‘The Most Appeasing Line’: New Zealand and Nazi Germany, 1935–40

Abstract

New Zealand's first Labour government has generally been depicted as opposing compromise with aggressive states during the late 1930s, thereby demonstrating an ‘independent’ and ‘moral’ foreign policy. Yet it consistently advocated negotiations with Nazi Germany, signed a trade agreement with it, welcomed the Munich settlement, discouraged public criticism of the German government and pursued a half-hearted rearmament programme. Most strikingly, it advocated a negotiated peace following the Nazi conquest of Poland and left the decision whether to fight on after the fall of France to the British government's judgement. Labour's motives included opposition to the Versailles Treaty, anti-militarism, suspicion of the British National Government, sympathy for the Soviet Union, a focus on the possible threat from Japan and, paradoxically, a desire for greater independence.

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This research was assisted by support for travel from the New Zealand Defence Force and Massey University.

Notes

The fullest treatment of New Zealand's stand over Abyssinia is in Bennett, New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy.

‘New Zealand alone among the Dominions criticised Britain for assuaging aggressors. It opposed Britain over Ethiopia, the Spanish civil war and the Japanese invasion of China. Above all it opposed Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler.’ Mein Smith, Concise History of New Zealand, 159. ‘In September [1937] New Zealand's… stern criticism of appeasing Hitler further irritated the British’. Brooking, History of New Zealand, 123. ‘New Zealand thus acted independently of Britain for the first time in criticising and condemning Japan's aggression and the appeasement of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco.’ Bohan, New Zealand, 83.

McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, 36.

Jordan to Savage, 24 March 1939, PM 16/2, Archives New Zealand (ANZ). Strangely Jordan had failed to tell his friend and prime minister about this apparently prescient and certainly very important declaration in his report to him on that meeting of the British and dominion delegates. The report deals only with the question of China and makes no mention of discussions about the re-militarisation of the Rhineland, the major crisis of the time that many thought could plunge Europe into war. Jordan to Savage, 27 Sept. 1937, PM 16/1, ANZ.

The Standard, 14 March 1940, 7.

Templeton, ed., Mr Ambassador, 129.

Unfortunately there appears to be no account of such an exchange in the official record or in published work. Principal Delegates' 3rd Meeting, 21 May 1937, 12–18, G 40/8, ANZ; Tamchina, ‘In Search of Common Causes’, 82–87, 97–100; Carlton, Anthony Eden, 104. Berendsen's recollections, which were written after his retirement in 1952, are not wholly reliable. For example, they contain no reference to his important memorandum to Fraser of 20 Oct. 1939, referred to in note 16 below. If the statement he attributed to Savage were made, it is most likely that it was used in relation to continued sanctions against Italy over Abyssinia, which was the major focus of debate at the conference regarding aggression and responses to it. Eden had warned against the danger of a frustrated Mussolini launching a war against Britain (the so-called ‘mad-dog act’) if sanctions drove him into a corner.

A well-researched unpublished manuscript completed in 1948 (one of the New Zealand War History Branch's ‘civilian narratives’) raised serious questions about New Zealand's relations with Nazi Germany, but does not seem to have had much impact on published references to that relationship. H. Witheford, ‘The Labour Party and the War’, Part II 1936–39', WA 2, 21/44b, ANZ.

Wood, New Zealand People at War, 90. Bennett, New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy, v–vi, accepted the recollection of Carl Berendsen in 1970 that ‘the New Zealand Government was angry at the Munich settlement’, but was reticent publicly because ‘[w]e were thousands of miles from Europe and it was not our business to tell Britain what she should or should not do’. However, Bennett was understandably puzzled by the explanation offered, remarking ‘Cf NZ's willingness to tell the whole world what to do about Abyssinia’.

Ibid., 106–07.

Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’, 170. There were only five and, after the Irish Free State effectively opted out, four such representatives

Taylor, Munich, 862. A more recent study has confirmed that New Zealand's representative at the gathering of high commissioners, F. T. Sandford, had agreed that Hitler's demands must be accepted in preference to war. Fry, ‘Agents and Structures’.

Taylor, Munich, 772, 775.

Carlton, Anthony Eden, 156.

Thorpe, Eden, 241.

Templeton, ed., An Eye, an Ear and a Voice, 12–14. The original document can be found as Berendsen to Fraser, 20 Oct. 1939, ABAS, 950, W4627, [PM] 102/2/2, Box 4947, ANZ.

Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, 174–75.

McGibbon, New Zealand and the Second World War, 27.

Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 50–52.

McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War, 262–63.

Ibid., 113, Appendices 1–3, 259–6.

‘New Zealand’, Round Table 97 (1934): 213–14.

Major-General William Sinclair-Burgess, ‘Report on the Defence of New Zealand’, 28 Aug. 1933, EA1, 85/1/1, ANZ.

Hankey to Harding, 29 Nov. 1934, CAB 63/87, TNA. See also McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, 129–33.

New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), 239 (1934), 373–74.

McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, Appendix 1, 259.

Miles to Macky, 10 Sept. 1938, Macky Papers, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library, Waiouru, New Zealand.

McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, Appendix 1, 259.

Ibid., Appendix 2, 261.

John A. Lee, ‘Suggestions for Discussion’, n.d. [mid-1936] and related papers, John A. Lee Papers, NZMSS 441/25 pt.1, Auckland Public Library. See also McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale, 263–69; McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, 236.

Wood, New Zealand People at War, 50; McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, 23–27; Tamchina, ‘In Search of Common Causes’, 86.

McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, 158. The words ‘It was almost as if’ seem very charitable.

Witheford, ‘Labour Party and the War’, 2–3, (see note 8).

NZPD, 245, 15 May 1936, 158. Fred Schramm, a prominent Auckland Labour MP and later speaker of the House of Representatives, repeated Hitler's justification for the move in declaring that, ‘[a]fter all, Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland may have been a technical breach of the terms of the treaty, yet it was merely a peaceful occupation of his own country to protect it against the armed force of the Republic nearby’'

CAB 32/128, TNA. Strictly speaking, as a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles (but not of Locarno), New Zealand had also undertaken to prevent such an event.

The trade agreement ‘for and on behalf of the Government of the German Reich’ was embodied in the Trade Agreement (New Zealand and Germany) Ratification Act, New Zealand Statutes, 1937, 11–19. It granted Germany the status of ‘most favoured foreign country’ in the articles specified, not equivalence with British preferential rates.

Note dated 18 March 1937, BT 11/786, TNA.

NZPD, 248, 7 Oct. 1937, 668-69.

Ibid., 670.

NZPD, 248, 6 Oct. 1937, 628–29.

Figure calculated from ‘Trade by Countries (Excluding Specie), Eight Months Ended August’, New Zealand Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Sept. months, 1935–39, 4.

Figure calculated from ‘Destination of Main Exports’, New Zealand Official Year-Book, 1941, 212.

New Zealand Herald, 16 Sept. 1938, 12.

Note of discussion of the international situation, 23 Sept. 1938, F.82/208, Item 16, Appendix I, Dominions Office, Czechoslovakia: Memoranda, Correspondence and Records of Meetings, March–October, 1938, Dominions No. 186, 30–31, G 49/42, ANZ.

Evening Post, 1 Oct. 1938, 9. The New Zealand telegram was addressed to the secretary of state for dominion affairs rather than personally to Chamberlain. One historian has suggested that this reflected Savage's dissatisfaction with the agreement. Taylor, New Zealand People at War, 17. However, correspondence between Jordan and Savage (who were old friends) indicates that the concern was that the British Conservative Party might gain electoral advantage from a personal telegram to Chamberlain if the latter decided to take advantage of the euphoria over Munich to call a general election. Jordan to Savage, 1 Oct. 1938, PM 16/1, ANZ.

Press, 3 Oct. 1938, 12.

Evening Post, 11 Nov. 1938, 8.

Evening Post, 2 Nov. 1938, 10.

Auckland Star, 19 Jan. 1939, 5, 3 Feb. 1939, 11; New Zealand Radio Record, 3 Feb. 1939, 1–2. Savage later denied that German consular pressure had led to the ban. Labour had nationalised broadcasting in 1936.

Workers' Weekly, 10 Feb. 1939.

New Zealand Herald, 17 March 1938, 10.

Algie to Berendsen, 29 March, 19 April 1939; Berendsen to Algie, 31 March, 21 April 1939; Jeffery to Berendsen, 14 Sept. 1939, ABHS 950, W4627, 337/3, ANZ.

Beaglehole, Small Price to Pay, 8–16, 146.

Nash to Thorn, 26 April 1939, Nash Papers 1311/0616, ANZ.

Jordan to Savage, 24 March 1939, PM 16/1, ANZ.

Berendsen to Savage, 14 Oct. 1938, EA 1, 85/1/1, ANZ.

Paper read to the Council of Defence, 21 Dec. 1938, EA 1, 85/1/1, ANZ.

Chiefs of Staff, 5 April 1938, EA 1, 85/1/1, ANZ.

Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Stevens, ‘Outstanding Items of Five-Year Plan’, in Defence Council Minutes, 2 Nov. 1938; Duigan to Minister of Defence, 3 Nov. 1938, EA 1, 81/12/3, ANZ; Chiefs of Staff, ‘New Zealand Defence Preparations’, Dec. 1938, AD 11, 9/9, ANZ; McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, 187–92, 259.

NZPD, 254, 6 July 1939, 169–70.

McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, 29; McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, 235.

Minutes of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Man-Power Committee, 5 May 1939, AD 11, 9/11; McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares, 187, 235.

Duigan to Gort, Liaison Letter No. 42, 23 June 1939, AD 11, 16/7, ANZ; ‘Regular Officers Ex. Force Headquarters’, ‘Regular Officers Required for One Mixed Brigade’, ‘Territorial Officers (Seniors and Staff)’ [n.d. but lists compiled in January 1939], AD 1, 7/25, ANZ; Miles to All Districts and others, 29 Aug. 1939, AD 12, Box 6, 28/2, ANZ; John Henderson, ‘New Zealand Defence Policy, 1935–1952: Lt-Gen. Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO’ [a paper based on interviews conducted with Puttick in June 1969 and Puttick's private papers]; John Henderson, ‘The History of New Zealand's Defence Policy: RO(H) Interview with Brigadier A.E. Conway, CB, OBE’, D55/4/4, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington; Wood, New Zealand People at War, 98.

UKHC Wellington to Dominions Office, 27 April 1939, FO 372/3318, TNA.

UKHC Wellington to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 24 July 1939, FO 371/23091.

Barry Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave, 251, 339 n. 18.

Jordan to Savage, 29 Sept. 1939, PM 16/2, ANZ. Presumably Germany and the Soviet Union were the ‘Continental countries’ to which Jordan was referring. Poland is not, of course, in the Balkans.

New Zealand Governor-General to Dominions Office, 11 Oct. 1939, FO 371/23965, TNA.

Entry for 11 Oct. 1939, Diary of Anthony Eden, Avon Papers 20/1/1–32, University of Birmingham Archives.

Minutes of meeting between the British Cabinet and Dominion Representatives, 1 Nov. 1939, CAB 99/1, TNA.

Fraser to Savage, 7 Nov. 1939, EA 1, 59/2/15, ANZ.

Minutes of First Joint Meeting, 1 Nov. 1939, EA 1, 153/17/2 Part 1, 13, ANZ.

Berendsen to Fraser, 20 Oct. 1939, ABHS 950, Acc. W4627 [PM] 102/2/2, ANZ.

Wood, New Zealand People at War, 98

Gustafson, Cradle to the Grave, 244.

Dilks, ed., Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 302–03.

Sir Harold Batterbee to Sir Eric Machtig, 27 June 1940, Batterbee Papers, Part II, Box 7, File 2, Rhodes House Library, University of Oxford. See also Batterbee to Machtig,, 29 December 1940, Batterbee Papers, Part II, Box 7, File 2:The piece of work here which has given most satisfaction to myself was during the dark days of June of last year [sic]. The reply to Churchill's appeal for advice as to whether to continue the war or not, as it emerged from the Cabinet, was a very defeatist affair, but thanks to my influence with the P.M. I managed to get it turned into something which I hope proved useful at the critical moment. A copy of the letter can also be found in Sir Eric Machtig's Personal Papers, DO 121/116, TNA. Batterbee, a great admirer of Fraser, appears to have struck up an unusually close friendship with the generally rather gruff Scotsman.

CAB 32/128, TNA. Assuming that Italy and/or Japan were also included in ‘the nations which are now most threatening in their attitudes’, it is interesting to reflect on what revisions of the Paris peace settlement Savage believed should be made in their favour.

Maoriland Worker, 1 Aug. 1913, 2.

NZPD, 245, 15 May 1936, 167.

Hence Harry Holland, the leader of the New Zealand Labour Party, initially denounced the League of Nations as unlikely to prevent war because it was ‘a league of governments not a league of peoples’.

Why did electors in so many countries continue to vote for such governments? A favourite explanation was the influence of the anti-Labour press, the ‘lie factories’. Hence there was an emphasis on the public broadcasting of parliament and the proceedings of the League of Nations. The vested interests of governments in maintaining the machinery of militarism included lucrative armaments contracts and the usefulness of military forces in suppressing ‘the people’ during industrial disputes.

Questions for Consideration by Cabinet', n.d. but early 1937, EA 1, 153/18/4 pt 1, ANZ.

Savage had cancer of the colon. Gustafson, Cradle to the Grave, 217–18. Late in 1939 Lee wrote an article entitled ‘Psychopathology in Politics’ for the magazine Tomorrow. It amounted to a thinly veiled allegation that the balance of Savage's mind had been disturbed by his illness and that he was no longer capable of leading the Labour Party. The article is reprinted in Lee, Simple on a Soapbox, 165–71. The issue of the effect of the illness on Savage's thinking is also explored in L'Etang, ‘Savage Affair’. However, Savage's opposition to rearmament and confrontation with Nazi Germany was consistent in sickness and health.

Sir Harold Batterbee to Sir Eric Machtig, 13 Nov. 1939, DO 121/94, TNA.

Diary entry, 7 Nov. 1939, Series 21, Notebook F, John A. Lee Papers, Auckland Public Library.

The shared identity that Labour ministers felt with the leadership of the British Labour Party was demonstrated when Clement Attlee, the leader of the latter party, became secretary of state for dominion affairs in 1942: ‘Your appointment has given very great pleasure to Ministers, and they are glad to think that they are now as it were directly represented in the War Cabinet.’ Sir Harold Batterbee to Clement Attlee, 5 March 1942, Batterbee Papers, Part II, Box 6, File 1. In 1937 the New Statesman demonstrated how the feeling was reciprocated in British Labour circles, seeing Jordan as representing ‘another England’ from that of the British Government's representatives. Bennett, New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy, 86.

For the change in attitudes in the British Labour Party towards France and Germany, see Imlay, ‘From Villain to Partner’.

Jordan to Savage, 1 Oct. 1938, EA 1, 63/2/3 Part 1a, ANZ.

By early October some newspapers had made reference to differences between the dominions and the British government over taking the risk of war. Fry, ‘Agents and Structures’, 331.

Secretary, Hastings Branch, New Zealand Post and Telegraph Employees Association to C. R. N. Mackie, Secretary, New Zealand Peace Council, 9 Sept. 1939, MSX 785, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington (ATL).

This analysis of signatories of the petition was deposited in the Alexander Turnbull Library by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs in the 1950s along with papers relating to Prime Minister William Massey's activities at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. This suggests that the petition was sent directly to Savage. Given its personal nature, this is not surprising. MSX 785, ATL.

Diary entry, 1 March 1940, Series 21, Notebook F, John A. Lee Papers, Auckland Public Library.

Sir Harold Batterbee to Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 9 Sept. 1939, FO 371/23965, TNA.

Sinclair, Walter Nash, 94, 97.

Ministers were no doubt influenced by the outcome of the 1923 British general election, in which the Baldwin government was defeated when it campaigned for the introduction of a limited form of Imperial Preference with vocal support from visiting dominion prime ministers, particularly William Massey of New Zealand.

Note of a Meeting between United Kingdom and New Zealand Ministers, 2 July 1937, United Kingdom-New Zealand Commercial Relations: General Trade Negotiations, BT 11/797, TNA.

It was not just disapproval of Wellington's restrictive trade policies that affected this stand. Three factors connected to the developing confrontation with Nazi Germany played a role. First, Britain's rapid rearmament was eating into its financial reserves. Second, London considered that such reserves constituted a powerful ‘fourth arm’ for the war effort. Third, it was providing substantial loans to East European countries to combat increasing German economic and political influence in the area. A patently anti-Semitic cartoon in the Standard (29 June 1939, 9) demonstrated an awareness that such loans were being made while Nash was being stalled.