EXPATRIATES AND THE GULF MONARCHIES: POLITICS, SECURITY AND THE ARAB SPRING

Abstract

For many years huge expatriate populations have played a much documented role in the economic development of the Gulf monarchies. But a less well-told story is how expatriates have also contributed to their political stability. As non-citizens their presence in such large numbers has reinforced the elite status of most citizens in the region – an important non-pecuniary legitimacy resource for the various ruling dynasties. Moreover, the primarily employment-driven status of expatriates has meant that they have usually adopted either an apolitical or even prostatus quo stance. In some cases their perceived loyalty has led to selective naturalization or even direct co-option into security services. Disrupting this decades-old relationship, however, have been the recently changing political and economic circumstances of the Gulf monarchies. Already decisions have been made to reduce significantly expatriate populations due to accumulating pressures. Such measures are likely to threaten the historic political advantages the presence of expatriates has provided for these polities.

Notes

1 Author's estimate based on below-mentioned US government and official Gulf government sources, where available.

2 See, for example I. Forstenlechner and E. Rutledge, ‘Unemployment in the Gulf: Time to Update the Social Contract’. Middle East Policy Vol. 17, Issue 2 (2010).

3 See, for example S. Al-Lamki, ‘Barriers to Omanization in the Private Sector: The Perceptions of Omani Graduates’. The International Journal of Human Resource Management Vol. 9, Issue 2 (1998).

4 A World Bank study from 2012, for example, claimed that annual remittances from the Gulf monarchies was $61 billion. See Arabian Business, 13 May 2013 ‘Revealed: where Gulf expats sent remittances in 2012’.

5 See, for example H.S. Atiyyah, ‘Expatriate Acculturation in Gulf Arab Countries’. Journal of Management Development Vol. 15, Issue 5 (1996).

6 For a discussion of social contracts and ‘ruling bargains’, as applied to the Gulf monarchies, see C.M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 49–75. For a more general discussion of social contracts and legitimacy in the wider region see M. Kamrava, ‘Non-democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis’. Third World Quarterly Vol. 19, Issue 1 (1998).

7 A substantial body of academic literature exists on the rights and conditions of migrant labour in the region. See, most recently M. Kamrava and Z. Babar (eds.), Migrant Labour in the Persian Gulf. London: Hurst, 2012. Specifically on Qatar see A. Gardner, et al., ‘A portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar’. Journal of Arabian Studies Vol. 3, Issue 1 (2013): 1–17.

8 On the Qatar case, for example, see M. Kamrava, ‘Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar’. Middle East Journal Vol. 63, Issue 3 (2009): 406. On the UAE case see F. Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. London: Longman, 1996, p. 397. On the Saudi Arabia case see S. Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and State in Saudi Arabia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010, p. 3.

9 For a full discussion see R.E. Lucas, ‘Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type’. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 4 (2004).

10 The ‘family card’ or ‘khulsat al-qaid’, was used in some Gulf monarchies to prove ancestry or identify lineage.

11 Most obviously Dubai – the most foreign direct investment and tourism-oriented of the UAE's constituent emirates.

12 In Bahrain's case, the sponsorship system was transferred to ministerial control in 2006. See M. Dito, ‘What can We Learn from Bahrain's Labour Market Reform?’ in C. Kuptsch (Ed.), Merchants of Labour. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2006, p. 109. For a discussion of the workings of Dubai's free zones and the implications for labour see M. Hvidt, ‘The Dubai Model: An Outline of Key Development-Process Elements in Dubai’. International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 41, Issue 1 (2009): 397–418.

13 For example the UAE Federal Commercial Companies Law of 1984, article 22.

14 US Department of State, ‘Background Note: Saudi Arabia’, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/saudiarabia/192423.htm (accessed 7 August 2013).

15 US Department of State, ‘Background Note: Oman’, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/oman/180260.htm (accessed 7 August 2013).

16 Gulf Daily News, 7 February 2011. Based on official population figures.

17 US Department of State, ‘Background Note: Kuwait’, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/kuwait/185818.htm (accessed 7 August 2013).

18 US Department of State, ‘Background Note: United Arab Emirates’, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/unitedarabemirates/192347.htm (accessed 7 August 2013).

19 Referring to official UAE Census (Tedad) April 2010 results, http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/EnglishHome/ReportDetailsEnglish/tabid/121/Default.aspx?ItemId=1914&PTID=104&MenuId=1 (accessed 7 August 2013).

20 US Department of State, ‘Background Note: Qatar’, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/qatar/181549.htm (accessed 7 August 2013).

21 Trade Arabia, 26 July 2013 ‘Thousands in Bahrain sign petition for peace’.

22 Quoting Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. New York Times, 8 June 2013.

23 For further discussion on the Dubai government see A. Kanna, Dubai, City as a Corporation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011.

24 The Palestinian Liberation Organization nominally backed Iraq during the Kuwait crisis, thus placing the Kuwaiti Palestinian population in a difficult situation after liberation.

25 For example Lebanese Shia, given their supposed support of the Iran-backed Hezbollah, or Jordanians in Qatar, given a long-running political dispute between the Qatari and Jordanian ruling families.

26 Over the course of 2013 several detailed investigative reports on Abu Dhabi and Qatar by the Guardian and Observer newspapers have cast further light on the contemporary conditions of migrant labour in these states. See, for example, Guardian, 25 September 2013 ‘Revealed: Qatar's World Cup Slaves’, and Observer, 22 December 2013 ‘Conditions for Abu Dhabi's Migrant Workers Shame the West’.

27 Voice of America, 11 October 2009. As reported, an independent survey published in 2009 claimed that the majority of foreign construction workers in the Gulf monarchies considered their current conditions to be better than those in their native countries.

28 There has been one notable exception, when in 2008 groups of Bangladeshi leftist ‘Naxalites’ were reportedly stirring hatred against the Gulf monarchies in Kuwait worker camps. The Kuwait Ministry for the Interior claimed that the Naxalites viewed the Gulf monarchies as their ‘number two enemy after India’ on the grounds of their capitalist exploitation of South Asian labour. Outlook India, 5 June 2008.

29 Study conducted by F. Al-Ajajji. Arab News, 4 August 2013 ‘KSA ranked second in expat remittances’.

30 Reuters, 26 September 2013 ‘Nepal Envoy Recalled After Qatar “Open Jail” Remarks’.

31 Reuters, 1 July 2013 ‘UAE to issue verdicts for defendants seeking to seize power’.

32 Most notably the Qatari poet M. Al-Ajami, who was sentenced to life imprisonment (later reduced to 15 years) for poems that criticised the former ruler of Qatar and praised the Tunisian revolution. BBC News, 21 October 2013 ‘Qatar Court Upholds Poet Mohammed Al-Ajami's Sentence’.

33 Exceptions include the UAE, where in June 2013 a few dozen Egyptian expatriates with supposed ties to the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested in parallel to the large number of UAE nationals with purported Brotherhood links. Reuters, 13 June 2013.

34 It is unclear how many protestors have died in Bahrain since 2011, but it is likely to now be several dozen.

35 Opposition groups claim that 19 Saudi protestors have been killed since 2 March 2011. On 21 January 2011 a stateless person died after setting himself on fire. See BBC News, 23 January 2011 ‘Man dies after setting himself on fire in Saudi Arabia’.

36 AFP, 1 April 2011 ‘Police shot dead a protestor in Oman’.

37 In 1981 the government arrested 73 people accused of plotting a coup on behalf of a pro-Iran organisation – the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, led by an Iraqi cleric, H. Modaressi. See J. Kinninmont, ‘Bahrain’, in C.M. Davidson (Ed.), Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies. London: Hurst, 2011, p. 38.

38 Ibid., p. 38.

39 The Baharna.

40 The Ajam.

41 International Herald Tribune, 2 October 2006.

42 International Herald Tribune, 17 November 2006.

43 Kinninmont, Bahrain, p.61.

44 Many Bahrainis have observed an influx of new citizens from Pakistan, Yemen, and Baluchistan. J. Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse. London: Chatham House, 2012, p. 18.

45 New York Times, 26 August 2010.

46 A good early account being F. Halliday, Mercenaries: Counter-Insurgency in the Gulf. London: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1977.

47 Al-Jazeera English, 30 July 2011 ‘Pakistani troops aid Bahrain's crackdown’. Also Express Tribune Pakistan, 11 March 2011.

48 Jakarta Globe, 19 June 2011.

49 New York Times, 14 May 2011.

50 Financial Times, 3 June 2013 ‘Bogota alarmed by exodus of Colombian soldiers to UAE’.

51 Author's interview with S. Mann, London, 31 July 2013.

52 Jakarta Globe, 19 June 2011. Quoting A. Al-Ahmad.

53 B. bin Sultan Al-Saud.

54 Al-Jazeera English, 30 July 2011 ‘Pakistani troops aid Bahrain's crackdown’.

55 Ahram, 6 November 2012 ‘Opposition figure corroborates claims of Jordanian troops in Kuwait’.

56 The National, 13 September 2011; Reuters, 20 December 2011.

57 Reuters, 20 December 2011.

58 Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 30 June 2013 ‘Kuwait, Jordan interior officials discuss issues of mutual concern’.

59 Bloomberg, 29 December 2012 ‘Saudi Arabia boosts spending goal by fifth in record budget’.

60 Reuters, 12 June 2013 ‘Oman needs to slash spending to keep budget sustainable – IMF’.

61 Arabian Gazette, 27 March 2012 ‘Kuwait public spending unsustainable despite massive budget surplus – World Bank’.

62 Gulf News, 4 June 2013 ‘Oman police arrest 631 infiltrators’.

63 The National, 5 June 2013 ‘12,000 illegal workers caught since UAE amnesty ended’.

64 Reuters, 13 June 2013 ‘Economic, social pressures behind Kuwait's crackdown on low-paid Asian workers’.

65 Arabian Business, 9 June 2013 ‘Kuwait deports total of 12,000 expats for traffic violations’.

66 Kuwait Times, 7 June 2013 ‘Now what? Retired expats in Kuwait still want to work, but laws stop them’.

67 Arab Times, 11 July 2013 ‘Current situation of expats in Kuwait similar to scary movie’.

68 Arabian Business, 26 June 2013 ‘Kuwait jails overcrowded with expats amid cull’.

69 Nyasa Times, 13 June 2013 ‘Malawi labour export blues’.

70 Reuters, 13 June 2013 ‘Economic, social pressures behind Kuwait's crackdown on low-paid Asian workers’.

71 Indo-Asian News Service, 28 June 2013 ‘3,600 Indians return from Kuwait, India asks for time and space’.

72 ABS-CBN News, 27 June 2013 ‘Are you an OFW in Kuwait? Read this’.

73 Planned before the Arab Spring began, the Nitaqat came into effect in June 2011.

74 Eurasia Review, 10 July 2013 ‘Nitaqat law: will it solve Saudi Arabia's unemployment problem? – Analysis’. Also The Economic Times, 4 July 2013 ‘Nitaqat: 92,000 emergency exit certificates issued to Indians in Saudi Arabia’.

75 Zee News, 14 July 2013 ‘Saudi Nitaqat law may restrict remittances to Pakistan – Report’.

76 Arab News, 26 November 2013 ‘Expat remittances to Egypt nosedive’.

77 Guardian, 2 April 2013 ‘Saudi Arabia expels thousands of Yemeni workers’.

78 Christian Science Monitor, 22 November 2013 ‘Bread-winners return empty-handed to Yemen, Arab World's poorest country’.

79 Associated Press, 22 January 2014 ‘Saudi Arabia says it has deported more than 250,000 foreign workers’.

80 Construction Week, 19 January 2014 ‘Saudi crackdown hits $26.6bn construction projects’.

81 Al-Arabiya, 9 June 2013 ‘Saudi Arabia's big elephant in the room’.