CHINA’S MARGINAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE 2023 IRAN-SAUDI ARABIA RECONCILIATION

Abstract

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023 has been described as a landmark in China’s advancing engagement in Middle Eastern affairs. This article argues, however, that China’s role in the deal was minimal and that the main drivers of the agreement were Iran and Saudi Arabia’s own objectives and concerns and, in particular, Saudi Arabia’s growing economic and military power. China’s greatest influence resulted from its intervention on the side of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states and the Tehran leadership’s perceptions that Beijing’s commercial interests were leading it to side with Riyadh. The Iranian government’s fears were exacerbated by concerns about mass protests in Iran in 2022 and the outcomes of the China-GCC Summit in December of that year. At the same time, Saudi Arabia chose to de-escalate its confrontation with Iran to strengthen its regional and global power underpinned by the huge Vision 2030 development programme.

Keywords:

• Balance of power
• China
• Iran
• Saudi Arabia
• threat perception

Introduction

On 10 March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced an agreement, mediated by China, “to resume diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran and re-open their embassies and missions”. Its terms included respect for “the sovereignty of states and the non-interference in internal affairs of states.” It was followed by an agreement to cooperate in areas ranging from economics to sport.¹ The agreement received worldwide attention, with coverage tending to highlight China’s role in bringing about the deal in the Middle East, apparently cementing its growing role in the region. Some analysts argued that China had leveraged its economic power to compel the two sides to reach a deal, suggesting that it has the tools and leverage to ensure that Iran complies. Mohammed Alyahya, former editor-in-chief of Al Arabiya English, argued that, without Chinese support, Iran’s economy might collapse.² Grant Golub opined that the China-facilitated deal would substantially de-escalate regional tensions and demonstrate an expansion of China’s global role.³Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr argued that the Saudi government believed that China’s involvement was the surest guarantee that the deal would last. In their view, the Saudi side believed that Iran would not jeopardise its ties with China by violating the agreement. They also argued that the agreement has the potential to change the Middle East by weaving the region into China’s global ambitions. They speculated that this breakthrough would serve as the foundation of a new geopolitical reality in the Middle East.⁴

This article sets aside the importance and implications of the deal and aims, instead, to uncover China’s role behind it. It will argue that, although China mediated between the two sides for a short period, the main drivers behind the agreement were the concerns and objectives of the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia. It will demonstrate that the Iranian leadership’s perceptions of the changing balance of power in the Middle East played the most significant role in their decision to reach the deal. It proposes that there were three main causes of this. Firstly, Saudi Arabia’s growing economic integration with the world, in comparison with Iran’s isolation. Secondly, China’s rapidly developing relations with Saudi Arabia, and thirdly, the protests in Iran following the killing of Mahsa Amini in September 2022 in the custody of the country’s morality police, along with allegations of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in stoking the protests. In the perception of Iran’s leaders, therefore, the 2023 agreement was intended to help them avoid conflict with the Saudis. The Saudi leadership, on the other hand, chose to de-escalate its tense relations with Iran because it was, and is, attempting to increase its regional and international influence, underpinned by the economic development programme known as Vision 2030.

Saudi-Iran relations since 1979

The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia dates back to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and there have been cycles of balancing and re-balancing between Tehran and Riyadh, accompanied by mutual fear and threat, ever since.⁵ In recent years, Riyadh has changed from being a cautious actor to becoming a more proactive one. This became evident after the ‘Arab Spring’ protests in 2011 and as international concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme grew during the 2010s. As a result, Iranian perceptions of Saudi Arabia have changed. Where once Iranian policymakers saw Saudi Arabia as a non-autonomous actor reliant upon the United States, now they regard it as one with much greater independence and strength.⁶

Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic with its strong anti-monarchical and anti-colonial vision, brought Islamic considerations into the rivalry.⁷ Khomeini’s revolutionary ideas, particularly those stressing Shi’ite values, created irritation among the more conservative Saudis, particularly those who adhere to Sunni Wahhabi beliefs.⁸ In its self-view, Iran’s Islamic leadership considers itself to be the leader of the Muslim world and regards Saudi Arabia as a pro-West monarchy and a threat to Islamic sanctity. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, regards itself as the centre of the Islamic world and deems Shia Iran, with its regional allies, a threat to its religious and diplomatic position.⁹

The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia worsened during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s when the Saudis supported Iraq. However, while Mohammad Khatami was president of Iran (1997–2005), his government sought to enhance ties with neighbouring countries.¹⁰ In April 2001, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a security agreement, asserting that the deal could bring peace to the region.¹¹ In 2005, the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran and subsequently invited to Riyadh. He was welcomed by King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (2005–2015), indicating the Saudi leadership’s desire for warmer ties. In December 2007, Ahmadinejad also travelled to Qatar to attend a summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In his opening speech at the meeting in Doha, Ahmadinejad declared, “We call for peace and security without any foreign influence. We propose the establishment of economic and security pacts and institutions among the seven states.” Nevertheless, there was no breakthrough in relations during his presidency.¹²

Iran's influence in the region increased after the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein following the American-led invasion of 2003, causing new friction between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Revelations about the Iranian nuclear programme during the 2000s further heightened Saudi Arabia’s concerns about its neighbour.¹³ The relationship deteriorated even more during the term of Ahmadinejad’s successor, Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021). The two governments backed opposite sides in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen that broke out in 2012 and 2014, respectively. Relations reached a crisis in 2016 following the deaths of 464 Iranian pilgrims in a stampede during the Hajj in Mecca in September 2015. In January 2016, the Saudi authorities executed a Saudi Shiite cleric, Nimr Al-Nimr, prompting Tehran to break off diplomatic relations with Riyadh and Iranian protesters to storm Saudi diplomatic facilities in Tehran and Mashhad. All the Arab Gulf states, with the notable exception of Oman, then cut diplomatic ties with Iran. Later that year, the Iranian leadership publicly accused the Saudis of “murdering” those who had died in the stampede.¹⁴

In April 2017, President Rouhani stated that Iran was ready to establish good relations with Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, generally regarded as the most powerful person in the kingdom, initially responded by saying that there was no space for talks with Iran because of the latter’s ambition to control the Islamic world.¹⁵ In October of that year, Saudi Arabia supported the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), the agreement which had been intended to reduce international concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme.¹⁶

Moves towards détente, 2019–2022

Mid-2017 can therefore be characterised as the lowest point in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in recent years. The two countries’ rivalry had impacts across the wider Middle East, most notably in the conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. This prompted regional efforts to mediate between the two leaderships in an effort to end the fighting. On 20 April 2019, Iran and Saudi Arabia participated in a summit hosted by the Iraqi government intended to ease regional tensions. The summit brought together leading legislators from Iraq’s six neighbours: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait.¹⁷ On May 8, however, Iran announced that it would resume enriching uranium, in violation of the JCPoA, if United States’ sanctions on the country were not lifted.¹⁸ This was followed by a missile attack on a Saudi airport on 12 June, launched by the Houthi militia in Yemen.¹⁹

The following month, however, the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif, announced Iran’s willingness to take part in bilateral talks with Riyadh.²⁰ Despite this move, conflict continued, most notably in the form of a drone attack on Saudi oil installations in September 2019, claimed by the Houthis. Both Riyadh and Washington blamed Iran for instigating the assault.²¹ Nonetheless, and contrary to Saudi expectations, President Trump refused to strike Iran and, instead, urged Riyadh to search for its own solution to the conflict.²² After a visit to Riyadh in September 2019, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, said Saudi Arabia wanted to de-escalate tensions with Iran and had rejected the military option.²³ By October, contacts were underway, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly asking Iraq and Pakistan to act as intermediaries.²⁴ The Crown Prince denied that he had requested the intervention, suggesting instead that “Baghdad and Islamabad had offered to mediate the talks.”²⁵ That question aside, it seems that the Saudi leadership came to understand that it could no longer rely on military support from the United States in the same way as in the past. Instead, it would need to act more independently, enhancing its power through diversifying ties and improving relations with countries at regional and international levels. Saudi Arabia set out several conditions ahead of the talks, however, including a demand that Iran should minimise its role in Yemen and Syria and reduce its support for armed groups such as the Houthis.²⁶ Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, the Saudi Foreign Minister stated that “Iran must change behaviour for discussions to take place.”²⁷ In other words, by early 2020 a détente was already underway in Saudi-Iranian relations. In the following sections, I will demonstrate that the strategic shifts in the relative balance of power between the two states were more significant than any direct role played by China in achieving the 2023 deal.

Saudi Arabia’s increasing power

This section delves into Riyadh’s strategies to increase its regional and international influence and Iran’s changing perceptions of Saudi Arabia’s rising power.

Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities

The signing of the JCPoA ‘Iran nuclear deal’ in July 2015 led to a change in Saudi Arabia’s perceptions of the threat from Iran. In the minds of Saudi officials, the deal had the potential to both strengthen Iran’s economy and enable it to manufacture nuclear weapons.²⁸ For these reasons, Riyadh labelled it a “flawed agreement”.²⁹ In response, Saudi Arabia intensified its military development. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2000-2010, Saudi Arabia was the world’s 16th largest arms importer.³⁰ During the following decade, however, it rose to become the second largest, with imports valued at USD 30 billion between 2011–2022.³¹ Although Saudi Arabia’s air force has long held an advantage over its Iranian counterpart, recent acquisitions, including British ‘Storm Shadow’ and American ‘SLAM-ER’ cruise missiles, have greatly enhanced these capabilities.³²

While most of these weapons imports came from Western countries, Riyadh also purchased missiles from China, including the 3,000-kilometre-range Dong Feng-3 in 2014 and, since 2018, other Dong Feng-class missiles, DF-21 ballistic missiles, and Wing Loong II drones.³³ In December 2021, reports emerged that China was helping Saudi Arabia to construct its own ballistic missiles and United States officials were quoted as being concerned about the transfer of “sensitive ballistic missile technology” to Saudi Arabia.³⁴ In an interview with the CNBC channel, the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Adel Al-Jubeir, was asked to confirm the reports but merely responded, “We have major defence programmes, and we will do everything necessary to protect its security and its people” but without denying the matter.³⁵ Furthermore, the Wall Street Journal reported that, with China’s help, Saudi Arabia had built a facility to process yellowcake uranium ore, a precursor for nuclear weapons.³⁶ In addition, Riyadh has made deals with China to produce unmanned aerial systems in Saudi Arabia.³⁷ These advances in Saudi Arabia’s long-range strike capabilities clearly have implications for Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s rising economic power

Saudi Arabia has long aimed to diversify its economy beyond energy.³⁸ In April 2016, its government unveiled a development plan, ‘Vision 2030’, to pursue these ambitions. The programme is intended to contribute to doubling the national gross domestic product (GDP) from its 2016 figure. Vision 2030 was expected to “raise the share of non-oil exports in non-oil GDP from 16% to 50%” and move the country “from the current position as the nineteenth largest economy in the world into the top 15”.³⁹ It predicts the creation of six million extra jobs for Saudi nationals and further investment of US$4 trillion in the non-oil economy by the private sector, leading to a 60% growth in Saudi household revenue.⁴⁰ When the project was proposed, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman expected that China would become a major contributor to the plan.⁴¹ By 2021, China was Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, with annual two-way trade worth $87.3 billion,⁴² and Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China.⁴³ At the same time, China was also becoming a significant investor in Saudi Arabia, with investments totalling $37 billion between 2013 and 2022, by one estimate.⁴⁴ By contrast, China’s economic relations with Iran are much thinner. In 2022, Iran was China’s seventh largest oil supplier and its 50th largest trade partner. This has been called an “asymmetrical or a one-way strategic partnership”.⁴⁵ Jonathan Fulton has argued that China’s economic cooperation with the states in the Middle East indicates its strong preference for collaboration with countries with the most potential for commerce, investment, and connectivity. As a result, the GCC countries are more alluring states than Iran.⁴⁶ This is mostly because of the effect of international sanctions on companies’ willingness to invest in Iran.⁴⁷

Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic agenda

The launch of Vision 2030 in 2016 incentivised Saudi Arabia to develop closer ties with other countries in its immediate region and beyond. To succeed, Vision 2030 requires both economic stability at home and good levels of growth globally.⁴⁸ Part of Riyadh’s efforts to create the best conditions for Vision 2030 has been strengthening ties with China. China also sees opportunities in Saudi Arabia. Fulton is among those who have noted that Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic location and role as a regional power, along with the opportunities of Vision 2030, make it a significant partner for China and its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’.⁴⁹ Duan and Aldamer (2021) argue that economic pragmatism and hedging will continue to define the Saudi relationship with China for the foreseeable future.⁵⁰

Another foundation for the success of Vision 2030 is regional peace. Since Crown Prince Mohammed took control of the government in 2017, Saudi officials have stated that the country's policies are designed to strengthen with friendly countries around the world. This has included working to restore relations with Iran.⁵¹ In a 2019 interview with the American television network CBS, the Crown Prince noted that a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran would bring about the “total collapse of the global economy”.⁵² Yasmine Farouk, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has argued that Saudi Arabia’s de-escalation with Iran is part of a more extensive foreign policy intended to support Vision 2030 on the grounds that any tension with Iran might threaten its progress.⁵³ This also includes ending regional conflicts such as those in Iraq, Syria and Yemen and the promotion of regional stability.⁵⁴

Iran’s motivations

Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami have argued that the perception of a new threat from Saudi Arabia has contributed to changes in Iran’s strategic thinking.⁵⁵ Abodolrasool Divsallar has suggested that, for many years, Iranian military planners had largely disregarded the threat from Saudi Arabia. Since 2018, however, Tehran has been adjusting its military capacities for a war scenario with Saudi Arabia as its most probable enemy.⁵⁶ The rise of Saudi Arabia along with its growing relations with China have, in turn, increased the threat perceptions in the minds of Iranian policymakers. Sustained higher oil prices since 2018 (excepting the 2020 slump caused by the COVID pandemic) have given Riyadh greater regional and international leverage and Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its growing capability to mobilise global financial and political networks against Iran. Given Iran’s weaker economy, the impact of sanctions and its lack of international partners, it could not respond in kind.⁵⁷

During the presidency of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021), Iran adopted policies to try to counter this situation. On the one hand, it sought to bolster national governments in friendly states such as Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, Iran also worked to develop collaboration, particularly with key players such as Saudi Arabia, to resolve difficult issues in the region. Mahmood Sariolghalam, Professor of International Relations at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, has argued that “80 per cent of the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is because of Iran’s decision to restore ties”.⁵⁸

Iranian concerns over the rising power of Saudi Arabia were exacerbated by the Kingdom’s strengthening relations with China. China and Iran’s cooperation dates back decades.⁵⁹ This includes China’s provision of weaponry during the Iran-Iraq War and its import of Iranian oil.⁶⁰ For years, Iran has also considered China an important partner in countering the United States’ power in the Middle East and its pressure on Iran.⁶¹ By late 2022, however, Iranian officials were concerned that improved economic ties between Beijing and Riyadh could unravel this status quo.⁶²

Late-stage engagement: China’s role in the Iran-Saudi détente

At the end of March 2021, the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi made a six-country tour of the Middle East. During his trip, Wang revealed “China's five-point plan for the region, which included mutual respect, equity and justice, non-proliferation, collective security and development cooperation”.⁶³ However, a closer look at Wang’s plan reveals that China’s comments concentrated on Syria, Yemen, and Libya, combating terrorism and establishing the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear weapons. No part of the initiative talked about reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.⁶⁴ When direct talks between the two countries finally began, on 9 April 2021, they took place in Baghdad, mediated by Mustafa al Kadhimi, the Iraqi Prime Minister. According to later reports, the talks focused on Yemen and Lebanon, both countries where the two leaderships supported opposing sides.⁶⁵ The first round included discussions on the Houthi attacks, which were reported positive by the officials.⁶⁶ It was stated by officials that the Iranian side had promised to “Use Tehran’s influence to stop Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. Riyadh had also promised to support the nuclear talks”. ⁶⁷ Mohammed bin Salman told an interviewer, “We are negotiating on our key issues with Iran such as Iran’s nuclear program, their support of illegal militias in the region or their ballistic missiles.”⁶⁸

After Ebrahim Raisi took office as president of Iran in August 2021, officials on both sides confirmed that they were willing to resume discussions. In September 2021, the two sides held a fourth round of talks in Baghdad. This was followed by a fifth round on 21 April 2022, which was reported as “progressive and positive”, according to Saeed Khatibzadeh, the former spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry.⁶⁹ On the same day, the Iraqi Foreign Minister also reported that Iran and Saudi sides had agreed on a 10-point memorandum of understanding, and the continuation of the ceasefire in Yemen was also discussed.⁷⁰ During the same period, secret talks between the Saudi authorities and the Houthi rebels were being facilitated and hosted by the government of Oman.⁷¹ It appears that by mid-2022, the Saudis were attempting to extricate themselves from the conflict in Yemen, a factor that would facilitate the rapprochement with Iran.

Despite this, however, the direct talks between the two were halted because of the outbreak of anti-government protests in several Iranian cities in September 2022. Iranian officials were quick to blame foreign powers for stoking the protests. Kazem Gharibabadi, the Vice-President of the Judiciary for International Affairs and the Secretary General of the High Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran claimed that the protests in Iran were a “Multifaceted, hybrid war against Iran in which the foreign countries utilised all capacities from social media and media to terrorist activities and foreign interference with the aim of changing Iran’s political system.”⁷² In his first official visit to Tehran in November 2022, Iraq’s newly appointed prime minister, Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, inquired about continuing the talks. Iranian officials refused on the grounds that Saudi Arabia had been supporting the protests in Iran through various channels, in particular through Saudi-funded media outlets based in London, most notably the TV channel Iran International.⁷³ The question of interference in each other’s internal affairs became a key element of the ensuing negotiations between the two governments. The Iranian leadership demanded that Saudi Arabia stop funding news channels that provide its opponents with a platform.⁷⁴

The likely impact of increasing China-Saudi ties on the balance of power in the Gulf was highlighted at the China-GCC summit, held in Riyadh on 9 December 2022. The final communiqué stressed the importance of “Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the GCC region and ensuring the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme to preserve regional and international security and stability” and “reaffirmed the call on Iran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” This was then followed by an intervention from China on the territorial dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. In the final statement of the summit, “The leaders affirmed their support for all peaceful efforts, including the initiative and endeavours of the United Arab Emirates to reach a peaceful solution to the issue of the three islands, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, through bilateral negotiations under the rules of international law, and to resolve this issue in accordance with international legitimacy”.⁷⁵ As Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani have noted, Beijing’s amplified relationship with the Arab states angered and shocked Iranian officials.⁷⁶ Nasser Kanani, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, called the statement on the disputed islands “the repetition of failed Iranophobia policy”.⁷⁷ Taking all the above data points together, it seems Iran’s rising security concerns towards Saudi Arabia and its increasing sense of isolation led the regime to reorient its ties with Riyadh. China’s greatest intervention in the Middle East was not a disinterested mediation between the two sides but an intervention on the Arab side, seemingly against the interests of Iran.

China’s mediation

President Xi’s attendance at the GCC summit was followed by a message to the leadership in Tehran and then a visit by Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, to China in February 2023.⁷⁸ The Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Shamkhani, travelled to Beijing on 6 March and on 10 March, following three days of talks with Saudi Arabia’s national security adviser Musaid Al Aiban, the three governments published their “Joint Trilateral Statement”. Diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia had been re-established, a little over seven years since they were severed following the execution of Nimr Al-Nimr and the attacks on the Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran. Although the agreement was finalised and announced in Beijing, the Saudi and Iranian sides took care to express their appreciation to Iraq and Oman for hosting the several rounds of talks that took place during 2021 and 2022.⁷⁹

The timeline outlined above demonstrates that China’s engagement with the deal was a relatively small factor compared to the motivations of policymakers in Tehran and Riyadh. For Beijing, however, the simple fact that the deal was concluded with China’s help provides it with an opportunity to demonstrate its global leadership. It came a year after President Xi unveiled China’s ‘Global Security Initiative’ (GSI).⁸⁰ In his speech, Xi asserted that a key element of the GSI is to “Stay committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation” and that China calls “on countries to adapt to the profoundly changing international landscape in the spirit of solidarity and address the complex and intertwined security challenges with a win-win mindset.”⁸¹ Ahmed Aboudouh, a Non-resident fellow with the Atlantic Council, has argued that, for China, the key is to connect significant actions to the GSI to give it “Conceptual meaning and considerable diplomatic weight.”⁸²

Despite its high-profile role in the resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China does not possess the power to influence all of Iran’s decisions in reaching the deal. The Iranian regime understands well that China’s relations with Iran are also affected by its relations with the United States. Abbas Akhuni, a former Minister of Roads and Urban Development in Iran, has noted that China has, previously, chosen to develop connections to Gwadar Port in Pakistan, rather than the Iranian port of Chabahar. He asserts that this decision was a result of China’s refusal to challenge American sanctions and avoid any strategic dependency on Iran.⁸³

Conclusion

As the above narrative demonstrates, the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia commenced long before China's involvement. Saudi Arabia and Iran each had their own motivations to reach a détente. These motivations played a more influential role than China's eventual intervention. Therefore, it is safe to say that although China played a facilitating role, the countries involved were already negotiating and willing to reach a deal. China’s peace-making was modest and mostly involved support from the sidelines. This has been termed ‘quasi-mediation’ by Degang Sun and Yahia Zoubir. They describe this type of intervention as ‘agenda-revising’ rather than agenda-setting, encouraging conflict de-escalation rather than conflict resolution, and following instead of leading.⁸⁴

The trilateral agreements between China, Iran and Saudi Arabia can be seen as an ‘ideal’ instance of China’s engagement with the Middle East. Although China facilitated and encouraged the countries to reach a deal, it was a form of ‘quasi-mediation’. The main factor was Saudi Arabia’s need to create stability in the region to underpin its economic, military, and political rise. It was this rise and Iran’s perception of a growing threat from Saudi Arabia that pushed the Islamic Republic into joining the agreement. In recent years, Iran has taken a more realistic view of its status in the region, recognising that changes in the balance of power in the Middle East have benefited Riyadh. The recent protests in Iran amplified this view and led to increased security concerns in the minds of Iranian leaders. This pushed Iran to make it a condition of the reconciliation that Saudi Arabia would stop its interference in Iran’s domestic affairs.

It was China’s increasing ties with Saudi Arabia created serious concerns in Tehran which were intensified after the China-GCC Summit in December 2022. It was this development, above all, that led the Islamic Republic to seek cooperation with the Kingdom. This strategy has been adopted more extensively after the mass protests in Iran in which the Islamic Republic struggled with legitimacy and any other causalities to its economy. With all the rivalries and intentions to gain superiority from both sides in the region and mainly considering Saudi Arabia’s rise as an independent country in Iran’s eyes, it is still too early to foresee how long the agreement to renew diplomatic relations will last.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Niloufar Baghernia

Niloufar Baghernia is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, the Australian National University (ANU). Currently, she serves as a sessional tutor at the ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences.Email: [email protected]

Notes

1 ‘Joint Trilateral Statement by the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202303/t20230311_11039241.html (accessed 14 September 2023).

2 Mohammaed Alyahya, ‘Significance of the Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement Brokered by China’. Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, March 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/significance-iran-saudi-arabia-agreement-brokered-china (accessed 16 September 2023).

3 Grant Golub, ‘Significance of the Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement Brokered by China’. Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, March 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/significance-iran-saudi-arabia-agreement-brokered-china (accessed 16 September 2023).

4 Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr, ‘A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabi’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region’. Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-relations, March 2023 (accessed 16 September 2023).

5 Abdolrasool Divsallar, ‘The Militarization of Iran’s Perception of Saudi Arabia’. The Muslim World, Vol. 113 (Winter-Spring 2023): 179.

6 Hassan Ahmadian and Payam Mohseni, ‘From détente to Containment: The Emergence of Iran’s New Saudi Strategy’. International Affairs (2021): 879.

7 Simon Mabon, ‘Saudi Arabia and Iran, Islam and Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, in Shahram Akbarzadeh (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East. Routledge, 2019, pp. 142–143.

8 Hossein Sadeghi and Hassan Ahmadian, ‘Iran-Saudi Relations: Past Pattern, Future Outlook’. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs Vol. 1. Issue 4 (2011): 120.

9 Ibid., pp. 135–137.

10 ‘Timeline of Iran-Saudi Relations’, United States Institute of Peace, June 6, 2023. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/jan/06/timeline-iran-saudi-relations (accessed, 12 July 2023).

11 ‘Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a Security Agreement’. The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), April 18, 2001, https://irna.ir/xYxGP (accessed 16 September 2023).

12 ‘Iranian-Saudi engagement picks up steam with ‘official invitation’’. Amwaj Media, March 21, 2023, https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-iranian-saudi-engagement-picks-up-steam-with-official-invitation (accessed July 2023).

13 Hossein Sadeghi and Hassan Ahmadian, ‘Iran-Saudi Relations: Past Pattern, Future Outlook’. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs Vol. 1. Issue 4 (2011): 129–135.

14 Amir Vahdat, ‘Iran’s top leader says Saudi murdered hajj pilgrims’’. Associated Press, September 6, 2016, https://apnews.com/4150740b72f748069fa502d44e738422 (accessed 14 October 2023). ‘Hajj hijacked by oppressors, Muslims should reconsider management of Hajj: Ayatollah Khamenei’. September 5, 2016, Khamenei.ir, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/4121/Hajj-hijacked-by-oppressors-Muslims-should-reconsider-management (accessed 14 October 2023).

15 ‘Rouhani: Iran is Ready for Better Relations with Saudi Arabis’. Middle East Monitor, April 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170411-rouhani-iran-ready-for-better-relations-with-saudi-arabia/ (accessed 16 September 2023). ‘Iran is Seeking to Control Islamic World, says Saudi Arabian Prince’. The Guardian, May 2, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/02/iran-is-seeking-to-control-islamic-world-says-saudi-arabian-prince (accessed 16 September 2023).

16 Nadeem Hamid, ‘Saudi Arabia wasted no time in backing Trump’s Iran strategy’. Bloomberg, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-10-13/saudi-arabia-wastes-no-time-in-backing-trump-s-iran-strategy#xj4y7vzkg (accessed 14 October 2023).

17 ‘Iraq summit brings together rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran’. Retrieved from Al Jazeera, April 20, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/20/iraq-summit-brings-together-rivals-saudi-arabia-and-iran (accessed 11 August 2023).

18 Kelsey Davenport, ‘Iran Threatens to Breach Nuclear Deal’. Arms Control Association, June 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/news/iran-threatens-breach-nuclear-deal (accessed 14 October 2023).

19 Patrick Wintour, ‘Saudi Arabia says Iran behind Houthi missile attack on airport’. The Guardian, June 13, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/12/yemen-houthi-rebel-missile-attack-injures-26-saudi-airport (accessed 14 October 2023).

20 ‘Iran to Saudi Arabia: We are willing to talk if you are’. Middle East Eye, July 31, 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-says-it-prepared-dialogue-over-tensions-if-saudi-arabia-also-ready (accessed 11 August 2023).

21 Ben, Hubbard, Palko Karsaz and Stanley Reed, ‘Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran’. The New York Times, September 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html (accessed 13 October 2023).

22 Helene Cooper and Michael Crowley, ‘Trump Focuses on Defending Saudis, Not Striking Iran, for Now’. New York Times, September 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/world/middleeast/trump-iran-saudi-arabia.html (accessed 13 October 2023).

23 ‘Iraqi PM Abdul Mahdi says Riyadh wants to avoid war with Iran’. Al Jazeera, September 30, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/30/iraqi-pm-abdul-mahdi-says-riyadh-wants-to-avoid-war-with-iran (accessed 13 October 2023).

24 Farnaz Fassihi and Ben Hubbard, ‘Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings to Head Off War’. The New York Times, October 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-talks.html (accessed 13 October 2023).

25 ‘Saudi Arabia, Iran takes steps towards indirect talks’. Al Jazeera, October 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/5/saudi-arabia-iran-take-steps-towards-indirect-talks-report (accessed 13 October 2023).

26 Mustafa Abu Sneineh and Simon Hooper, ‘Saudi Arabia gives green light for talks with Iran’. Middle East Eye, October 1, 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-saudi-arabia-gives-green-light-for-talks-with-Iran (accessed 11 August 2023).

27 ‘Saudi Arabia Minister: Iran must change behaviour for discussions to take place’. Arab News, February 15, 2020, https://arab.news/p4fhz (accessed 11 August 2023).

28 Mansour al-Marzouki, ‘Why Saudi Arabia and Israel Oppose Iran Nuclear Deal’. Al Jazeera, April 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/4/14/why-saudi-arabia-and-israel-oppose-iran-nuclear-deal (accessed 13 October 2023).

29 ‘Saudi Arabia says backs U.S. decision to withdraw from Iran Nuclear Deal’. May 9, 2018, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-gulf-idUSKBN1I92SH (accessed 13 October 2023).

30 ‘TIV of arms imports to the top 5 largest importers, 2000–2022’. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php (accessed July 2023).

31 Ibid., 2023.

32 Abdolrasool Divsallar, ‘The Militarization of Iran’s Perception of Saudi Arabia’. The Muslim World Vol. 113 (Winter-Spring 2023): 184–185

33 Ibid., pp. 84–185.

34 ‘CNBC's full interview with Saudi Arabia’s minister of state for foreign affairs’. CNBC, January 19, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlMBlC_O-Nw (accessed 7 August 2023).

35 Ibid. Julia Masterson, ‘Saudi Arabia Said to Produce Ballistic Missiles’. Arms Control Association, 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-01/news/saudi-arabia-said-produce-ballistic-missiles (accessed April 2022).

36 Warren P. Strobel, Michael R. Gordon, and Felicia Schwartz, ‘Saudi Arabia, With China’s Help, Expands its Nuclear Program’. The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-with-chinas-help-expands-its-nuclear-program-11596575671 (accessed 7 October 2023).

37 Ibid, p. 6.

38 Sarah Muhanna Al Niami, ‘Economic Diversification Trends in the Gulf: the Case of Saudi Arabia’. Circular Economy and Sustainability Vol. 2 (2022): 221–230.

39 ‘Vision2030 Plan’. The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC, 2016, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/v2030/overview/ (accessed July 2023): 7, 82 and 47.

40 Redwanur Rahman and Ameerah Qattan, ‘Vision 2030 and Sustainable Development: State Capacity to Revitalize the Healthcare System in Saudi Arabia’. The Journal of Health Care Organisation, Provision, and Financing Vol. 58 (2021): 2.

41 Ganzheng She, ‘Changing focus while maintaining balance: Strategic adjustments behind the developing Sino-Saudi relations’. Mediterranean Politics (2023): 5.

42 ‘Saudi-China energy, trade and investment ties’. Reuters, December 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-china-energy-trade-investment-ties-2022-12-09/ (accessed 7 October 2023).

43 ‘Saudi Arabia stays top crude supplier to China in 2022, Russian barrels surge’. Reuters, January 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/saudi-arabia-stays-top-crude-supplier-china-2022-russian-barrels-surge-2023-01-20/ (accessed 7 October 2023).

44 ‘China Global Investment Tracker’. American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/, (accessed 7 October 2023).

45 ‘Iran and China Trade: A Trade Lifeline’. United States Institute of Peace, July 5, 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran-china-trade-lifeline (accessed 13 August 23).

46 Jonathan Fulton, ‘The China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: A Tale of two Regional Security Complexes’. Asian Affairs Vol. 53 (2022): 158.

47 ‘Saudi-China energy, trade and investment ties’. Reuters, December 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-china-energy-trade-investment-ties-2022-12-09/ (accessed 7 October 2023).

48 Ibrahim Atta, ‘From Confrontational to Subtle Diplomacy: the Reorientation of Saudi Foreign Policy’. Gulf International Forum, May 2023, https://gulfif.org/from-confrontational-to-subtle-diplomacy-the-reorientation-of-saudi-foreign-policy/ (accessed 17 September 2023).

49 Jonathan Fulton, ‘Situating Saudi Arabia in China’s Belt and Road Initiative’. Asian Politics and Policy Vol. 12 (November 3 2020): 363.

50 Xiaolin Duan and Shafi Aldamer, ‘The Saudi-China Relationship at a Crossroad: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis’. Asian Politics and Policy Vol. 14 (2022): 115.

51 ‘Saudi Arabia-Government reshuffle was expected as its four-year term was up’. Reuters, December 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-politics/saudi-arabia-government-reshuffle-was-expected-as-its-four-year-term-was-up-idUKKCN1OR1H7 (accessed 17 September 2023).

52 Mustafa Abu Sneineh and Simon Hooper, ‘Saudi Arabia gives green light for talks with Iran’. Middle East Eye, October 1, 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-saudi-arabia-gives-green-light-for-talks-with-Iran (accessed 11 August 2023).

53 Yasmine Farouk, ‘Riyadh’s Motivations behind the Saudi-Iran Deal’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 30, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/03/30/riyadh-s-motivations-behind-saudi-iran-deal-pub-89421 (accessed 20 July 2023).

54 Abdolrasool Divsallar and Hesham Alghannam, ‘The Strategic Calculus behind the Saudi-Iranian Agreement’. April 2023, https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-strategic-calculus-behind-the-saudi-iranian-agreement/ (accessed 27 February 2024).

55 Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Defending Iran, From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles. Cambridge University Press, 2021, p. 14.

56 Abdolrasool Divsallar, ‘The Militarization of Iran's Perception of Saudi Arabia’. The Muslim World Vol. 113. Issue1–2 (Winter-Spring 2023): 178.

57 Ibid., pp. 178–179.

58 Mahmood Sariolghalam, ‘Iran can totally shift its policy under some circumstance, such as the deal with Saudi Arabia’. Euronews, May 2023, https://parsi.euronews.com/2023/05/17/saree-qalam-to-euronews-iran-u-turne-under-pressure-like-the-agreement-with-saudi-arabia (accessed 23 July 2023).

59 John W. Garver, China and Iran, Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World. The University of Washington Press, 2006, p. 3.

60 Muhamad Olimat, China, and the Middle East, from Silk Road to Arab Spring. Routledge, 2012, p. 154.

61 John W. Garver, China and Iran, Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World. The University of Washington Press, 2006, p. 79.

62 Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ‘Saudi-Iran talks said to have stalled over protests in Iran’. Associated Press, December 19, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-tehran-976f8fe3ffd9653acd42651092dad7e8 (accessed 11 August 2023).

63 ‘Wang Yi Proposes a Five-point Initiative on Achieving Security and Stability in the Middle East’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/202103/t20210327_9168120.html (accessed 13 October 2023).

64 Ibid.

65 ‘Iran-Saudi Talks’. United States Institute of Peace, December 21, 2022, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/may/04/secret-iran-saudi-talks (accessed 11 August 2023).

66 Andrew England, ‘Saudi and Iranian officials hold talks to patch up relations’. Financial Times, April 18, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/852e94b8-ca97-4917-9cc4-e2faef4a69c8 (accessed 14 October 2023).

67 ‘Second round of Saudi -Iran talks planned this month’. Reuters, April 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-saudi-talks/second-round-of-saudi-iran-talks-planned-this-month-sources-idUSKBN2C82A8 (accessed 14 October 2023).

68 ‘Full Transcript: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman interview with Saudi journalist Abdullah Al-Mudaifer’. Arab News, April 28, 2021, https://arab.news/ywhra (accessed 14 October 2023).

69 ‘The Fifth round of Iran and Saudi Arabia Talks were progressive and positive’. Islamic Republic News Agency, April 25, 2022, https://irna.ir/xjJcVH (accessed 11 August 2023).

70 ‘Iran-Saudi Talks’, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., December 21, 2022, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/may/04/secret-iran-saudi-talks (accessed 11 August 2023).

71 ‘How Huthi-Saudi Negotiations Will Make or Break Yemen’. International Crisis Group, December 29, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b089-how-huthi-saudi-negotiations-will-make-or-break-yemen (accessed 1 March 2024)

72 ‘Riots in Iran part of Hybrid War’. Kayhan Newspaper, July 4, 2023, https://kayhan.ir/en/news/116847/official-riots-in-iran-part-of-hybrid-war (accessed 26 July 2023).

73 Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ‘Saudi-Iran talks said to have stalled over protests in Iran’. Associated Press, December 19, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-tehran-976f8fe3ffd9653acd42651092dad7e8 (accessed 11 August 2023).

74 Saeed Azimi, ‘The Story behind China’s role in the Iran-Saudi Deal’. STIMSON, March 13, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-story-behind-chinas-role-in-the-iran-saudi-deal/ (accessed 23 July 2023).

75 ‘Statement of the Riyadh Summit for Cooperation and Development between the GCC and the People's Republic of China’. Saudi Press Agency, December 9, 2022, https://sp.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2408192 (accessed 24 July 2023).

76 Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani, ‘How China’s Saudi-Iran deal can serve U.S. interests’. Foreign Policy, March 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/14/china-saudi-iran-us-middle-east-geopolitics-diplomacy/ (accessed 24 July 2023).

77 Nasser Kananni ‘The Statement of the GCC is the Repetition of Failed Policy of Iranophobia’, Islamic Republic News Agency, December 10, 2022, https://irna.ir/xjLd2j. See also the Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, on his Twitter page both in Persian and Chinese, tweeted that “The three islands are the inseparable parts of Iran, and we do not accept any countries’ comments on that.” Hossein Amir-Abdollahian (@Amirabdolahian), ‘The Three Islands are Inseparable Parts of Iran’, December 11, 2022, https://bit.ly/3tXDVd4 (accessed July 2023).

78 Saeed Azimi, ‘The Story behind China’s role in the Iran-Saudi Deal’. STIMSON, March 13, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-story-behind-chinas-role-in-the-iran-saudi-deal/ (accessed 23 July 2023).

79 ‘Joint Trilateral Statement by the People's Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202303/t20230311_11039241.html (accessed 22 July 2023).

80 ‘Full text: President Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of BFA annual conference 2022’. The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, April 21, 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202204/21/content_WS62616c3bc6d02e5335329c22.html (accessed 27 February 2024).

81 ‘The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html (accessed 27 February 2024).

82 Ahmad Aboudouh, ‘China’s Mediation between Saudi and Iran is No Cause for Panic in Washington’. Atlantic Council, March 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/chinas-mediation-between-saudi-and-iran-is-no-cause-for-panic-in-washington/ (accessed 27 February 2024).

83 ‘Abbas Akhundi’s Explanation of China’s Unfaithfulness by Citing Two Examples’. Tabnak, December 2022, https://www.tabnak.ir/004qIp (accessed 27 February 2024).

84 Degang Sun and Yahia Zoubir, ‘China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case of Quasi-mediation Diplomacy?’ Journal of Contemporary China, October (2017): 240.