Negotiating with the Malayan Communist Party, 1948–89

Abstract

This article looks at one of the best documented examples of negotiations with insurgents in a British colonial territory: the Baling Talks of 28–29 December 1955. At these, the Malayan Communist Party Secretary-General, Chin Peng, attempted to negotiate an end to the Malayan Emergency. It examines how the communist leadership came to desire negotiations over the period 1954–56, how it viewed them, and on what terms they might have succeeded. It also seeks to understand the British perspective. It shows how, for the British, these one-off negotiations have to be understood in relation to a wider British ‘persuasive’ strategy. Finally, the paper shows why the attitudes and interests of the British and host nation politicians meant that the 1955 talks were doomed to fail.

Notes

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (henceforth ISEAS): H.S. Lee papers, Folio 18.2/1-4.

From Ramakrishna (ed.), Freedom News, 262–64.

Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 78. Baling transcripts in The National Archives, Kew, London (henceforth TNA): Co1030/29.

Plum, ‘The End of the Emergency’, 385–93.

TNA: Air20/10377, Director of Operations, ‘Review of Emergency in Malaya’, June 1948–Aug. 1957, Oct. 1957, pp. 3–4. Henceforth ‘DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957’. See also Straits Times, 2 Aug. 1960, 1, ‘The Big V-Parade Parade’.

TNA: Air20/10377, DOO Review of the Emergency in Malaya 1957. Min Yuen supporters lived in the jungle fringe near villages. From 1952 they were armed. A peak of ‘over one million of the Chinese population were at least potential supporters’. As of 31 Aug. 1957, of the 1,830 remaining insurgents, 200 were in the MNLA, the remaining 1,600 being Command and Min Yuen. The name and general location of almost all were known to Special Branch, 9,581 terrorists were eliminated from June 1948 to Aug. 1957, and over 11,500 men and women were at some time insurgents. The MNLA was 90–95 per cent Chinese. But a number of Malay and Indian trade unionists, radicals and workers joined the MCP after 1948. Its 10th Regiment, originally in Pahang, was mainly Malay.

TNA: Co1022/187, has more than 60 pages of the Resolutions, in an (MCP) English version.

‘DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957’, 4, 8.

Historiography is discussed in Hack, ‘The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm’, 383–414; and ‘Iron Claws on Malaya: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency’, 99–125. The conflict is related to current COIN in Hack, ‘Extracting Counterinsurgency Lessons’.

The Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman bin Hashim, was assassinated by the CPM-ML (Marxist-Leninist Faction) on 4 June 1974.

See Chin Peng, My Side of History, 479–507; and Ratanachaya, The Communist Party of Malaya, Malaysia and Thailand: Truce Talks.

The correct Malay title was Radio Suara Revolusi, and the station was re-established as a mobile unit in Thailand. Hack, ‘The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand’, 194.

For the second Malayan Emergency and CPM splits (notably of the CPM-Revolutionary and CPM-Marxist-Leninist Factions in 1970 and 1974), see Hack, ‘The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand’, 173–200; Chin and Hack (eds.), Dialogues with Chin Peng, 23–24, 368–72; and Ong and Wang (eds.), Voice of Malayan Revolution.

Rhodes House, Oxford, Granada End of Empire papers, Research Interviews with Guy Madoc.

Storrie, ‘Talking to the “Enemy”—Informal Conflict Termination in Iraq’.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.28, Leaflet No. 34444/HPWS/58, Chinese-language, 22 Feb. 1955, ‘Government Reward Policy’. See also Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 190.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee Papers, Folio 19.57/1-9, Malayan Combined Emergency Planning Staff, ‘Disposal of SEP’, 7 Sept. 1955.

For government and SEP use of the term ‘self-renewed’, see London: Imperial War Museum, Harry Miller papers, editions of the New Path News (Sin Lu Pao).

The key role of personal relationships is noted by sociologist Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya.

Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 109, 162–63.

Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 198. Thus SEP and CEP together meant the SF had about 30 per cent of insurgent ‘eliminations’ as live and so potentially as self-renewals.

SEP percentage of eliminations for 1948–60 was c. 25 per cent, and killed was 62 per cent. Statistics derived from Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 190–202. For post-1953 government surrenders see Ramakrishna, ‘Content, Credibility and Context: Propaganda, Government Surrender Policy and the Malayan Communist Terrorist Mass Surrenders of 1958’.

See Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 107. Lam Swee was the perfect SEP, having a long record as a popular MCP leader, and also being genuinely repulsed by the MCP strategies.

Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 81–83.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee Papers, Folio 19.57/1-9, Malayan Combined Emergency Planning Staff, ‘Disposal of SEP’, 7 Sept. 1955.

Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 114–15, 155.

‘DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957’, 10, notes that 1955 operations were focussed on MCP areas of weakness. The original ‘Briggs Plan’ of 1950 (for joint military-civil committees, area dominance and resettlement) had aimed to ‘roll up’ the MNLA from south to north, but dropped this (Johor in the south was one of the toughest states) in favour of targeting areas of opportunity and/or MNLA weakness. See also: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.41a, Appendix A to the Second DOO Meeting of 1955, DOO Staff, ‘Surrender Policy’, Conclusions, (c).

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.33, DOO Directive to SWECs, Feb. 1955, in which DOO Bourne reported that ranking MCP SEP Osman China had confirmed the importance of SF dominance of MCP committee areas for periods of 20 plus days. The DOO emphasised that air and artillery action should push MNLA towards ‘better kill zones’.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.18, ‘Appendix D’ to Agenda for DOO Committee meeting 6 of 1955, 17 March 1955, Review of Surrenders, 1951—Feb. 1955.

A compromise was reached in 1954, by which the elected component remained a slight minority, but the High Commissioner would select some nominated members on the recommendation of the majority party.

Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 2, citing Malay Mail of 6 Jan. 1955. The Alliance eyed Kenya, see ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.43 of July 1955.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18/28, Leaflet 3489/HPWS/63.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.38, DOO Committee Minutes, 2 meeting of 1955, 17 Jan. 1955. The Tunku read a paper on the eight conditions, including: (i) the ‘terrorists’ [since 1954 insurgents were officially termed Communist Terrorists or CTs] ‘including known criminals’ to have option of return to China; (ii) non-criminals option of remaining, but to undergo ‘rehabilitation’, (iii) time-limit, (iv) safe conduct to both sides, (v) every effort to contact CTs if necessary through intermediary such as Nehru. (vi) operations to continue except in truce area, (vii) safe conduct back after negotiations. The DOO offered a battery of objections, and the committee agreed that ‘Any form of peace negotiations would be unacceptable’, and to set up a committee to re-examine amnesty terms.

TNA: CO1022/22. Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 4.

TNA, CO1022/22, Federation of Malaya to Secretary of State for Colonies, 19 Jan. 1955.

Manchester Guardian, 9 Feb. 1955, p.6.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.41a, Appendix A to the Second DOO Meeting of 1955, ‘Surrender Policy’. The paper even suggested that accepting negotiations might open the way to an independent cease-fire commission.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.28, Leaflet No 3489/HPWS/63, Federal Amnesty. Government Surrender Terms—The Facts’, saying no SEP (as opposed to CEP or arrested supporters) had been executed since 1949. This leaflet was explicit about ‘what happened to those who have surrendered’. There were also leaflets listing ‘Self-Renewed’ and ‘Hints on How to Escape’.

TNA: Co1027/27, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Prime Minister, 23 Oct. 1955, ‘Rahman thinks that, with the end of the emergency, he will have vast sums at his disposal to promote social welfare and economic development …’, but the UK was actually providing most additional funding.

Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 192–93.

The full Sept. 1955 Amnesty terms can be found in TNA, Co1030/29.

The Chief Minister and DOO jointly announced the 1 Dec. 1955 deadline for ceasefire areas, alleging the MCP had used them to make contacts and replenish supplies. Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 24–25.

Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 193. DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957, 10.

Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 195. Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 14–15.

Chin Peng, My Side of the History, 364. The Head of Propaganda was Lee An Tung.

Stockwell, Malaya, vol. iii, Document 380, 172–74.

TNA: Co1027/27, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Prime Minister, 23 Oct. 1955.

See TNA: Cab128/CM(55)36, 20 Oct. 1955, minute 4, for Colonial Office fears this could mean the end of responsible government; and Stockwell, Malaya, vol. iii, 118ff.

Straits Times, 27 Oct. 1955.

TNA: Co1022/27, ‘Talks’, draft CO memorandum for ministerial circulation, apparently not discussed by latter. See also Stockwell, Malaya, vol. iii, 201–03.

TNA: Co1030/27, Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor of Singapore, 27 Oct. 1955. See also Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 195.

TNA: Co1022/27, Legislative Assembly address of 30 Nov. 1955.

TNA: Co1022/27, Copy of letter from Mr A.M. Macintosh, received 21 Dec. 1955, and MacGillivray to Governor of Singapore, 7 Dec. 1955; Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to PM, 23 Oct. 1955.

DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957, pp. 3–4, 8, 10–11.

TNA: Co1027/27, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Prime Minister, 23 Oct. 1955.

For 1948 see Hack and Wade, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40, 3 (Oct. 2009), and related H-Net roundtable: http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-30.pdf.

Coe, ‘Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds’, 174–75.

Extract from TNA: CO1022/187.

Coe, ‘Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds’, 175.

Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 272–3, for MCP ‘Seven Point Proposition: People's Struggle for Freedom’, report to Second Congress of Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the British Commonwealth, 21 April 1954. See also Chin Peng, My Side of History, 351–53.

Chin Peng, My Side of History, 367–69.

Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 205–07.

ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.2/1-4, ‘Translation of a Letter posted in Haadyai’, 7 June 1955, to UPAM, Kuala Lumpur.

Chin Peng, My Side of History, 359–61.

ISEAS: H.S.Lee Paers, Folio 20, 20.2/5, Summary by Principal Staff Officer, 29 Nov. 1955. See also TNA: Co1022/27, ‘Decisions taken at the Meeting of the Amnesty Working Party held in the Chief Minister's office on Sat’. 26 Nov. 1955.

TNA: CO1030/27, 10 Dec. 1955, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Secretary of State.

Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 173–74.

Chin Peng, My Side of History, 366–67.

Just before the meeting, the MCP announced that Musa bin Ahmad was made chairman of the Central Committee with an Indian and former leader of the Rubber Labourers' Union, R. G Balan, as Vice-Chairman. Coe, ‘Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds’, 275.

The following passages combine information from: TNA, Co1030/29, ‘Record of the Baling Talks’; Chin Peng, My Side of History, 367–86; and Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 171–85.

Chin Peng, My Side of History, 371.

TNA: CO1030/27.

Tan, David Marshall, 320–26. For Tan Cheng Lock's (later Sir Cheng Lock Tan) sole significant intervention see Co1030/29, ‘Verbatim Record’, Tan saying ‘Why waste money unnecessarily on the Emergency, there is no point in that’.

The Government defined loyalty as including: no communist activities, as these were ‘alien’; abandon class warfare; renounce subversion and violence; accept the Malay Rulers’ role; assume citizenship responsibilities; accept the Constitution; work for racial harmony; demonstrate loyalty to the Government; abandon loyalty to foreign forces; and support peoples’ individual rights. Coe, ‘Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds’, 264. Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 80–81, ‘Once you are free to join society, you are free and can form whatever party you like’ from the Tunku, versus Marshall's ‘there can be no question of the Communist Party forming a political party under another name’.

All quotations from the talks are taken from the record in Co1030/29, unless otherwise stated.

ISEAS, H. S. Le Papers, Folio 20/9/1-9, Appendix A to Agenda for DOO Committee meeting 17 of 1955, ‘The Future Development of the amnesty’, 25 Sept. 1955.

TNA: Co1030/29, Verbatim Record, Fourth Session.

Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 77–78. Marshall was spiky and brilliant, asking ‘if you have the welfare of Malaya at heart, what are you prepared to sacrifice for the welfare of Malaya?’ For comments on the MCP claim see also, Dialogues, 18–19.

Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 75, the Tunku suggested SEP in rehabilitation and agricultural training (Kemendore) ‘have got to give up their Communist ideologies too’.

Co1029/30, Draft transcript, and verbatim record, and Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 75–76.

Coe, ‘Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds’, 275.

TNA: Co1030/29, Verbatim Record of Baling Talks', communist request made first day at 1900 hours.

The piece of paper is shown in Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 67.

Coe, ‘Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds’, 175–76.

Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 197.

Chin Peng, My Side of History, 390–91. At a closed session at the ISEAS, Singapore, on 7 Oct. 2004, Chin Peng further described his faith in the Tunku's ‘promise’ of a further meeting as ‘naïve’ (author's notes on the meeting). Further discussed in Abraham, ‘The Finest Hour’, 170–71.

Shennan, Our Man in Malaya, 218–20, utilising Davis's scribbled notes on this last meeting.

Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, develops the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ concert. See also the article by Duyvesteyn and Schuurman in this special edition.