Abstract
Whilst there is a general acceptance amongst Chinese analysts that the country's global power has really increased (and for very good reasons), how best to use this power to generate real change in the global order remains a subject of considerable debate. The nature of that international order itself is a key determinant of what China can do. On one level the rise of new powers is leading to a depolarised order with fluid and changing alliances that create possibilities for China to build partnerships for change. But on another level, the residual power of the US creates clear limits on what can be done. This creates a rather unique set of circumstances where a partially dissatisfied rising power has to try to find ways to responsibly change (but not fracture) the existing system as self-perceived No.2, with the No.1 rather reluctant to accept the No.2's agenda.
Notes
1. And where this paper refers to China, it is shorthand for those that matter in China, rather than assuming that everybody in the country has the same interests and objectives.
2. This section is informed by discussions with leading Chinese international relations experts in Beijing, and I am particularly indebted to discussions with Jia Qingguo, Ren Xiao and Zhao Minghao.
3. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are a set of principles for government of relations between states that was first codified in the China-India Agreement of April 1954. They later formed the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement.
4. Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, ‘China's “New Type of Great Power Relations”: A G2 with Chinese Characteristics?' forthcoming in International Affairs, 2016.