotic Commodities, pp. 39–40; Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 40.

18 Ibid.

19 L. Grove, ‘Imitation and Innovation in the Early Twentieth Century North China Weaving Industry’, in Furuta and Grove (eds), Imitation, Counterfeiting and the Quality of Goods, pp. 123–36.

20 Canton was the current province of Guangdong in southern China.

21 Grove, ‘Imitation and Innovation’, p. 135.

22 The First Opium War was fought in 1839–1842 between Great Britain and the Qing Dynasty; see Grove, ‘Imitation and Innovation’, pp. 126–7.

23 K. Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge, Harvard University Asia Center, 2003).

24 Commonly known as China, the Republic of China was a sovereign state based in mainland China prior to the relocation of its government to Taiwan. Gerth, China Made, p. 43.

25 Ibid., China Made, pp. 44–5.

26 Dikötter, Exotic Commodities, p. 30.

27 Ibid., pp. 33–4.

28 C. Crow, 400 Million Customers (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1937), p. 271.

29 Dikötter, Exotic Commodities, p. 36.

30 Ibid., p. 266.

31 Ibid., p. 47.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., p. 262.

34 ‘The Economic Context of Botswana’, Lloyds Bank, website, October 2022, available at https://www.lloydsbanktrade.com/en/market-potential/botswana/economical-context, retrieved 27 September 2022.

35 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Botswana, ‘An Overview of the Relations Between China and Botswana’, website, 1 February 2008, available at http://bw.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zbgx/200802/t20080201_5723182.htm, retrieved 7 November 2022.

36 A.C.G. Best, ‘General Trading in Botswana, 1890–1968’, Economic Geography, 46, 4 (1970), pp. 598–611.

37 E. Ma Mung, ‘The New Chinese Migration Flows to Africa’, Social Science Information, 47, 4 (2008), p. 644.

38 Li served as the fourth Premier of the People’s Republic of China from 1987 to 1998; this is a Chinese greeting that means ‘hello’.

39 ‘Caca’ (擦擦) in Chinese means ‘rubbing’. According to the pioneer Chinese merchants, in the early days, those Chinese who were selling essential balm oil could not speak English. Being asked by local people about how to use the oil, those Chinese would demonstrate how to rub the oil on the arm while saying ‘caca’.

40 Interview with a Chinese pioneer, Gaborone, 26 September 2014. All interviews were conducted by the author.

41 Both the local population and the Chinese merchants currently operating in Botswana employ the term ‘China shop’. Approximately 99 per cent of China shops in Botswana are Chinese-owned and generally sell goods made in China to African customers.

42 Yiwu and Jinjiang are cities in China that are famous for selling small, everyday goods.

43 A. Ito, ‘Bottom-Up Industrialization in the People’s Republic of China: A Case Study of Industries Producing Small Things in Zhejiang’, in Furuta and Grove (eds), Imitation, Counterfeiting and the Quality of Goods, p. 275.

44 Ibid.

45 D. Cissé, ‘African Traders in Yiwu: Their Trade Networks and Their Role in the Distribution of “Made in China” Products in Africa’, Journal of Pan African Studies, 7, 10 (2015), pp. 44–64.

46 Zi, ‘The “Fong Kong” Phenomenon in Botswana’.

47 Interview with a Chinese business leader who established a business in Botswana in 1991, Gaborone, 26 September 2014.

48 Interview with a middle-aged Motswana local customer, Mochudi, 27 January 2012.

49 Best, ‘General Trading in Botswana, 1890–1968’.

50 G. Mathews and Y. Yang, ‘How Africans Pursue Low-End Globalization in Hong Kong and Mainland China’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 2 (2012), pp. 95–120.

51 T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (New York, Penguin Books, [orig. 1899] 1994).

52 Staff reporter, ‘Fongkongs …’, MmegiOnline, Gaborone, 18 June 2010, available at https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=6&aid=3072&dir=2010/June/Monday21, retrieved 3 July 2021.

53 Interview with a Botswana local business owner who runs a popular fashion shop in a shopping mall, Gaborone, 13 September 2013.

54 T. Motlogelwa, ‘Chinese Offer to Curb Piracy in Botswana’, MmegiOnline, 2 May 2007, available at https://www.mmegi.bw/news/chinese-offer-to-curb-piracy-in-botswana/news, retrieved 10 July 2021.

55 Ibid.

56 Interview with a young Chinese merchant who joined her family business in Botswana in 2003, Gaborone, 8 September 2014.

57 Interview with a middle-aged street trader who sells fake brand sneakers outside shopping malls, Gaborone, 9 September 2014.

58 Interview with a middle-aged shop assistant who worked for a China shop for four years, Gaborone, 10 September 2013.

59 Y. Zi and M. Mogalakwe, ‘Decoding Relationships between Chinese Merchants and Batswana Shop Assistants: The Case of China Shops in Gaborone’, African Study Monographs Supplementary Issue, 54 (2018), pp. 171–89.

60 Y. Zi, Iron Sharpens Iron: Social Interactions at China Shops in Botswana (Cameroon, Langaa RPCIG, 2017), pp. 183–5.

61 Interview with a Chinese merchant who started her business in Botswana in 2003, Gaborone, 8 September 2014.

62 Interviews in September 2011, September 2014 and September 2018.

63 Interview with Mr and Ms Chen, online, WeChat, 8 September 2018.

64 Interview with Mrs Chen, online, WeChat, 8 September 2018.

65 Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic Diversification Drive: Medium to Long-Term Strategy 2011–2016 (Gaborone, Government of Botswana, 2011), available at https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/adaptation_committee/application/pdf/20151002_botswana.pdf, retrieved 26 February 2024.

66 Ministry of Trade and Industry, ‘Economic Diversification Drive (EDD) Registration’ (Gaborone, Government of Botswana, undated), available at https://www.gov.bw/doing-business/economic-diversification-drive-edd-registration, retrieved 26 February 2024.

67 The main purpose of AGOA was to improve trade and economic co-operation between the US and eligible sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.

68 X. Tang, The Impact of Asian Investment on Africa’s Textile Industries (Beijing, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2014).

69 Staff reporter, ‘Botswana Calls on Chinese Companies to Support Economic Growth’, Xinhua News, China.org.cn, website, 28 May 2023, available at https://english.news.cn/africa/20230528/741474d3fb3645aca3f957ba87e195d3/c.html, retrieved 15 July 2023.

70 According to the author’s interviews, six Chinese families moved their businesses to Namibia due to distrust in Botswana’s trading policies.

71 Zi and Mogalakwe, ‘Decoding Relationships’.

72 The Botswana government was tempted to issue this policy in 2011, which triggered turmoil among the Chinese community.

73 I. Sun, The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment Is Reshaping Africa (Boston, Harvard Business Review Press, 2017).

74 Staff reporter, ‘Botswana Calls on Chinese Companies’.

75 Yang, Faked in China, p. 3.