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Abstract
The eruption of contestation is likely when development projects involve the displacement and resettlement of local communities, such as for dam-building, mining and plantations. Impact assessments are regarded as critical to mitigate a project’s adverse effects. However, development projects are institutional interventions and dependent on the endogenously grown context in which they are implemented. An oft-disregarded principle is that land-based institutions in a rural, developing context play a role in the provision of social security and welfare, rather than functioning for economic transfer. When that function is not acknowledged, the impact assessment – be it an environmental impact assessment (EIA), social impact assessment or hydropower sustainability assessment – merely serves as ‘window-dressing’ to legitimize the imposition of institutions that inevitably evolve into empty or non-credible institutions. The paper provides a compelling case: the resettlement of the Orang Asli, a Malaysian indigenous community, whose land was usurped for the Kelau Dam. By utilizing the Formal, Actual and Targeted (FAT) institutional framework (see Introduction, Ho Citation2016), it is demonstrated that the impact assessment served the supposition of communal rights by non-credible, private title. It is concluded that improved implementation perhaps does not lie in the impact assessment, but rather in distinguishing pre-conditions that constitute a ‘no-go-area’.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers of this journal, as well as to Wim Ravesteijn and Eefje Cuppen for their helpful advice on earlier drafts of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Bin Md Saman Nor-Hisham is adjunct researcher at Minzu University of China and senior lecturer at the University of Technology Mara (UITM), Malaysia. He obtained his PhD from the Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands. Dr. Nor-Hisham specializes in town and regional planning, with particular reference to environmental assessment, large-infrastructure and dam projects, land use, and public participation. His articles have appeared in journals such as the Planning Bulletin and the International Review for Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development. He has worked as consultant for the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development, the State Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and the Department of Town and Country Planning, Perak. Email: [email protected]
Peter Ho is a professor at Minzu University of China and Delft University of Technology. He has published widely in the leading journals of development, planning and environment (H-index: 28). Furthermore, he has published over 10 books with Oxford University Press, Routledge, and Blackwell. Ho has worked extensively on the revision of ‘Western’ theories of development in relation to institutions and property rights. He was named a Fellow in China’s 1000 Talents Program; awarded the Kapp Prize by EAEPE, one of the largest European economics associations; was named a Leading Expert by the China State Ethnic Affairs Commission; and was awarded the Consolidator Grant by the European Research Council (www.recoland.eu). Corresponding author: [email protected]
Notes
1 In this context, Grabel aptly notes that the credibility of institutions is ‘always secured endogenously … rather than exogenously’ (Citation2000, 1).
2 For more information, see the discussion in the Introduction to this collection by Ho (Citation2016a).
3 For a detailed discussion of the conceptual distinction between the ‘empty’ and the ‘non-credible’ institution, please refer to the contribution on grasslands, mining and pastoralism (Ho Citation2016b).
4 Ho (Citation2009, 186) has proposed several proxies for measuring the institutional credibility: ‘the level of conflict that an institution generates; the extent of “institutional robustness” expressed as a function of institutional lifespan and flexibility; the degree to which an institution facilitates or frustrates overall socio-economic, political and cultural change; and the extent to which an institution fulfils the functions it ought to perform in the eyes of social actors’. The methodology for measurement of these proxies is further detailed in Ho (Citation2014).
5 The Bakun Dam survey was preceded by a pilot survey of 15 households. In addition, 16 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with local village leaders and peasants.
6 Clustering was made according to the location of the housing blocks which were divided into five zones: east, west, back, entrance, and center. In this way, the survey aimed to ensure that all the Orang Asli resettlers received equal opportunity to be selected as respondents. The number of respondents represented 27 percent of the total population at the RSLB.
7 Each of the interview sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.
8 It is a package offered to the countries which had been affected by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 (Furuoka Citation2011, 1).
9 Initially, the dam project involved the relocation of two Orang Asli sub-groups – the Temuan and the Che Wong sub-group from Bukit Lanchar (a village near Sungai Temir). However, due to a decrease in the dam level from 85 to 84 meters above sea level coupled with the persistent refusal of the Che Wong to relocate, they were allowed to remain at Bukit Lanchar (Edwards Citation2007; Oral communication with Collin Nicholas, a Coordinator for the COAC, in Subang Jaya, Selangor, 25 October 2011).
10 The Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water recorded 84 (MEGTW Citation2010, 10). Yet the Department of Orang Asli Affairs counted as many as 137 previous to resettlement (DOA Citation2012). The increase can be explained by a dual factor: (1) young couples quickly married to qualify for a house and other forms of compensation (oral communication, Romziah Azit, Project Assistant Director MEGTW, 18 August 2011); and (2) remigration by those who had previously remained outside of the village but returned to it in the prospect of potential compensation.
11 This location was near the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) Scheme of Lurah Bilut, the first such scheme in Malaysia.
12 For Peninsular Malaysia, poor households have been defined as earning between RM 430 and 720 (ICU Citation2011).
13 Poverty-prone households are those with a monthly income of less than RM 1000 for rural areas and less than RM 1500 for the urban areas in Peninsular Malaysia (ICU Citation2011). The survey determined that the remaining 5.4 percent earned an income of between RM 2001 and 2450 per month.
14 The extremely poor in this area are defined as households with a monthly income of less than RM 430.00 (ICU Citation2011). Deducting the subsidy also implies a certain proportion of households had a negative income. This is due to the fact that the oil palm plots allocated to them were not ready for harvest as this normally takes four to six years of cultivation.
15 The remaining proportions earned, respectively, between RM 840 and 1199 (eight percent) and between RM 2000 and 3000 (four percent) (MEGTW Citation2010, 24).
16 IJM is a merger of three (3) companies, specifically, IGB Construction Sdn Bhd, Jurutama Sdn Bhd and Mudajaya Sdn Bhd. The joint-venture company was established in 1983 and is one of Malaysia's leading conglomerates. Its core business activities encompass construction, property development, manufacturing and quarrying, infrastructure concessions, and plantations (IJM Citation2015).
17 According to DOE (Citation2009, 10), the project approving authority includes: (1) the State Development Planning Committee (SDPC) for federal government-sponsored projects; (2) the State Executive Council (EXCO) for state government-sponsored projects; (3) the various local authorities or regional development authorities with respect to planning approval within their respective areas; and (4) the Ministry of International Trade and Industry for industrial projects.
18 The invited NGOs (COAC, CAP and SOS Selangor) suspected that the meeting was merely a public relations exercise for JICA, the expected funder of the project, which was also present at the meeting (Omar Citation2002b). According to the COAC’s coordinator, the public participation process for the KDP was driven by seeking compliance rather than genuine inputs and feedback (Collin Nicholas, oral communication, Subang Jaya, Selangor, 25 October 2011).
19 In other words, the judge asserted that, despite legal recognition of public participation in the EIA, there was no provision that provided an obligation to do so.
20 Another 3.3 percent stated they did not understand the EIA report due to language barriers, while the remaining 30 percent were uncertain about the specifics of non-compliance.
21 As of 14 October 2011, there were 249 court cases in the Malaysian High and Appeal Courts concerning various issues of land disputes. The figures were based on LexisNexis Malaysia, a search engine that, among others, provides a database of court cases. However, the figure does not include cases in the Lower Courts.
22 In this regard, an NGO representative noted: ‘The government does not recognize our land. How many Orang Asli villages have received [land] grants? Instead, the government saw our customary land as a halt to development’ (oral communication, Yusri Ahong, Committee Member of Jaringan Kampung Orang Asli Semenanjung Malaysia or JKOSAM, Temerloh Pahang, 3 December 2012).
23 The remaining percentage agreed.
24 This NGO, abbreviated JKOSAM, is a grassroots Orang Asli non-governmental group. It was established in 2009 and has frequently opposed government policy on giving private land ownership for customary, Orang Asli land.
25 Abbreviated as JOAS, which is a coalition of 21 NGOs in Malaysia that aims to advocate indigenous people’s rights. It was established in 1993 (Orangasalblogpot Citation2013).
26 Only 2.7 percent disagreed, and 2.7 percent were uncertain.
27 The situation is also reflected in the court affidavit by Bedu anak Nan, 7 October 2007, addressed to the High Court of Malaya. In it, it was highlighted that the Lakum Forest Reserve and Bukit Lanchar Area were free resource areas for the Orang Asli for them to obtain forest products such as rattan and other high quality trees, e.g., ‘gaharu’ (High Court of Malaya Citation2007a, point 11).
28 Among these, 2.7 percent disagreed and 16 percent were uncertain.
29 A total of 8.1 percent were uncertain.
30 The FELDA peasants received 8–10 acres of land as compared to the six acres for the Orang Asli (oral communication, Collin Nicholas, Coordinator COAC, Subang Jaya, 25 October 2011).
31 Only one percent strongly disagreed, and 2.7 percent were uncertain.
32 To this question, 2.7 percent disagreed, and 5.4 percent were uncertain.