A question of blame? Defending Britain's position in the South China Sea, the pacific and South‐East Asia, 1919–1941¹

I would like to thank Saki Dockrill and Andrew Lambert from the Department of War Studies, King's College London, for their help in preparing this article.

Abstract

The fall of Singapore holds a central place in the mythology of the Second World War, with Britain's defeat generally laid at the door of the principle actors, especially Churchill But taking this narrow view of the complex set of circumstances surrounding the British presence in the Far East is in the view of Christopher Baxter inadequate. Going back to the immediate aftermath of the First World War he traces Britain's foreign policy and strategic objectives and the conflicting demands of maintaining naval supremacy with economic realities. As time went on in the run up to the Second World War it became increasingly obvious that in the face of a triangular threat the defence of Britain and Europe would be a priority and the naval presence in the Far‐East would be inadequate against a growing Japanese fleet. By the outbreak of war while it was still necessary to be seen to maintain a presence and defend British interests, there was no possibility of diverting resources away from the struggle in Europe to south‐east Asia Mr Baxter concludes that, rather than blame individual figures the fall of Singapore had its roots in the difficult choices to be made between strained resources and strategic priorities.

Notes

I would like to thank Saki Dockrill and Andrew Lambert from the Department of War Studies, King's College London, for their help in preparing this article.