THE RUSSIANS IN AFGHANISTAN

Abstract

The author sets the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989) in the historical context of the “Great Game”, in which the British and the Russians had paranoid suspicions of each other. An analogous process continued through the Cold war and, as a result, after the coup against Daoud the Soviets were forced slowly down the road to the 1979 intervention which they tried hard to avoid. His detailed analysis of the campaign sheds new light on many aspects of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, overturning many Cold War myths in the process. He then assesses their overall performance, making some interesting comparisons with both Vietnam and the current Coalition campaign.

Notes

Khalfin Kh, Proval Britanskoi Agressii Afghanistane. Moscow, 1959, pp. 33–34.

W.E. Moneypenny and G. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. (Vol. VI). London: Macmillan, 1920, pp. 154–155.

A. Chernyaev, V. Medvedev G. Shakhazarov, V Politburo Tsk KPSS. Moscow: Alfaprint, 2006 p. 109.

Ibid., p. 149.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rodric Braithwaite

After military service, Rodric Braithwaite joined the Diplomatic Service in 1955, serving in Indonesia, Italy, Poland and the Soviet Union. A fluent Russian speaker, he was from 1988 to 1992 British Ambassador in Moscow, first to the Soviet Union and then to the Russia Federation. He was subsequently the Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser and chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1992–1993. His published books include Across the Moscow River: The World Turned Upside Down and Moscow 1941: A City and its People at War. His latest book Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–1989, was published by Profile Books in March 2011. This is an edited version of the lecture he gave to the Society on 3 November 2010.