Land grabs and primitive accumulation in deltaic Bangladesh: interactions between neoliberal globalization, state interventions, power relations and peasant resistance

Abstract

This essay provides theoretical and empirical analysis of the interrelationships between land grabs, primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession (ABD) in the context of capitalist development. Evidence from a multi-class peasant formation in deltaic Bangladesh indicates that land grabs have been propelled by interactions between neoliberal globalization, state interventions, power relations and peasant resistance. Key roles have been played by illegal violence and de-linking of poor peasants from production organization and clientelist relations providing access to land. Establishment of a shrimp zone for export production has led to systematic eviction of the poor, backed by state power. Poor peasant resistance has shifted towards overt forms involving coalition-building and collective action. It is argued that the concept of primitive accumulation can subsume both market and non-market mechanisms as well as voluntary and involuntary transactions involving different degrees of intentionality, inclusive of deliberate dispossession, unintended consequences and negative externalities. Primitive accumulation and ABD correspond to distinct historical phases of capitalism and are subsumable under a generic concept of ongoing capitalism-facilitating accumulation. The dynamics of ‘actually existing capitalism’ display a two-way and recursive causal relationship in which continuing primitive accumulation is as much a consequence of expanding capitalist production as its precondition.

Keywords:

• land grabs
• primitive accumulation
• accumulation by dispossession
• peasant resistance
• capitalist development
• Bangladesh

Notes

¹The domain of the ‘economic’ is defined to consist of markets and non-market institutions involved in production and distribution such as state agencies and enterprises, operating according to agreed price rules without involving force. In contradistinction, ‘extra-economic’ pertains to other kinds of mechanisms involved in the allocation and transfer of resources, inclusive of the use of force and violence.

²The area of the (old) Noakhali district, dating from the preceding British and Pakistani periods, has been divided under latter-day Bangladesh into three smaller administrative units designated as the (new) Noakhali, Lakshmipur and Feni districts.

³As discussed elsewhere, a stratum of landless peasants existed in colonial Bengal (Bangladesh) without any prior enclosure process being involved – reflecting its very different social–historical circumstances (Adnan 1985, 63, fn 17, 2012).

⁴While extra-economic force has certainly been used in many cases, there are also historical and contemporary instances in which transactions involving credit, alcohol, drugs and other resources have been used to orchestrate alienation of the lands of poor peasants and indigenous peoples through market or non-market processes that involve persuasion or temptation, rather than the use of force (e.g. Adnan 2004, Adnan and Dastidar 2011).

⁵Harvey's conceptualisation of ABD has also given rise to theoretical debates about conflation of its mechanisms with the normal workings of capitalism and the questionable status of ‘fictitious financial accumulation’ (Brenner 2006, 98–102, Ashman and Callinicos 2006, 119, Fine 2006, 143–146, Harvey 2006, Adnan 2012).

⁶The term primitive accumulation has also been used by scholars in the analysis of contemporary land grabs and capitalist expansion in China (Walker 2006, 6, 2008a, 464) and India (Harriss-White et al.2009, 540–541).

⁷Wolf (1969, 26–27 and 280–281) notes the simultaneous pursuit of land seizure and denial by private haciendas encroaching upon the territory of Indian peasants in Mexico.

⁸See Moore (1966, 13, 28), Brenner (1976, 70–71, 1977, 73–75), Perelman (1984, 46), De Angelis (2004, 79) and Adnan (1985, PE-62, fn 12).

⁹See Scott (1985, 1986), Adas (1986), Turton (1986), Kerkvliet (1986, 1990, 2009), Adnan (2007), and Walker (2008a).

¹⁰See studies of resistance in the Philippines (Kerkvliet 1990, 179–182), Bangladesh (Adnan 2007, 183–185), and China (Walker 2008a, 463).

¹¹During 1973–2000, the Meghna estuary experienced gross accretion of 1372 sq. km. and gross erosion of 864 sq. km., resulting in net land formation of 508 sq km. Maps and satellite images of changes in the deltaic landscape over this period are shown in de Wilde (2011, 21–35).

¹²Ali (1981, 185), Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004 and 22 June 2004), and de Wilde (2011, 181–182).

¹³During the British colonial period, the procedures for determining the ownership of char lands were governed by the Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation of 1825. After independence, the provisions of this law were incorporated into the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act (EBSATA) of 1950 (Siddiqui 1981a, 16, 1981b, 70). The latter allowed former owners to reclaim eroded lands that had re-surfaced in the same location within a period of 20 years after their re-emergence. However, this law was amended by the Awami League government in 1972 through Presidential Order No. 135, which decreed that all newly accreted chars would henceforth become khas or state-owned. This, in turn, was amended by the BNP (Bangladesh National Party) government on 13 July 1994 through PO Order No. 15/1994. The amended law allowed accreted lands to be reclaimed within 30 years of their emergence by any former owners of private property in the same location; otherwise, ownership of such char areas passed to the state by default.

¹⁴The term ‘ambiguous land’ was initially used by Sato (2000, 156–161) to designate very specific kinds of anomalies between co-existent land rights in Thailand. Comparable situations have been noted in Indonesia (Peluso 1992), Honduras (Jansen and Roquas 1998, 83–85, 92–94) and Africa (Cotula and Vermeulen 2011, 41). I have redefined and broadened the notion of ‘ambiguous land’ to subsume all types of anomalies in the status of landed property resulting from co-existent contending claims of de jure and/or de facto rights on the same area.

¹⁵The term jotedar refers broadly to the classes of small landlords and rich peasants which took control of landed property and the power structure in rural Bangladesh after the abolition of the large zemindari or landlord estates by the East Bengal State Acquisition Act of 1950 (Abdullah 1976, 68–89).

¹⁶Settlement of state lands by landless peasants took place in various char areas of Noakhali, including Ramgati, Sandwip, Hatiya, Companyganj and Sudharam. However, jotedars attempted to stop this process by force. For instance, they made a particularly violent attack on 4 November 1992 to take over lands held by squatter households in the chars of Nabagram (Hossain 2003, 460).

¹⁷Vide settlement no. 91/85-86 by the Government of Bangladesh.

¹⁸Vide letter from Ministry of Land to Noakhali district administration dated 30 May 2000 (Ref: 91-71/98-1901/SA of 29 November 1998), regarding allotment of land to landless households in Char Baggardona of Sudharam Upazila of Noakhali.

¹⁹For instance, jotedars launched a violent attack on 29 June 1984 against landless peasants allotted plots by the LRP (Matin 1986b, Adnan 2006).

²⁰Allotment of state lands was given on the basis of 99-year leases (Ajker Kagaj 16 June 2004).

²¹ Desher Khabor (23 January 1999) and de Wilde (2011, 164–168). Also, copies of official lists of the occupants of state lands with reference to the Noakhali Shrimp Zone.

²²Fraudulent practices, including forgery of land rights documents, were rampant in Noakhali (Foyej 2004).

²³ Jugantar (4 June 2001) and Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004 and 22 June 2004). The clearing of forests in the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna delta for land reclamation can be traced back to the expansion of the Mughal Empire in the early seventeenth century (Eaton 1997, 210–226).

²⁴ Jugantar (4 June 2001), Nabil (2003) and Sajjaduzzaman et al. (2005, 732).

²⁵Nabil (2003, 21), Jugantar (4 June 2001), Janakantha (11 December 2003 and 14 December 2003), Prothom Alo (11 December 2003 and 21 January 2004) and Sangram (2 January 2004).

²⁶Nabil (2003, 20–21), and Jugantar (4 June 2001). Statement by an arrested banadasyu leader (Sangram, 2 January 2004).

²⁷ Sangram (2 January 2004) and Sajjaduzzaman et al. (2005, 733).

²⁸The World Bank and the UNDP funded the Shrimp Culture Project in 1986 and the Third Fisheries Project in 1991 (Guimaraes 2002, 298–299, 307–311), while the Asian Development Bank supported another shrimp project in Chittagong in southeastern Bangladesh.

²⁹The Chingri Mahal (shrimp zone) rules, memo no. 217 of the Ministry of Land, dated 30 March 1992 (Ittefaq, 5 December 1999).

³⁰ Ittefaq (5 December 1999), Noakhali (27 October 1996) and Abayab (16 November 1996).

³¹ Banglabazar Patrika (24 October 2000) and Ittefaq (25 October 2000). For instance, in 2000, armed gangs sent in by powerful interest groups attacked 75 landless households in Char Bagga, causing death and injury.

³²Foyej (2004), Prothom Alo (2 August 2001), Manabjamin (2 August 2001), Ittefaq (2 August 2001 and 3 August 2001), Jugantar (3 August 2001), Ajker Kagaj (3 August 2001) and Sangbad (3 August 2001).

³³ Ittefaq (1 December 2001), Jugantar (1 December 2001), Bhorer Kagaj (3 August 2001 and 2 December 2001), Ajker Kagaj (2 December 2001 and 4 December 2001) and Sangbad (3 December 2001).

³⁴ Sangbad (13 September 1999). These politicians were reported to have been offered commissions in the form of ‘shares’ of the thousands of acres that were expected to be grabbed.

³⁵Nabil (2003, 22), Sajjaduzzaman et al. (2005, 733), Jugantar (7 March 2007) and Amar Desh (14 May 2007).

³⁶Nabil (2003, 19), Foyej (2004), Prothom Alo (21 January 2004) and Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004).

³⁷ Ittefaq (6 August 2000), Banglar Bani (31 July 2000) and Prothom Alo (7 August 2000).

³⁸ Samakal Barta (25 February 2003) and Lok Sangbad (1 March 2003).

³⁹ Loka Sangbad (30 May 1999 and 1 July 1999), Ittefaq (1 July 1999), Banglabazar Patrika (2 July 1999) and Muktakantha (4 July 1999 and 6 July 1999).

⁴⁰ Prabhat (1 March 2000, 3 March 2000 and 15 March 2000), Ittefaq (1 March 2000 and 14 February 2001) and Muktakantha (1 March 2000).

⁴¹ Sangbad (13 September 1999) and Ittefaq (5 December 1999).

⁴²Minutes of the meeting of 1 October 2002 of the SRDM committee, chaired by the DC of Noakhali, dated 18 November 2002, Memo no. JePra/Noa/Chingri/S, A/13-30/2002-1883(30). Endorsed by letter from the DC Office of Noakhali to the Secretary of the Ministry of Land, dated 21 November 2002, Memo no. JePro/Noa/Chingri/S, A/13-30/2002/1898.

⁴³Letter from Ministry of Land to DC of Noakhali, dated 6 May 2003, Reference no. Bhum/Sha-8/600/2002/320, and Ministry of Land, Memo No. Land/Section/8/ Revenue/227/91/217. Manabjamin (26 May 2003), Banglabazar Patrika (27 May 2003) and Loka Sangbad (1 June 2003).

⁴⁴ Loka Sangbad (1 March 2004). The committee's proposal was based on large farms suitable for brackish water shrimps (penaeus monodon or bagda chingri), even though their production was not feasible in Noakhali because of inadequate salinity. However the committee unwarrantedly interposed cost–returns data of freshwater prawns (macrobrachium rosenbergii or galda chingri), which could be grown in Noakhali, but needed much smaller units based on family labour to be profitable (i.e. by excluding the significant supervision costs of wage labour). See also Guimaraes (2002, 181–184, Table 7.1, and 205–213, Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1).

⁴⁵Framing in terms of ‘empty’ lands has been used to justify the eviction of the incumbent peasantry (Guttal and Monsalve 2011, 75, Borras and Franco 2010, 9–10, 19–20) and take over their lands (LRAN 2011, 8).

⁴⁶Nearly 15,000 households had been living in the designated area of the NSZ for the preceding 12–15 years, of whom 8000 had obtained formal land rights of one kind or another. Nearly 6000 acres of agricultural land had been occupied illegally for shrimp farms, with 4000 acres of forest being destroyed in the process, before the declaration of the zone was made. Vide letter from the DC Office of Noakhali to the Secretary of the Ministry of Land, dated 21 November 2002, Memo no. JePro/Noa/Chingri/S, A/13-30/2002/1898. Also, Star (29 February 2004) and Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004).

⁴⁷ Banglabazar Patrika (27 May 2003).

⁴⁸Petition addressed to the DC of Noakhali by NSULCA on 25 May 2003.

⁴⁹Press release by the NSULCA on 25 May 2003. Manabjamin (26 May 2003), Jugantar (26 May 2003), Banglabazar Patrika (10 June 2003), Prothom Alo (26 May 2003), Ajker Kagaj (26 May 2003) and Gonojagoron (26 May 2003).

⁵⁰ Loka Sangbad (1 June 2003) and Banglabazar Patrika (10 June 2003).

⁵¹ Prothom Alo (20 January 2004). There were more than 47,000 acres of state lands in Noakhali, of which only around a quarter was located within the shrimp zone.

⁵² Jugantar (22 June 2003), Banglabazar Patrika (22 June 2003) and Prothom Alo (25 June 2003).

⁵³ Prothom Alo (20 October 2004).

⁵⁴ Prothom Alo (20 October 2004).

⁵⁵ Prothom Alo (20 October 2004) and Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004).

⁵⁶Nabil (2003, 22), Khabarpatra (23 September 2003), Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004) and Prothom Alo (20 October 2004).

⁵⁷ Bhorer Kagoj (15 December 2003).

⁵⁸ Sangbad (20 September 2003).

⁵⁹ Sangbad (20 September 2003) and Star (29 February 2004).

⁶⁰ Prothom Alo (22 October 2003), Manabjamin (22 October 2003) and Banglabazar Patrika (22 October 2003).

⁶¹Comments from Edward Lahiff on an earlier draft helped to clarify this point.

⁶²These included the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) commanded by army officers as well as the coastguard of the navy to block possible escape routes of the banadasyus by waterways. Kaiser (2003, 4), Banglabazar Patrika (10 December 2003 and 11 December 2003), Janakantha (10 December 2003) and Bhorer Kagaj (15 December 2003).

⁶³ Janakantha (10 December 2003) and Bhorer Kagaj (15 December 2003).

⁶⁴ Bhorer Kagaj (15 December 2003).

⁶⁵ Bhorer Kagaj (15 December 2003), Janakantha (19 December 2003), Manabjamin (21 December 2003) and Banglabazar Patrika (21 December 2003).

⁶⁶Foyej (2003) and Kaiser (2004). Major national dailies provided detailed coverage of these violent events in the remote chars of Noakhali: Prothom Alo (8 December 2003, 9 December 2003 and 10 December 2003), Banglabazar Patrika (8 December 2003, 9 December 2003, 11 December 2003 and 21 December 2003), The Independent (11 December 2003), Janakantha (9 December 2003, 10 December 2003 and 19 December 2003), and Manabjamin (14 December 2003 and 21 December 2003).

⁶⁷Such retributive justice had precedents in the tradition of peasant movements in Bangladesh. In 1969, angry mobs had executed cattle thieves in the char areas of Tangail under the banner of the local peasant association (Krishak Samity) (Hossain 2003, 318–319).

⁶⁸ Banglabazar Patrika (8 February 2004) and Janakantha (21 April 2004 and 2 June 2004).

⁶⁹ Manabjamin (12 December 2003, 13 December 2003 and 16 December 2003) and Kaiser (2003, 5–6).

⁷⁰ Jugantar (14 December 2003), Manabjamin (17 December 2003, 28 March 2004 and 15 July 2004), Prothom Alo (17 December 2003 and 12 July 2004), Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004), Janakantha (11 July 2004), and Banglabazar Patrika (13 July 2004 and 24 March 2004).

⁷¹ Banglabazar Patrika (24 March 2004) and Manabjamin (28 March 2004).

⁷² Janakantha (11 July 2004) and Prothom Alo (11 July 2004).

⁷³ Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004), Janakantha (11 July 2004), Prothom Alo (12 July 2004), Banglabazar Patrika (13 July 2004) and Manabjamin (15 July 2004).

⁷⁴ Banglabazar Patrika (24 March 2004), Manabjamin (28 March 2004) and Janakantha (11 July 2004).

⁷⁵ Banglabazar Patrika (24 March 2004) and Manabjamin (28 March 2004).

⁷⁶ Manabjamin (15 July 2004).

⁷⁷ Prothom Alo (24 February 2004) and Banglabazar Patrika (2 March 2004).

⁷⁸ Manabjamin (19 March 2004 and 22 March 2004), Jugantar (19 March 2004) and Ittefaq (19 March 2004).

⁷⁹ Prothom Alo (12 July 2004).

⁸⁰ Jugantar (22 July 2004) and Prothom Alo (22 July 2004).

⁸¹ Bhorer Kagoj (15 December 2003).

⁸² Prothom Alo (11 July 2004).

⁸³Some left-wing political parties also attempted to organize the poor peasants of Noakhali. For instance, the Krishak Samity, a front organization of the Bangladesher Biplabi Communist Party (M-L), organized landless peasants in Char Dhalchar of Hatiya (Hossain 2003, 459).

⁸⁴The NGO, Nijera Kori, played a leading role in supporting the poor peasantry all through, while involvement of the other organizations varied according to the issue concerned. The latter included BELA (Bangladesh Paribesh Ainbid Samity), BLAST (Bangladesh Legal Aid Services Trust), ASK (Ain o Shalish Kendra), ALRD (Association for Land Reform and Development), BSEHR (Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights), as well as a team of socially committed lawyers based in Noakhali.

⁸⁵de Wilde (2011, 156). Writ petition no. 7248/2003 filed by Nijera Kori, in collaboration with BELA and BSEHR, and statement issued by BELA as advocate for the petitioner. Manabjamin (16 December 2003), Ajker Kagaj (16 December 2003), The Independent (16 December 2003), and Banglabazar Patrika (16 December 2003).

⁸⁶Rule of the High Court, dated 24 January 2004, on Writ Petition No. 7248 of 2003. Dinkal (25 January 2004) and Prothom Alo (25 January 2004).

⁸⁷Writ Petition no. 5194/2004, filed by Nijera Kori in collaboration with BELA, BLAST, ASK, ALRD and BSEHR, and Rule on Writ Petition no. 5194 of 2004, dated 8 September 2004, by the High Court Division (Special Original Jurisdiction).

⁸⁸Order on Writ Petition no. 5194 of 2004, dated 13 March 2005, in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, High Court Division (Special Original Jurisdiction).

⁸⁹ Prothom Alo (25 January 2004).

⁹⁰ Prothom Alo (1 May 2006).

⁹¹ Banglabazar Patrika (10 June 2003).

⁹²Comparable mechanisms for circumventing restrictions on sale of land have been noted in Nicaragua (Deininger 2003, 122–123).

⁹³This was in sharp contrast to the more accepted and legitimate role of the state in acquiring private lands for public purposes. Comparable roles have been played by the state in the special economic zones of India (Walker 2008b, 580, citing Bhaduri 2008, Levien 2012, 941) and China (Walker 2006, 4, 2008a, 464–466).

⁹⁴The roles of the executive and legislative machineries of the state in earlier instances of land enclosure and primitive accumulation have been noted by Marx (2010, 505–506, 528) and Harvey (2005, 145–150). The state has played comparable roles in other parts of Bangladesh (Adnan 2004, Adnan and Dastidar 2011).

⁹⁵ Ajker Kagaj (16 June 2004).

⁹⁶Such transformation in the form of resistance serves to dispel the belief that subordinate groups in non-revolutionary situations only adopt ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985, 1986), lacking the capability to confront those oppressing and exploiting them (Kerkvliet 1990, 179–182, Adnan 2007, 183–185, Walker 2008a, 463).

⁹⁷In contrast, the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh undertook armed insurgency under a political leadership in order to contest the forced takeover of their lands (Adnan 2004, Adnan and Dastidar 2011). In certain parts of India, land grabs by the state and private corporations have been challenged by Maoist revolutionary armed movements based on mobilization of the poor peasantry and indigenous peoples (Walker 2008b, 582–583, 596).

⁹⁸Comments from Md. Anisur Rahman reinforced this point. Cf. Walker (2008a, 469) on comparable attempts by the state to confine peasant struggles in China within the NGO fold.

⁹⁹ Amar Desh (14 May 2007) and Jugantar (7 March 2007).

¹⁰⁰Comparable instances of land grabs for speculative gains have been noted in other parts of Bangladesh (Adnan and Dastidar 2011, 88–91, Feldman and Geisler 2012).

¹⁰¹Ironically, these commercial units, even if located within the Noakhali Shrimp Zone, cannot produce brackish water shrimps due to inadequate salinity.

¹⁰²This hypothesis is based on qualitative assessment of fieldwork observations and documentary sources. Representative quantitative data on inter-temporal trends in the land areas under the control of non-capitalist and capitalist enterprises in Noakhali are not available.

¹⁰³Critical comments from Barbara Harriss-White served to clarify this point.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shapan Adnan

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the international conference on Global Land Grabbing during 6–8 April 2011, held at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, and organised by the Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) in collaboration with the Journal of Peasant Studies and the Future Agricultures Consortium. I am indebted to the late Willem Assies for his encouragement and help when I began work on an earlier version of this essay. I acknowledge with thanks comments on earlier drafts and specific issues from A.M.M. Shawkat Ali, Jun Borras, Anjan Datta, Barbara Harriss-White, Judith Heyer, Jens Lerche, Mushtaq Khan, Edward Lahiff, David Ludden, Nilufar Matin, Md. Anisur Rahman and Kamal Siddiqui. Editorial comments from an anonymous reviewer were very useful for revising the essay. Fieldwork in the study area and access to relevant documents were made possible with the help of Khushi Kabir, Rezanur Rahman Rose, Jalal, Gouranga Ghosh and other colleagues from Nijera Kori. I am obliged to Ranajit Dastidar, Shamsul Huda and Promit Adnan for helping me with obtaining specific documents and information, and Mobarak Hossain for assistance with preparation of the text and the map.