Teaching virtue virtually: Can the virtue of tolerance of diversity of conscience be taught online?

ABSTRACT

This research, conducted at a midsize university, focused on the virtue of tolerance as it relates to an often-neglected area of diversity—diversity of conscience—defined as ‘legitimate differences of moral and religious conscience’. Tolerance is essential for fostering civility in our increasingly diverse societies and for promoting the free exchange of perspectives central to the mission of higher education. A short whiteboard animation video was created in an effort to teach the concept of tolerance of diversity of conscience in an engaging way. This video was embedded in an online workshop that also presented the cardinal virtues as accountability parameters for civil dialogue. The results from pre- and post-workshop questionnaires revealed that students increased in self-reported understanding of the concepts, and were able to apply knowledge of the concepts, thus providing support that this modality may be a useful first step in teaching tolerance of diversity of conscience.

KEYWORDS:

• Virtue
• tolerance
• diversity
• conscience
• cardinal virtues

Introduction

University campuses are being enriched by an increasing diversity in the student body (Stolzenberg et al. 2019). However, there are also concerning trends, including polarization and difficulties in civil discourse, on college campuses (Anderson, 2020; Beck, 2018; Duffy, 2012, 2013; Levin, 2020; The Knight Foundation, 2018). A recent study surveyed students from hundreds of U.S. colleges and universities and found that 62% reported that students are reluctant to state their views in the classroom due to a perceived campus culture that does not support viewpoint diversity (Stiksma, 2021). The most common reasons for students’ reticence were that other students or professors would criticize their views as offensive or wrong. Similarly, in what has come to be called the ‘cancel culture,’ universities have increasingly seen invited speakers disinvited because of objections by some faculty, students, or alums to the speaker’s views. In their much-discussed article, ‘The Coddling of the American Mind,’ constitutional lawyer Greg Lukianoff and social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2015) reported that between 2000 and 2015 more than 240 campaigns were launched to prevent public figures from speaking at campus events. In a more recent follow up interview, Lukianoff reported that ‘everything’s speeding up’ (Beck, 2018, p. 4) as it relates to these trends on campuses. Cancel culture within the academy has reached public awareness and is receiving scrutiny as evidenced by the recent Forbes article ‘2020: The Year Universities Surrendered Completely to Cancel Culture’ (Gerstmann, 2020), which describes several examples. It is becoming clear that the risk of protecting students from unpopular views is that critical thinking, robust debate, and the courage to take an unpopular stand may become the endangered species of campus life.

In contrast, the richness of a diverse campus community is most fully realized in a culture that promotes an open and respectful exchange of ideas—including on matters of legitimate disagreement. Universities can promote the kind of environment in which, as John Henry Newman (1976) envisioned, the liberally educated student ‘has taken a survey of all knowledge … [and] has gained from [it] a special illumination and largeness of mind’ (pp. 166–167). The UK’s Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, an internationally-recognized leader in promoting character and virtue education, shares a similarly hopeful vision of what is possible in the university setting:

Through their time at university, students are inducted into an intellectual culture that shapes them to critically and fairly evaluate evidence and arguments of different kinds. They are expected to engage respectfully and conscientiously with those with whom they disagree and grow in the creativity, discernment and good judgment required to formulate hypotheses, evaluate evidence, construct arguments and draw fitting conclusions from complex analyses and debate. (The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2020, p. 4)

There is an opportunity within virtue education to teach and model respectful, meaningful dialogue between individuals and between groups—no matter how polarized—in our universities, schools, and society at large. How might we begin to operationalize respectful, reasoned, and compassionate discourse between people with fundamental differences in their core values and/or in how they apply those values to particular issues? We propose that a possible first step is understanding and practicing the virtue of tolerance of diversity of conscience (Lickona, 2006), which we view as foundational to civil discourse. This concept was coined by Thomas Lickona in 2006, but to the best of the authors’ knowledge has never been researched or further discussed in extant literature. We also propose that the cardinal virtues can provide parameters for civil discourse—all in the service of facilitating deeper dialogue and understanding between persons and ultimately strengthening the norm of civility on which democratic discourse depends.

This research is a pilot study to examine the merits of an online workshop that teaches tolerance of diversity of conscience and virtuous parameters for civil discourse. This study seeks to contribute to the vast literature on character education in schools (Arthur et al., 2017; Berkowitz, 2011) and a growing literature on character education in higher education (Lamb et al., 2021; The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2020). An online modality was chosen because it would allow for rapid dissemination of this aspect of character education to the wider university community, and because research has demonstrated the efficacy of online learning in higher education (Nguyen, 2015).

Defining the virtue of tolerance

In raising the issue of tolerance, much less teaching it, we stand at the fragile edge of many people’s comfort zone. In part, this is due to the vastly different ways that tolerance has been regarded. Some see tolerance as an essential interpersonal and societal virtue, while others consider ‘being tolerated’ an insult (Forst, 2017). The former view reflects a conception of tolerance based on respect for the other, despite differences. This is the form of tolerance endorsed in this project. The latter response reflects conceptions of tolerance based on power imbalances, such as a powerful majority group permitting a less powerful minority group to live out some difference in belief or lifestyle (see Forst, 2017, for a discussion of different definitions of tolerance). The respect conception of tolerance is the most stable because, on this account, tolerance is based on the choice to respect, which need not change with shifting power differentials nor depend on whether one is in the position of power. For example, a college student might tolerate the political views of her parents because she loves and respects them, even though they have power over her and vehemently disagree with her on such matters. It is also the most congruent with tolerance as a virtue. The virtue of tolerance ‘emphasises the moral good involved in putting up with beliefs one finds offensive’ (Williams, 2001, p. 19). This may involve an appeal to our higher-order goals, such as ensuring that others have ‘the common good that is their due,’ valuing the ‘autonomy’ of self and others, and ‘social peace’ (Bowlin, 2016, pp. 126–127), as well as love of one’s neighbor (see Bowlin, 2016, pp. 206–241, for discussion). By contrast, tolerance that is simply ‘indifference and “Hobbesian”¹ compromise … [or] merely a political arrangement’ (Heyd, 2001, p. 5) is not a virtue.

Another area of discomfort is that tolerance often involves disagreement. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘the term “toleration”—from the Latin tolerate: to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained’ (Forst, 2017, p. 1). Tolerance involves respecting the other person, but it does not require acceptance of their views. Requiring acceptance would clearly be a nonstarter for any conversation about controversial issues where a precondition of accepting the other person’s views might be impossible. In such cases, defining tolerance as acceptance could have the effect of preventing rather than facilitating constructive dialogue. Sometimes a meaningful sharing of ideas requires honest acknowledgment that two parties deeply disagree and may remain set in their positions, yet are open to understanding the other person’s point of view.

Thus, even tolerance based on respect implies disagreement. However, the desire to avoid such disagreement may explain a subtle threat to tolerance that is arguably growing in our time, namely, allowing tolerance to become indifference. Heyd speaks to this danger:

The modern conception [of tolerance], which rests on easy acceptance of the heterogeneity of values and ways of life, pushes the concept of tolerance dangerously close to that of indifference. And even if … welcomed by the moral pluralist, … much of the original intrinsic value of tolerance is put under threat. (Heyd, 2001, p. 4)

There is no need to tolerate that to which one is indifferent (Williams, 2001, p. 20). In the spirit of not offending others, some well-intentioned people try to occupy a politically safe zone of moral neutrality with respect to a particular ethical issue by not committing to, or perhaps never personally formulating, a position. However, this is indifference, not tolerance, and neutrality regarding ethical issues is not always without consequence.² Additionally indifference is not an option in some cases. For example, faith-based educational institutions, by definition, must define tolerance within their communities as distinct from indifference because they make available (they do not mandate) a particular worldview to help inform students’ search for truth and guide ethical decision making (see Burns & Hahn, 2020, for a discussion of faith-based education). Students and other members of the educational community may or may not embrace the views of that faith tradition. For example, a Catholic university may invite a pro-life speaker to campus, fully aware that there will be a range of opinions on this issue among the faculty, staff, and students in the audience. In this example, tolerance is lived out in a milieu where members of the community encounter a set of beliefs with which they can agree or disagree, and question or wrestle with in discussions that move them to deeper reflection about ethical matters that may affect their lives. In a campus culture such as this, tolerance is not defined by indifference, and disagreement can occur with civility as members of the community learn from and stay in relationship with one another. There are two more considerations in refining our understanding of tolerance that are helpful for the purposes of this study, given its concern with civil discourse: diversity of conscience, and the limits to both tolerance and freedom of conscience.

Tolerance of diversity of conscience

Heyd (2001), in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, observed that the definition of tolerance has evolved over time; in today’s culture, he said, we expect people to be treated equitably—not out of toleration, but out of basic fairness. From this perspective, we would not label as ‘tolerance’ the mere recognition of that which ought to be self-evident, such as the rights of minorities. In the contemporary context, Heyd argues, we tend to view tolerance as applying more to matters of moral or intellectual disagreement—matters where what is right or true is contested. Understood in this narrower way, tolerance applies to ethical, political, and religious disagreements, but not to things that are generally considered to be morally irrelevant, such as the color of one’s skin (Horton, 2001, p. 34). This is consistent with what Lickona (2006) called ‘tolerance of diversity of conscience,’ which is an aspect of tolerance we think has been neglected. It is the respect for diversity of conscience, defined as legitimate differences of moral and religious conscience. This kind of tolerance is what enables people to dialogue respectfully when their consciences come into conflict.

This is not to discount the importance of the full range of the forms of tolerance, which include a fair attitude toward ‘opinions, beliefs, practices, racial or ethnic origins, etc., that differ from our own’ (Dictionary.com, LLC, n.d.). Tolerance as a broad virtue enables us to live with differences that we may simply dislike or react to negatively, for no rational reason. Everyday racial and religious prejudices, social exclusion of those who aren’t like us, ethnic cleansing, the worldwide bullying of children who differ in appearance or behavior from their peers—these irrational rejections and persecutions of others arguably represent the most common forms of intolerance still plaguing humanity.

That said, we think tolerance of diversity of conscience has a special claim on our attention in the contemporary context, where its absence appears to be on the rise. Increasing this particular kind of tolerance was therefore the aim of our intervention study and is the focus of this report.

Limits to tolerance and limits to freedom of conscience

Clearly, not all tolerance is intrinsically good (e.g., tolerating human rights violations) much less a human excellence (i.e., virtue). We are right to be intolerant of injustice and to advocate for the common good. In fact, properly understood, tolerance is a moral virtue that is subsidiary to the cardinal virtue of justice. In other words, tolerance must be rooted in the wider moral virtue of justice in order to be a virtue. Tolerance must give others their due (justice) and, ultimately, do so in the service of love. As Thomas Aquinas repeatedly asserted, ‘Charity (love) is the form of the virtues’ (II–II.23.8). At minimum, tolerance can be seen as an aspect of love since one must have a certain amount of charitable regard for the other person to bother disagreeing with them, to risk engaging in a dialogue of opposing viewpoints, or to try to understand their point of view. A fuller expression of love would be to tolerate as a way of loving one’s neighbor as oneself. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin (2009) makes this point in his book, A Code of Jewish Ethics, Vol. 2: ‘Justice and tolerance, the virtues that demand from us fairness and respect, are also based on the love we should feel for those, like ourselves, created in the image of God’ (p. 2). The claim to respect or even love a person while not accepting some of their beliefs or behaviors is not a specious distinction. Real-life examples abound, as evidenced by the 2020 United States presidential election, when many (on both sides) had the lived experience of maintaining loving relationships with friends or family members while deeply disagreeing with, but nevertheless tolerating, their voting choice. In summary, tolerance is a virtue if, and only if, it serves the common good. Turning a blind eye to injustice reflects vice, not the virtue of tolerance.

This also applies to tolerance of diversity of conscience, which is tolerance that respects legitimate differences in moral and religious conscience.³ Clearly, what constitutes ‘legitimate differences’ can be debated. We define them as those differences that would generally be regarded as legitimate by the standards of reason and basic fairness. For example, most persons would not judge as legitimate the position that people ought to be treated differently based on their sex, race, or religion. Most would also not judge as legitimate a position that denied widely accepted scientific or historical facts (e.g., denial of the Holocaust). Individuals might legitimately disagree, however, on the best ways to avoid unjust racial, religious, and gender discrimination and to ensure the fair and equal treatment of all citizens. Individuals also might, in good conscience, disagree on how the standard of equal treatment should be applied in particular cases. A current example of that sort of disagreement is the debate about whether it is fair to allow transgendered college athletes who were originally biological males (typically giving them certain physical advantages) to compete with biologically female athletes, or whether there should be separate competitions.

Generally speaking, a person should be able to follow the dictates of their own conscience but one’s freedom of conscience does have limits: ‘It is the liberty to make personal moral choices as long as those choices do not infringe on the rights of others or undermine the common good’ (Lickona, 2006, p. 2). This is an important qualification because it does not shelter inherent evils, such as terrorism or racism, under the protective umbrella of freedom of conscience. The limits to freedom of conscience help us define what is reasonable to try to discuss civilly so that, upon this foundation, parameters or rules for engagement can be built.

Promoting tolerance of diversity of conscience on college campuses

Promoting tolerance and civil discourse in higher education allows the diversity within the university community to be engaged at a deeper level. Diversity in general is hailed as a valued component of the educational experience by institutions of higher learning. This belief stems from appreciating that we all have much to learn from those who differ from ourselves, especially on university campuses (Lehto et al., 2014). In this spirit, universities have historically aspired to be beacons of plurality where students of varying viewpoints can engage in mutually beneficial exchanges. In higher education, not only in the classroom but also outside the classroom, especially in personal relationships, students have been able to develop important skills, such as effective communication, which are highly valued by employers (Arthur et al., 2009). Such skills are cultivated through opportunities to engage in dialogue and see things through a different lens.

In part, the open exchange of ideas is valued as an avenue for students to discern truth from falsehood. In his State of the University address, Princeton University president Christopher Eisgruber (2021) addressed how this is currently being challenged:

This University will fail in its scholarly and educational mission if we become an echo chamber in which viewpoints go unchallenged simply because they are popular amongst groups dominant on the campus. We will also fail, however, if we treat all opinions as equally legitimate. … Our commitment to free speech may require us to treat even very offensive viewpoints as exempt from censorship or punishment, but it does not require us to treat all viewpoints as morally equivalent. … Free speech affects how we pass such judgments, not whether we can do so—indeed, it is designed to facilitate (among other things) judgments about truth and morality. (p. 5)

Eisgruber’s speech pointed to a sign of the times for universities, where ‘coddling’ (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015) and ‘cancel culture’ (Gerstmann, 2020) can create roadblocks in the pursuit of truth. In this kind of anti-intellectual climate, clearly antithetical to the core mission of a university,⁴ teaching tolerance of diversity of conscience takes on even greater urgency. It represents one concrete, focused way we can work to restore campus cultures that promote a free and open exchange of ideas and the intellectual growth that comes from that. Additionally, universities can invite speakers who respectfully discuss differences of opinion and present well-reasoned arguments about difficult topics. This models civil debate for the students and respects students’ ability to critically evaluate and assess multiple perspectives.⁵

Teaching tolerance for diversity of conscience has another crucial purpose: preparing students to participate effectively in the ever more pluralistic world they are about to enter. Exposure to diversity helps equip students with the skills to flourish in a global society (Arasaratnama & Doerfelb, 2005). University students must graduate with the ability to engage in respectful and meaningful civil discourse and be able to apply critical thinking skills to deeply-held beliefs in the areas of religion, ethics/morality, and politics. As one of the authors of this paper puts it:

In the 21st century, more than ever, educating for democracy requires that schools form citizens who can live harmoniously in an increasingly diverse society. But educating for diversity must have, as a core commitment, teaching respect for diversity of conscience. It must include the explicit recognition that persons of conscience may disagree, even profoundly, about issues ranging from personal moral choices to public policy. In a democratic society, an authentic respect for diversity enables us to live with our deepest differences, even as we continue to debate them. (Lickona, 2006, p. 1)

Preparing students to function in a pluralistic world begins with an awareness that truly valuing diversity means that we welcome everyone to the table and hold the ensuing discussions accountable to standards of reason and goodwill. This may not result in agreement among participants, but it will likely result in a forthright encounter between persons who would better understand each other at the level of some core beliefs.

In an effort to promote civil discourse on campus, this study proposed the cardinal virtues as guidelines because these virtues provide safe parameters for discussion, hold participants accountable to a positive standard, and promote civility and fairness. For several reasons, the cardinal virtues of prudence (wisdom), justice (fairness), courage (fortitude), and temperance (self-control) have been shown to form the basic ground rules for civil discourse. First, they are transhistorical, having their roots in the philosophy of ancient Greece (as well as in other cultures under varying names), and consequently have the endorsement of longevity along with some of the world’s greatest minds, such as Plato and Aristotle. Relatedly, these virtues can be understood and valued via reason alone and are considered ‘natural’ virtues in the sense that they can be obtained and developed by one’s own efforts. As such, these virtues appeal to secular and religious thinkers alike. Third, there is a growing body of research confirming the cross-cultural value and existence of these basic virtues in all cultures and philosophical traditions (McGrath, 2015; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Fourth, prudence, justice, courage, and temperance are understood as foundational, such that all other natural virtues can be understood as somehow subsidiary to one of these cardinal (i.e., ‘hinge’) virtues. Fifth, these virtues are consistent with a variety of faith-based educational institutions as well as those with a commitment to character education.

The cardinal virtues are widely recognized as representing excellence in human behavior. How might they be applied to provide parameters for civil discourse? One might exercise the virtue of prudence by wisely choosing the time and place to discuss the controversial topic or use humor to diffuse tension. The self-control of temperance might look like using good manners or pausing to take time to think after being challenged. An example of courage might be daring to share one’s view and really listen to another person’s views—or perhaps even modify one’s original view. Finally, justice is giving the other person their due. As applied to civil discourse, justice might steer one toward the goal of understanding the other person rather than convincing that person of one’s own views. Justice might also lead one to admit one’s own mistakes. Offering the cardinal virtues as parameters for civil discourse is a way to provide a common language and framework for the university community—a framework in which personal accountability and public accountability, as they relate to civil discourse, can begin to have a common point of reference.

In summary, this research seeks to introduce the concept of tolerance of diversity of conscience to students along with the cardinal virtues as parameters for civil discourse by means of an online workshop, as well as to determine the helpfulness and efficacy of the workshop.

Method

Participants

Seventy undergraduate students took part in this study. The opportunity to participate was offered to every student involved in a leadership position (i.e., student senate, resident assistants, tutors, etc.) at a predominantly undergraduate residential campus of a midsize university in the midwestern United States. This was a convenience sample because we expected these students to be motivated to participate given their leadership responsibilities at the university. In addition, we could invite these groups of students to participate outside of their academic requirements so that the pilot data would not be influenced by being a part of an academic course. Further, if these students found the workshop helpful, as leaders, they could potentially help to champion the information to the wider university community. In total, 259 students were invited to participate in the study; 70 accepted, yielding a response rate of 26%.

Procedure

The overarching intent of this study was to determine whether the concept of tolerance of diversity of conscience could be effectively taught by means of an online workshop, and to obtain feedback regarding whether students found the workshop information to be helpful. This data will be used to determine whether to educate the wider university community about diversity of conscience in an effort to promote tolerance and civil dialogue among community members. The specific educational goals of the workshops were to (a) define diversity of conscience, (b) discuss the limits of freedom of conscience, (c) differentiate between tolerance and acceptance, and (d) present how the cardinal virtues can serve as accountability parameters for civil dialogue. The workshop consisted of a 15-minute online narrated slide presentation with an embedded 3-minute whiteboard illustration video (see Appendix A for links to both videos). In order to assess workshop effectiveness, students were asked to complete pre- and post-workshop questionnaires. The study was conducted during the spring and fall semesters of 2020. Of note, both semesters involved a university-wide shift to distance learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Measures

A five-item pre-workshop questionnaire was constructed for this study and administered at the beginning of the workshop directly after participants signed the Informed Consent form. The questions were written in a straight-forward manner to assess students’ baseline familiarity with the concepts presented in the study and to assess their feelings about having controversial conversations. Specifically, students’ baseline familiarity with the concepts was measured by three questions (‘I know what diversity of conscience is, and I could explain it to someone’; ‘I can describe the difference between acceptance and tolerance’; and ‘People should be able to pursue the dictates of their conscience with total freedom’). Students’ baseline optimism about having controversial conversations was measured by two questions (‘I feel hopeless about trying to talk to someone who disagrees with me on a controversial topic’ and ‘I feel optimistic that I have the tools to help people who disagree talk respectfully about a controversial topic’). These questions were repeated verbatim on the post-questionnaire so that each student’s pre- and post-score on the items could be paired in the statistical analysis. Participants indicated their responses on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Two post-workshop questionnaires were also constructed for this study to be completed directly after viewing the workshop. The first questionnaire included the same five items from the pre-workshop questionnaire to assess self-reported learning of the concepts. In addition, four questions were added to assess perceived helpfulness of the concepts and the workshop (‘I would rather have a conversation about a controversial topic with someone who knew about tolerance for diversity of conscience than with someone who had never heard of it’; ‘Tolerance of diversity of conscience is not a very helpful concept’; ‘If both people are committed to practicing tolerance of diversity of conscience and using the cardinal virtues as ground rules for civil dialogue, they should be able to discuss controversial topics with respect and civility’; and ‘I found this workshop to be helpful’). Participants indicated their responses on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Finally, a four-item questionnaire was administered at this time to assess whether participants could demonstrate application of the concepts. This was done via four vignettes, each of which illustrated a different reason for breakdown in civil dialogue. These scenarios were written based on real-life examples of conversations with constituents at the university. Such conversations were very instrumental in helping the authors design the workshop and write the questionnaires used to conduct this study. For the vignette scenarios, participants indicated one of the relevant concepts involved in the failure of dialogue: respect for each other’s right to freedom of conscience, the difference between acceptance and tolerance, understanding the limits of freedom of conscience, or how to use the cardinal virtues as ground rules for civil dialogue (Appendix B).

Data analyses and results

Forty-two women and twenty-eight men participated in this study. Most were in their junior or senior year of study (11% freshmen, 18% sophomores, 41% juniors, and 30% seniors) and had an average age of 20 years old.

In our main analyses, we assessed workshop effectiveness of the five matching pre- and post-test questions using paired t tests. We also assessed effectiveness by examining students’ ability to correctly apply the concepts covered in the workshops, measured as the percentage of correct responses to each of four multiple-choice questions. Additional analyses examined student perceptions of workshop helpfulness by calculating the mean responses to three questions that used seven-point Likert rating scales. Finally, post hoc analyses were conducted to assess whether course effectiveness scores on the five post-test items were related to student ability to correctly apply core concepts. For these analyses, we used independent sample t tests, dividing students into two groups: those who responded correctly to each of the four multiple-choice questions and those who responded incorrectly. The dependent variables for each of these questions were the five post-test items.

For both the paired and independent sample t tests, we assessed statistical significance using sample-based standard error estimates as well as boot-strapped standard error estimates based on 2,000 replications to control for non-normality. The boot-strapped standard errors and significance tests based on them matched the sample-based significance tests with no substantive differences in whether a given result was significant or nonsignificant. Consequently, all results reported below use the sample-based standard errors, t values, and significance tests. Similarly, Levene’s test of the equivalence of group variances was also run for each t test. As none of these variance comparisons were significant, we report the t test results that assume equivalent sub-group variances.

Perceived workshop effectiveness

There was a significant increase in students’ perceived knowledge of and ability to explain the concept of diversity of conscience after viewing the workshop (M = 4.9, SD = 1.8), compared to before viewing (M = 3.2, SD = 1.6), t(64) = −6.3, p = .000. There were also significant increases in students’ perceived ability to describe the difference between acceptance and tolerance after the workshop (M = 6.1, SD = .74) versus before (M = 5.7, SD = 1.1), t(63) = −2.3, p = .02, and optimism about having the tools to help people who disagree talk respectfully about a controversial topic after the workshop (M = 5.9, SD = 1.1) versus before (M = 4.8, SD = 1.3), t(63) = −6.6, p = .000. A surprising finding was an increase in students’ feelings of hopelessness in trying to talk with someone who disagrees on a controversial topic after the workshop (M = 5.4, SD = 1.5) versus before (M = 4.5, SD = 1.6), t(62) = −4.2, p = .000. Finally, there was not a significant change in students’ opinions regarding whether people should be able to pursue the dictates of their conscience with total freedom after the workshop (M = 3.6, SD = 1.8) versus before (M = 3.7, SD = 1.6), t(63) = .90, p = .37. See Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. T test results for paired pre- and post-items.

Variable	Mean	SD	df	t	p	Cohen’s d
Can explain tolerance of diversity of conscience	−1.7	2.2	64	−6.3	.000	−.50
Can describe difference between acceptance and tolerance	−.33	1.1	63	−2.3	.02	−.04
Hopeless when it comes to disagreement	−.87	1.6	62	−4.2	.000	−.27
Should follow conscience with total freedom	.16	1.4	63	.90	.37	.36
Optimistic I have tools to help people who disagree	−1.1	1.3	63	−6.6	.000	−.54

Significance is 2-tailed.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	n	Mean	SD
(Pre) Can explain tolerance of diversity of conscience	70	3.3	1.6
(Pre) Can describe difference between acceptance and tolerance	69	5.7	1.0
(Pre) Hopeless when it comes to disagreement	68	4.4	1.6
(Pre) Should follow conscience with total freedom	69	3.8	1.7
(Pre) Optimistic I have tools to help people who disagree	68	4.9	1.3
(Post) If committed to these concepts, people can talk with civility	65	6.2	1.1
(Post) Rather have a controversial talk with someone who knew about these concepts	65	3.3	2.2
(Post) Tolerance of diversity of conscience is not a helpful concept	65	5.1	2.3
(Post) Hopeless when it comes to disagreement	65	5.3	1.5
(Post) Optimistic I have tools to help people who disagree	65	5.9	1.0
(Post) Can explain tolerance of diversity of conscience	65	4.9	1.8
(Post) Should follow conscience with total freedom	65	3.6	1.8
(Post) Can describe difference between acceptance and tolerance	65	6.1	.75
(Post) Workshop was helpful	64	5.6	1.3

Note: These means differ slightly from the text and Table 1 due to different n’s (pairs with missing data were excluded from t tests).

Applied measure of workshop effectiveness

Analysis of students’ ability to apply the concepts after viewing the workshop revealed that the majority of students were able to apply the concepts to practical scenarios successfully, including: respect for the right to freedom of conscience (67% applied correctly; n = 64, correct = 43, incorrect = 21); the difference between acceptance and tolerance (91% applied correctly; n = 64, correct = 58, incorrect = 6); the limits of freedom of conscience (78% applied correctly; n = 64, correct = 50, incorrect = 14); and the cardinal virtues as ground rules for civil dialogue (67% applied correctly; n = 64, correct = 43, incorrect = 21).

Perceived workshop helpfulness

Analysis of the mean scores for perceived workshop helpfulness yielded mixed results. As indicated on a seven-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating the student found the course more helpful, the students reported finding the workshop to be helpful overall (M = 5.6, SD = 1.3). In addition, they believed that if both people are committed to practicing tolerance of diversity of conscience and to using the cardinal virtues as ground rules for civil dialogue, they should be able to discuss controversial topics with respect and civility (M = 6.2, SD = 1.1). However, students also reported that tolerance of diversity of conscience is not a very helpful concept (M = 5.1, SD = 2.3) and were neutral, tending toward mild disagreement, regarding whether they would rather have a conversation about a controversial topic with someone who knew about tolerance of diversity of conscience than with someone who had never heard of it (M = 3.3, SD = 2.2). We did not find any statistically significant differences on the mean post-test item scores between students who answered the conceptual questions correctly versus those who answered incorrectly. As such, students’ opinions about the helpfulness of the workshop were not related to whether or not they could correctly apply the concepts.

Discussion and conclusion

Recent decades have witnessed an international explosion of interest in character education in K-12 schools, the efficacy of which has been supported by recent meta-analyses (Jeynes, 2017; Johnson, 2021). Universities have been slower to intentionally incorporate character development even though moral development is an important aspect of this stage of ‘emerging adulthood’ (Arnett, 2014). Some argue that universities have an obligation to form leaders of character who bring that character to bear on their civic duties. ‘The cultivation of character is integral to the core research, education, and civic mission that universities share’ (The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2020, p. 3). Clearly, some special considerations are necessary at the university level. Extra care should be taken to ensure that virtues are taught in a way that embraces the diversity of students’ backgrounds and professional paths (Brooks et al., 2019) and respects the moral autonomy of mature learners—especially those outside of a professional track that indisputably warrants character training (see Carr, 2017, for discussion) such as nursing and teaching (The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2016). Character education should also rely more heavily on students seeking virtue for themselves, as well as students’ critical thinking skills, including how they choose to employ their virtue knowledge in their own lives (see The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2020, for discussion).

We believe that teaching tolerance of diversity of conscience aligns with the overall mission of higher education and reinforces as well as respects the intellectual and moral autonomy of students. We contend that it does so by creating conditions in which diverse views can be freely discussed and critically considered. Said differently, it facilitates a school culture of virtuous tolerance, where people feel free to ‘disagree with people but don’t impugn their motives’ (Telushkin, 2009, p. 449).

This study offers a targeted incremental contribution to the literature on character education by reintroducing, and more thoroughly discussing, the virtue of tolerance of diversity of conscience, and by lending empirical support to the idea that it can be effectively taught via an online workshop. Self-report data indicated that, after taking the workshop, students believed they were better able to explain the concepts and help people talk respectfully with each other about a controversial topic. Further, most were able to apply the concepts from the workshop: respect for the right to freedom of conscience, the difference between acceptance and tolerance, the limits of freedom of conscience, and the cardinal virtues as ground rules for civil dialogue. Students also reported that the workshop was helpful, and believed that if people are committed to practicing tolerance of diversity of conscience and the cardinal virtues, they should be able to discuss controversial topics with respect and civility.

A paradoxical finding was that students’ self-reported optimism and hopelessness both increased after the workshop. Hope (not hopelessness) and optimism are typically positively correlated (Steed, 2002). One explanation for our finding might be that the hopelessness item in our questionnaire (‘I feel hopeless about trying to talk to someone who disagrees with me on a controversial topic’) measured one’s own perceived ability in a controversial conversation while the optimism item (‘I feel optimistic that I have the tools to help people who disagree talk respectfully about a controversial topic’) measured one’s perceived ability to help others. Another explanation is that the workshop may have made salient the challenges of having controversial conversations, whereas, before the workshop, such complexities were not in the forefront of students’ minds. Students may well have ended the workshop more optimistic that they have the tools to help others, while simultaneously feeling the challenges of having controversial conversations to be daunting. This will be important to evaluate in future research because there is some evidence that hopelessness is negatively correlated with social engagement (Zhang et al., 2018).

Another unanticipated finding was that students mildly agreed that tolerance of diversity of conscience was not a helpful concept, even though they found the workshop to be helpful overall and felt that people who understood the concepts should be able to have controversial conversations respectfully with each other. It may be that, considered as an isolated concept, tolerance of diversity of conscience seems less helpful to students than when it is contextualized and applied within the wider workshop, which includes an explanation of conscience and ground rules for dialogue. It may also be that for most students the phrases ‘tolerance of diversity of conscience’ and ‘legitimate differences of moral and religious conscience’ remained abstractions whose meanings were not fully understood. The workshop gave only brief examples of legitimate differences of conscience (in the whiteboard video). In retrospect, spending more time teasing out the differences may have helped participants understand more fully not only in the moment, for this pilot, but also into the future as they engage in these virtuous practices. The whiteboard video, for instance, could have shown a substantive exchange of views between two persons who disagreed about a particular issue but did so in a way that exemplified respectful speaking and listening-to-understand—in short, what the practice of tolerance of diversity of conscience actually looks and sounds like.

Study limitations

A limitation of this study was the limited convenience sample of student leaders, rather than a larger randomly selected sample from the general student population. The unusual condition of distance learning due to the Covid-19 pandemic may mean that students participated in this study under some distress due to the unprecedented circumstances of an international pandemic and resultant distance learning for part of the academic semester. In addition, limited demographic information was collected post hoc in order to keep the workshop and questionnaires as short as possible. This means that demographic data was only analyzed in aggregate for this pilot study. Future research should collect demographic information with the pre-questionnaire, broaden it to include ethnicity and academic major, and statistically assess whether there are between-group differences. Future research should also extend the sample to a wider demographic of students, faculty and staff, and have a control group.

This study suffers from a problem common to many character and virtue program evaluations—the lack of measured behavioral outcomes (Was et al., 2006). The reliance on self-report measures makes the findings vulnerable to problems inherent to self-reports including social desirability bias and inaccuracy of reporting. For example, students may have tried to please the researcher or misjudged their level of understanding of the concepts assessed due to a lack of self-awareness. Knowledge of concepts and application of concepts was assessed but it was not triangulated in the findings with other behavioral outcomes. It is unlikely that the 15-minute workshop would result in significant and lasting behavioral change unless it is nested in an educational culture where others value and practice tolerance of diversity of conscience and engage in virtuous discourse. It is believed that this workshop plants a seed, or offers a shift in perspective, that can grow over time.

Toward this end, offering a follow-up, in-person workshop would provide an opportunity for students to practice the skills presented online and have their questions answered. This would address a limitation of the online modality, which is that students were unable to receive clarification on things they did not fully understand. This may have negatively affected learning outcomes, and consequently these study results, and may limit students’ ability to implement these concepts in their lives. In future workshops, students could start with a mildly controversial topic (e.g., whether the electoral college should be abolished) and move to progressively more charged topics (e.g., whether a president should be impeached for inciting insurrection). Better still, student pairs could choose from a menu of topics to discuss. Supervised practice might increase the likelihood that the concepts will be generalized to relationships and conversations beyond the workshop. Finally, devising a plan for a cohort of students and following up on them over time would be beneficial in determining the long term benefits of this training.

Revisiting tolerance of diversity of conscience

Defining and defending the virtue of tolerance is necessary because there is little chance for deep interpersonal understanding when dialogue breaks down in hostility or never even begins due to polarization, shaming, or fear. One cannot coerce a meaningful exchange of ideas, let alone a change of heart, in another person. Tolerance allows people to stay in communication and this study suggests it may lead to greater openness about and deeper conversations related to the matters that divide us.

Institutions of higher education can help to increase tolerance in students, especially through an institutional commitment to diversity (Himbeault Taylor, 1998). Moreover, it is well established that virtue can be taught, as well as ‘caught,’ in the educational milieu (Arthur et al., 2017). There is also promising empirical support for the efficacy of teaching character in postgraduate programs, such as findings from the Oxford Global Leadership Initiative (GLI; Brant et al., 2020). Ideally, virtues are not only taught but also caught and sought within the educational institution (The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2017). In our study, the taught virtue of tolerance is unlikely to take root unless it is also caught in a university culture where it is modeled by others. These conditions may also facilitate the virtue being sought by the students themselves, which has extra import when dealing with mature learners. Toward this end, the online format of the workshop is advantageous because the concepts can be taught consistently and disseminated widely and easily throughout the university and, hopefully, beyond. The findings of this study offer some support that the virtue of tolerance of diversity of conscience can be taught in this efficient way, which we hope will positively impact school culture. Practicing the virtue of tolerance in combination with the cardinal virtues (as ground rules for civil discourse) may help facilitate more open dialogue as both parties share their positions while respecting the moral obligation of each person to earnestly follow his or her own conscience. Such conversations, even if concluded by agreeing to disagree, still exemplify a coming together in communication through interpersonal connection and an open dialogue that prepares students to engage meaningfully in an increasingly diverse society.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Marcy Van Fossen

Marcy Van Fossen, PhD is a member of both the Character and Virtue Initiative and the Board of Trustees at Saint Mary’s University of MN. In addition to character and virtue education, research interests include human motivation. (maiden name: Church)

James P. Burns

James P. Burns, PhD is the 14th president of Saint Mary’s University of MN and instituted the school’s Character and Virtue Initiative. Research interests include character and virtue education in higher education, the virtue of Christian hope, curricular development and assessment for virtue education, and virtue as it relates to professional ethics.

Thomas Lickona

Thomas Lickona, PhD is the founding director of the Center for the 4th and 5th Rs (Respect and Responsibility) and emeritus professor of education at SUNY-Cortland. He is formerly the president of the Association of Moral Education, and has published extensively in the areas of moral psychology and character education.

Larry Schatz

Brother Larry Schatz, FSC, currently serves as director of vocation ministry for the Midwest Province of the De La Salle Christian Brothers. He previously served as provincial director for the Brothers and was also on the executive team for the Conference of Major Superiors of Men. He resides on the campus of Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota, where he has previously served as an adjunct professor.

Notes

1. A reference to Williams’s (2001) discussion of Hobbesian compromise as an unstable balance of (political) power that is practical rather than principled, ‘under which the acceptance of one group by the other is the best that either of them can get’ (pp. 21–22).

2. One example of the danger of indifference in the name of tolerance can be seen in modern societies where sex has arguably become a ‘moral free zone,’ where virtually everything is to be tolerated except sexual assault and other failures to get consent. Tolerance regarding sexual behavior has come to mean almost total nonjudgementalism. In reaction to this, some scholars (e.g., Eberstadt, 2012; Wilcox, 2011) have argued that the resulting normlessness concerning sex has had dire societal consequences, including the exploitation of women, the weakening of marriage and family, the negative effects on children’s welfare and development, and other individual and societal problems. From this perspective, excessive tolerance in the form of indifference to sexual morality—which, among other things, called for sexual self-control and taking responsibility for the children one brings into the world—has carried a high social cost.

3. Conscience is defined as ‘the sense or consciousness of the moral goodness or blameworthiness of one’s own conduct, intentions, or character together with a feeling of obligation to do right or be good’ (Merriam-Webster.com, 2020). The Catholic intellectual tradition understands conscience in the following manner.

Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. … For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. … His conscience is man’s most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths (Catholic Church, 2012).

Evident in both the secular and the religious understanding of conscience is the deep, inner experience of conviction of the moral valence of a particular action. This inner conviction is taken very seriously and even given primacy by virtually all religious and nonreligious thinkers (Kreeft, 2004; Pope Francis, 2017; Smith, 1998). This is because acting contrary to one’s own conscience is, by definition, doing what one thinks is wrong (i.e., evil and personally corrupting). However, this does not mean that conscience is infallible, and philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas have carefully described one’s moral responsibility in forming one’s conscience and being informed regarding relevant factors impacting a particular decision.

4. The core mission of universities is generally understood to be research, teaching/learning, and service.

5. For a discussion of how some Catholic universities balance their faith-based mission with campus speakers, see Desmond (2017).

Appendix A:

Tolerance of Diversity of Conscience Online Workshop and Whiteboard Videos

The complete 15-minute Tolerance of Diversity of Conscience Workshop, including the 3-minute whiteboard video, is available online. http://www2.cortland.edu/centers/character/video/workshop-on-tolerance-of-diversity-of-conscience-smumn%20(with%20CC).mp4/

The 3-minute whiteboard illustration video is available online at SUNY-Cortland’s website, Center for the 4th and 5th Rs.

https://www2.cortland.edu/centers/character/video/ClosedcaptionedToleranceofDiversityofConscienceVideo.mp4

Appendix B:

Post-Workshop Questionnaire Items

For each vignette, please indicate the concept that best describes what is misunderstood by Person A.

1) Person A learns that his church is splitting due to deep disagreement over issues related to sexual orientation. He says to a friend, ‘I’ve attended this church since I was a child and everyone seems so nice. I had no idea that so many of them are hateful.’

Which best describes what is misunderstood by Person A in this example?

2) Person A and Person B are discussing a recent pro-life demonstration. They are on opposite sides of the issue, but have been friends for many years and trust that one another’s views come from a deep place of caring and careful discernment. After a heated but respectful conversation, Person B says, ‘Well, at least we can agree to have tolerance for each other’s views.’ To which Person A replies, ‘I don’t like the word “tolerance,” I prefer to say “acceptance”.’

Which best describes what is misunderstood by Person A in this example?

3) Person A feels naturally inclined to ‘live and let live.’ It is easy for him to be lovingly open-minded toward other people’s life choices. Upon learning the concept of tolerance of freedom of conscience, he embraced it and inspired others to do the same. However, when one of his friends challenged him by saying, ‘That all sounds nice, but how can I possibly “tolerate” a suicide bomber acting on his conscience?’, Person A didn’t know what to say.

Which best describes what is misunderstood by Person A in this example?

4) Person A dreads his family holiday gatherings because invariably the conversation turns to religion and politics. Vastly different views are deeply held by members of the group. The family members love each other and respect that the views represented reflect the dictates of each person’s conscience. Still, what starts as a friendly conversation always seems to end up degenerating into angry accusations and name calling.

Which best describes what is misunderstood by Person A’s family in this example?