STABLE JORDAN: HOW A MONARCHY SURVIVED DISORDER

ABSTRACT

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has recently experienced large-scale unrest on a scale not witnessed for several years. The country, long viewed as a beacon of stability in a deeply fragile region, now faces a growing risk that it could be destabilised. This article addresses multiple pillars of stability and drivers of instability in Jordan, including the impact of the Syrian crisis, large-scale displacement, resource scarcity, and chronic political, economic, and social difficulties. Whilst the regime has endured crisis and remained stable, increasing pressures in the past few years have led analysts to predict the onset of violence or deepening instability in Jordan.

KEYWORDS:

• Jordan
• Stability
• Instability
• Middle East monarchies
• Regime survival
• economy
• tribes
• Palestinians
• security
• tribes

Introduction

Jordan has long been viewed as a beacon of stability in a deeply fragile region, yet there is a growing risk that the country is becoming destabilised. Over the seven decades since the inception of the modern Jordanian state, this resource-constrained country has gained increasing strategic importance for its geographical location between conflict zones, including the Arab Israeli wars, the wars in Iraq, the Syrian and Lebanese civil wars, and the global war against terrorism. Whilst predictions of Jordan’s imminent collapse have proven incorrect on every occasion so far, there is a growing sense of concern over the country’s prognosis. Commentators warn that Jordan stands on the brink of collapse amid the intensification of a range of stresses that have accumulated as a consequence of the country’s complex geopolitical, social, economic, and historical context.¹

In response to government decisions in the summer of 2020, protests swept the nation’s streets calling for the overthrow of the government.² This bears similarities to previous waves of protests in the state, which began with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 — a political revolution that the Kingdom’s Hashemite leadership effectively staved off. Jordan is not unlike other Arab countries in that the state is subject to similar political, economic, and social grievances to those which contributed to sparking the first demonstrations of the Arab Spring elsewhere in the region. Satloff and Schenker pointed out that “the risk of internal instability … is greater than ever”,³ a prediction that gained credence in 2016, when King Abdullah confirmed in a BBC interview that Jordan “has reached a boiling point, sooner or later the dam will collapse”.⁴

In addition to the challenges faced by the Kingdom, there are emerging problems that may develop into serious threats, including limited resources; rising tension among Jordanians about the large number of refugees; pressure on services; dissatisfaction with the political system; marginalisation and cronyism; and increased violence in schools and universities. These add to a potent mix of longer-term tribal and religious conflicts, many of which have long been simmering below the surface.⁵

The Hashemite monarchy has responded with violent measures in some instances and mild measures in other incidents. On the other hand, in March 2013 King Abdullah was determined that the democratic transition in the country should be observed, holding parliamentary elections two years before their time. This highlights the Kingdom`s strategy in pulling back and forth with these upheavals that have arisen.

This article begins by introducing a conceptual framework of instability and stability factors. It examines the case of Jordan in a comparative perspective within the trajectory of the Arab region since the Arab Spring of 2011. It introduces the context of Jordan from a historical perspective and examines the main drivers of stability and instability. The article examines instability factors pertaining to Jordan and analyses how its government has effectively contained the crisis.

The article is based on over a decade of research and professional engagement within Jordan. Primary data was collected from a variety of sources and empirical fieldwork carried out in Jordan. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Arabic by the author, alongside Skype and telephone interviews. Secondary sources including published academic research, policy literature, and quality journalism are also cross-referenced throughout the article. In addition, the article builds on the cumulative experience and observations of the author, who has worked in Jordan and who remains professionally engaged in the region.

Pillars of stability

Describing a state as unstable suggests the presence of political, economic, or social upheaval. The Fund for Peace (FFP) lists twelve indicators of vulnerability related to social, economic, and political instability. Social indicators include demographic pressures, and the movement of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) in and out of the state. Economic indicators include a level of economic decline, unevenness of development and the economic impact of human displacement. Political indicators encompass the legitimacy of the state, inefficiency of public services, the extent to which human rights are protected, the prevalence of the rule of law, and external intervention by other states.⁶ Economic growth is stymied by political instability, in a negative link which drives the decrease in human capital and rising inflation. Meanwhile, a stagnant economy may increase inequality, in time giving rise to political and social unrest.⁷ However, political instability does not necessarily cause violence, as demonstrated in the instability experienced by many developing and developed countries, which – though they face swift modifications to their governance and clashes in opinion between actors – does not result in armed conflict.

The stability of authoritarian regimes can be explained with reference to Gerschewski,⁸ who presents three pillars of stabilisation in such regimes: legitimation, repression, and co-optation. Though the pillars operate interdependently, they may not prevail at the outset of a regime, but rather build up over time. Stability translates as the extent to which a regime balances these three pillars. However, where a pillar is absent or weak, the remaining two pillars may be sufficient for stabilisation.⁹ Gerschewski clarifies that legitimation is obtained when a regime acquires the support of the population through either active consent or passive obedience.¹⁰ Easton distinguishes two forms of legitimation: diffused and specific. Diffused support can be enforced by repression and manipulated by propaganda, while specific support represents the compensation the regime offers in return for allegiance.¹¹ In the context of autocratic rule, diffused support is based on polishing the image of the rulers and considering them as an extension of a grand history and, therefore, their deficits in performance are acceptable.¹² Diffused support can be acquired from different sources, which may be political, religious, nationalistic, or traditional.¹³

Davenport defines repression as the “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organisation, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, to impose a cost on the target as well as deter specific activities.”¹⁴ It includes intimidation to encourage or discourage certain behaviours. Levitsky and Way detail two types of coercive repression: “high and low intensity.”¹⁵ They indicate that high intensity acts target many individuals or institutions and opposition leaders, while low intensity threatens less important groups and employs non-combatant tactics such as denial of educational opportunities or debarment from certain jobs. Limited freedoms may be granted to individuals, but not to the extent that can empower them to topple the regime and “they must not become autonomous and powerful enough to grow into serious contenders for political power.”¹⁶

Gerschewski explains co-optation as the capacity to tie relevant actors to the regime’s elite.¹⁷ This strategy implies an autocracy that transforms stakeholders from opponents to supporters. Gerschewski shows that to maintain stability autocracies use an additional, more informal, means of co-optation called “neo-patrimonialism”, which is defined as the capacity of elites to sustain a balance between competing subordinate actors to avoid one growing too strong.¹⁸ This helps autocratic regimes to maintain stability within the state even if the internal state actors are competing amongst themselves. The regime, by not being part of this competition, ensures its control over this state of equilibrium among actors.

Stefes posits that corruption can also be a tool for co-optation. For example, public officials can use illegal methods to secure an extensive income.¹⁹ Then the regime can use inside information to blackmail officials, guaranteeing their support and discouraging a wealthy elite from plotting outside the circle of authority and leadership.

International aid supports the durability of authoritarian regimes in covering deficit state resources, perpetuating the status quo. Aid prevents the disruption of order, keeping society organised. Politically, it prolongs the life of the ruling elite.²⁰ Licht posits that aid can facilitate the political success of leaders by up to 60%.²¹ Brand and Yom independently highlight the extent to which foreign aid contributes to financing co-optation and repression strategies.²² Yom and Gause argue that the presence of “diplomatic assurances, economic grants and military interventions” explicate the importance of foreign aid provision from the US to Middle Eastern countries to ensure their survival throughout the Arab Spring, especially after 2011.²³ Kono and Montinola both observe that sustained aid flow over a long period promotes the survival of regimes, allowing for assistance to be stockpiled for times of crisis.²⁴

Jordan’s stability vs instability: historical context

The wave of revolutions known as the Arab Spring began with large, peaceful protest movements in many Arab countries, starting in Tunisia in late 2010. By early 2011, the sentiment of the protests had spread to other nations such as Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. This wave of popular unrest, large-scale protest movements, and in some cases successful revolutions shattered the established view within political science and Middle Eastern studies that the region was governed largely by states possessing authoritarian stability.²⁵ The main causes of the popular movements for change were mainly thought to be a lack of economic opportunities coupled with an increasing cohort of educated, jobless young people;²⁶ and widespread grievances against authoritarian regimes characterised by high levels of corruption, low-quality governance and political repression.²⁷ The protests themselves were largely facilitated by the increased availability of communications technology, enabling the free spread of information beyond the controls of authoritarian regimes and thus effective collective action.²⁸

Jordan was no exception to the unrest that swept through the region and, much like the rest of the Arab world, was subject to protest movements. However, unlike Tunisia or Egypt, the country’s long-standing ruling regime was not overthrown, nor did the state descend into conflict, like Yemen, Libya, or Syria. Various explanations have been offered as to why Jordan did not succumb to a similar fate to other states within the region. Jordan’s stability is multi-faceted and affected by many social, economic, and political factors. In this section, key drivers of instability are analysed.

Legacy of grievances

The Kingdom of Jordan was established in 1923, as part of the settlement between British and French forces in the wake of the First World War. The state gained independence in 1946, establishing the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Since the inception of the state, Jordanian tribes in the state have been the main backers of the monarchy, with a clear interest in the survival of the Jordanian state. From independence to the present day, societal institutions in Jordan, which include the monarchy and national and local governments, have relied on tribal communities not only to confirm national identity in the postcolonial world but also to ensure continuity of political and security support. For the government of Jordan, tribes have been the basis for allowing the state to govern.²⁹

Whilst state-society relations with East Bank tribes have been the basis of regime stability, over time this reliance has created divisions within Jordan that have threatened to destabilise the country. It has been argued that the greatest fear of the Jordanian regime is that the Palestinian majority would come to supersede the Jordanian national identity.³⁰ An interviewee contended that there is a rift in Jordanian society between Jordanians who are descendants of indigenous tribes and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. He explained that this latter category consisted primarily of refugees and their children who were displaced from historical Palestine in the Arab-Israeli wars. In 1949, following the first Arab-Israeli war, the rest of Palestine – the West Bank and East Jerusalem – became part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Whilst Jordan has remained largely stable, a brief period of civil unrest broke out with the “Black September” conflict of 1970 between the Jordanian army and Palestinian militants. In its aftermath, Palestinians were politically marginalised within the Jordanian state and largely excluded from security, military, and public sector positions.³¹ An interviewee claimed that Palestinian-Jordanians feel their national identity is under threat – a feeling that became particularly acute following Jordan’s separation from the West Bank in 1988, in which 1.5 million people were stripped of their Jordanian nationality overnight. Jordanian officials offered as justification that keeping the birthplace of Palestinians living in the West Bank prevented Israel from colonising the area. However, Palestinians saw this as the Jordanian government trying to get thousands of Palestinians to go back to the West Bank.

Observers note that most calls for political reform within the country have emerged from East Bank Jordanians, who form about half of the population. Palestinian Jordanians have been less critical of the regime, and have instead focused on campaigning for equal rights within the Kingdom.³² East Bank Jordanians argue that Palestinian Jordanians enjoy economic benefits and significant wealth because they control the business sector, while “indigenous” Jordanians tend to have low-paying jobs and are more likely to be living in poverty.³³ By contrast, an interviewee claimed that Palestinian Jordanians feel discriminated against in the military and public sectors, priority being given to East Bank Jordanians, with their predominance in the private sector defended as an enforced decision. They also feel economically marginalised, with investment favouring tribal areas.³⁴ Despite this, an interviewee explained that their reluctance to oppose the state over the past 50 years stems largely from their feelings of insecurity and concerns that their residency in the Kingdom is precarious. Yet, the East Bank/Palestinian division is a sensitive issue with deep historical, political, economic, and social implications that continues to constitute a fault line in Jordanian society with the potential to lead to instability in the future.

According to a study conducted in 2018 by the International Republican Institute, tribalism can play a determining factor in undermining the relationship between the people and government, since members of tribes may turn to their tribes to attain services that were supposed to be delivered by the government. Increasing tribalism potentially decreases the stability of the state by undermining any Jordanian identity. On the other side of the spectrum, a very fine line separates the government from supporting and “over supporting” a tribal structure. If tribal ties are diminished and their sense of belonging is shaken, individuals may feel isolated and as a result, in some instances, may turn to violent extremism.³⁵

Demographic pressure

Jordan is subject to large-scale demographic pressure, with many migration movements to and from Jordan playing a major role in shaping the present demographic makeup of the state. This considerable movement is a consequence of Jordan’s geographical position at a crossroads between two areas of instability and protracted conflicts, making the Kingdom the primary destination for forced migrants from Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Jordan has been affected by the many wars fought in the region, including the Arab-Israeli wars, the Iran-Iraq war, the Lebanese civil war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US invasion of Iraq, and the Arab Spring revolutions that led to large waves of displacement of refugees to Jordan. The main consequence for Jordan has been the migration of displaced and vulnerable peoples into their territory.

In 2020, the total population of the Kingdom of Jordan reached 10.101 million,³⁶ with approximately 6.6 million Jordanian nationals and 2.9 million non-Jordanians, representing 30.6% of the total population. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis – the result of the 1990–1991 Gulf War as well as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent instability – have settled in Jordan, either temporarily or permanently. In addition, the Kingdom is home to refugees from Somalia, Sudan, Libya and Yemen. Further, the Syrian civil war triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis as millions of Syrians fled the terror and the destruction and sought refuge elsewhere, largely in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. Out of the total 750,195 refugees in Jordan, 660,262 are Syrian refugees.³⁷ The response to the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan has brought about several adverse social, economic, political and ecological effects. The presence of a large number of refugees has affected the livelihoods of the host population in nearly every sector of the economy. The large influx of Syrian refugees has also fuelled a housing crisis,³⁸ with families spending much of their income on meeting housing requirements.³⁹

Growing pressure on critical infrastructure, resources and capacity is leading to a deterioration in services such as education, energy, water, and waste disposal. With Jordanians also feeling overlooked by international and national humanitarian programmes which prioritise Syrians, the United Nations and international non-governmental organisations have warned of rising tensions and resentment toward refugees over recent years. A majority of Jordanians feel that the quality of public education, health services, municipal services, and employment opportunities has deteriorated as a consequence of the refugee influx.⁴⁰ Successive Jordanian governments have expressed frustration at the cost of supporting refugees, which, King Abdullah stated, accounts for a quarter of the national budget.⁴¹ The government consequentially faces great difficulty in continuing to provide services to Syrians.

Economic instability

Jordan has been facing a myriad of problems that have combined to produce a deteriorating economic situation.⁴² Resource-scarcity is a major economic factor destabilising the country. Jordan relies mainly on remittances, tourism, and goods transit across its territory. Water shortages are on top of the list when it comes to resource scarcity as Jordan is considered as one of the four driest countries in the world.⁴³ This severe shortage in water supplies is not only hindering food production, but also restricting the social and economic development of the country. Furthermore, only four percent of Jordan’s land is arable and forest consists of less than one percent of its territory. ⁴⁴

The recent COVID-19 pandemic has added additional stress on to an already weakened Jordanian economy. Jordan’s economic growth was projected to contract significantly to −3.5% gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, an assessment predicated on the assumption of a significant slowdown in the global economy and reduced domestic demand during the year. The overall fiscal deficit of the central government – including grants and use of cash – continued to slip, standing at 4.7% of GDP in 2019, up 1.6% compared to the 2019 budget. Furthermore, the unemployment rate remained high at 19% in the third quarter of 2019.⁴⁵

Measures taken by Jordan to stabilise the economy through securing an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan have sown the seeds of instability through austerity. Jordan entered into an agreement in 2012 for a $2.1 billion IMF loan over three years to help balance the budget. As a condition of the loan, Jordan expanded fiscal reform measures that had started in the past few years. The strict fiscal reform measures that the IMF imposed on Jordan included increased fuel price and electricity charges, higher taxes on mobile phones contracts, and a reduction in subsidies for gas, diesel, kerosene and gasoline prices in 2012.⁴⁶ These austerity measures have been a consistent driver of unrest, with major protests occurring in that year.⁴⁷

Taxes imposed in February 2017 and the summer of 2018 provoked protests that swept the streets of Jordan. The government-imposed price increases on a variety of goods and services sought to raise $4.5 billion over four years, including $643 million in 2017, $520 million in 2018, and $800 million in 2019.⁴⁸

The sales tax on internet services increased by 50% and a tax of JD 2.6 (about US$3.7) was charged on every cellular telephone line sold, as well as a high tax on cigarettes, and a 10% tax increase on soft drinks. The price of most types of sweets and some types of bread increased at varying rates. Most goods in the Kingdom are subject to a sales tax of 16% and other taxes sometimes exceeding three times the original value of the commodity. The government raised the price of issuing and renewing passports from JD 20–50 (US$70). Oil prices rose from 6.8% to 7.2% with additional fees also being charged. Through these measures, the government aimed to raise about JD 450 million (about US$635 million) to reduce the budget deficit of 2017.

As previously alluded to, an additional economic factor destabilising the nation can be seen in the soaring unemployment rate. The rate remained at 18-19% for three years until 2020, when the rate among young people peaked at a staggering 40%.⁴⁹ According to the most recent estimates, made in 2017, the average unemployment rate in the Middle East and North Africa stands at approximately 10.6%; in the same year, the Jordanian total unemployment was 15.3%. The challenges of unemployment are the result of demographic factors, trends in labour demand, public sector employment policies, inefficient employment support programmes, low levels of training, and uneven development between Jordanian provinces. Most crucially, however, unemployment is concentrated at high rates amongst young people (aged 15-24), which indicates structural problems in the economy that make it unable to integrate fresh graduates into the labour market. This is evidence of a mismatch between education output and labour market requirements, as well as the lack of programmes to facilitate the transition of young people from education into the workplace. As a result, there is a significant brain drain as thousands of highly skilled Jordanians travel abroad every year in search of jobs and better opportunities, thus depriving the country of valuable human capital.⁵⁰

A Jordanian activist noted that Jordan’s weak economic performance is also reflected in its high-income inequality. He clarified that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened in recent years, especially as the government relied on increasing taxes on the sale of basic items rather than on direct taxes, adding to the burden on the middle and working classes.

Radicalisation and terrorism

In the past few years, the presence of radical groups in Jordan has been growing, as reflected in an increase in the rate and severity of terror attacks on Jordanian soil. For example, in December 2016, the country was subject to a terror attack that resulted in the death of security personnel and several foreign tourists at the historical Kerak Castle, in southern Jordan. The attack by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the subsequent crackdowns in Kerak, indicate a growing threat by the group in the country. In 2016 terrorist attacks killed about 30 civilians overall, alongside three American soldiers and a Canadian tourist. This comes in addition to a suicide bombing at a Jordanian military base in Al Rukban, on the Syrian border, in which six soldiers were killed, and an incident in November 2016, in which a Jordanian soldier killed three US soldiers at the Al Jafr Air Base.⁵¹

War in neighbouring countries, particularly Syria and Iraq, has been cited by participants of the Jordanian demonstrations as precipitating the increasing levels of insecurity. Jordan shares a 375 km border with Syria, which makes weapons smuggling into either state not only possible but arguably also a likelihood. Furthermore, since 2014, Jordan's commitment to the international coalition to combat the ISIS in Syria has heightened its citizens’ fears of attacks by the terror group, compounded by fears that ISIS fighters had already transited into Jordan. Jordan's King Abdullah II recognised these security concerns, stating that “the new Taliban, which we will have to deal with, will be this time in Syria. Even if better governments come to power in Damascus, we will still have to keep our borders secure for two or three years so that we will not allow them to infiltrate our territory”.⁵²

It would be reductive and simplistic to explain the growth of the ISIS and other radical Jihadi groups in Jordan solely as a consequence of the mass influx of refugees which the state has experienced in recent years. Rather, the violent extremist threat has deep domestic roots in Jordan. The growth in the terrorist threat arises in a historical context in which the 1990s saw a significant increase in radicalism due to the return of “Afghan Jordanians”. Regional events also spurred extremism further, including the Gulf War of 1991, and the Jordanian peace treaty brokered with Israel in 1993. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to the radicalisation of a new generation, whilst Al Qaeda in Iraq was formed by a Jordanian national, Abu Musab Zarqawi, who ordered the brutal terrorist attacks in Amman in 2005. These events, which are completely independent of the Syrian war, have each made a significant contribution to the emergence and development of the ISIS terror group.

According to some estimates, Jordan was among the countries contributing the most fighters to ISIS per capita, with 5,000 jihadis located in Zarqa, Salt, Baqa'a, and other camps. It was estimated that there are over 2000 Jordanians fighting in Syria and Iraq.⁵³

Support for jihadist groups is not limited to marginalised areas of Jordan, with the flags of ISIS reported having flown in Salt, a relatively prosperous city close to the capital Amman.⁵⁴ This suggests that it is not just poor Jordanians who are susceptible to ISIS’s message, which dictates that the suffering of Muslims and all other groups in the region is rooted in monarchical rulers, presidents for life and corrupt, self-serving ruling elites – chief amongst which is what the terror group views as the illegitimate Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. ISIS propagates this message to sow discord within Jordan and achieve its goal of an Islamic Caliphate.

Jordan remains a key target for jihadist groups, with a particular focus on low-level members of the security forces, posing a huge state security threat. For the past five years, threats inside the Kingdom have been effectively combated by the Jordanian security forces, however, the risk of attack from jihadist groups continues to loom.⁵⁵ An additional contributor to radicalisation, and thus potentially violent extremism, lies in an individual’s relative feelings of belonging. The state leadership must strike a balance between citizens’ sense of tribal belonging and the unification of all tribes in the form of the state.

Stabilisation factors

The Arab Spring crushed many regimes like the Libyan regime, the Tunisian regime and others. However, the Jordanian monarchy has remained steadfast to date. Scholars argue that this survival is due to its external allies “and its main internal pillar of support: the Jordanian armed forces”.⁵⁶ The Arab Spring was a turning point accentuating the critical importance of the civil–military interactions in the Arab states. The armies and security forces of the Arab states directly influenced the outcome of these uprisings like that in Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen. The violent reaction of the armed and security forces to these uprisings determined in many cases the results of these uprisings. In the case of Jordan, the sheer force in its reaction to the uprisings meant that civil demands were overlooked and ignored.⁵⁷ The loyalty of the army and security forces remained unshaken. Originally, the armed forces of the monarchy were mainly from the Bedouins; however, today this is not the case. The forces are more diverse in their composition, but still profess loyalty to the Hashemite rulers as well as playing a significant role in upholding the national identity of the Kingdom.⁵⁸ Indeed, the security and armed forces have an especial responsibility for the stabilisation of Jordan and the region. Any failure in the security sector would also constitute a direct threat to the neighbouring countries.

A major factor explaining Jordan’s regime stability is the use of highly developed conflict management mechanisms that build on the elements listed below.

Legitimation

The Survival of the monarchies in the Arab world, as in Jordan, is primarily due to historical-religious legitimacy.⁵⁹ In the case of Jordan, this is through the ruling family being descended from the Prophet Muhammad.⁶⁰ This is, in line with the notion of diffused support described above, a legitimation strategy used by the ruling family to gain the support of the population. A denial of the rule of the Hashemite family would be a tacit denial of the dynasty of the Prophet Muhammad. Yom adds another legitimising factor, termed the “neighbourhood effect”, which dampened protests by providing Jordanians with a strong incentive not to follow a similar path to the destruction seen in neighbouring Syria following their revolution.⁶¹

In the early days of the Arab spring, a Jordanian commentator posited that the ruling authorities responded wisely and quickly to Jordanian protests following the toppling of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, by taking several actions which included King Abdullah dismissing the Prime Minister and swiftly initiating a Cabinet reshuffle. This coincided with the launch of a $500 million incentive package for government employees which included subsidies for food and fuel.⁶² One can claim that this is the same method that the Hashemite Kingdom has consistently implemented to quell unrest since the days of the late King Hussein, with the King able to appoint or dismiss a Prime Minister and dissolve parliament at any time.⁶³ Successive Jordanian governments, under the King’s directives, dealt peacefully with protests by Jordanian citizens in particular in moments of major unrest including in 1989, 1996, 2012, 2018 and 2020. No civilians were shot or arbitrarily punished, and the authorities managed to stave off mass unrest and maintain stability whilst avoiding a “Jordanian Spring” throughout the period 2011–2021.

Co-option

Historically, the Jordanian Government has co-opted the tribes and tribal leaders, granting tribal leaders a stake in the survival of the regime as they are afforded a portion of the roles and rewards that come with being in a position of authority. This reduces the danger of rebellion from the citizenry, as tribal leaders are capable of mobilising tribe members to support the regime. Tribes do not using their power against the government; instead, their resources are used in line with the ruling elite’s demands. So far, the Jordanian Government has found an effective equilibrium by supporting tribal communities in Jordan just enough to keep their ties with the tribe, but still to exercise its co-option measures whenever needed. The tribes are not given the ultimate power to function by themselves – they are still dependent on the regime and enjoy only limited access to power. Weir indicated that “Tribal politics have erased the distinct boundaries between what is the state and what is private. Tribal politics in Jordan helps explain how the state is not a discrete monolith that is controlled exclusively by an authoritarian leader. Rather, over time, the state has evolved unevenly and in reaction to tribal groups who were looking to empower or enrich themselves. Different powerful tribes have captured various agencies of the state and rule them almost as part of their personal power.”⁶⁴

In October 2012, the Obeidat tribe – which opposes the normalisation politics with Israel – was able to deter one of its members from accepting an appointment to the post of Jordan’s Ambassador to Israel. Appointing a member of a tribe to serve a cause that opposes the tribe’s beliefs shakes the stability and the arrangement that the tribe has established with the state, and therefore the tribe was ready to deter the ambassador from accepting the post. To reject the post, the tribe offered Walid Obeidat five million dinars to represent Obeidat tribe in the Jordanian parliament for four consecutive terms instead. This is one of the many instances in which the influence of tribes in Jordan is evident in the political sphere of the country. The political layout shows that the tribes have a say in the parliament and they can appoint chosen members.

On another note, a unique dynamic relationship is created between the tribe and the state. Although such a relationship is seen as norm it the country, it would be considered to be corruption elsewhere. “Tribal authority based on the use of indirect power and relationships is accepted explicitly as maintaining security and producing employment for the average Jordanian citizen.”⁶⁵ Weir classifies this situation as corruption that is accepted by all members of the society. He cites the example of a Jordanian MP who had reportedly hired 80 of his friends and relatives to serve as secretaries in parliament.⁶⁶

Oppression

The Jordanian authorities has been accustomed to suppress the protests against deteriorating living conditions. For example, the Jordanian police recently raided and closed the Teachers Syndicate headquarters in Amman on July 25, 2020.⁶⁷ Many teachers were arrested and the 11 branches of the Teachers Syndicate all over the country were closed. Restrictions on freedom of assembly are also classified as low-intensity coercion⁶⁸ and such restrictions were imposed by the Jordanian authorities targeting social media activists in 2019. In November 2019, Human Rights Watch reported a campaign of mass arrests targeting activists in Mafraq governorate who were accused of posting offensive content against the country’s leadership on social media.⁶⁹ Other activists were accused of “undermining the political regime” which is deemed as a terrorism offence under the jurisdiction of the State Security Court.⁷⁰ This incident led Human Rights Watch to declare that the “Jordanian authorities should stop using vague criminal provisions to limit freedom of expression and release anyone held for the peaceful expression of their views.” On this Human Rights Watch declared that “Jordan faces significant economic and political problems that are adding to citizens’ frustrations but jailing activists and violating protesters’ rights may only hide popular discontent.”⁷¹ “Allowing free expression is essential for giving citizens confidence that their concerns are being heard and taken into account.”⁷² Before that report, Human Rights Watch had reported that the Jordanian authorities targeted political and anti-corruption activists who were known as the “hirak” coalition.⁷³ Journalists and political activists were among the detainees and all were arrested on the accusation of publicly criticising of Jordanian leaders and policies.⁷⁴

The Kingdom of Jordan has enhanced its counter-terrorism measures in anticipation of attacks by ISIS on its soil, including increasing its military armaments on the Jordanian side of the Yarmouk River. Additionally, in 2014, Jordan launched the National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, which aims to further combat violent extremism and terrorism in the state. An interviewee pointed out that extremist ideas and violent groups remain a recruiting tool for activists. He explained that ideological and administrative campaigns to prevent extremism have not been successful because they have not yet tackled the sources of violence and crime, claiming that current simplified solutions did not help in the fight against violence, but instead contributed to the violence. The interviewer commented that religious extremism can only be solved through a comprehensive approach that addresses the political injustice, economic injustice, feelings of marginalisation, insecurity and loss of citizenship that segments of the population have experienced.

Foreign aid

Jordan’s strategic importance as an ally to the United States provides it with substantial foreign aid that functions as political rents, enabling the state to weather the storm of regional turbulence.⁷⁵ Since it entertains a strategic position regionally, Jordan has always been involved in regional and international bargains and thus the monarchy has access to resources originating from abroad. As a consequence of this foreign aid, the regime has been able “to fulfil the social bargain and to buy widespread legitimacy.”⁷⁶ Hence, the cooperation of the Kingdom with international actors has stabilised the nation by allowing the state apparatus to gain legitimacy with subsidies such as those seen in the stimulus plan implemented immediately after unrest at the start of the Arab Spring.

The country remains highly dependent on substantial financial aid largely provided by the United States, Europe, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Aid has had a major impact in recent years in stabilising the economy. “The only reason for the sustainability of Jordan's fiscal policy is its heavy reliance on foreign aid.” In 2018, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan received more aid than any other country in the Middle East, other than crisis-ridden Yemen and Syria. The United States also expanded its economic commitments to Jordan and increased core annual aid from $660 million to $1 billion annually between 2015 and 2017.

On February 14, 2018, Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on foreign assistance from the US. This was not the first such agreement: two similar agreements preceded it, each lasting three years. The most recent agreement is the longest (2018-2022) and it commits the US to annual bilateral assistance to Jordan that amounts to $1.275 billion, a five-year total of $6.375 billion. This latest agreement represents a 27% increase in the commitment of US foreign aid to Jordan, compared to the previous two.⁷⁷ The aid provided is targeted towards improving the socio-economic status of the population. General political standards are affected by this as well as economic and social ones, as all complement one another and when aid programmes target “the general population, the majority of relationships between stability and foreign aid stem from it. Over the years, the majority of the projects have been in the governing and civil society sector, which relates directly to maintaining political stability”.⁷⁸

Conclusion

The Hashemite Kingdom’s leadership has so far been successful in maintaining the stability of the country amidst the wave of the Arab Spring that swept other neighbouring Arab states. However, this article highlights the stresses currently facing the regime, and the potential future impact of instability factors on the regime. Concerning Gerschewski’s “three pillars” theory, it can be argued that the Hashemite leadership has endured notable crises through the mechanisms of repression, co-option, and legitimation tactics. In addition, foreign aid has played a significant role in stabilising the situation in the country, contributing directly to regime survival. While the monarchy has often defied predictions of its imminent collapse, the litany of strains that the Kingdom currently faces – and will face in the foreseeable future – suggests that there is a great potential that such predictions will come to pass.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ghassan Elkahlout

Dr Ghassan ElKahlout is head of the MA Programme in Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action at the Doha Graduate Institute. He has a PhD in post-war reconstruction and development studies from York University, UK.

Alaa Hadid

Alaa Hadid is an MA Graduate of Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar.

Notes

1 ‘Jordanian Judge Resigns after “Warning” to Gulf Leaders by Friday Sermon: “Where are Your Money and Wealth?”’ [in Arabic], CNN, 2017, January 22. https://arabic.cnn.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

2 ‘Jordan Arrests Leaders of Teachers’ Union in Opposition Crackdown | Education News’. Al Jazeera, 2020, http://aljazeera.com (accessed 29 March 2021).

3 Robert Satloff and David Schenker, ‘Political Instability in Jordan’. Council on Foreign Relations, May 15, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

4 ‘Syria Conflict: JORDANIANS “at Boiling Point” Over Refugees’. BBC, February 2, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

5 Mona Christophersen, ‘Protest and Reform in Jordan: Popular Demand and Government Response 2011 to 2012’. FAFO. 2013, https://www.fafo.no/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

6 Fund for Peace (FFP), Fragile states index annual report, 2020, https://fundforpeace.org/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

7 Lorenzo Bernal-Verdugo, Davide Furceri, and Dominique Guillaume, ‘The Dynamic Effect of Social and Political Instability on Output: The Role of Reforms’. International Monetary Fund. IMF Working Paper, 13/91, 2013.

8 Johannes Gerschewski, ‘The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes’. Democratization Vol. 20. Issue 1 (2013): 13–38.

9 Johannes Gerschewski, ‘The Three Pillars of Stability: Towards An Explanation for the Durability of Autocratic Regimes in EAST ASIA’. APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 14, 2010.

10 Ibid.

11 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

12 Gerschewski, ‘The Three Pillars of Stability: Towards an Explanation for the Durability of Autocratic Regimes in East Asia’, op. cit.

13 Ibid.

14 Christian Davenport, ‘State Repression and Political Order’. Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 10. Issue 2 (2007).

15 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, ‘Competitive Authoritarianism: International Linkage, Organizational Power; and the Fate of Hybrid Regimes’. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2006.

16 O. Schlumberger and A. Bank, ‘Succession, Legitimacy, and Regime Stability in Jordan’. The Arab Studies Journal Vol. 9. Issue 2/1 (2001): 50–72.

17 Gerschewski, ‘The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes’, op. cit., p. 22.

18 Gerschewski, ‘The Three Pillars of Stability: Towards an Explanation for the Durability of Autocratic Regimes in East Asia’.

19 Christoph H. Stefes, Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions: Corruption, Collusion and Clientelism. Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

20 Hans Morgenthau, ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’. The American Political Science Review Vol. 56. Issue 2 (1962): 301–309.

21 Amanda A. Licht, ‘Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival’. Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 54. Issue 1 (2010): 58–87.

22 Laurie A. Brand, ‘Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity’. Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 24. Issue 4 (1995): 46–61; Sean L. Yom, ‘Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy’. Journal of Democracy Vol. 20. Issue 4 (2009): 151–166.

23 Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On’. Journal of Democracy Vol. 23. Issue 4 (2012): 85.

24 Daniel Yuichi Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola, ‘Does Foreign aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?’ The Journal of Politics Vol. 71. Issue 2 (2009): 704–718.

25 Asef Bayat, ‘Arab Revolutions and the Study of Middle Eastern Societies’. International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 43. Issue 3 (2011): 386–386; F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability’. Foreign Affairs Vol. 90. Issue 4 (2011): 81–90.

26 Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor, ‘Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring’. Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 26. Issue 2 (2012): 167–188.

27 Elena Lanchovichina, Eruptions of Popular Anger: The Economics of the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath. The World Bank, 2017.

28 Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, ‘What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy causes of the Arab Spring’. International Studies Review Vol. 15. Issue 1 (2013): 48–66.

29 Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.

30 Nicole Peterson, Tom Rieger and Allison Astorino-Courtois, ‘Potential Paths to Instability in Jordan’. National Security Innovations (NSI), NSI Reachback Report, 2020 https://nsiteam.com/social/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

31 Lamis El Muhtaseb, ‘Jordan’s East Banker-Palestinian Schism’. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), Expert Analysis, 2013; Barbara Gallets, ‘Black September and Identity Construction in Jordan’. Journal of Georgetown University-Qatar Middle Eastern Studies Student Association Vol. 2015. Issue 1 (2015); Brand, ‘Palestinians and Jordanians’, op. cit.

32 Muhtaseb, ‘Jordan’s East Banker-Palestinian Schism’, op. cit.

33 Ibid.; Brand, ‘Palestinians and Jordanians’, op. cit.

34 Christophersen, ‘Protest and Reform in Jordan’, op. cit.

35 International Republican Institute, ‘Violent Extremism in Jordan: Local Governance, Tribal Dynamics and Forced Migration’, 2018.

36 World Bank, Jordan data, 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan (accessed 22 March 2021).

37 UNHCR, Jordan: Factsheet (September 2020), 2020. https://data2.unhcr.org/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

38 UNHCR, Basic Needs and Shelter Working Groups, 2018. https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/61728 (accessed 22 March 2021).

39 REACH Initiative, ‘Evaluating the Effect of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Stability and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities’. Preliminary Impact Assessment, 2014.

40 G. Elkahlout, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Refugees in Host Countries: Jordan as a Case Study’. Siyasat Arabiya Vol. 38 (2019).

41 UN Web TV, Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, min. 33:30, 2016. http://webtv.un.org/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

42 ‘Jordan at Boiling Point’. The Economist, February 6, 2016. https://www.economist.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

43 UNDP, In-depth, 2021. https://www.jo.undp.org/content/jordan/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/in_depth.html (accessed 15 October 2021).

44 Ibid.

45 World Bank, Jordan data, op. cit.

46 Jeroen van IJzerloo, ‘Jordan’s Economy Remains in Jeopardy’. Rabobank, Country Report, 2016. https://economics.rabobank.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

47 Christophersen, ‘Protest and Reform in Jordan’, op. cit.

48 ‘Jordan Parliament Endorses State Budget for 2017’. ANSAmed, January 19, 2017. http://www.ansamed.info/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

49 Michael Safi, ‘Frustration and Anger Fuel Wave of Youth Unrest in Arab World’. The Guardian, November 2, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

50 Françoise De Bel-Air, ‘A Political Demography of the Refugee Question. Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon: Between protection, forced return and resettlement, European University Institute (Florence) & Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies’. CARIM Research Reports Vol. 2 (2012).

51 Mohamed Eltaher, ‘Jordan and the Dangerous Danger [in Arabic]’. Russia Today Arabic. January 13, 2017. Available online at: https://goo.gl/j5qTaJ

52 Quoted in: Christopher Dickey, ‘Jordan’s King Abdullah: “The New Taliban are in Syria”’. The Daily Beast, 2013, January 25. https://www.thedailybeast.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

53 Osama Al Sharif, ‘Jordan and the Challenge of Salafi Jihadists’. Middle East Institute, March 21, 2016. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

54 Nadeen Nimri, ‘In Jordan: Extremism is no longer the preserve of the poor and the marginalized [in Arabic]’. Raseef22, October 12, 2016. https://raseef22.net/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

55 Oliver Holmes, ‘Israeli Settlers Speak Out Against US-Backed Annexation Plan’. The Guardian, June 4, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

56 C. R. Ryan, ‘The Armed Forces and the Arab Uprisings: The Case of Jordan’. Middle East Law and Governance Vol. 4. Issue 1 (2012): 153–167.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 A. Bank, T. Richter and A. Sunik, ‘Durable, Yet Different: Monarchies in the Arab Spring’. Journal of Arabian Studies Vol. 4. Issue 2 (2014): 163–179.

60 David Mednicoff. ‘Arab Monarchical Stability and Political Liberalization: Connections between Morocco and Jordan’, in George Joffé (Ed.), Jordan in Transition, 1990–2000. London: Hurst, 2002, pp. 91–110.

61 Sean L. Yom, ‘Jordan’s Protests Are a Ritual, Not a Revolution’. Foreign Policy, June 11, 2018.

62 Christophersen, ‘Protest and Reform in Jordan’, op. cit.

63 Hamida Ghafour, ‘Survivor Jordan: How King Abdullah has Kept his Crown amid the Arab Uprisings’. The Star, June 10, 2013. Available online at: https://www.thestar.com/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

64 Laura C. Weir, From Diwan to Palace: Jordanian Tribal Politics and Elections. Doctoral dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 2013.

65 Ibid., p. 85.

66 Ibid.

67 Human Rights Watch, ‘Jordan: Escalating Repression of Journalists’. August 18, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

68 Levitsky and Way, ‘Competitive Authoritarianism’, op. cit.

69 Human Rights Watch, ‘Jordan: New Arrests of Activists’, November 28, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/ (accessed 22 March 2021).

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Martin Beck and Simone Hüser, ‘Jordan and the “Arab spring”: No Challenge, No Change?’ Middle East Critique Vol. 24. Issue 1 (2015): 83–97.

76 Ibid.

77 Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations’. Congressional Research Service, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov (accessed 22 March 2021).

78 Ibid., p. 12.