Social media as inadvertent educators

ABSTRACT

My aim in this paper is to examine the epistemic habits that agents develop through frequent social media usage. I point out that extensive social media usage is conducive to the development of closed-mindedness and unreflective thinking and accordingly argue that social media act as inadvertent educators of epistemic vices. I contend that understanding social media as generators of epistemic dispositions is of significant import to intellectual character education. It shows the urgency of incorporating in educational curricula pedagogical methods that eliminate the bad (disvaluable) epistemic habits that agents acquire through frequent social media usage. I propose character building through problem-solving as an effective educational method for efficiently offsetting such habits. Fostering intellectual virtues through problem-solving safeguards against intellectual vices commonly developed through extensive social media usage. At the same time such an educational approach trains students’ information-seeking abilities.

KEYWORDS:

• Social media
• inadvertent educators
• intellectual virtues and vices
• intellectual character education
• problem-solving teaching method

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Valuable in the sense that they enable agents to acquire epistemic goods such as knowledge and wisdom.

2. The Gettier problem refers to cases that challenge the view that knowledge equals justified true beliefs. For an examination of Gettier cases from a virtue epistemology perspective, see e.g. Sosa, 2007; Zagzebski, 1996.

3. In opposition to virtue responsibilists, there are scholars (i.e. virtue reliabilists such as Greco, 1999, 2010; Pritchard, 2005; Sosa, 1991, 2007) who understand intellectual virtues as cognitive faculties and habits (e.g. perception and memory) that enable agents to maximize truth over error (see e.g. Sosa, 1991, p. 225).

4. Note that throughout the paper I am using the terms intellectual virtues and epistemic virtues interchangeably.

5. There are still important studies developed on virtue education that focus primarily on moral virtues (see e.g. Curren, 2013, 2014; Kristjánsson, 2015, 2016; Sanderse, 2018).

6. For instance, Vallor (2016) discusses technomoral virtues, that is virtues that are specifically geared to approaching the internet responsibly while Harrison (2016) and Dennis and Harrison (2020) examine the importance of cultivating cyber-wisdom and other cyber-virtues. See also Vallor’s (2014) paper on new technologies and moral skills.

7. Young people use social media much more frequently than older people (see e.g. Perrin, 2015).

8. Related to this is Kidd’s (2019) recent work on epistemic corruption and education—see also Kidd (2015). According to Kidd (2019, p. 220), ‘epistemic corruption occurs when an agent comes to develop or exercise one or more epistemic vices due to their interaction with a social environment’. Following Kidd’s conception of epistemic corruption, one could understand (certain aspects of) social media as epistemic corruptors.

9. Besides closed-mindedness and unreflectiveness, one could argue that social media also facilitate the growth of intellectual vices such as intellectual arrogance and intellectual laziness. Still, I have decided against making this argument here simply because there are only a few empirical studies supporting it—though this may change in the future.

10. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of any virtue responsibilist who considers the virtue of open-mindedness to be of little epistemic value.

11. Of course, it should be noted that not all social media platforms are alike—as Vallor (2016, p. 181) argues ‘their algorithms, users, and design interfaces vary, and the environments for truth vary with them’. Still, it remains that the vast majority of social media platforms filter the news feed of their users—customizing them to their preference (this is not only in the case of social media but news media platforms too—see Vallor, 2016, p. 180).

12. Not everyone agrees with Carr’s views. For example, Pritchard (2016) believes that, if used virtuously, technology can improve our cognitive capabilities (see his extended cognition thesis). In addition Heersmink (2016, 2018) argues that, if used virtuously, the internet yields more epistemic benefits than drawbacks. Pritchard’s and Heersmink’s arguments do not go against my own views. They both believe that agents need to use technology virtuously in order to benefit from it and so do I—and this is why I focus here on developing an educational approach that enables agents to develop the necessary skills and traits for using the internet virtuously.

13. Reflective thinking may sound (to some readers) somewhat similar to the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom. One could argue that active, persistent and careful consideration is a significant part of what characterizes a practically wise agent. Nonetheless, reflective thinking is, as Mi and Ryan (2016) put it, a distinct epistemic virtue. This can be seen from the fact that it is not sufficient to engage in reflective thinking for an agent to be practically wise but they must also, for example, make the right judgements. Moreover, the reflective thinker is not necessarily wise nor does she necessarily reflect only on matters of practical wisdom. For more on the relationship of reflective thinking to other virtues, see Mi and Ryan (2016).

14. It should be noted that one could also make a case for the opposite view (i.e. that the massive amount of information found online can have a negative effect on epistemic value). For instance, too much information can be overwhelming for users (see e.g. Carr, 2011, p. 91)—especially for those that do not possess the skills/virtues necessary for handling vast amounts of information.

15. One could argue that changing the structure and/or use of social media through legislation (if technological companies are unwilling to do so voluntarily) might be the best approach to safeguarding against the negative consequences of social media on users’ epistemic characters. Still, assuming that this is a realistic alternative, I believe that learning through problem-solving is a better approach since it is a proactive rather than a reactive measure. It fosters the growth of virtues that pertain to all aspects of agents’ lives (whether online or offline).

16. One could argue that habits acquired in class are not likely to transfer online. To the defense of my view, studies such as Hampton et al.’s (2014) suggest that, in the majority of cases, users tend to have similar (if not the same) habits/behaviors both online and offline. Kosinski et al.’s (2014) study provides further support for the claim that acquired traits and/or habits transfer online. Their study shows that one’s personality can be used to accurately predict their online behavior.

17. For the origins of the problem-solving pedagogical method, see Kotsonis (2020).

18. For more on the use of moral dilemmas in moral education, see for example, Clare et al. (1996), Harrison et al. (2018), and Wong (2020). Note, however, that the proposed problem-solving learning method does not rely only on moral dilemmas, nor has as its primary aim to foster the growth of moral virtues.

19. There are many variations of the trolley case problem but that is not directly relevant to the discussion—albeit the fact that other variations of the trolley problem might be more challenging for the students to solve. Here I am discussing the standard formulation of the problem in which the agent has to decide either to do nothing and let five people die or turn the switch and kill one person.

20. As already noted, if this is not the case, and the majority of students agree on a specific solution to the problem, then the educator should play the devil’s advocate in order to spark the discussion. For example, in the case of the trolley problem, if most students believe that the agent should turn the switch and kill one person, the educator could present alternative scenarios—e.g. the fat man variation of the trolley case (would you throw a fat man off a bridge in order to stop the train and save five?)—that would challenge the students’ answer.

21. Admittedly, some closed-minded people are great problem-solvers. If the proposed problem-solving method was of an individual nature (i.e. students working on problems individually without having any discussions), then one could even argue that it fosters closed-mindedness. Still, the proposed problem-solving method seeks to safeguard against closed-mindedness by incorporating group work and in-class discussion of problems.

22. Having the necessary expertise, as a teacher, to choose appropriate problems for specific groups of students as well as coordinate discussions could be potential barriers to implementing this approach. Nonetheless, this can be easily overcome with the proper training.

23. Note that I am not suggesting that the problem-solving approach should take up the entire curriculum of virtue education programs. Rather, problem-solving should be viewed as a method that can be implemented in parallel to other pedagogical methods.

Additional information

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Alkis Kotsonis

Alkis Kotsonis works at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of education. His current research focuses on virtue and vice epistemology, contemporary intellectual character education and the educational role of social media.