STATES AND NON-STATES: THE LEVANT IN TURMOIL

Abstract

This article reflects on the turmoil in the states of the Levant, particularly seen in the context of broader tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Particular regard is given to the radical challenge of Sunni and largely Salafi jihadism; the disabling of large parts of the Middle East state system in the wake of the Arab Spring; the dramatic fall in global energy prices; the fraying of traditional alliances between Saudi Arabia, the US and other powers. The increase in sectarianism and conflicts over authority in Islam are also discussed.

Notes

1. This does not mean that the Saudis, for example, will not seek to coopt Islamists, including now the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, where they can subordinate them to their national purposes: Al Islah in Yemen is a complex case in point and Syria, with its mosaic of Islamist militias, is another. The important word is ‘transnational’.

2. See Ali Mamouri, ‘Was Zahran Alloush really a moderate leader?’. AL Monitor, January 14, 2016 at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/zahran-alloush-moderate-islamisis.html.

3. “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the Magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to the Protection and Service of another Prince. For by this means the Magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign Jurisdiction in his own Country, and suffer his own People to be listed, as it were, for Soldiers against his own Government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this Inconvenience; especially when both the one and the other are equally subject to the absolute Authority of the same Person; who has not only power to perswade the Members of his Church to whatsoever he lists, (either as purely Religious, or as in order thereunto) but can also enjoyn it them on pain of Eternal Fire. It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahumetan only in his Religion, but in every thing else a faithful Subject to a Christian Magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople; who himself is intirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor, and frames the feigned Oracles of that Religion according to his pleasure. But this Mahumetan living amongst Christians, would yet more apparently renounce their Government, if he acknowledged the same Person to be Head of his Church who is the Supreme Magistrate in the State.” A Letter Concerning Toleration, second edition, which can be found with commentary (for example) at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2375. This, of course, was written in the context of the Exclusion Crisis in the 1680s.

4. And indeed with the earlier transitional government: see ‘Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan’, AEI/ISW 2012, 57ff at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/iranian-influence-in-the-levant-egypt-iraq-and-afghanistan_171235465754.pdf.

5. The phrase is that of Brendan Simms, Michael Axworthy and Patrick Milton, ‘Ending the New Thirty Years War’, The New Statesman, January 26, 2016, at http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/01/ending-new-thirty-years-war.

6. Phillip Smyth, How Iran is Building its Syrian Hezbollah, The Washington Insitute, March 8, 2016, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/27756 is an excellent analysis of Syrian militiafication and by extension the wider phenomenon. Matthew Levitt,’ Behind the GCC’s Terrorist Designation of Hizbullah, Tony Blair Faith Foundation’, March 10, 2016 at http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/opinion/behind-gccs-terroristdesignation-hizbullah is also worth reading.

7. I discussed these figures with the former NTC Minister of Oil and Finance and Deputy Prime Minister and now Head of the Constitutional Commission, Dr Ali Tarhouni, in Abu Dhabi last November. For an example of how state money can be diverted bureaucratically for militia purposes see the testimony of Dr Ali Zeidan, the former PM of Libya, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nOzqlbRxoU&feature=youtu.be (in Arabic). Two recent pieces in the New York Times by Joe Becker and Scott Shane, ‘Hilary Clinton, “Smart Power” and a Dictator’s Fall’ at http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html?smprod=nytnow&_r=3&referer have some interesting – if incomplete and very US-centric – reflections on these issues.

8. Currently a highly debated subject: the foundational piece was Christoph Reuter, ‘Der Stratege des Terrors’., Der Spiegel, March 18, 2015, at http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-134097196.html.

9. Prime Minister Abadi has recently appointed a retired Federal Police General, Mohsen al Ka’abi, as Deputy Chairman for Financial, Administration and Operational Affairs in the Popular Mobilisation Commission, a move designed to restrain the power of the militia leaders. It is a brave but perhaps futile move given the strength of the latter. He needs support.

10. Michael Knights, ‘Iranian EFPs in the Gulf: An Emerging Strategic Risk’, The Washington Institute, February 23, 2016, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranianefps-in-the-gulf-an-emerging-strategic-risk is an excellent illustration.

11. India signed defence agreements with Qatar in 2008 and KSA in 2014 but has major investment interests in Iran, annual trade worth $150 billion with the GCC and nearly 7 million of its citizens working on the Arab side of the Gulf, sending some $35 billion back to India in remittances each year. China is a major consumer of Gulf energy and is seeking to build a presence in infrastructure and other major projects in the GCC and capitalising on Iranian economic reintegration to support its One Belt, One Road policy. India’s difficult relationship with Pakistan is also a complicating factor.