The true self as essentially morally good: An obstacle to virtue development?

ABSTRACT

Psychological research has revealed that there is a strong tendency for people to believe that they have a ‘true self’, and to believe that this true self is inherently morally good. This would seemingly be very good news for virtue theorists, since this may help to promote virtue development. While there are some obvious benefits to people having morality intrinsically tied to their sense of self, in this paper I want to suggest instead that there may also be some significant drawbacks, especially when it comes to motivating virtue development and moral improvement. In part this stems from people’s belief in their own inherent moral goodness being merely assumed (as part of one’s core identity), rather than earned (say through reliably good moral behavior). This disconnection between identity and behavior can result in attempts to reinforce one’s identity as morally good, at the expense of virtuous behavior or self-improvement.

KEYWORDS:

• True self
• virtue
• moral identity
• moral development
• mindsets
• essentialism

Acknowledgments

My thanks to Matthew Vess, Rebecca Schlegel, Joshua Hicks, Joe Maffly-Kipp, andPatricia Flanagan for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Tobias Krettenauer for making valuable editorial suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. While these two forms of identity are distinct, Lefebvre and Krettenauer (2020) go on to note: ‘It is plausible that our early-forming intuitions about true selves may be an ontogenetic precursor of moral identity in the Eriksonian sense’ (p. 13). Though in terms of motivating virtuous behavior, while a belief in the true self as essentially morally good might motivate one to take on moral commitments (including acquiring virtues), it would then be moral identity in the developmental (or Eriksonian) sense that has the more direct motivational impact in carrying out moral behavior on a regular basis. In virtue theory, the acquisition of virtue would more directly relate to this developmental sense of identity, in terms of having ‘particular commitments to particular ways of being’ that provide a ‘sense of unity and coherence’.

2. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with the larger moral identity literature, see Krettenauer (2020) where he discusses multiple accounts of moral identity in the psychological literature, and advances a view of moral identity ‘as a context-specific adaptation and goal-orientation’ (p. 2). This is based on his own work with self-determination theory (SDT), for ‘the intermediate level of context-specific adaptations and goal-orientations is most akin to SDT as context-dependent personal goals play a pivotal role in this theory’ (Krettenauer, 2020, p. 3). This also happens to match well with my preferred account of virtue, which is based on goal constructs and self-regulation theory (Stichter 2018). Further parallels can be seen in Lefebvre and Krettenauer’s (2020) claim that this developmental sense of moral identity relates to ‘the integration of self-concerns with moral commitments’ (p. 13). This kind of integration would connect to the importance virtue theory places on exercising practical wisdom (i.e., phronesis) and integrating one’s activities with a view to what it is to live well (i.e., Eudaimonia).

3. Krettenauer (2019) also suggests an overlap between the two forms of moral identity with the two distinctions found in Dweck’s work, and that the true self as essentially good seems to map on to Dwecks’s ‘fixed’ mindset or ‘entity’ implicit theory. Though it’s less clear that moral identity in the developmental (or Eriksonian) sense maps onto a malleable mindset, as personal commitments are not abilities per se. But virtues as acquired excellences could bridge that gap, being both a developed ability and a moral commitment, especially since virtue possession (like skill) is a matter of degree (Stichter 2018).

4. I agree with Krettenauer (2019) in thinking that there are likely two different goals associated with these two forms of moral identity. Moral identity in the developmental sense gives us moral goals to aspire to, whereas the goal associated with moral identity in the sense of the true self seems primarily to be to maintain the view of oneself as essentially morally good (or as he puts it, not being immoral). This would be another reason why the influence of the true self on moral behavior might reveal itself most in response to failure, insofar as the goal of preserving one’s moral identity as essentially good is easy to maintain except when one looks to have acted immorally.

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Matt Stichter

Matt Stichter is an Associate Professor of Philosophy in the School of Politics, Philosophy, & Public Affairs at Washington State University. He pursues research at the intersection of moral psychology, virtue ethics, and the philosophy of expertise. He has published extensively on the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis, arguing that the development of virtue should be understood as a process of skill acquisition, and he draws on the psychological research on self-regulation and expertise to formulate this thesis. He recently published a book on this topic, The Skillfulness of Virtue: Improving our Moral and Epistemic Lives, with Cambridge University Press (2018).