ABSTRACT
We introduce a special issue of articles that emerged from teams of interdisciplinary researchers, social scientists and philosophers, who were funded under the auspices of the Self, Motivation and Virtue Project (SMV; funded by Templeton Religion Trust). The articles in the special issue demonstrate nuance and complexity in the structure of virtuous motivations. Several articles examine the nature of virtue, specific virtues such as humility, perceptions of moral virtues and how they are shaped. Two articles address well-being or flourishing whereas two articles address aspects of life that limit or undermine virtue expression.
The goal of this special issue is to demonstrate ways that interdisciplinary research into self, motivation, and virtue can be accomplished. The articles emerged from teams of interdisciplinary researchers, funded under the auspices of the Self, Motivation and Virtue Project (SMV).Footnote1 Each team was charged with deep integration from start to finish of the project. Teams used the cross-fertilization of social sciences and humanities to design the innovative research ventures reported here.
The aim of SMV was to stimulate research into self, motivation, and virtue by opening the self framework as an avenue for sustained and serious interdisciplinary research into virtue and motivation. This approach was consciously chosen as an alternative to the predominant personality framework. Personological perspectives from psychology often take virtue as constitutive of character and character as indicative of personality, and typically avoid taking a perspective on the nature of the self. Instead it is assumed that the class of character traits is coextensive with, or a subset of, the class of personality traits. Yet several noted theorists believe a meaningful distinction can be made between the self and personality. According to this view, the self (typically assumed to be a mature adult) is the possessor of both character and personality, with moral character the bearer of moral character traits or moral virtues, and the personality the bearer of personality traits. The self, or characteristics thereof, is theorized as deeper than personality by the following philosophers and psychologists: Goldie (Citation2004), Kristjánsson (Citation2011), Sripada (Citation2010), Sripada and Konrath (Citation2011), McAdams and Pals (Citation2006), and McAdams (Citation2006). These theorists acknowledge that personality researchers study personality traits, but believe that character traits are to be found by studying the self. The distinction between character and personality is also documented in the work of historians Susman (Citation2003) and Nicholson (Citation1998).
Another theme that was central to SMV is the notion that appropriate motivation is essential for genuinely virtuous action. This notion is used as a working hypothesis to be investigated through funded research projects. The concept may seem familiar, as it is derived from philosophers such as Aristotle (Citation1985), who maintained that virtuous behavior proceeds from a stable character state and is appropriately motivated. Following Aristotle, we note that virtuous motivation is not only a matter of conscious intention. Aristotle acknowledges many occasions on which virtuous action is performed automatically, without conscious thought or deliberation, as if from ‘second nature,’ especially when our virtuous dispositions are deeply entrenched. In fact, Snow (Citation2010) offers one possible account of this phenomenon in terms of the psychological literature on goal-dependent automaticity. Narvaez (Citation2005) and Narvaez and Lapsley (Citation2005) described multiple forms of situation-based and skill-based automaticity in a discussion of moral expertise. We wholeheartedly agree that nonconscious processing is vital for virtuous action. Seeding new research into social cognition directed toward elucidating the conscious and nonconscious motivations that give rise to virtuous actions was integral to this research initiative.
The articles in the special issue demonstrate nuance and complexity in the structure of virtuous motivations. Although Snow (Citation2010) maintained that virtues have distinctive motivations, expressing a commitment to the value the virtue expresses, it is also possible that virtues differ from each other in fundamental ways. Thus, for example, some virtues, such as justice and compassion, may have distinctive or characteristic motivations, whereas others, such as self-control, patience, or perseverance, may not be motivationally structured in the same way. Instead of being self-controlled for the sake of being self-controlled, or patient for the sake of being patient, and so on, someone might have and exercise these virtues for the sake of some other virtue, such as justice or compassion. In this kind of framework, one is just or compassionate for its own sake, but one might persevere for the sake of justice, or be patient because of one’s compassion or kindness. Or, as Narvaez (Citation2014) argues, self-regulatory capacities arise from an early upbringing that matches evolved developmental needs, making other virtues generally easier to come by. Openness to the nuance and complexity of virtuous motivation is a hallmark of the careful scholarship provided in these articles.
The first articles in the special issue examine the nature of virtue, one offering a pathway to a science of virtue, and the other examining specific aspects of virtue. In ‘Psychological Realism, Normative Ethics, and the Limits of Empirical Psychology,’ Bradford Cokelet and Blaine Fowers take a broad perspective, noting that there exists no science of virtue currently. Taking an optimistic rather than pessimistic view of virtue, they argue that a science of virtue can and should be developed. They contend that new models and new empirical studies are needed to sort out the inconsistencies discussed in virtue scholarship. With an emphasis on ordinary thought about realistic rather than idealist traits, they suggest a specific roadmap for establishing a science of virtue that avoids the typical pitfalls such as the measure of strength or consistency by situation. They present a five-step strategy to investigate virtue traits, from identifying realistic ideals and empirical data to working with scientists to design empirical studies of things that can be studied. They end with suggesting their STRIVE-4 model (Scalar Traits, Role sensitive, manifest in trait-situation Interactions inspired by Values, at least conducive to Eudaimonia; with four conditions: traits visible in behavior, behavior that is intentional, emotion concordant, and dispositional). The STRIVE-4 model may be a good contender for guiding the way forward in virtue research.
Michael Spezio and Robert Roberts discuss the distinctiveness of humility in ‘Humility as Openness: Lessons from l’Arche for Moral Education and Formation.’ They take up the concept of humility, distinguishing it from shame or self-abasement. The theory of interactive humility was developed using empirical data from members of L’Arche communities, places where developmentally delayed adults live in community with caregivers. Spezio and Roberts gathered texts that inspire the L’Arche community and conducted semantic analysis comparing these texts with several other standard databases of texts. Humility and openness to others were highly related only in the L’Arche text analysis. The resulting Interactive Humility as Openness (IHO) to others model is distinguishable from an absence of pride and from intellectual humility as well because it is interactive and interpersonal. Spezio and Roberts conclude that moral averaging should not be used in research studies because it rather tends to reflect cultural values, missing the distinctiveness of individuals and subgroups like members of L’Arche. Their work offers a promising glimpse into methods that can be used to make the kinds of distinctions needed in the study of virtue.
The second set of articles involves perceptions of moral virtue, what shapes them in the self, and the effects of perceptions of moral change in others. In ‘What Kind of Education Matters Most to Moral Motivation?,’ Michel Ferrari, Hyeyoung Bang and Zhe Feng conducted an exploratory study on values and wisdom in Canada and South Korea. They examined the influence of different forms of education—formal, informal, non-formal. Informal education refers to religious practices, formal education was comprised of state-mandated coursework and non-formal was measured as level of religious belief. Though age was correlated with numerous values, nation and faith were not. Formal education contributed significantly to cultivating wisdom. Each sample had a different pattern of results, contributing to the challenges of measuring and interpreting cross-nation research.
In ‘Parole and the Moral Self: Moral Change Mitigates Responsibility,’ Javier Gomez-Lavin, Nina Strohminger, Shaun Nichols, and Jesse Prinz empirically address a longstanding philosophical interest in personal identity—i.e., perceptions that others have of a person’s identity. In prior work, a person’s moral values have been critical to views of the continuity of identity and the ascription of moral responsibility. Here they present studies of identity change, specifically, whether a prisoner who undergoes moral change deserves parole. Overall, they offer a unique way to examine what about a person alters observer perceptions of their moral responsibility.
Two articles address flourishing or well-being. The first article addresses the relation of well-being to virtue and life experience. Well-being is often considered an outcome of virtue, a matter of excellence in being human. In ‘Integrating Philosophical and Psychological Approaches to Well-being: The Role of Success in Personal Projects,’ Colin DeYoung and Valerie Tiberius note definitional disagreements among scholars of well-being. But they are also able to identify an area of agreement in conceptions of well-being, specifically, success in personal projects. Using data from a longitudinal undergraduate college student sample, they measured individual personal projects, using five different scales to assess aspects of subjective well-being. They measured satisfaction with life, flourishing, purpose, meaning in life and positive affect and showed that success in current personal project success contemporaneously related to subjective well-being (except for positive affect). Their work demonstrates the importance of taking into account an individual’s primary projects in assessing well-being.
In ‘The Integration of Mindfulness and Compassion: Reconceptualizing Flourishing and Interpersonal Relationships,’ Paul Condon, John Dunne and Christine Wilson-Mendenhall investigated the natures of mindfulness and compassion and their interrelation in close relationships. They use Buddhist sources to describe flourishing. The greater one’s compassion and wisdom, the more one will flourish and exhibit virtuous behavior, which relies on one’s primary state of mind (other-cherishing, not self-cherishing). The authors combine these ideas with a Western social science view of successful relationships: the partner’s validation of one’s core self and the maintenance of positive illusions towards one’s partner. The authors integrate the Buddhist and social science notions to recommend healthy and flourishing interpersonal relationships. Wisdom requires ‘dereification’—i.e., understanding thoughts not as representative of reality but only as passing impressions, of which the self is one artificial construction. Not reifying the self can be a helpful stance generally but also during interpersonal disagreement. However, too much dereification can lead to apathy. On the other hand, too much compassion can lead to enmeshment or abuse. The authors describe how wisdom and compassion can be and must be balanced within the dynamism of relationship.
The last two articles focus on aspects of life that undermine virtue or change its expression. In ‘Shame, Shame: Episodic and Dispositional Shame in the Politics of the Moral Self,’ Theresa Tobin and Dawne Moon delve into the world of shame among US conservative Christians who are or are allied with non-heterosexuals, examining identity, gender expression and same-sex marriage. Using participant-observation methodology, they examine the content of felt shame and humility among both groups. They suggest that shame is an experience of disruption in the sense of interpersonal equality and relational connection which otherwise, according to Martin Buber Citation([1923]1970), fosters openness to growth and change. They found that unlike for stealing or lying, shaming for being non-heterosexual does not effectively prevent or stop related behaviors but instead ruptures relationships and the felt capacity for healthy relationships. And it can lead to self-harm and ill health. Based on their data from over 100 interviews, they propose ‘humility-pride,’ which allows one to experience shame virtuously by supporting self-respect and honest self-assessment, protecting the self from the vices of deficiency, while embracing vulnerability to others in ways that allow the self to acknowledge the truths that others expose. They provide a road map for further empirical study of this important construct.
The last article examines experiences that lead to particular virtues and thwart others from life course and everyday life. Believing that virtues develop at the expense of other virtues, Jack Bauer and Peggy DesAutels in ‘When Life Gets in the Way: Generativity and the Development of Non-idealized Virtues in Women’s Life Stories,’ take up the examination of non-ideal lives and the struggles that challenge virtue expression. Focusing on the life stories of the women interviewed, they investigated the care-related virtue of generativity. Though generativity is a cultural master narrative (McAdams, Citation2006), they focus on generativity as a theme, not as a particular script used to describe a life. The motive for expressing the virtue served as a narrative theme in describing one’s life. Bauer and DesAutels explore the costs of virtuous living and how obstacles are overcome when life circumstances are more than difficult, specifically the ‘burdened virtues’ from highly gendered roles.
We hope these articles stimulate innovation and foster further interdisciplinary endeavors. The humanities and social sciences can only benefit from a deeper, transdisciplinary exploration of self, motivation and virtue.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Darcia Narvaez
Darcia Narvaez is professor of psychology at the University of Notre Dame, who studies neurobiological and evolutionary influences on moral development.
Nancy E. Snow
Nancy E. Snow is Director of the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma. She co-directs the Self, Virtue, and Public Life Project with Darcia Narvaez, and works in virtue ethics.
Notes
1. SMV was funded by the Templeton Religion Trust. The views summarized here do not necessarily reflect the views of that foundation.
References
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