Exam cheating among Cambodian students: when, how, and why it happens

ABSTRACT

This study examines Cambodian students’ exam cheating practices throughout their schooling. Based on a thorough analysis of interviews with 19 university students, the study found that, although cheating was more prevalent at the secondary level, individual students’ cheating experiences varied in frequency and timing (i.e. when they started, stopped, increased, or decreased such practices). Curricula, parents’ attitudes, peer behaviour, institutional policies, and – most significantly – relationships with teachers were identified as influencing factors for students’ cheating practices. These findings largely echo academic dishonesty literature, but they also indicate the context-specific features of these factors.

KEYWORDS:

• Exam cheating
• academic dishonesty
• Cambodia
• teacher-student relationship
• life-history
• developing country

Introduction

Over the last century, much research has been conducted on academic dishonesty, including exam cheating, especially in the United States (e.g. Bowers 1964; Craig and Evans 1990; McCabe and Treviño 1993). After the 2000s, the focus shifted to other parts of the world (e.g. Grimes and Rezek 2005; Bernardi et al. 2008; McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield 2012; Buckner and Hodges 2016). However, developing countries have received less attention. Meanwhile, extensive global research has been conducted in comparative and international education on ethics and corruption in education (e.g. Eckstein 2003; Hallak and Poisson 2007; Heyneman 2009), but exam cheating has received less focus.

Against this background, the present study investigates exam cheating in Cambodia, a developing country. By examining Cambodian university students’ narratives, it examines when, how, and why they have or have not cheated on examinations throughout their schooling.

First, the paper provides the conceptual framework and two sections on the study’s background: Cambodia’s society, education, and examination system and a review of the existing literature on exam cheating in Cambodia. Next, after the study methodology is explicated, the main findings are discussed in two sub-sections: cheating experiences and factors contributing to cheating practices. The final section concludes the study.

Conceptual framework

This section reviews the international exam cheating literature to shed light on exam cheating in Cambodia. Particular attention is paid to these points: changes in individual students’ cheating practices over time and factors affecting their cheating practices.

Regarding changing cheating practices throughout schooling, in the United States, exam cheating is more prevalent in high school compared to university (Schab 1991; Jensen et al. 2002), middle school (Craig and Evans 1990; Anderman and Midgley 2004), or elementary school (Brandes 1986; Schab 1991). A similar pattern has been found in many other developed countries where high school performance directly influences university admission likelihood (e.g. Davis et al. 1994; Clariana et al. 2012). However, there is not enough available literature to identify this pattern in developing countries. This study thus attempts to explore exam cheating in this little explored context.

Concerning factors affecting students’ cheating practices, extensive research has been conducted on such behaviours in the United States. Such factors are often sorted into two categories involving personal factors and contextual factors. Personal factors concern individual characteristics, including gender, age, academic performance, social class, and personality tendencies such as learning motivation and moral attitudes; contextual factors concern students’ home and school environments, including school integrity policies, penalty threats, peer relationships, cheating opportunities, peers’ and teachers’ behaviours and attitudes towards cheating, teaching methods, and parental pressure (McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield 2001; Davis, Drinan, and Bertram Gallant 2009; McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield 2012).

Academic dishonesty research on developing countries is scarce, but some studies have identified personal and contextual factors in countries such as Kenya (Owenga, Aloka, and Raburu 2018), Ghana (Mensah and Azila-Gbettor 2018), Nigeria (Umaru 2013), and Lebanon (McCabe, Feghali, and Abdallah 2008; Vlaardingerbroek, Shehab, and Alameh 2011).

Including these personal and contextual factors, Bertram Gallant (2008) suggested a more holistic analysis of academic dishonesty, identifying four dimensions affecting students’ behaviours: internal, organisational, institutional, and societal. The internal dimension includes personal factors; the organisational dimension includes the immediate context of students’ experiences, such as peer norms and classroom dynamics; the institutional dimension includes the schools and their academic systems; and the societal dimension concerns broader societal contexts, such as technology changes and social behaviour expectations. These four academic dishonesty dimensions can shape individual students’ behaviours (Bertram Gallant 2008).

A brief literature review provides some clues to identify the motivating and deterring factors for Cambodian students’ cheating. This study explores the several individual personal and contextual factors discussed in the abovementioned literature along with other factors by using Bertram Gallant’s (2008) four-dimensional lens. In this regard, the results section highlights the major factors perceived by Cambodian university students.

Cambodia’s society, education, and examination system

This section briefly describes this study’s contextual background with the aim to identify some factors, especially those falling under the institutional and societal dimensions in Bertram Gallant’s (2008) lens. Cambodia has experienced drastic political, social, economic, and ideological change within a relatively short period. Gaining independence from France in 1953, it underwent Buddhist socialism, civil war (1970–1975), the tremendously destructive Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1979), and Vietnam’s occupation in the 1980s, before adopting a market-oriented economy. Since the mid-1990s, Cambodia has enjoyed rapid economic growth and political stability.

However, a number of social problems, including poverty and the rich-poor disparity, remain. As of 15 March 2019, Asian Development Bank website states that more than 70% of the population lives on less than $3 a day, vulnerable to the poverty cycle.

Another persisting issue is widespread corruption. Prime Minister Hun Sen (in power since 1985) and his family members have often been criticised for corruption and nepotism (Global Witness 2016). Corruption is widespread, with not only the grand corrupt practices of politicians and high officials but also lower-ranking civil servants’ petty corrupt practices. Although, with pressure from the international community, an anti-corruption law was adopted in 2010, weak political will has limited its effectiveness (Ear 2016). Transparency International’s web-site shows that, in 2018, Cambodia ranked 161st among 180 countries and territories for perceived public sector corruption levels. In particular, the education sector has been identified as a public service sector with extremely high corruption (Nissen 2005; Transparency International 2013). To survive day-to-day, even teachers, generally expected to have high ethical values and moral standards, commit unethical and corrupt practices – often involving parents and students.

In Cambodia, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS) is responsible for the entire country’s educational services. Furthermore, there are 24 Provincial – and one Municipal – Offices of Education (POEs), which oversee the District Offices of Education (DOEs).

Formal Cambodian education follows a 6-3-3 structure, comprising primary school (Grades 1–6; six years), lower-secondary school (Grades 7–9; three years), and upper-secondary school (Grades 10–12; three years). Since 2000, the net enrolment rate has remained over 90% at the primary level. Gross enrolment rates were 55.7% (59.6% for female students) for lower-secondary and 25.1% (26.7% for female students) for upper-secondary in the 2016/2017 school year (MoEYS 2017b). The enrolment rate for tertiary education was 13.1% (12.2% for female students) in 2017 (UIS 2019). Recently, with a growing middle-class population demanding quality education (Khiev and Ty 2011), student enrolments in private schools have risen, particularly in urban areas. During 2015/2016, 5.4% of primary students and 4.3% of secondary students attended private schools nationwide, whereas 38.4% of primary students and 22.3% of secondary students attended private schools in the capital Phnom Penh (MoEYS 2016a, 2016b).

Cambodian students generally take three kinds of written assessments throughout their schooling: monthly tests, semester examinations, and completion examinations. Monthly tests are school-based assessments students complete for most subjects, and these are prepared, invigilated, and marked by students’ subject teachers. Students also take semester examinations twice a year. Each public school manages the five-day examination period. Semester examinations are also school-based assessments. Despite neighbouring schools’ occasional exam paper sharing, papers are largely prepared, invigilated, and marked by teachers at the students’ schools. Semester examinations in Grades 6, 9, and 12 are strictly inspected by POE/DOE staff. To matriculate to the next grade level, students require an annual average score of 50% on school-based assessments, including the monthly tests and semester examinations, and mandatory attendance (MoEYS 2014). However, since MoEYS pressures schools to meet the Education for All (EFA) targets, in practice, about 90% of primary school students are promoted to the next grade regardless of their performance (Dawson 2009, 60).

In addition, at the end of Grades 9 and 12, students take a two-day national completion examination, which determines their progression to the next education level. Hereafter, these are referred to as the ‘G9 exam’ and ‘G12 exam’, respectively.

Like semester examinations, the G9 exam is a school-based assessment; it is inspected more strictly by POE/DOE staff. After these exams are scored in schools, the results are reported to the POEs. In recent years, G9 exam pass rates have approximated 90% (Brehm 2016, 107; MoEYS 2017a, 43).

The G12 exam is administrated, prepared, and scored by MoEYS. The examination is conducted at about 200 schools (designated exam centres) nationwide. The invigilators are usually teachers from outside the exam-takers’ schools. Like the current G12 exam, the G9 exam was administrated by MoEYS before 2014, when most study participants took the exam.

The rigorous G12 exam grading system, which selects only a small number of students who are then considered elites, is a colonial inheritance from France (Sine 2002). G12 exam papers are graded as A, B, C, D, and E (all pass) and F (fail) on a subject-specific and overall basis. Students who score over 90% obtain an overall A grade (Retka and Mech 2015). In 2015, when most participants in this study took the exam, only 108 students (0.1%) of 83,341 exam-takers obtained an A grade. This was followed by 1,085 B grades (1.3%), 3,292 C grades (4.0%), 6,093 D grades (7.3%), and 35,982 E grades (43.2%); the remaining students (44.1%) failed the exam (Retka and Mech 2015). G12 exam-passers can take entrance examinations for four-year bachelor’s programs at higher education institutes. Furthermore, students with higher grades can obtain scholarships for their university studies. Meanwhile, non-passers can retake the exam (in the subsequent year or later); alternatively, after completing a two-year associate degree program, they can enter a four-year bachelor’s program (Taguiam 2015).

Yearly changes have occurred in G12 exam pass rates due to the exam’s difficulty level and the implementation of anti-cheating measures. In 2002, when strict anti-cheating measures were implemented along with the introduction of new subjects, the pass rate (66% in the previous year) dropped to 40% (Yun 2002a). Similarly, in 2002, the anti-cheating measures caused a similar decline in G9 exam pass rates (Yun 2002b). When this implementation was gradually relaxed, the pass rates increased. However, with the introduction of a new MoEYS policy against G12 exam-related corrupt practices in 2014, the pass rate plunged from about 80% (2012–2013) to 26% in the August 2014 examination; after this exam’s non-passers received a second chance in October that year, the total pass rate reached 44% (2014) and rose again to about 60% (2015–2016) (Khouth and Amaro 2016; for the relevant figure for 2017–2018 [which was over 60%] see Dara 2018).

The 2014 anti-cheating policy was adopted after the ruling party had lost a significant number of seats in the national elections in 2013. The party was under pressure of two expected events: the 2015 establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community and the 2018 national elections. The government wanted to appeal to the youth, the largest voter demographic, which was predicted to face stiff job competition from foreign workers after graduating from an education system that lagged behind other countries (Kelsall et al. 2016). Furthermore, the government needed to fend off severe criticisms regarding not only unemployment but also corruption (Khun 2016).

These conditions and some other aspects of Cambodian society can be analysed using Bertram Gallant’s (2008) lens; the competitive exam system and the anti-cheating policy could fall under the institutional dimension, and others, such as poverty, prevalence of corruption, post-colonial issues, domestic politics, and international pressure on the economy, could be categorised into the societal dimension.

Previous research on exam cheating in Cambodia

Limited research is available on student exam cheating in Cambodia. Kem et al.’s (2012) survey is one such study. This survey examined cheating practices during the G12 exam before the 2014 anti-cheating policy was introduced. The study found that, among 157 randomly selected candidates, 65% bought cheat sheets prior to the exam, and 78% copied answers from other candidates; 16% communicated with people outside exam venues by receiving answer sheets thrown through windows, by using mobile phones, or by receiving help from invigilators or police. It also found that 67% of candidates bribed the invigilators during the exam, and 92% of these arrangements were initiated by the candidates. On average, one candidate paid about $30 during the examination period.

Kem et al.’s (2012) study partially confirmed frequent media reports regarding exam cheating scandals. Analysing 63 local newspaper articles from 1992 to 2013, Leng (2017) found that cheating was perceived as a necessary means to help candidates escape forced conscription in the 1980s. Cheating practices were often assisted by people from different parts of society, including monks. Leng (2017) also found that, over the years, using technology and social media became one of the major cheating techniques; while many people – including students – had fully recognised the rampant cheating, most prominent MoEYS officials ignored this issue. Moreover, since 2014, the media have frequently reported about the positive influence of the anti-cheating policy on students’ and teachers’ behaviours (e.g. Koyanagi 2017). Media attention has focused on the G12 exam and, to a lesser extent, other examinations involving MoEYS inspections. Nevertheless, these media reports provide broader contextual information about the exam cheating issue. Thus, these reports could indicate some institutional dimension factors (e.g. the MoEYS high officials’ attitudes and the anti-cheating policy) and some societal dimension factors (e.g. forced conscription, social behaviour, and technology changes) when analysed using Bertram Gallant’s (2008) concept.

In response to these media reports, researchers have often briefly mentioned exam cheating as part of their research on other educational issues, especially private tutoring (e.g. Dawson 2009; Bray et al. 2015; Brehm 2016). Low-paid Cambodian teachers make extra income by teaching private supplementary classes. These teachers often embarrass students who do not attend their private classes. Research has also revealed other unethical and corrupt practices among teachers, including forcing students to make informal payments in exchange for grades, altering attendance records, providing better treatment to favoured students, and promoting ‘the right to cheat on an exam’ (Dawson 2009, 62).

Prior research and media reports have indicated that Cambodian students become involved in unethical and corrupt practices at very young ages. For example, Dawson (2009) stated, ‘Students take part in a daily ritual of paying bribes to teachers from the age of 6 years old when they enter the primary school cycle in Cambodia’ (71); furthermore, Chhay and Cuddy (2015) stated, ‘After being taught from pre-school that education is synonymous with bribery, parents said demanding that grade 12 students earn their results was a lesson too late.’

Although research findings and media reports all imply Cambodian students’ habitual engagement in cheating practices since early schooling years, the actual situation is under-researched. By exploring individual students’ experiences, this study attempts to bridge this research gap.

Methodology

This study employed the topical life history method, which ‘does not aim to grasp the fullness of a person’s life, but confronts a particular issue’ (Plummer 2001, 26); in the present study, this issue is exam cheating. Study data were collected from interviews with 19 Cambodian university students (aged 20–25 years) in Phnom Penh (see Figure 1). They had received primary and secondary education in various provinces and/or Phnom Penh. Some, who had moved from one province to another throughout their schooling, could not define their ‘hometown’ accurately. The informants were recruited using a snowball sampling technique, in which early informants helped to recruit other potential informants. The first recruited informant was a sister of the researcher’s friend. Next, she asked her friends to participate in this study and also asked them to seek other informants. They were promised anonymity and confidentiality and asked to provide information about their own experiences and observations of cheating practices throughout their schooling (primary school to the present) and their perceived reasons for the prevalence of such practices. Each informant was interviewed for 1–2 hours in a closed space in English or Khmer. Next, supplementary data were collected by contacting the informants by phone, e-mail, or other means.

Figure 1. Students’ cheating experiences

Locations (provinces) where informants spent their school years are not shown in order to protect their identities.

University students were chosen as informants because this study mainly explores cheating at the primary and secondary levels; the literature indicates that, without fear of punishment, graduates may report more accurately than currently enrolled students (Mensah, Azila-Gbettor, and Asimah 2018). However, this study acknowledges that the informants may have generated inaccurate or false memories, as is inevitable in autobiographical research (Schwartz and Sudman 1994; Conway 1997). The gathered information’s reliability, particularly regarding social and political aspects, was ascertained through other sources: newspaper articles and reports published by the government, international agencies, and NGOs.

Nvivo software was used to analyse the collected data. Referring to Fendler and Godbey’s (2016) work, the extents/frequencies of student cheating behaviours were classified into three categories: no cheating, occasional cheating (i.e. cheating in some subjects or on some occasions), and frequent cheating (i.e. premeditated cheating for most subjects/occasions). The differing definitions of cheating among informants posed a research challenge. Thus, as with any research on self-reported behaviours, underreporting bias may have occurred (Burrus, McGoldrick, and Schuhmann 2007, 14). It has been suggested that researchers should focus on intentional and immoral cheating rather than unintentional cheating, where students are not aware of their unethical behaviours. This can ‘avoid casting the morality of contemporary schools and students in an inaccurately negative light’ (Barnhardt 2016, 340). Therefore, this research defined exam cheating as any perceived unethical or intentional behaviour conducted in an attempt to obtain unfair benefits in examination settings.

Results

Cheating experiences

The informants reported various cheating experiences from their schooling (Figure 1). About half the informants reported that they started cheating in primary school; the earliest reported cheating experiences (Students 1 and 10) occurred in Grade 2, while most started in the late primary grades. In lower-secondary school, all except one (Student 11) committed cheating. One (Student 3) reported that cheating practices reduced after primary school. Unsurprisingly, almost all informants cheated during the critical G9 exam. After entering upper-secondary school, most informants continued to cheat as frequently as in lower-secondary school; one (Student 4) reported cheating more frequently in upper-secondary than in lower-secondary school, and another (Student 9) stopped cheating in upper-secondary school (the G12 exam being the only exception). The other two (Students 2 and 12) increased their cheating practices in the days leading up to the G12 exam.

The informants’ reports also revealed that students’ cheating experiences during the G12 exam differed considerably before and after the implementation of the anti-cheating policy in 2014. Whilst all seven informants, who took the exam before the policy implementation, cheated, only four out of the 12 informants who took the exam after policy implementation cheated. At university, many stopped cheating or cheated less frequently compared to upper-secondary school. Two informants were identified as outliers: Students 8 and 11 had rarely cheated throughout their schooling.

This study’s informant experience reports show that cheating in Cambodia appears to be more prevalent at the upper-secondary level than at the primary or university levels. This general finding is consistent with the literature and findings in the United States and other countries. However, cheating behaviours at the lower-secondary and upper-secondary levels seemed to have similar prevalence levels. Furthermore, contrary to previous research implications, cheating practices did not always start during early schooling, and not all students cheated throughout schooling; some reported that they had rarely cheated in school. Indeed, the current study has revealed diverse cheating behaviour patterns among the informants. Individual experiences regarding when they started, stopped, restarted, increased, and decreased cheating practices varied greatly.

Factors contributing to cheating practices

Analysis of the informants’ narratives revealed five major perceived factors that contributed to students’ cheating practices: curricula, relationships with teachers, parents’ attitudes, peer behaviour, and institutional policies. Considering Bertram Gallant’s (2008) four dimensions concept, curricula and institutional policies function as institutional factors, and relationships with teachers, parents’ attitudes, and peer behaviour serve as organisational factors.

Before a closer examination of these factors, some other perceived factors will be discussed briefly. This study deemed them as fitting the internal dimension suggested by Bertram Gallant (2008). One such factor was academic performance. Student 8, who obtained an A grade on the G12 exam, explained that he rarely cheated throughout his schooling because he could solve the problems by himself. Another factor was students’ moral attitudes. Student 11, who cheated on fewer occasions, stated that he viewed cheating negatively and felt better when he did not cheat. As stated earlier, the international research literature suggests that both academic performance and moral attitudes affect students’ cheating practices. If endorsed by further research, these individual variables may also be accepted as important influencing factors in the Cambodian context. For now, this section’s discussions will only focus on the five major perceived factors reported by most of the informants.

Curricula

Many informants perceived that curricula were a significant contributing factor for their cheating practices. They reported that they had cheated more in secondary school compared to primary school or university:

When I was in primary school, I didn’t cheat. But from lower secondary onwards, I did. […] because there were so many subjects. […] I wasn’t good at every subject. (Student 2)

I think in upper-secondary school […], cheating seems to be okay because we are forced to study some subjects that we don’t really like and that are not really important. It is very different from university, where we only learn subjects related to our future career, so I think we should not cheat. (Student 4)

As these quotes show, informants rationalised cheating behaviours because they perceived secondary-level curricula to be overloaded, complex, unimportant, or even irrelevant to their lives. Mathematics and science were perceived as being particularly content-heavy. These perceptions are supported by the fact that private tutoring is popular among secondary school students, partly because it helps them learn the overloaded curriculum (Bray et al. 2016). Furthermore, MoEYS (2015) also supported these perceptions when it admitted that the current curriculum is often disconnected from students’ lives and interests and fails to equip them with adequate knowledge or skills for their futures.

The international academic dishonesty literature (e.g. Anderman, Griesinger, and Westerfield 1998; Anderman and Koenka 2017) has clearly and consistently shown that students with intrinsic learning motivation are less likely to cheat compared to those with extrinsic drives (e.g. performance evaluation). Also, until some time ago, Cambodians often viewed education as a means of attesting social and economic status instead of the acquisition of useful necessary skills (Vickery 1984, 20). This view can be enhanced by the current secondary school curricula, which may not be designed to inspire or motivate students to learn; this may have led to the pervasive cheating problem. The following subsection addresses how these problems are worsened by poor instructions from teachers.

Relationships with teachers

All informants indicated that their relationships with their teachers influenced their cheating behaviours. Some said that their motives for and deterrents against cheating tendencies were related to teachers’ unfair favouring of bribers over non-bribers and those who attended private tutoring lessons over those who did not. This situation was described as follows:

Since Grade 4, teachers seemed to favour students who gave them money every month. Although such students didn’t do well on tests, the teachers still gave them good grades. Such teachers’ unfair behaviours motivated me and other students to peek at textbooks during exams, as we didn’t want to fail or get lower scores than the teachers’ favourite students. (Student 3)

Some teachers were really strict with the students who didn’t attend their supplementary classes. They didn’t allow those students to cheat but allowed other students, who attended their supplementary classes, to cheat. (Student 2)

Punishment was also a factor that worked both as a motivator towards and a deterrent against cheating behaviours. In Cambodia, teachers’ use of corporal punishment is not uncommon (MoWA, UNICEF Cambodia, and CDC 2014). Student 5, who rarely cheated during primary school, said that he was afraid of receiving corporal punishment for cheating. A similar fear was expressed by Student 6:

In primary school, if a student was stupid, my teacher would hit the student. Sometimes, the teacher would pull the student’s ears or hair very hard. […] I was afraid of the teacher, and this made me look at my friends’ answers during math exams when the teacher was far away from me. This was my reason for cheating. […] But, if he knew I was cheating, as a warning to others, he would make me stand in front of the classroom.

Furthermore, teachers’ pedagogical styles and their interest in student learning and behaviour also influenced students’ cheating behaviours. Although some informants had encountered teachers who, out of concern for students’ academic achievements and integrity, had cracked down on exam cheating, such teachers seemed to be rare:

Because my teacher was absent frequently […], I didn’t learn anything. […] [That is why] the other students and I cheated on the exam. (Student 17)

Because teachers didn’t provide proper explanations in class, […] I had to ask for my friends’ help during the exams. […] Sometimes, the teachers would get really angry when students asked for further explanations in class. (Student 13)

I had one teacher who inspired students to study, and we didn’t even think about cheating, [..] [but] most of the other classes were not enjoyable. We would go to class just to sit at the desk and listen to the teacher. […] The teachers taught a lot of lessons by asking students to read textbooks. It was so boring […] to read textbooks again and again. […] The students became lazy, and as a result, we cheated on tests because it was the shortcut to success. (Student 12)

Interestingly, the teachers’ dominance over their students seemed to decrease as the grade level increased. The informants revealed that some secondary school students interrupted lessons, locked their teachers out of classrooms, and even beat up strict teachers. In fact, it has been reported that such student behaviours have considerably contributed towards reducing teachers’ motivation to work with students in Cambodia (VSO Cambodia 2008). This stressful relationship, particularly at the secondary school level, seems to be one contributing factor influencing cheating practices because, as informants observed, such demotivated teachers tended to not interrupt student matters – that is, ignore both students’ cheating and learning.

Nonetheless, informants’ views regarding teachers were mixed. While they often criticised their teachers for being unpleasant, unethical, and corrupt, they also viewed them favourably as sympathisers, supporters, and collaborators in student cheating.

Because the invigilators were our teachers, they were sympathetic towards us, so they sometimes ignored students’ cheating. (Student 8)

During the Grade 9 national exam, my English teacher was not an invigilator but a marker. He told us – students who attended his supplementary class – to make a special sign on the answer sheet so that he could give us better marks. (Student 17)

Informants also reported that, sometimes, like teachers in their own schools, teacher-invigilators in other schools also supported their cheating during the national exams without demanding bribes:

The invigilators understand that, if students fail, they need to repeat the year. This imposes a financial burden on students. They don’t try to catch students. […] They understand what students’ lives will be like. (Student 5)

Thus, the informants’ narratives showed that students’ relationships with teachers significantly influenced their cheating behaviours. Teachers’ unfair treatment of students, use of corporal punishments, poor pedagogical methods, indifference towards student learning and behaviour, demands for bribes, and support for cheating have influenced students’ cheating decisions.

Some of these narratives echo previous findings in the literature. Previous studies have indicated that students tend to cheat due to teachers’ unfairness (Graham et al. 1994), poor instructional methods (Murdock, Beauchamp, and Hinton 2008; Bertram Gallant 2017), and low teaching enthusiasm (Orosz et al. 2015). Studies have also noted that, while close teacher-student relationships generally discourage students from cheating (Stearns 2001), they may also dissuade teachers from embarrassing cheating students (Davis, Drinan, and Bertram Gallant 2009, 152). Cambodia seems to exemplify an extreme case of the latter situation because students’ attendance of private tutoring cultivates close teacher-student relationships (Bray et al. 2016). Furthermore, Lebanon’s national exams (Vlaardingerbroek, Shehab, and Alameh 2011) present another case where teacher-invigilators may be dissuaded from embarrassing exam-takers; in this case, teachers and students unite to cheat the exam implementer – the government. As such, close teacher-student relationships encourage teachers to ignore and even support student cheating. Thus, the teacher-student relationship seems to be a strong factor influencing cheating practices in Cambodia.

Parents’ attitudes

Informants’ reports suggested that not only parental pressure but also parents’ attitudes towards cheating influenced students’ cheating behaviours. These attitudes ranged from zero tolerance to active involvement in their children’s cheating. Student 5, who was not a frequent cheater throughout his schooling, was never allowed to cheat by his parents. However, such cases appear to be very rare. Most informants reported that their parents found exam cheating more or less acceptable, as reflected in this typical comment:

They advised me not to cheat during the monthly and semester exams in my school. They never supported cheating. But, when I took the national exams, they tried their best to help me by giving me ‘cheat books’, and they bought a cheat sheet somewhere and stuck it on my body so that I could carry it into the exam room. They also gave me extra money to bribe the invigilators. (Student 3)

Informants claimed that their parents’ involvement in cheating included obtaining and making cheat sheets, sewing hidden pockets into shirts to hide cheat sheets, giving advice on cheating techniques, and, most importantly, providing money to bribe invigilators.

However, the informants indicated that some students lacked such support for cheating. This was the case for students from disciplined families and for those whose families could not afford to pay bribes:

My family members, who are farmers, couldn’t earn money easily, as you know. […] During the Grade 9 semester exams, we could buy exam answer keys [from teachers], but if they were wrong, it was not easy to recover the money. […] In my school, only some rich students did it. [..] Children had to ask their parents for the necessary money to pass their exams. [..] My parents wanted to do it but couldn’t afford it. […] Whenever I attempted to persuade my parents to provide me with money, they always answered, ‘No.’ (Student 6)

The informants’ narratives are seemingly attested by limited evidence from previous studies, which indicate that parents’ attitudes can affect cheating occurrence (Koljatic, Silva, and Ardiles 2003; Lonsdale 2017). In the Cambodian case, however, it seems reasonable to consider the prerequisite that cheating should be ‘affordable’, as parents’ attitudes are often subject to financial considerations such as household budgets. Informant narratives showed that many parents viewed cheating as a common and ‘fair’ practice for success and felt that its costs, demanded by teachers and schools, should be affordable.

Peer behaviour

Academic dishonesty research has identified peer behaviour’s dominant influence on student cheating (McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield 2012, 113–122), which is stronger in collectivist cultures than individualistic cultures (McCabe, Feghali, and Abdallah 2008; Payan, Reardon, and McCorkle 2010). This may explain the Cambodian case, which is situated within a collectivist society (Berkvens 2017).

Informant reports confirmed this point; most stated that they just copied other students’ cheating behaviours. They also noted that non-cheaters were considered ‘odd’ in such an environment. In addition, students who did not want to cheat were pressured to join their peers in cheating behaviours:

I was in Grade 11, […] I didn’t care [about the score]. Half of my paper was blank. My friends couldn’t stand it; they took my pen, cheated for me, wrote for me, and said, ‘Come on, you have to write something on your paper.’ Then they wrote answers for me. They worked like a team. I didn’t want to be a part of it, but I joined them. (Student 11)

I didn’t pay the invigilators during the science exams [..] because I could manage it easily by myself. […] But, the invigilators sometimes asked me to share my answers with other students in the classroom. (Student 8)

Informants indicated that students who did not cooperate with their peers were labelled ‘unkind’. Their behaviour may be considered as being against Cambodia’s Buddhist culture, which encourages harmony, cooperative attitudes, and mutual aid (Bit 1991, 22–23). This echoes a similar case from the Philippines (Diego 2017), where many students ‘share their answers even if they know it is not the right thing to do’ (132). There are indications that peer disapproval is the strongest motivator for changing cheating behaviours (McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield 2012, 116–118); however, in Cambodia, it seems to have a reverse effect (i.e. adversely affects honest behaviours).

Institutional policies

Most informants indicated that institutional policies on academic integrity significantly influenced their exam cheating behaviours. They stated that private schools generally implemented stricter rules compared to public schools. Student 9, who transferred to a private upper-secondary school from a public lower-secondary school, remarked that the private-school students did not cheat because their teachers taught them well during regular classes and did not take bribes from students thanks to high teacher salaries and strict school rules. However, all participants who attended private schools did not share the same experience. For example, Student 13, who was only enrolled in private schools (lower and upper-secondary), confessed to cheating frequently during that period.

The informants also stated that the MoEYS anti-cheating policy drastically reduced their cheating behaviours. One informant, who took exams under this policy, remarked:

We changed a lot […] [of] our attitudes towards studying. We spent most of our time studying. […] We felt really nervous, and we were afraid that we would fail if we behaved like before. […] The Grade 12 national exam was really strict. None of the invigilators requested or took money from the candidates. They also didn’t allow cheating as they had before. (Student 3)

Most informants, including 12 who took the G12 exam under the anti-cheating policy, viewed the policy as effective and desirable for making exams fair and reducing corruption. This was consistent with public opinions in Cambodia (Everett and Kaing 2014).

Meanwhile, some informants also pointed out the policy’s shortcomings. Cheating behaviours diminished but were not completely eliminated. For example, Student 5 observed that exam centres in urban areas, where the inspection personnel were easily available (e.g. a school inspected by an education minister), were far stricter than those in rural areas.

The most serious flaw seemed to be distrust regarding policy implementation. Therefore, regardless of cheating opportunities or the lack thereof, half of the 12 informants still made cheating preparations (e.g. obtaining cheat sheets, bringing a calculator, and so on). Some informants doubted that the policy would be implemented strictly and consistently:

After the new policy [was introduced], some students still believed that, like they had experienced in the past, exams would not be administered strictly every year. […] For this year’s exam, some students believe that the exam will not be administered strictly because of the election. As you know, we have learned this from past experiences. (Student 17)

Such comments revealed a distrust towards the government, which has often used educational policies for political purposes rather than to meet people’s needs (Ayres 2000; Kusakabe 2009). In contrast with the government’s intentions, the informants expected the government to appeal to youth voters by increasing exam pass rates – that is, loosening the policy’s implementation – as similar incidents had occurred in the past (e.g. Chhorn and Rann 2009; Sen 2017).

Previous research has provided consistent evidence that an ethical environment is effective for reducing cheating; such an environment can be created through strictly implemented institutional policies (McCabe, Treviño, and Butterfield 2012, 91–112), as is further evidenced by the informants’ narratives. In Cambodia, although the policy drastically reduced cheating, some students remained doubtful regarding its actual enforcement in eliminating cheating attempts. Thus, the policy’s effectiveness for reducing students’ propensity towards cheating behaviours was weakened by their lack of trust in its implementation.

Conclusion

This study examined when, how, and why Cambodian students had or had not cheated on exams throughout their schooling. The results showed that, although cheating was more prevalent at the secondary level than the primary or university level, individual students in this study had diverse experiences regarding cheating frequency and when it started, stopped, increased, or decreased.

Furthermore, using the four-dimensional lens offered by Bertram Gallant (2008), the study identified five major perceived factors influencing cheating practices: ‘curricula’ and ‘institutional policies’ as part of the institutional dimension and ‘relationships with teachers’, ‘parental attitudes’, and ‘peer behaviour’ as part of the organisational dimension. In addition, it considered ‘academic performance’ and ‘students’ moral attitudes’ as part of the internal dimension. Moreover, it mentioned factors that could fall under the societal dimension, such as poverty, prevalence of corruption, post-colonial issues, domestic politics, international pressure on the economy, social behaviours, and technology changes.

Concerning the five major factors identified by the study, the findings generally accorded with the academic dishonesty literature. Nevertheless, the contextualised specificities underlying the operation of these factors were revealed. For example, the overloaded and demotivating Cambodian curriculum contributes towards cheating behaviours in secondary schools. The unhealthy relationships between low-paid teachers and their students influence cheating practices. The actual effect of parents’ attitudes towards cheating is often subject to financial considerations. Collectivist societies can amplify the influence of peer behaviours. Lack of trust in their implementation can weaken the influence of institutional policies.

Among these five major factors, the most significant in the Cambodian case is likely the teacher-student relationship, which has received inadequate attention in international academic dishonesty literature. Cambodian students’ cheating behaviours seemingly revolve around this factor. Some cheat as a benefit from an unhealthy teacher-student relationship; some cheat to compensate for the lack of benefits from such a relationship. Others do not cheat because they lack such a relationship and fear adverse consequences from an unsympathetic teacher; only a few reject cheating due to a healthy teacher-student relationship.

These findings imply that combating exam cheating in Cambodia requires comprehensive and context-specific measures. Simply promoting anti-cheating measures during the final school year can be ineffective, although it can be a first step. It requires extensive efforts such as initiating curriculum reforms, promoting ethical behaviours to students and their parents, and building truly trustful teacher-student relationships in the lower grades.

In the exam cheating situation, Cambodia may be similar to other developing countries and different from developed countries, such as the United States, where research on academic dishonesty has flourished. Nevertheless, this study may contribute towards increasing our understanding of the exam cheating phenomenon not only in developing countries but also in the wider educational context. This is because the internationalisation of educational institutions is making exam cheating an increasingly global issue.

Acknowledgments

The researcher appreciates all the research participants and assistants as well as her anonymous reviewers. The researcher is grateful to the University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Education for accepting her as a Visiting Scholar while this research was being conducted.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the researcher.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [Grant number 17K04721].