The India-Pakistan Conflict in Kashmir and Human Rights in the Context of Post-2019 Political Dynamics

Abstract

The article takes a critical look at the multiple challenges related to the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, with particular focus on the correlation between the countries’ policies and selected human rights (HR) related challenges in Kashmir. In particular, it investigates the post-2019 dynamics, with the major watershed being the abrogation of the semi-autonomy of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by India. The major objective of this research is to unpack the evolving complexities of the Kashmir situation by analysing holistically how certain key local/domestic, bilateral, and regional aspects influence the conflict’s trajectories and by looking at them from political and HR-related perspectives. The study concludes that domestic, bilateral, and international circumstances make both adversaries prone to bolster their belligerent narratives rather than deal with the issue constructively, by de-escalating mutual tensions and addressing the problems of the indigenous residents of Kashmir. This unresolved dispute stamps its negative imprint not only on Indo-Pakistani relations and the entire South Asian security system but also adversely affects the situation in the pieces of Kashmir administered by India and Pakistan, respectively.

Introduction

Since the partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 and the beginning of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the control of Kashmir acquired an identity-related, symbolic significance to both India and Pakistan. Although the ongoing dispute consumes many resources which could otherwise be diverted into socio-economic development and remains a major hurdle in the normalisation of bilateral relations, the chances for its resolution are severely limited. The major victims of the protracted belligerence are the residents of the disputed area, divided for decades, currently administered by India and Pakistan.

There is an abundance of material written on the history and intractability of the Kashmir conflict, which investigates it from the perspective of Indo-Pakistani enmity and focuses on their conflicting narratives and profoundly limited chances for peaceful resolution.¹ At the same time, more academic deliberations provide an in-depth analysis of the narratives within all parts of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (PSJ&K), currently administered by India and Pakistan. They include the Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh (administered by India), and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan (administered by Pakistan).² All these regions have their own historic specificity and complex religious and socio-cultural diversity, the analysis of which goes well beyond the spectrum of this article, yet these factors have to be briefly and selectively invoked in the context of the geostrategic dynamics, India’s and Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis these territories, and in particular, how they are governed and politically projected by the respective central governments. Consequently, this study will briefly refer to the situation in all parts of the erstwhile PSJ&K, understanding the term “Kashmir” in a broader spectrum.

Contrary to a narrative that appears in many political science analyses of the dispute, the Kashmir situation is not only a territorial bone of contention between India and Pakistan. It is a complex set of diverse power rivalries and discourses on regional, bilateral, and sub-local levels, engaging various state and non-state actors, civil society activists, and other representatives of local communities, who try to materialise their prerogatives or express their grievances. The dispute should also be regarded as a historically inherited, ideological, emotional centrepiece of the state-led, intentionally nurtured nationalisms, with artificially projected and politicised communal Hindu-Muslim rhetoric taking inspiration from the pre-partition times, often serving as a tool for belligerent mobilisation on both sides of the border.

The article briefly assesses the situation in all sections of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (henceforth PSJ&K), now administered by India and Pakistan.³ Presently, Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (IaJK) includes the Kashmir Valley and Jammu (forming the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, UTJ&K) and Ladakh (now the Union Territory of Ladakh, UTL). The common narrative on Kashmir tends to equate Kashmir with the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley as it is the centrepiece of the anti-India insurgency, where the inhabitants' rights are systematically abused by the Indian armed forces and jihadist militants. Nonetheless, in order to provide a glimpse into the unprecedented sub-regional diversity within the former State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K, which existed until its division into two UTs in 2019), the article goes beyond the Kashmir Valley and briefly looks at Jammu and Ladakh.

Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK) consists of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). Both of these regions are strategically crucial in the regional geopolitical dynamics, which includes the Sino-Pakistani alliance, and consequently, they are strictly controlled by the Pakistani central authorities (AJK and GB do not have provincial status).

Among the central questions to be answered by this study is how these ideological tools are manifested and what is their impact on the dynamics of animosity, particularly after the bifurcation of Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir. The key assumption is that the debate on such a complex, multi-layered challenge as the Kashmir issue needs to be recontextualised with the aim being to unpack the diverse interconnections between the regional and local power politics and human rights/grievances of the indigenous inhabitants of the disputed region. Correspondingly, this investigation follows three pillars of analysis:

• Local/domestic: the discourses within different parts of Kashmir, and the policies of India and Pakistan vis-à-vis their respective administered parts of the region,

• Bilateral: antagonistic Indo-Pakistani narratives related to the Kashmir issue with mutual accusations and projecting the arch rival as the human rights (HR) abuser,

• Regional: current security dynamics with China expanding its footprint in South Asia and the potential influence of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan on the Kashmir situation.

After an introduction with brief historical scrutiny, the article is divided into three major sections which investigate the current dynamics of the Kashmir dispute with reference to these three pillars, followed by a conclusion.

India-Pakistan: historically inherited narratives

The historically-inherited belligerent discourses of India and Pakistan have to a large extent conditioned their bilateral interactions for more than seven decades. Protracted antagonism has profoundly influenced the way all pieces of the former PSJ&K are legally and politically administered. IaJK, particularly the Kashmir Valley, remains a focal point of Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders, who persistently claim that this Muslim-majority region should be incorporated into Pakistan, in accordance with the logic of the 1947 Indian Subcontinent partition. India claims that the accession of the entire former PSJ&K was final, complete, and irreversible. The Instrument of Accession of the State of Jammu & Kashmir to India signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947 remains legally binding and requires no additional justification. Contrary to this conviction, Pakistan claims that the incorporation of Kashmir into India was both forced and illegal ab initio, and that Maharaja Hari Singh had no authority to sign the document. These approaches remain intact, with both adversaries keeping the mutual accusations going.

Under the ruling Indian People’s Party (Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP) government, primarily during the second term of Narendra Modi since 2019, India has institutionally reinforced the role of the far-right nationalist ideology in its domestic policy. Its democratic status has been downgraded by various international bodies (vide infra). At the core of the policy of religiously-motivated majoritarian nationalism are twin notions of Hindu superiority: Hindutva (Hinduness) and Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), which are used as a political tool to mobilise the masses⁴ and subjugate those who reject such an exclusivist idea of nationhood and rather view India as a modern democracy that should cherish its unique diversities. The long-term political pledges of the BJP vis-à-vis Kashmir culminated in August 2019 when Article 370 and, by implication, Article 35A of the Constitution of India were abrogated, and the legal status of J&K was reorganised.⁵ The bifurcation and thus eradication of the former J&K state’s territorial integrity through the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act of 2019 (JKRA), was a manifestation of the BJP-promoted policies, tantamount to implementing the centre’s control over Kashmir. As Christopher Snedden appositely contends, in the aftermath of the annulment of partial autonomy, Kashmiri identity experienced a severe threat of further dilution within India, or even of it being totally subsumed by India.⁶

Pakistan is often referred to as an ideological, praetorian state with persistent mostly India-oriented security dilemmas. The successful encroachment of the Pakistani military establishment into political issues, which in a democratic state should remain the exclusive domain of civilian decision-makers, has resulted in the army’s dominant position in constructing and materialising Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives. The two-nation theory (of Muslims and Hindus projected as separate nations), which laid the ground for Muslim separatism, provided an ideological background for India’s bifurcation in 1947, and Pakistan’s inception. The theory is inextricably tied to Pakistan’s political discourse and had an overwhelming impact on the incessant territorial claims vis-à-vis IaJK. Husain Haqqani argues that notwithstanding the changing geopolitical realities, unlike other states, Pakistan has not managed to develop an identity beyond the grievances that fuelled the demands for a separate state in the subcontinent. It paved the way to state-led nurturing of the combustible mix of religion and politics, encouragement of proxy campaigns vis-à-vis Kashmir, led by such groups as Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the combative tone on relations with the world.⁷ The strategy of supporting Islamic fundamentalist groups to materialise regional goals has not brought any success, yet the army has managed to maintain its leading role in defining the country’s policy objectives and retained its disproportionately large segment of central government spending. Consequently, the prevalent feature of Pakistan’s political environment has become the fact that Pakistani politicians have had to operate in very specific circumstances, where the genuinely pro-democratic forces participate in a competition for power with the army, corrupt politicians, fundamentalist clergy, and, more perceptibly, with the far-right political organisations, which try to exert more influence on the domestic socio-political process. Under the government of Imran Khan and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which won the general election in 2018, Pakistan has an apparently democratic structure, which in fact remains a pawn for the powerful Deep State (the military establishment). India-centrism remains a key feature of the state’s security policy. Within this framework, Pakistan unalterably projects itself as a sole defender of Kashmiri Muslims’ rights (in IaJK) and their calls for freedom (azadi) from the Indian oppression.

Decoding the Kashmir conflict on a local/domestic level with an HR-oriented approach

Kashmir remains a vital point of reference in the domestic and foreign policies of both South Asian foes. In India and Pakistan, the notion of Kashmir is ideologically constructed as an inalienable and indisputable element of their statehood. In the official discourses, the disputed areas are projected on the one hand as an idyllic paradise with pristine natural beauty, while on the other as a security zone that needs to be strictly controlled.⁸ Consequently, the collective imagination of the region is shaped by two contrasting approaches. Firstly, references to its picturesque beauty, pristine nature, comparisons such as “Switzerland of Asia”, “paradise on earth”. Secondly, it is the region that has to be territorially, politically, and economically subdued, even if it is tantamount to the systemic and systematic disenfranchisement and persecution of its inhabitants. Kashmir is, therefore, imagined to mobilise support for certain territorial claims and incite animosity towards the neighbouring rival; India calls all territories Pakistan administers “occupied”, conversely, Pakistan considers all parts of Kashmir India controls as occupied. Both countries accuse each other of human rights abuses, while at the same time being perpetrators of multi-faceted deprivation of basic rights in the areas of the disputed region that they respectively administer. Overt advocacy of certain values, such as human rights or democracy, often serves as a useful political catchphrase and a means with which India and Pakistan try to divert attention from their own wrongdoings.

It is worth referring to the way political performance and democratic standards in India and Pakistan are internationally assessed. India, in promoting itself as the biggest democracy in the world, has eagerly announced its role as the symbol of progressiveness and tolerance to provide moral support for its ambitions as the leader of developing countries and a rising power with legitimate global aspirations. Nonetheless, under the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government, India experiences significant democratic erosion. Its position was, for the first time, downgraded and equalled with Pakistan by human rights watchdog Freedom House, to “partly free” on its three-scale measure (free, partly free, not free).⁹ The Democracy Index published by The Economist Intelligence Unit qualified Pakistan as a hybrid regime and India as a flawed democracy (Democracy Index, 2020). IaJK and PaJK were assessed as not free, with largely curtailed political rights and civil liberties.¹⁰ In 2020, the University of Gothenburg-based V-Dem Institute exposed global democratic decline and measured several types of HR violations, enumerating India (along with Hungary, Turkey, Poland, Serbia, and Brazil) among the fastest autocratising countries in the world in the decade from 2010-2020, assessing its status as an electoral democracy because of severe limitations on media freedom, curtailing the opposition, and civil society.¹¹ In 2021, V-Dem dedicated a separate chapter to India (“Democracy Broken Down”), finally downgrading it from “electoral democracy” to “electoral autocracy”. Using sedition or anti-terrorism laws such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967, to imprison political opponents and critics, harass journalists, and intimidate academia and civil society were given as examples of accelerated autocratisation. Growing censorship on issues viewed as “fragile” by the government, with simultaneous empowerment of the organisations aligned with Hindutva was also highlighted. V-Dem highlighted significant deterioration, particularly since the BJP-led Hindu nationalists took power in 2014: “India’s level of liberal democracy registered at 0.34 by the end of 2020 after a steep decline since its high at 0.57 in 2013”. A 23 percentage point drop was assessed as “one of the most dramatic shifts among all countries in the world over the past 10 years”.¹² This not only downgraded, but also put India on par with the hybrid regime of Pakistan which systemically curtails basic rights (“India is, in this aspect, now as autocratic as is Pakistan, and worse than both its neighbours, Bangladesh and Nepal”), evoking a harsh reaction from the Indian government, which staunchly rejects any international criticism of its human rights and democracy record.

The rights of the indigenous residents of IaJK and PaJK should be regarded as a key element in the discussion related to the Kashmir conflict and its resolution. Recontextualising and recalibrating the debate in such a manner is a sine qua non for understanding its complexity by going beyond the geostrategic and bilateral dynamics and referring to the narratives within the erstwhile PSJ&K. Importantly, the HR abuses in Kashmir are noticed and documented by international governmental and non-governmental organisations. Both Indian and Pakistani governments critically assess such reports, arguing that they are one-sided, especially if they raise the HR issue with regard to their respectively administered parts of Kashmir; any international criticism of the neighbour’s policies is gladly accepted. For example, in June 2018 a landmark first report issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on Kashmir called for an international inquiry into multiple violations on both sides of the LoC. Notably, it referred to abuses committed both in IaJK and PaJK and provided seventeen recommendations to India and seven to Pakistan.¹³ India’s Ministry of External Affairs in harsh words questioned “the intent in bringing out such a report, and assessed it as malicious, fallacious, tendentious, and motivated, violating India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. It alluded to Pakistan's long-term proxy strategy by arguing the necessity “to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country from cross border terrorism”.¹⁴ In its official statement, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as always, referred to the situation in Kashmir as “occupied” by India and argued that HR violations in PaJK should not be compared. It did not provide any information on how the situation on the Pakistani side will be addressed: “References to human rights concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan should in no way be construed to create a false sense of equivalence with the gross and systematic human rights violations in IoK”.¹⁵

On 9 July 2019, the OHCHR published a second report, an update of the situation in both parts of the LoC. It inter alia reiterated that the HR abuses on both sides continued unabated.¹⁶ On 1 December 2021, the OHCHR spokesperson Rupert Colville expressed concern over the arrest of the renowned Srinagar-based human rights activist, Khurram Parvez, under Indian counter-terrorism legislation, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), and called for prompt, thorough, transparent, independent, and effective investigation into the recent incidents of killings of civilians in the Valley.¹⁷ India again rejected the comments on UTJ&K as baseless.

Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and human rights

The HR violations are particularly accentuated with reference to the Sunni Muslim dominated Kashmir Valley, which has witnessed an anti-India insurgency since 1989, supported by Pakistan-sponsored proxies. The ubiquitous presence of the Indian armed forces¹⁸ and the ongoing militancy profoundly affect the Valley’s civilian population. Entangled in counterterrorist campaigns, prolonged states of emergency and permanent conflict, the region’s inhabitants are exposed to institutionalised violence, repression, and dispossession, which entails the deprivation of basic, inalienable internationally-recognised rights and freedoms such as the right to life, liberty, security, to seek and receive impartial information, equality before the law, peaceful assembly, freedom of movement, thought, and expression, freedom from arbitrary arrest.¹⁹ After IaJK's bifurcation, Kashmir Valley remains a major point of reference in Pakistan’s territorial revisionism and a crucial security-related challenge for India. The complex situation in the Valley stems from the historically inherited strategic significance of the region, which is embedded in the protracted and escalation-prone dispute between India and Pakistan and remains a central point of reference of India’s state-promoted majoritarian nationalism and Pakistan’s persistent territorial revisionism. These largely Kashmir-oriented narratives, promoted by the key stakeholders on both sides of the border, effectively hinder any genuine and meaningful reconciliation process.

Following Kashmir’s bifurcation, a lockdown, which particularly hit the Valley, was imposed by New Delhi. Communication lines, including the internet and mobile networks, were severed. The crackdown, which was meant to quell dissent, lasted for 17 months and became the longest-ever internet shutdown in a democratic country. Amnesty International launched the campaign “Let Kashmir Speak” and emphasised that although legitimate security concerns may lead to reasonable restrictions in certain circumstances, the shutdown in Kashmir “did not comply with the need for proportionality as set out under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which India is a party”.²⁰

In 2020, the New Delhi-authorised legislature expanded the number of people eligible to reside in Kashmir. The Ministry of Home Affairs’ orders, followed by the new Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Domicile Certificate (Procedure) Rules 2020, issued on 18.05.2020, replaced the term “permanent residents’ with “domiciles of UT of J&K”. Under certain provisions, the migrants were empowered to apply for a job in UTJ&K and allowed to acquire status equal to Kashmiris. The new law was regarded in the Valley as another attempt to neutralise Kashmiri Muslims via the outside settlement, a strategy similar to Punjabi settlement in PaJK. In 2020, thanks to this fast-track procedure, thousands of applicants, including retired Gorkha officers and soldiers, received domicile certificates in UTJ&K.²¹ There were apprehensions among some Kashmiris in the Valley, that New Delhi’s policies may legally dispossess, make stateless, and deprive of government jobs those native Kashmiris who would not be able to prove their residency and get a domicile certificate. As a result, this could provide legal facilitation for demographic engineering. Getting Kashmiri residency was received positively as a chance for equal rights and a better life by lower caste Hindus from Jammu, who had been brought to Kashmir in the 1950s from Punjab to perform sanitation works and similar tasks. Other Hindus were often apprehensive of losing their position or jobs to the outsiders. In Ladakh, the domicile laws were not introduced, which raised accusations by some Valley Kashmiris that there are different standards of the centre’s policy towards UTJ&K and UTL.

The popular resentments in Ladakh (the Leh district of Ladakh is overwhelmingly Buddhist with Sunni Muslims as a more important minority, and Kargil district is 80% Muslim, mainly Shia) and Jammu were for decades overshadowed by the restiveness of the Valley. The discourse within Jammu, the most heterogenous chunk of IaJK, locates this region as a victim of the power tussle between New Delhi and Srinagar (the summer capital of the UTK&K, the winter one being Jammu), regarded as key architects of the local security environment. Most residents of Jammu division, especially those who have strong pro-BJP leanings, celebrated the bifurcation of the erstwhile J&K. The restrictions were introduced, which hit local business and academia. Some political leaders were prevented from holding press conferences and delivering speeches. Some of them, like Gulchain Singh, president of Charak Dogra Sadar Sabha and a former minister, were detained by the police. Others were placed under house arrest in Jammu (for example, J&K Pradesh Congress Committee president, Ghulam Ahmad Mir), which was reminiscent of the detentions in the Valley. Notably, some Hindu organisations in Jammu have demanded liberation from what they regard as the Valley’s suzerainty; current policies of New Delhi may, therefore, be regarded as a major hindrance in materialising their aspirations.²² Consequently, the sense of disenfranchisement in Jammu may lead to enhanced resentment against New Delhi’s policies, especially if it is accompanied by a lack of economic development.

Ladakh, geostrategically important, plays a distinctive role in shaping India’s security policy vis-à-vis China and remains part of the regional rivalry with Beijing. According to some Ladakhis, who accentuate the distinctiveness of their identity within India and within the former State of J&K, the administration of former J&K was “predominantly communalist”,²³ and their distinctiveness, language, and culture were neglected and underrepresented. In Leh (unlike in Kargil), there was strong popular demand for Union Territory status. In 2000, the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF) was established, under the leadership of influential Buddhist politician and Ladakhi nationalist, Thupstan Chhewang, who had started his campaign already in the 1970s. The J&K’s bifurcation was celebrated in Leh, as the people considered it as the final fulfilment of BJPs promise and a chance for development. There was practically no restriction of the internet or phones. At the same time, Kargil observed 31 October 2019 as “black day”; the markets were shut down to protest against the government’s decision.²⁴

Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir and human rights

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is robustly promoted by its policymakers and the pro-establishment media, glorified by the military and civilian institutions, and implemented as a proxy campaign carried out by violent non-state actors. At the same time, providing political rights and empowerment to the inhabitants of PaJK remains an unfulfilled challenge. Pakistan administers its pieces of the erstwhile Princely State separately, primarily through decisions of the central authorities, with a decisive role of the military establishment.

In AJK, the political and military establishment has either directly ruled or implicitly influenced the situation in the region, which is in socio-political, strategic, and economic terms strictly controlled by the centre. The parliamentary system functions in AJK under the 1974 AJK Interim Constitution. The “interim” was added to emphasise the unresolved character of the Kashmir dispute with India and the fact that Pakistan never accepted the LoC as the de jure international border.²⁵ The OHCR report mentioned above emphasised that “members of nationalist and pro-independence political parties claim that they regularly face threats, intimidation, and even arrests for their political activities from local authorities or intelligence agencies” and the Interim Constitution of AJK “places several restrictions on anyone criticising the region’s accession to Pakistan, in contravention of Pakistan’s commitments to uphold the rights to freedoms of expression and opinion, assembly, and association”.²⁶ The indigenous residents of AJK are prevented from getting any government jobs or contesting elections unless they take the loyalty oath, which corroborates the two-nation theory and Pakistan’s ideology that Kashmir will belong to Pakistan. The appointment of Sardar Masood Kahan, a former president of AJK, as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States in November 2021, could be regarded as an indication of the incessant centrality of the Kashmir issue to Pakistan.²⁷

Gilgit Baltistan’s legal status has never been definitively regulated by the Pakistani authorities, under a pretext of the unresolved Kashmir conflict with India. This directly affects the situation in the region, where the lack of political inclusion does not prevent the authorities from proliferating state-endorsed nationalism. Similarly to AJK, the rights to freedoms of expression and opinion, assembly, and association are restricted. The Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018, and the updated Gilgit-Baltistan Governance Reforms 2019, retain the same language limiting freedom of association from the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009.²⁸ Gilgit Baltistan has regions with a Shia majority which in the eyes of the establishment makes it a potential theatre of rebellion against majoritarian Sunni nationalism. The state-controlled influx of outsiders to Gilgit Baltistan gradually changed its demographic balance and created a sense of insecurity among the local people, who felt deprived of their culture and the control of the resources they owned. The Shia majority in 1947 exceeded 80% but has significantly declined with Pashto and Punjabi migration. Shias now account for 60% of Gilgit’s population and Sunnis 40%. In Baltistan, the proportions are 96% Shia, 2% Nurbakhshi, and 2% Sunnis.²⁹ Since the 1980s, the level of sectarian violence perpetrated by Sunni extremists has surged dramatically, and more people tend to perceive the situation through a sectarian lens. The imposition of Pakistani Sunni-dominated discourse manifested itself in tensions over curricula and textbooks, which had gradually escalated in the early 2000s, resulting in the deployment of additional armed forces, including Punjab Rangers and the army.³⁰ The agitation resulted in violent Shia-Sunni clashes spreading into the villages. Thanks to the fact that Gilgit-Baltistan is China’s gateway to Pakistan, the strategic significance of this region is further reinforced by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) constructions (vide infra).

Human rights as a weapon in Indo-Pakistani sabre rattling

Indo-Pakistani relations often resemble a fierce tug-of-war, erupting regularly with mutual accusations of human rights violations being an inseparable element of both states’ narratives. Following the 14 February 2019 terrorist attack in Pulwama district (south of Srinagar), carried out by Pakistani-sponsored jihadists from Jaish-e-Mohammad, with 40 members of the Central Reserve Police Force killed, India blamed Pakistan for being a terror-supporting state. Each attack perpetrated by Pakistan-based Islamist groups evokes such accusations; the proxy strategy has recurrently contributed to the escalation of relations with India and substantially tarnished Pakistan's international image.

Manifesting opposition against the violations of Kashmiris’ rights by the authorities and Indian security forces, and projecting Pakistan’s international image as a human rights defender, form a key pillar of Pakistan’s regional strategy, aimed at showing its neighbour in a negative light by highlighting suffering Kashmiris, diverting attention towards India’s misconduct, and at the same time overlooking its own wrongdoings in PaJK. Pakistani reaction to India’s bifurcation of IaJK, engaging the state’s key decision-makers, may serve as an example of such a selective approach. Imran Khan called and presided over the National Security Council (NSC); he strongly criticised India’s policy. Markedly, the NSC is a controversial federal consultative body, created and supported by the military leaders, which includes amongst others the Director General of the ISI (powerful Inter-Services Intelligence) and Chief of Army Staff, which provides an additional platform for the military establishment to directly influence Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. Islamabad downgraded relations with New Delhi, suspended trade, pledged to internationalise the issue at the UN forum, declared 14 August (Pakistan’s independence day) as solidarity day with Kashmiris residing on the Indian side of the LoC, and 15 August (India’s independence day) as “black day”. Pakistan rejected India’s request to open airspace to Narendra Modi for his flights to the United States (United Nations General Assembly meeting) and Saudi Arabia, claiming it was due to human rights violations in IaJK. At the same time, political activism on the Pakistani side was closely monitored. Imran Khan warned hundreds of AJK pro-independence campaigners, who wanted to march towards Srinagar after India revoked Article 370, against expressing solidarity with IaJK’s Kashmiris. Cooperation initiatives between Kashmiri people artificially divided by the LoC are regarded with apprehension by both the Pakistani and Indian leadership, as they oppose the official state-authorised narratives.

The problems are multi-faceted and emanate from multiple internal and external factors, which in varying degrees characterise political narratives in both India and Pakistan: far-right nationalism formed into a majoritarian discourse, systemic and systematic exclusion of minorities and dissidents, legitimised by unconstitutionally enacted rules and regulations, enhanced censorship, intimidation and oppression by the civil–military apparatus, one-party control, dictatorial inclinations, gender inequality (particularly harmful in restive areas), militarisation of the political process, and elevation of religious fundamentalism to the socio-political and morally dominant force, usurping to be a sole representative of the national values.

Evolving regional trajectories and Kashmir

Evolving geostrategic trajectories have had their historical influence on the dynamics of the Kashmir conflict. In the post-2019 era, this specificity remains intact. In this regard, and with reference to the research topic of this article, the two key elements of the international dynamics, which directly and/or indirectly impact the situation in Kashmir and have to be highlighted, are the China–Pakistan alliance and Sino-Indian border clashes in Ladakh, and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.

China–Pakistan alliance and Sino-Indian border clashes in Ladakh

While tightening Islamabad’s cooperation with Beijing, the CPEC may eventually bring geopolitical shifts in China–Pakistan–India interactions. In particular, the project may lead to the escalation of Sino-Indian rivalry as it traverses disputed territories of PaJK. In order to demand judicial clarity for its investments, China might search for a political solution for the status of Gilgit-Baltistan to legalise the implementation of CPEC-related projects in the area. In this regard, Gilgit-Baltistan remains a core asset for Pakistan due to its geographic location as the northernmost administrative territory. It has borders with AJK, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the narrow Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan, the Xinjiang province of China, and the Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL). The region has notable resources of water as well as metals and minerals such as copper, gold, silver, coal, and iron, and considerable reserves of uranium. Pakistan struggles with a persistent shortage of electrical power, leading to long load-shedding throughout the country. Northern mountainous areas of Pakistan such as Gilgit-Baltistan have an abundance of water resources (including glaciers), which can be used to produce power.

Gilgit-Baltistan is the only gateway to China, Pakistan’s “all-weather ally”, and the starting point of the CPEC. One potential option is to constitutionally integrate Gilgit-Baltistan as the fifth province of Pakistan. If Pakistan grants provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan (which would meet China’s objectives), it is likely to evoke a firm reaction in New Delhi.³¹ There is a need for an impartial investigation of the CPEC’s impact on the situation in volatile regions, including PaJK, where it is contested by local communities who claim they are excluded from managing their resources and regard the project as imposed by the ruling elites. This practice may reinforce corruption and an authoritarian style of governance based on rigid centralised control and violation of civil rights and constitutional freedoms. Pakistan’s expectations and portraying China as a supporter of its Kashmir-oriented strategy do not seem to reflect the reality. The PRC materialises its own geostrategic objectives that are focused on multi-faceted expansion of its footprint in the region and beyond. Cooperation with Pakistan is regarded as a means to achieve this goal.

The evolving geostrategic environment with Sino-Indian recurring hostilities along the eastern Ladakh border may enable China to augment its regional push-for-power policies. India assumes that all pieces of the former PSJ&K administered by Pakistan and China are ipso facto Indian territories, occupied by foreign powers. Consequently, China is accused of illegal administration of Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin (the former ceded to PRC by Pakistan following the boundary agreement in 1963, the latter captured by China after a short border war with India in 1962). Sino-Indian rivalry escalated in 2020 after India bifurcated J&K; Indian and Chinese troops engaged in confrontation along the disputed border, turning the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh into another escalation-prone flashpoint. The China-related threat prompted India to further militarise UTL, regarded as a key security zone.

The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan: transforming the geopolitical landscape

The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021 marked a crucial turning point in shaping the geostrategic regional landscape. In Pakistan, which has a long-term policy of providing multi-dimensional support and safe haven for the Afghani Taliban, it was welcomed with enthusiasm. Pakistan hopes to bolster its geostrategic role as an intermediary of China-Taliban potential cooperation and regards the current dynamics as a chance to minimise India’s influences in Kabul. From Islamabad/Rawalpindi’s point of view, continuous effort should be put towards avoiding having an ally of India on its western border. Post-American Afghanistan, with its potential regional spillover effect, is likely to have a noteworthy impact on the recalibration of security dilemmas by both South Asian rivals in order to adjust their strategies to new conditions. With a rapidly deteriorating socio-economic situation and looming humanitarian crisis, the new rulers in Kabul will be searching for international recognition and, most importantly, economic support. Potential conflict with Pakistan is not an impossible scenario; it has to be presumed that controlling/capturing much richer Pakistan would largely help the Taliban to survive. The increased radicalisation in Pakistan, with too soft an approach towards Islamic extremists such as the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, a far-right political party, noticeable over the last few years, is, therefore, a particularly worrisome phenomenon which must be rigidly dealt with by the authorities. The fundamentalists who struggle to introduce harsh sharia laws should not be regarded as proxies in domestic politics, as it is likely to adversely affect the future and international image of Pakistan and may make it more prone to religious extremism as well as persecution of minorities and those regarded as enemies of Islam (exemplified gruesomely in December 2021 by a mob lynching and killing of Priyantha Kumara, a Sri Lankan factory manager in Sialkot, over “blasphemy” allegations), socio-political radicalisation, and overall chaos.

The way the South Asian rivals try to navigate the developing geopolitical landscape is likely to impact the situation in Kashmir. Before the Taliban takeover, India was one of the key donors of infrastructural and development aid to Afghanistan and engaged itself in civilian reconstruction projects. After August 2021, New Delhi needs to reassess its role in Afghanistan and adjust its policies to the new, challenging realities. On 10 November 2021, India organised the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan to discuss the ways to stabilise the rapidly deteriorating situation in the now Taliban-ruled country. Russia, Iran, and Central Asian Republics took part in the initiative, but two key players – China and Pakistan – refused, which can be interpreted as Beijing’s muscle-flexing and projecting itself as a driving force in regional geostrategy, and Pakistan’s obsessive strategy of eliminating India’s influences in the region. With its unceasing India-centric security dilemma, encouraged in geostrategic terms by its cooperation with China, Pakistan is likely to put much effort into excluding New Delhi from Afghanistan-related projects.

The dynamics in Afghanistan, with India’s potential engagement with Kabul, may worsen Indo-Pakistani relations. Happymoon Jacob assumes that it may also contribute to the escalation of the situation in IaJK, with Pakistan bolstering its proxy strategy there as a means to contain India.³² The violence in IaJK, particularly in the Valley, may again deteriorate, with more jihadists crossing the Line of Control, and, consequently, resulting in the continued militarisation and further abuses of Kashmiri civilians’ rights. The author rightfully highlights the fact that the seemingly conciliatory steps of Pakistan towards India, manifested by backchannel talks in late 2020 and early 2021 that included the reduction of violence in Kashmir, and the February 2021 ceasefire agreement, were ended in August 2021 with the Taliban takeover. Thereafter, the infiltrations and ceasefire violations escalated, and Pakistan demanded the pre-August 5 2019 restoration of IaJK’s autonomy.

Facing these challenges, India, interested in containing China and strengthening its regional position, will try to build its own strategy, including greater engagement in cooperation with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. As the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan shows, New Delhi is likely to search for alliances with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian republics (referred to as the “extended neighbourhood” by India) in its strategic manoeuvrings vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Thanks to Washington’s China-focused geostrategic considerations in the Indo-Pacific, and the potential key position India may occupy in it, the likelihood that the United States under Joe Biden’s administration will abandon any India-promoted bilateralism-based approach vis-à-vis a Kashmir resolution is next to zero.

Conclusion: multiple challenges in turbulent times

At the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, the Kashmir conflict remains a core issue bedevilling relations between India and Pakistan. Contextualising the policies of belligerent neighbours and their impact on the lives of the inhabitants of disputed areas in a broader spectrum of regional security dynamics enables the analysis of the Kashmir problem in a more holistic way. A resolution of this intractable dispute must include not only a comprehensive, compromise-oriented dialogue but also a focus on safeguarding due rights to the inhabitants of IaJK and PaJK. The selected factors of local, bilateral, and regional character, which influence the dynamics of the Kashmir conflict and which have been investigated in this article, point to the conclusion that adversaries are prone to bolstering their belligerent narratives and pursuing the iron-hand policies vis-à-vis the respectively administered parts of the erstwhile PSJ&K, rather than dealing with the issue constructively by de-radicalizing their approaches, de-escalating mutual tensions, and addressing the grievances of the disputed region’s inhabitants. Notably, enabling people-to-people contacts and facilitating trade cooperation at the grassroots level could serve as a valuable reconciliation-oriented effort that would substantially improve the human rights situation in divided Kashmir.

At the time of writing, a credible bilateral rapprochement is hardly possible, and it can be assumed that sustained Indo-Pakistani belligerence will continue to bring dire consequences for both adversaries and the residents of divided Kashmir. Moreover, the narratives and policies of India and Pakistan vis-à-vis Kashmir are often remarkably, yet unsurprisingly, similar. Both rivals use, either explicitly or indirectly, the unresolved issue as an important determinant of their internal and foreign policies; the conflict is incessantly embedded in their power structures. At the same time, being signatory states of various international human rights instruments, they both acknowledge the general framework of the human rights regime, and their duties imposed thereby.³³ Nevertheless, in contradiction to these obligations, they both commit a wide range of human rights violations in their respectively administered parts of the erstwhile Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir and do not seem to be interested in introducing any appropriate measures that would eliminate them. Tools of identity and national pride are used to control Kashmir, its people and resources, and these have become inseparable elements of the states’ security goals and antagonist discourses. As a result, because of the lack of any resolution of the Kashmir conflict, South Asia is likely to remain the least integrated region in the world. The human rights situation, including the abuses perpetrated by various stakeholders in Kashmir, demands the attention of the international community, yet, with great probability, greater geopolitical concerns (containing China) are likely to overshadow the necessity of resolving the Kashmir situation with a human rights-oriented approach. Radicalisation reinforced by religiously motivated nationalistic jingoism on both sides of the LoC has become a dismal feature of Indo–Pakistani relations.

Author’s note

The publication was funded by the Priority Research Area Society of the Future under the programme “Excellence Initiative – Research University” at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Agnieszka Kuszewska

Agnieszka Kuszewska is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Jagiellonian University in Kraków (Faculty of International and Political Studies, Institute of the Middle and Far East), where she teaches international relations and security, conflict studies, human rights, modern history, and contemporary political/socio-economic challenges for South Asia.

Notes

1 See for example: Stanley Wolpert, India and Pakistan. Continued Conflict or Cooperation? Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010; Stephen Philip Cohen, Shooting for a Century. The India–Pakistan Conundrum. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013; Happymon Jacob, Kashmir and Indo-Pak Relations. Politics of Reconciliation. New Delhi: Sam˙skr̥ti, 2013; Husain Haqqani, India vs Pakistan. Why Can't We Just Be Friends? New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2016; T. V. Paul (ed.), The India–Pakistan Conflict. An Enduring Rivalry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

2 Of the most recent publications see Serena Hussain (Ed.), Society and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.

3 PSJ&K was an artificially stitched political entity consisting of multi-dimensionally diverse regions, which existed under British colonial occupation and hereditary Dogra rule between 1846 and 1947. For a detailed historical analysis see: Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska, Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies. London: Routledge, 2022 [in print].

4 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (a staunch opponent of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's inclusive policies and an RSS ideologue) coined the term Hindutva and formulated its ideology in the early 1920’s.

5 Two presidential orders, C.O. 272 and C.O. 273, were issued as the legal basis for the abrogation.

6 Christopher Snedden, Independent Kashmir. An Incomplete Aspiration. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021, p. 321.

7 Husain Haqqani, Reimagining Pakistan. Transforming a Dysfunctional Nuclear State. New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2018, p. 7.

8 Nosheen Ali exemplifies such policies in Gilgit Baltistan. Nosheen Ali, Delusional States. Feeling Rule and Development in Pakistan’s Northern Frontier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 1.

9 Freedom in the World 2021. India. Freedom House 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2021 (accessed 21 October 2021), Freedom in the World 2021. Pakistan. Freedom House 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2021 (accessed 21 October 2021).

10 ‘Freedom in the World 2021. Indian Kashmir’, Freedom House 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/indian-kashmir/freedom-world/2021 (accessed 21 October 2021); ‘Freedom in the World 2021. Pakistani Kashmir’, Freedom House 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistani-kashmir/freedom-world/2021 (accessed 21 October 2021).

11 ‘Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows. Democracy Report 2020’, V-Dem Institute, https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf (accessed: 27 November 2021).

12 ‘Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021’, V-Dem Institute, https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/c9/3f/c93f8e74-a3fd-4bac-adfd-ee2cfbc0a375/dr_2021.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).

13 ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to April 2018, and General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan’, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 14.06.2018, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018 (accessed 29 November 2021).

14 ‘Official Spokesperson’s response to a question on the Report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on “The human rights situation in Kashmir”’, Ministry of External Affairs, 14 June 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/29978/official+spokespersons+response+to+a+question+on+the+report+by+the+off (accessed 04 December 2021).

15 ‘Pakistan’s reaction to the UN report on Human Rights violations in Kashmir’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14.06.2018, https://mofa.gov.pk/pakistans-reaction-to-the-un-report-on-human-rights-violations-in-kashmir/ (accessed 04 December 2021).

16 ‘Update of the Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019’. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8.07.2019, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/IN/KashmirUpdateReport_8July2019.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).

17 Comment by the UN Human Rights Office spokesperson Rupert Colville on the arrest of human rights defender Khurram Parvez and recent killings in Indian Administered Kashmir, 1.12.2021, https://www.ohchr.org/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27883&LangID=E (accessed 04 December 2021).

18 Among the legal acts which provide the armed forces with wide-ranging power and exempt them from prosecution are: the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (JKPSA), 1978 (amended in 1987 and 1990) and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) 1990.

19 More on HR abuses in IaJK and PaJK: Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska, Human Rights Violations in Kashmir. London: Routledge, 2022 [in print].

20 India: ‘Let Kashmir Speak’ Campaign La Month into the Lockdown, Amnesty International, 05.09.2019, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/india-let-kashmir-speak-campaign-launched-month-lockdown (accessed 04 December 2021).

21 Rohan Dua, ‘Many Retired Gorkha Soldiers in 6.6k to Get J&K Domicile’, The Times of India, 05.07.2020. Many retired Gorkha soldiers in 6.6k to get J&K domicile | India News - Times of India (indiatimes.com) (accessed 09 December 2021).

22 For example, Ikkjutt Jammu, which has functioned as a party since November 2020, demands Jammu Division’s statehood and restoration of Dogra heritage in the region. It also wants Kashmir Hindu exodus (Hindu Pandits, who experienced jihadists’ targeted violence migrated from the Valley in the early 1990’s following the inception of the insurgency) to be recognised as genocide, and demands a separate UT for them. Narendra Modi's administration has not been able to address the lingering problems of Kashmiri Pandits (including a repatriation to their homeland), which may seem paradoxical since the BJP attaches great importance to the interests of the Hindus. More on Kashmiri Pandits' plight: Balcerowicz and Kuszewska, Human Rights Violations in Kashmir, op. cit.; Balcerowicz and Kuszewska, Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies, op. cit.

23 Martijn Van Beek, ‘Beyond Identity Fetishism: “Communal” Conflict in Ladakh and the Limits of Autonomy’. Cultural Anthropology Vol. 15. Issue 4 (2000): 525–569.

24 More: Balcerowicz and Kuszewska, Human Rights Violations in Kashmir, op. cit.

25 Balcerowicz and Kuszewska, Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies, op. cit.

26 ‘Update of the Situation … ’, op. cit., p. 6.

27 ‘Masood Khan Named Ambassador to US’, The News, 04.11.2021 (thenews.com.pk) (accessed 30 November 2021).

28 ‘Update of the Situation … ’, op. cit., p. 6.

29 Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006, pp. 194–196.

30 The forces with a regional background and a considerable percentage of Shia personnel (police, Northern Light Infantry, Gilgit Scouts) were perceived as untrustworthy by the central authorities. More: Georg Stöber, ‘Religious Identities Provoked: The Gilgit “Textbook Controversy” and Its Conflictual Context’. Internationale Schulbuchforschung Vol. 29. Issue 4 (2017): 389–411; Balcerowicz and Kuszewska, Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies, op. cit.

31 Agnieszka Kuszewska and Agnieszka Nitza-Makowska, ‘Multifaceted Aspects of Economic Corridors in the Context of Regional Security: The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor as a Stabilising and Destabilising Factor’. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs Vol. 8. Issue 2 (2021): 218–248.

32 Happymon Jacob, ‘Kabul, Kashmir and the return of Realpolitik’, The Hindu, 17.11.2021, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/kabul-kashmir-and-the-return-of-realpolitik/article37529486.ece (accessed 30 November 2021).

33 More: Balcerowicz and Kuszewska, Human Rights Violations in Kashmir, op. cit.