Between thick and thin: responding to the crisis of moral education

Abstract

This article presents a moral orientation that can serve as a commonly shared foundation for developing moral consciousness in (postmodern) multicultural democratic societies. To this end, I distinguish between two prevailing generic views of moral education—‘thin’ and ‘thick’—and claim that the tensions between them contribute to the sense of crisis of moral education (and public schooling in general). I begin by showing these tensions through a discussion of representatives of each side of the thin–thick dichotomy, as well as through Lickona’s integrative account. After discussing the complications of each view, I present PARTS—Postconventional Authentic Relation-to-Self—as a normative perspective that is able to reconcile the two generic views. I show the merits of PARTS by discussing the notions of moral judgement and motivation.

Notes

1. A clear indication of the grim state of young individuals’ ability to think about morality is presented in the recent publication by Smith, Christoffersen, Davidson, & Herzog (2011). This publication is based on research, conducted in 2008, which included in-depth interviews with 230 young adults from across America. The results of the research show a disheartening incompetence by young individuals to think and talk about moral issues. Moreover, they reveal a general atmosphere of moral relativism and extreme individualism; most interviewed believe that morality (including differentiating right from wrong) are simply about how an individual feels. Smith et al. argue that the responsibility for this state of moral thinking and judgement lies on the shoulders of social institutions—primarily families and schools—that have not supplied youngsters with the resources with which to think about morality in any serious or mindful way.

2. The distinction I am presenting here, as any analytic distinction, is certainly not exhaustive since there are some approaches to moral education that do not fall precisely within the conceptual boundaries of either side of the ‘thin–thick’ dichotomy. My point is that it is possible to organise the field along a conceptual continuum between the two opposing sides and depicting nearly every approach as leaning either to one or the other.

3. Walzer uses the term ‘differentiated commonalities’ to express the diversity of meanings of shared principles. With regard to ‘justice’ Walzer states: ‘But our interpretations can do no more than suggest the differentiated commonalities of justice—for these common features are always incorporated within a particular cultural system and elaborated in highly specific ways’ (Walzer, 1990, pp. 525–526).

4. A central claim against prevailing thin approaches to moral education—dominant today in most educational systems—is their failure to support young individuals’ processes of self-development and self-realisation. By focusing merely on the development of cognitive moral-reasoning skills, schools are ill-equipped to address the pervasive disorientation (and even depression) of today’s young individuals as a result of both cognitive and emotional deficiencies in dealing with prevailing (relativistic) attitudes and the rapidly shifting and ever-changing socio-cultural realities (e.g. Aviram, 2010; Smith et al., 2011). Substantiating this claim demands a separate discussion.

5. One of the central problems of ‘thin’ or formal accounts of morality since Kant has been that they cannot reply to the question ‘Why be moral?’, since universal rule-following does not contain a motivating element (intrinsic) that goes beyond mere fear of sanctions. This type of extrinsic motivation certainly cannot constitute an appropriate motivating force that is dependent upon the free and uncoerced choice of the moral agent.

6. It is interesting to note that Munn locates the structural change in educational policy and legislation from the 1980s onwards towards more parent involvement as stemming from conservative quasi-market attitudes viewing parents as consumers of public services.

7. It is worthwhile noting here that while a strong work ethic is clearly valued in Protestant societies, it is certainly not a universalisable value shared by all or at least not prioritised by all.

8. Sarid, A. (in press) Reconciling divisions in the field of authentic education. Journal of Philosophy of Education.

9. I am not saying that genetics or biology (physiological processes in general) do not play an important role in shaping the person one is and wants to be. In fact prominent inter-subjectivist theorists devote considerable attention to the impact of physiological processes on the development of personality. One need only refer to Habermas’ discussion of eugenics to recognise this fact. Suffice it to say at this point that the construction of meaning and authentic relations are inherently social constructs. For me, one of the best depictions of a social understanding of self-formation from its earliest development is found in G.H. Mead’s Mind self and society, specifically in his discussion of the ‘biological individual’. Mead depicts in great detail the gradual development of the human organism into a minded self—reaching full individuation by evolving through the social structure of ‘taking-the-attitude-of-the-other’.

10. I should mention that I detect in Habermas’ framework two different and inconsistent conceptions of self-realisation. Habermas (1994) speaks of ethical self-realisation, which closely follows Taylor’s position; in earlier accounts Habermas (1992) speaks in terms of post-conventional self-realisation which is grounded on universalised discourse. I claim that each account is unacceptable from the standpoint of post-conventional authenticity and each presents its own problems.

11. Mark Warren makes such claims regarding Habermas’s approach (see Warren, 1995, p. 167).

12. I am arguing, following Aboulafia (1996)—who bases his view on the work of G.H. Mead—that leading a stable or ‘healthy’ emotional life requires that the individual recognise and accept the fact that she is determined by the social context and free at the same time. Of course, a person may wish to undermine the influence of the social interactions that have shaped his or her identity; there are very rare examples in which individuals, in fact, utterly transform themselves and adopt a wholly different set of beliefs—such as convert to a different religion or adopt a lifestyle that radically goes against the lifestyle previously experienced. Generally speaking, these are generally radical indications or reactions to an unhealthy process of development.

13. See Habermas’ view—based on G.H. Mead—that socialisation and individuation are two sides of the same coin, or in other words, they are two interrelated processes (Habermas, 1992).

14. I endorse and apply for PARTS the same notion that Mitchell Aboulafia attributes to the work of G.H. Mead: ‘… were it not for its oxymoronic ring, the phrase “contextual universalist” might be a suitable label for Mead’ (Aboulafia, 2001, p. 63).

15. Axel Honneth (1996) views struggles for recognition—or the need to gain recognition for one’s own voice or identity—as constituting a core moral issue. The ethical dimension of going against what is considered legitimate in a particular social context is addressed also in Mead (1934). The issue at stake here is not the desire to give up one’s membership to a given social group, but rather the struggle to persuade the group to regard a particular view or identity as legitimate or worthy of recognition.

16. By ‘subjective’ standards I mean that authentic validation of one’s identity is dependent on ‘connecting’ to one’s inner-voice or inner-nature. Whereas this type of validation follows the Romantic and existentialist view of authenticity, PARTS follows an inter-subjective or dialogical approach to authenticity. By ‘social’ standards, I mean validating one’s identity along the conventions and social expectations deemed worthy in a certain social group or community.