DEEPENING INFORMAL-CONSULTATIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ASEAN MEMBERS DURING COVID-19

Abstract

This article analyses the activities of Chinese embassies in ASEAN member states during the COVID-19 pandemic, understood as one part of China's efforts to reshape the regional order towards a more informal structure it calls ‘consultative governance'. The article begins by providing a theoretical explanation of informal practices in international politics and the Chinese cultural and political context. It mainly focuses on the concepts of ‘track two diplomacy' and ‘peripheral diplomacy’. The empirical section then outlines how China, within its pandemic diplomacy, actively fostered relations with Southeast Asian countries. It notes that this was not a one-size-fits-all approach. China diversified its informal tactics to secure regional interests and promote network-based regional consultative governance. Chinese diplomats prioritised economic interests while cultivating network politics. They engaged with political, party, and military elites while strengthening relations with the Chinese diaspora.

Keywords:

• China
• ASEAN
• COVID-19
• informality
• relationality
• consultative governance

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the time and effort of two anonymous reviewers dedicated to reviewing my research paper and Bill Hayton for his remarks on the very first draft of the paper. I would like to thank Xiao Zhibin – the trainee at the Center for Asian Affairs at the University of Lodz, who assisted in collecting data for this paper. Finally, the paper was prepared with the support of the research project “‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and the Developing World: the People’s Republic of China as a multilateral and normative power” that is supported by the Polish National Science Center under project no. 2019/33/B/HS5/01667.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Peter Martin, China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021 and Duan Xiaolin and Liu Yitong, ‘The Rise and Fall of China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’, September 22, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/the-rise-and-fall-of-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/ (accessed 7 February 2024).

2 Evelyn Goh, ‘The Modes of China’s Influence. Cases from Southeast Asia’. Asian Survey, Vol. 54. Issue 5 (2014): 825–826 and Brantly Womack, ‘China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy’. Pacific Affairs Vol. 76. Issue 4 (2003/2004): 529–548.

3 Nicholas Woolf and Christina Silver, Qualitative Analysis using MAXQDA. The Five-Level QDA Method. Routledge, 2018.

4 Joseph V. Montville, ‘Strategic Track Two Diplomacy: The Work of Healing History’. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations Fall (2006): 16 and Joseph V. Montville, ‘The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy’, in Vamik D. et al. (Eds.), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships. London: Lexington, 1991, pp. 162-163.

5 See for example Anthony Aust, ‘The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments’. International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 35. Issue 4 (1986): 787–812; Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’. International Organization Vol. 54. Issue 3 (2000): 421–456.

6 Michael Th. Greven, ‘The Informalization of Transnational Governance: A Threat to Democratic Government’, in E. Grande and L. W. Pauly (Eds.), Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century. Toronto: Toronto University Press Stone, 2005, pp. 261–284.

7 Oliver Westerwinter, ‘Formal and Informal Governance in the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission’, in Anja P. Jakobi and Klaus D. Wolf (Eds.), The Transnational Governance of Violence and Crime. Non-State Actors in Security. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 61–83.

8 Melissa Carlson and Barbara Koremenos, ‘Cooperation Failure or Secret Collusion? Absolute Monarchs and Informal Cooperation’. The Review of International Organizations Vol. 16. Issue 3 (2021): 1-41.

9 Xue Yu, ‘China as a Great Power: Reconsidering Face Culture in Chinese Foreign Policy’. International Journal Issue 4 (2022): 521–538 and Zeng Qingjie and Yujeong Yang, ‘Informal Networks as Safety Nets: The Role of Personal Ties in China’s Anti-corruption Campaign’. China: An International Journal Issue 3 (2017): 26–57.

10 Jacob Harding, ‘Corruption or Guanxi? Differentiating Between the Legitimate, Unethical and Corrupt Activities of Chinese Government Officials’. Pacific Basin Law Journal Vol. 31. Issue 2 (2014): 128–145.

11 Jack Barbalet, ‘The Structure of Guanxi: Resolving Problems of Network Assurance’. Theory and Society Vol. 43. Issue 1 (2014): 51–69 and Deepak Nair, ‘Saving Face in Diplomacy: A Political Sociology of Face-to-Face Interactions in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’. European Journal of International Relations Vol. 25. Issue 3: 672–697.

12 Lowell Dittmer, ‘Chinese Informal Politics’. The China Journal Issue 34 (1995): 1–34.

13 Lucian W. Pye, ‘Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour’. The China Journal Issue 34 (1995): 35–53.

14 Emillian Kavalski and Young Chul Cho, ‘Worlding the Study of Normative Power’. Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations Vol. 15. Issue 57 (2018): 49–65.

15 Wu Jieh-min, ‘State Policy and Guanxi Network Adoption in China: Local Bureaucratic Rent Seeking’. Issue and Studies Vol. 37. Issue 1 (2001): 30-31.

16 Kwang-kuo Hwang, ‘Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game’. The American Journal of Sociology Vol. 92. Issue 4 (1987): 968.

17 Xiong Xi, ‘A Study of the Structure of Consultative Democracy in China’s Political System’. International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science Vol. 8. Issue 2 (2020): 7.

18 Wei Chonghui, ‘Xieshang zhili zhong guanxi shengcheng yu guiyue de bentu luoji’ (The Indigenous Logic of Relationship Formation and Regulation in Deliberative Governance), Journal of Shenzhen University (Humanities and Social Sciences) Vol 39. Issue 2 (2022): 104-105.

19 Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress, 19 November 2012, http://en.people.cn/90785/8024777.html (accessed 29 May 2022); Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 16th Party Congress, 17 November 2002, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Nov/49107.htm (accessed 9 September 2022) and Xi Jinping zai zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotan hui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua (Xi Jinping delivers an important speech at the forum on neighboring diplomatic work), October 25, 2013, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878897.htm (accessed 29 May 2022).

20 Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy’. China Leadership Monitor Issue 44 (2014): 1–43; Jacob Stokes, ‘China’s Periphery Diplomacy: Implications for Peace and Security in Asia’. Special Report Issue 467 (2020): 1–24; Chen Jimin, ‘Challenges in China’s Peripheral Diplomacy’. China US Focus, June 24, 2021, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/challenges-in-chinas-peripheral-diplomacy; Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy. An Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2020 (chapter 7) and Suisheng Zhao, ‘China’s Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors’. Security Dialogue Vol. 30. Issue 3 (1999): 335–346.

21 For example: Li Boyi, ‘Xin shidai Zhongguo zhoubian quyu zhili moshi de zhuanxing yu chongsu’ (The Transformation and Reshaping of the Governance Model in China’s Peripheral Regions in the New Era) South and Southeast Asia Issue 5 (2019): 15.

22 Zhao Kejun, ‘Xieshang xing waijiao: quanqiu zhili de xin waijiao gongneng yanjiu’ (Consultative Diplomacy: Research on the New Diplomatic Function of Global Governance) Guowai Lilun Dongtai (Foreign Theoretical Trends” Issue 8 (2013): 37.

23 Dominik Mierzejewski, Bartosz Kowalski and Jarosław Jura, ‘The Domestic Mechanisms of China’s Vertical Multilateralism: The FOCAC and the 16+1 Format Case Studies’. Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 32. Issue 142 (2023): 652–668.

24 Shi Yuanhua, Jindai Zhongguo zhoubian waijiao (Modern China’s peripheral diplomacy). Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2019.

25 Hu Zhiyong, ‘Zhongguo zhoubian waijiao ‘wei’ yu ‘buwei’’(China’s neighbouring diplomacy: pro and cons), Global Times, November 22, 2021, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJxQWA (accessed 24 July 2021).

26 Tian Shihui and Zheng Xianwu, ‘Guanxi xing quanli yu Yatai haiyang anquan hezuo. Dongmeng zhongxin diwei’ (Relational Power and the Construction of “ASEAN Centrality” in Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Cooperation), Dangdai Yatai (Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies). Issue 6 (2022): 98–133.

27 Tang Huangfeng, ‘Xieshang zhili de Zhongguo shijian: jingyan, wenti yu zhanwang’ (The Chinese Practice of Consultative Governance: Experience, Problems and Prospects), October 13, 2022, http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/202010/t20201013_5193920.shtml (accessed 16 January^, 2022).

28 Wei Ling, Guanxi pingheng, Dongmeng zhongxin yu diqu zhixu yanjiu (Relationship balance, ASEAN center and regional order evolution) Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Politics and Economy) 2017, no 7, pp. 38–45.

29 Li Keqiang, ‘Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China At the 20th China-ASEAN Summit’, November 15, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201711/t20171115_678641.html (accessed 25 January 2021).

30 Liaongtao Liu, Yangli Huang and Jiyang Jiu, ‘China’s Vaccine Diplomacy and Its Implications for Global Health Governance’, Healthcare Vol. 10. Issue 7 (2022): 1276 and Denny Roy, ‘China’s pandemic diplomacy’, “East-West Center”, no. 144, September 2020.

31 Zhang Jie, ‘Zhongguo yu Dongnanya de gonggong weisheng zhili – yi xinguan yiqing zhili wei li’ (Public Health Governance in China and Southeast Asia-Taking COVID-19 Governance as an Example), Dongnanya yanjiu Issue 5 (2020): 24–26; Pan Yue, ‘Cong shuangbian dao duobian: Zhongguo yu Dongnanya guojia de xinguan yimiao hezuo’ (From bilateral to multilateral: COVID-19 vaccine cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries), Dongnanya yanjiu Issue 6 (2021): 146-147 and Li Yunlong, ‘Zhongguo yu Dongmeng guojia de xinguan yimiao hezuo’ (COVID-19 vaccine cooperation between China and ASEAN countries: motivations, results and challenges) Dongnanya yanjiu Issue 4 (2022): 6-7.

32 The slogan “community of common destiny for mankind,” translated also as community with a shared future for mankind or human community with a shared future is central to the notion of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy”, the phrase encompassing Chinese foreign policy in the so-called “New Era.” See: The China Media Project Dictonary, ‘Community of Common Destiny for Mankind’, August 25, 2021, https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/community-of-common-destiny-for-mankind/ (accessed 6 February 2024).

33 Moritz Rudolf, ‘China’s Health Diplomacy during Covid-19 China’s Health Diplomacy during Covid-19’. January 26, 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021C09/ (accessed 6 September 2023).

34 ‘China to prioritize Mekong countries for COVID-19 vaccine’, August 24, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/24/c_139313619.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

35 ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Cooperation in Support of the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework, October 26, 2021, https://asean.org/asean-china-joint-statement-on-cooperation-in-support-of-the-asean-comprehensive-recovery-framework/ (accessed 9 September 2023).

36 ‘China, ASEAN form a comprehensive strategic partnership as Xi chairs summit’, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/23/c_1310326437.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

37 According to Bridge Consulting (by December 28, 2022) China delivered the number of vaccine doses as follows: Myanmar 56.34 million (22.64 million donated), Thailand 29.9 million (3.4 million donated), Laos 9.102 million (all donated), Vietnam 41.5 million (5.3 million donated), Cambodia 42.103 million (13.603 million donated), Malaysia 28.4 million (2.5 million donated), Philippines 60.025 million (5.025 million donated), Indonesia 268.279 million (3 million donated). More check: ‘China COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker’, https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/#China8217s_Vaccines_in_Asia_Pacific (accessed 15 September 2023).

38 Christine Hackenesch and Julia O. Bader, ‘The Struggle for Minds and Influence: The Chinese Communist Party’s Global Outreach’. International Studies Quarterly Issue 64 (2020): 729 and Yao Wen, ‘Assessing Effects of China’s Party Diplomacy vis-à-vis Southeast Asia: Ideas, Interests, and Controversies’. Asian Perspective Vol. 47 (2023): 579–602.

39 China’s ‘Global Security Initiative’ was introduced in April 2021. This framework comprises three sections: basic concepts and principles, cooperation priorities, and platforms and mechanisms. Regarding international cooperation, China maintains that the UN should occupy the central coordinating position. The GSI aims to expand China’s global influence and ensure long-term security and prosperity. The following initiative includes various aspects, such as military modernisation, maritime security, and economic investments in multiple regions worldwide.

40 The phrase “community of common destiny for mankind” is central to the “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” notion. In his address at the inauguration of the Belt and Road Forum in 2017, Xi Jinping incorporated this phrase into his speech. Subsequently, in 2018, this concept was enshrined in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. This reaffirmed China’s stance against imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism and its dedication to fostering unity among global populations. See: Community of Common Destiny for Mankind, August 25, 2021, https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/community-of-common-destiny-for-mankind/ (accessed 27 October, 2023) and ‘Laowo biaoshi zhonggong ershi da wei shijie zengjia queding xing zhuru xin dongli’ (Laos says the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has increased certainty and injected new impetus into the world), China Embassy in Laos, November 17, 2022, http://la.china-embassy.gov.cn/dssghd/202211/t20221117_10977100.htm (accessed 12 August 2023).

41 ‘Laowo dang Zhong lianbu bu chang Tong Shawan zhuhe Zhongguo Gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian’ (Thongsawan, Minister of the Central Liaison Department of the Lao Party, congratulated the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China), China Embassy in Laos, June 26, 2021, http://la.china-embassy.gov.cn/xwdt/202106/t20210626_8938394.htm (accessed 12 August 2023).

42 The Prime Minister of Laos spoke highly of the major achievements of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and stated that he would ensure the epidemic prevention needs of Chinese citizens in Laos) China Embassy in Laos, February 9, 2021, http://english.scio.gov.cn/internationalexchanges/2021-02/09/content_77203268.htm (accessed 12 August 2023).

43 S. C. Y. Ku, ‘Laos in 2014: Deepening Chinese Influence’. Asian Survey Vol. 55. Issue 1 (2015): 214–219.

44 ‘Zhongyue gongtong juban „xin xingshi xia Zhong-Yue liang dang waijiao sixiang yu zhengce” yantaohui’ (China and Vietnam co-host the seminar on “China-Vietnam Bipartisan Diplomatic Thoughts and Policies under the New Situation”), China Embassy in Vietnam, October 28, 2021, http://vn.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202110/t20211028_10349111.htm (accessed 25 August 2023).

45 ‘Xiong Bo dashi huijian xinren yue gong zhongyang shuji chu shuji, zhongyang xuanjiao bu buznahg Rua Zhongyi’ (Ambassador Xiong Bo met with the newly appointed Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Director of the Central Propaganda and Education Department Nguyen Trong Ngai), China Embassy in Vietnam, March 21, 2021, http://vn.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202103/t20210324_8914090.htm (accessed 25 August 2023).

46 ‘Yuenan zongli fan Mingzheng huijian Xiong Bo dashi’ (Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Thanh met with Ambassador Xiong Bo), China Embassy in Vietnam, August 28, 2021, http://vn.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202108/t20210824_8914268.htm (accessed 25 August 2023).

47 ‘Xiong Bo dashi huijian xinren yue gong zhongyang dui waibu buzhang Lihuaizhong’ (Ambassador Xiong Bo Met with the Newly-appointed Minister of External Relations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Huai Trung), China Embassy in Vietnam, April 3, 2021, http://vn.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202104/t20210403_8914111.htm

48 John van Oudenaren, ‘Party Ties: Vietnam, Cuba and China’s Relations with Other Marxist-Leninist States’ China Brief Vol. 23. Issue 9 (2023), https://jamestown.org/program/party-ties-vietnam-cuba-and-chinas-relations-with-other-marxist-leninist-states/

49 ‘2022 nian Zhongguo Guangxi yu Yuenan bian jing si sheng dangwei shuji xinchun huiwu huodong yi shipin lian xian fangshi juxing’ (In 2022, the Chinese New Year Meeting of Party Committee Secretaries of the Four Border Provinces between Guangxi, China and Vietnam will be held via video link 2022) China Embassy in Vietnam, February 25, 2022, http://vn.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202202/t20220225_10645726.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

50 ‘Vietnam, China’s Guangxi promote trade cooperation’, China Embassy in Vietnam, April 12, 2023, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-chinas-guangxi-promote-trade-cooperation/251448.vnp (accessed 15 August 2023).

51 ‘Lu Kang dashi daoren baihui Yinni qian zongtong, Minzhudang zuigao weiyuanhui zhuxi suxi luiji minzhudang zong zhuxi Agusi’ (Ambassador Lu Kang Calls on Former Indonesian President, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Democratic Party Yudhoyono Susilo and President of the Democratic Party Agus), China Embassay in Indonesia, April 6, 2022, http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/chn/sgsd/202204/t20220406_10664984.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

52 ‘Ambassador Lu Kang Meets with Deputy Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia Ahmad Muzani’, China Embassy in Indonesia, June 26, 2022, http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202206/t20220628_10711348.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

53 Daniel Peterson, ‘China’s Power Play in Indonesia: Infrastructure Investment and Territorial Incursions’, https://journals.openedition.org/moussons/10736 (accessed 15 August 2023).

54 ‘Ouyang Yujing dashi baihui Malaixiya goaji buzhang, maoyi yu gongye buzhang Azimin’ (Ambassador Ouyang Yujing Calls on Malaysian Senior Minister, Minister of Trade and Industry Azmin), China Embassy in Malaysia, August 13, 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202108/t20210813_8919546.htm (accessed 15 August 2023) and ‘Ouyang Yujing dashi huijian Malaxiya zongli fu jingji shiwu buzhang Mustafa’ (Ambassador Ouyang Yujing Meets with Minister of Economic Affairs of the Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia Mustapha), China Embassy in Malaysia March 12, 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202103/t20210312_9934493.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

55 ‘Tang Rui gongshi chuxi zhiku yantao hui xuan jie shijiu jie liu zhong quanhui jingshen’ (Minister Tang Rui Presents the Spirit of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee at the Think Tank Symposium), China Embassy in Malaysia December 12, 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202112/t20211209_10465012.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

56 ‘Ouyang Yujing dashi huijian Malaixiya qian zongli Mahadier’ (Ambassador Ouyang Yujing Meets with Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad), China Embassy in Malaysia May 5, 2022, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202205/t20220505_10681793.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

57 ‘Duteerte zongtong ganxie Zhongguo zaici juanzeng yimiao’ (President Duterte thanks China for another vaccine donation), China Embassy in the Philippines, August 20, 2021, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202108/t20210820_8937365.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

58 ‘Huang Xilian dashi huijian Feilubin zongtong fu xinwen buchang Andanaer’’ (Ambassador Huang Xilian meets with Philippine Presidential Information Secretary Andanar), China Embassy in the Philippines, June 7, 2022, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202206/t20220607_10699882.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

59 ‘Huang Xinlian dashi baihui Manila shi xinren shi zhang Lakuna’ (Ambassador Huang Xilian paid a courtesy call on the new mayor of Manila, Lacuna), China Embassy in Philippines, July 13, 2022, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202207/t20220713_10719204.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

60 ‘Shoujie „Zhongguo – Feilubin Manila Luntan” jiang yu 3 yue 3 ri zhaokai yatouhang Jin Liqun xing zhang jiang fabiao zhuzhi yanjinag’ (The first “China-Philippines Manila Forum” will be held on March 3 AIIB President Jin Liqun will deliver a keynote speech), China Embassy in the Philippines, February 25, 2021, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202102/t20210225_9933851.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

61 ‘Zhongguo zhu Fei shiguan xiangfei Dawoshi zhengfu juanzeng 1000 tai pingban dianna’ (The Chinese Embassy in the Philippines donated 1,000 tablet computers to the Davao city government), China Embassy in the Philippines, March 31, 2021, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202103/t20210331_8937337.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

62 According to respondents in Bangkok, the Future Forward Party was labelled as being pro-Chinese. It’s interesting to note that when new political forces emerged, such as the Future Forward Party, China was prepared to engage with them, as evidenced by meetings with officials from Shanghai and Guangzhou. However, within the context of Thailand’s domestic politics, where anti-communist sentiments hold significance, being labeled as “pro-Chinese” can be perceived as a threat to the established political system. This may lead to calls for laws and regulations to restrict the activities of such parties (The in-depth interviews conducted by the author in Bangkok, February 2020).

63 ‘Wang Yi huijian Taiguo gongzhu Shi Lintong’ (Wang Yi Meets with Princess Sirindhorn of Thailand), China Embassy in Thailand, February 4, 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202202/t20220204_10638811.shtml (accessed 15 August 2023).

64 ‘Zhong fangxiang Shi Lintong gongzhu dianxia juanzeng Huawei shipin huiyi zhongduan’ (China donates Huawei video conferencing terminals to HRH Princess Sirindhorn), China Embassy in Thailand, May 8, 2021, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/gdxw/202105/t20210508_8928619.html (accessed 15 August 2023).

65 ‘Han Zhiqiang dashi xiang Shi Lintong gongzhu zhuanjiao Zhongguo zhengfu yuanzhu yimiao’ (Ambassador Han Zhiqiang handed over vaccines donated by the Chinese government to Princess Sirindhorn), China Embassy in Thailand, February 4, 2022, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/chn/dszl/dshd/202202/t20220204_10638890.html (accessed 15 August 2023).

66 ‘Zhongguo dashiguan xiang Shi Lin tong gongzhu dianxia zengsong Huawei shipin shebei’ (The Chinese Embassy presents Huawei video equipment to HRH Princess Sirindhorn), China Embassy in Thailand, January 5, 2021, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202101/t20210105_10161789.html (accessed 15 August 2023).

67 Helena Legarda, ‘The PLA’s Mask Diplomacy, China Global Security Tracker No. 7’, August 3, 2020, https://merics.org/en/tracker/plas-mask-diplomacy (accessed 12 August 2023).

68 ‘Laowo wanquan zhichi quanqiu anquan changyi’ (Laos fully supports global security initiative), China Embassy in Laos, May 4, 2022, http://la.china-embassy.gov.cn/xwdt/202205/t20220504_10681510.htm (accessed 15 August 2023) and ‘Zhongguo zhu Laowo dashiguan guofang wuguan yingyao fu Laowo guofang bu xuanjie Xi Jinping zong shuji „qiyi” zhongyao jianghua jingshen’ (The defense attache of the Chinese embassy in Laos was invited to the Ministry of National Defense of Laos to introduce the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s “July 1” important speech), China Embassy in Laos, August 5, 2021, http://la.china-embassy.gov.cn/xwdt/202108/t20210805_8938403.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

69 ‘Laowo fuzongli jian guofang buzhang zhan sha meng biaoshi Laowo jundui jiang jixu shenru xuexi yantao Xi Jinping zong shuji „qiyu” zhongyao jianghua’ (Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Zhansamoun said that the Lao army will continue to study and discuss General Secretary Xi Jinping’s “July 1” important speech), China Embassy in Laos, August 3, 2021, http://la.china-embassy.gov.cn/xwdt/202108/t20210803_8938401.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

70 ‘Zhongguo gongan bu yuanzhu Laowo Gongan by zhifa cheliang jiaojie yishi zai wanxiang jiuxing’ (The Handover Ceremony of Law Enforcement Vehicles Assisted by the Ministry of Public Security of China to the Ministry of Public Security of Laos Held in Vientiane), China Embassy in Laos, October 24, 2020, http://la.china-embassy.gov.cn/xwdt/202010/t20201024_1545264.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

71 ‘Zhongguo Guofang bu xiang Laowo Guofang bu yuanzhu di er pi kang yi yiliao wuzi’ (The Ministry of National Defense of China assists the Ministry of National Defense of Laos with the second batch of anti-epidemic medical supplies), China Embassy in Laos, June 3, 2020, http://la.china-embassy.gov.cn/xwdt/202006/t20200603_1545170.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

72 Ibid.

73 ‘Chinese troops to hold rare joint military exercise in Laos’, Reuters, May 5, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-troops-hold-rare-joint-military-exercise-laos-2023-05-05/ (accessed 15 August 2023).

74 Ibid.

75 The in-depth interviews conducted by the author in Phom Pehn and Siem Reap, September 2023.

76 ‘Jian zhengfu juxing longzhong yishi yingjie Zhongguo jundui wuchan yanzhu de xinguan yimiao’ (The Cambodian government held a grand ceremony to welcome the new crown vaccine donated by the Chinese military), China Embassy in Cambodia, August 24, 2021, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/dssghd/202108/t20210824_8904720.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

77 Ibid.

78 ‘Zhongguo Gong’an bu yuan jian kangyi wuzi jiaojie yishi juxing’ (The Handover Ceremony of Anti-epidemic Materials Aided by the Ministry of Public Security of China Held), China Embassy in Cambodia, June 23, 2020, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/dssghd/202006/t20200623_1400394.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

79 ‘In military drills with Cambodia, China aims to counter shift towards the US, say analysts’, South China Morining Post, April 3, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3216329/military-drills-cambodia-china-aims-counter-shift-towards-us-say-analysts (accessed 11 August 2023).

80 ‘Xiong Bo dashi jiu Meiguo zhengke cuna fang Zhongguo Taiwan diqu xiang Yue fang chanshu Zhongfang lichang’ (Ambassador Xiong Bo Explains China’s Position to Vietnam on US Politicians’ Visit to Taiwan), China Embassy in Vietnam, August 5, 2022, http://vn.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202208/t20220805_10735843.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

81 ‘Zhongguo zhu Yuenan shiguna jiu Meiguo guanyuan zai Yue fabiao she hua cuowu yanlun fabiao yanzheng shenming’ (The Chinese Embassy in Vietnam Issues a Solemn Statement on U.S. Officials’ Wrong Statements about China in Vietnam), China Embassy in Vietnam, November 23, 2020, http://vn.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202011/t20201123_1703467.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

82 Li Keqiang, ‘Full text of Premier’s speech at 18th China-ASEAN Summit’, The State Council, November 24, 2015, http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2015/11/24/content_281475241254129.htm (accessed 6 February 2024).

83 Oscar Almen, ‘The Chinese Communist Party and the Diaspora Beijing’s extraterritorial authoritarian rule’ 2020, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4933--SE (accessed 23 October 2023).

84 ‘Ouyang Yujing dashi chuxi 2022 nian quanqiu Huaren jingji he keji fenghui’ (Ambassador Ouyang Yujing attended the 2022 Global Chinese Economic and Technological Summit), China Embassy in Malaysia, December 7, 2022, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202212/t20221207_10986655.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

85 Ibid.

86 ‘Ouyang Yujing dashi huijian zhong zong zhong hui zhang Dai Liangye’ (Ambassador Ouyang Yujing met with ACCCIM President Dai Liangye), China Embassy in Malaysia, December 31, 2020, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgxw/202012/t20201231_1718337.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

87 ‘Feilubin huaren huaqiao shetuan fenfen fasheng zhichi renda lifa jueding’ (Overseas Chinese associations in the Philippines voiced their support for the legislative decision of the National People’s Congress), China Embassy in the Philippines, May 26, 2020, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202005/t20200526_1216494.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

88 ‘Feilubin huaqiao huaren fenfen Zhongguo kangji xinxing guanzhuang bingdu feiyan yiqing juanzeng kuan wu’ (Overseas Chinese in the Philippines donate money and materials to China’s fight against the novel coronavirus pneumonia), China Embassy in the Philippines January 2, 2020, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202002/t20200201_1216128.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

89 ‘Huang Xilian dashi: qidai Fei huaqiao huaren ningxing ju li puxie Zhong-Fei heli kang yi xin pianzhang’ (Ambassador Huang Xilian: I look forward to the Chinese and overseas Chinese in the Philippines working together to write a new chapter in the joint efforts of China and the Philippines to fight the epidemic) China Embassy in the Philippines October 16, 2020, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/sgdt/202010/t20201016_1217168.htm (accessed 15 August 2023).

90 ‘Han Zhiqiang dashi chuxi Taiguo Zhonghua zong shanghui xin yi jie hui dong hui jiuzhi dianli bing xiang qiaobao’ (Ambassador Han Zhiqiang Attends the Inauguration Ceremony of the New Board of Directors of the Thai Chinese Entrepreneur Association and Greets the Overseas Chinese), China Embassy in Thailand, January 16, 2022, www.th.china-embassy.gov.cn/dszl/dshd/202201/t20220116_10524329.html (accessed 15 August 2023).

91 ‘Shi Lintong gongzhu chuxi Taiguo huaqiao Baode Shantang 110 zhounian qingdian’ (Princess Sirindhorn Attends the 110th Anniversary Celebration of the Overseas Chinese Baode Shantang in Thailand), China Embassy in Thailand, December 19, 2021, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/dszl/202112/t20211219_10471612.html (accessed 15 August 2023).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Narodowe Centrum Nauki [grant number: 2019/33/B/HS5/01667].

Notes on contributors

Dominik Mierzejewski

Dominik Mierzejewski is head of the Centre for Asian Affairs and associate professor in the Department of Asian Studies at the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz, Poland. He specialises in the rhetoric of Chinese diplomacy, Beijing's relations with the Global South, and central government-provinces relations in the PRC.